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A tree is beautiful, but what’s more, it has a right to life; like water, the sun and 
the stars, it is essential. Life on earth is inconceivable without trees. Forests 
create climate, climate influences peoples’ character, and so on and so forth. 
There can be neither civilization nor happiness if forests crash down under the 
axe, if the climate is harsh and severe, if people are also harsh and severe.... 
What a terrible future! Anton Chekhov. Letter to A.S. Suvorin. October 18, 1888. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Beekeepers resting in the shade of a beautiful, melliferous Schefflera abyssinica tree in Ki-
lum Ijim forest, March 2007  

 Part I: Introduction and objectives 
This section presents the topic and the study. In chapter one the research is intro-
duced with the assumption that governance arrangements in non-timber forest 
product (NTFPs) value chains originating in Cameroon influence sustainable liveli-
hoods of actors involved in these chains. The scene is set by introducing the main 
components of this postulation: the forest and its products, value chains, livelihoods 
and governance. Unpacking these further, links emerge between forests and their 
products (with a focus on non-timber products), the people involved and the places 
that these chains emerge from and travel through. A review of these major themes 
serves to introduce the research arena. The research objectives and questions are 
then presented. This paves the way for an elaboration of the conceptual orientations 
underpinning this research in Chapter two. Here the relevance of concepts on sus-
tainable livelihoods, forest product values, governance, institutions and value 
chains are explained and linked. The research design and methodology is described 
in Chapter three. The choice of subjects (chains, geographic regions and actors) and 
multiple, mixed methods (interviews, observation and participatory action research, 
literature review, market surveys and information systems, trade data analysis, ac-
tion research, botanic inventories and assessments) to answer the research questions 
are described and their limitations are discussed. 
Kerbside cola nut seller in Yaoundé, Centre region, June 2010 
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Forests, products, people, places  
and poverty – an introduction 
This thesis explores the premise that governance arrangements in non-timber forest 
product (NTFPs) value chains originating in Cameroon impact the sustainability of live-
lihoods of people and organisations (termed ‘actors’) involved in these chains. This 
chapter sets the scene by first introducing the main components of this assertion: the 
forest and its products, value chains, livelihoods and governance. Unpacking these fur-
ther, links emerge between the forests and their products (focussing on non-timber 
products), the people involved and the places that these chains emerge from and travel 
through. A review of these major themes serves to introduce the research arena. The re-
search objectives and questions are then presented. 
Let’s start by taking an imaginary hike to the study 
location: the Congo Basin, a region with more forested 
land (71%) than any other region worldwide, both cur-
rently and in the last two decades (FAO 2011). Conrad 
(2001: 107) (in)famously helps set the seemingly time-
less scene: “The reaches opened before us and closed 
behind, as if the forest had stepped leisurely across the 
water to bar the way for our return. We penetrated 
deeper and deeper into the heart of darkness”. In Came-
roon, our walk is dominated by 16,467,570 hectares of 
continuous, dense, humid forest, wrapping 35% of the 
country. We continue, passing through light-filled, dry 
and hot mosaics of savannah, dense deciduous forest 
and croplands covering 126,294,186 hectares, cover-
ing 13% of the land. Climbing we find, clinging onto 
1% of the country’s mountains, 7,285,392 hectares of 
misty, luxuriant montane forests (de Wasseige et al. 2009). Deforestation and degrada-
tion is visible, with the drivers discernible during this walk: many people, expanding 
urban areas, fresh agricultural fields and plantations increasingly encountered (DeFries 
et al. 2010; Robiglio et al. 2010). The tensions of sustaining growing numbers of peo-
Photo 1.1   A walk in the forest, 
Lobeke, May 2010 
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ple’s livelihoods whilst these forests become increasingly degraded are also evident dur-
ing the saunter: with widespread poverty obvious. Forests support livelihoods by 
providing security, basic materials for life (goods, food and shelter), contributing to 
peoples’ freedom of choice and action.  
A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets and activities required as means of liv-
ing and is termed sustainable when people can cope with and recover from stresses and 
shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, both now and in the future, 
while not undermining the natural resource base (Chambers and Conway 1991). Also 
noticeable are the many people creatively offering goods and services, and after ubiqui-
tous checkpoints, colourful markets selling a range of forest products. Table 1.1 summa-
rises what is apparent at the time of the stroll.  
 
 
Table 1.1    Poverty, forest and governance indicators for Cameroon 
Indicator                  Rating 
Po
ve
rty
 
 
Country classification D Lower middle income 
Population (millions) B, D 19.1 
Population in povertyO/living below US$2/day D 39.9%/44.1% 
Population density / km2 (2008)F(2005) B 39 
Urban population 1975A 26.9% 
Urban population 2010 D 58.4% 
Urban poverty % urban population N 20 
GDP per capita 1987/1980 (US$ 2008 PPP) D 600 
GDP per capita 2007 (US$ 2007 PPP) D 2,979 
GDP (US$ billions 2007 PPP) D 39.4 
Overall HDI rank 2009 D 95 
Fo
re
st
s  
Total forest area (ha) H 27,351,387 
Forested landscapes (all types)% H 59 
Annual national net deforestation rate% H  
Annual savannah net deforestation rate% I 
Annual montane net deforestation rate%  J  
0.03 
1.0 
0.4 
Annual national net forest degradation rate% H 0.07 
Public forest ownership C 86% 
Contribution forest exports to GDP (2008)  
Annual fiscal value timber (million $) H 
6% 
84 
Annual exports timber (m3 thousands) K 600 
Contribution forestry (timber) to GDP H 6% 
Domestic sales value timber (million $) K 58 
Annual domestic timber exploited (m3 thousands) K 900 
% fuelwood as domestic energy source M 82 
G
ov
er
na
nc
e Inequality measure (Gini index)
D 44.6 
Ease of doing business E  
Averaged rank worldwide governance indicators L 
168 
19 
Governance ranking in AfricaP 25 
Corruption ranking G 146 
Sources: A (UNDP 2007)(177 countries), B Population Census 2005(Government of Cameroon 2010), C(MINFOF et 
al. 2005), D(UNDP 2009) (182 countries) (World Bank 2009a; b), E (World Bank 2010b) (out of 183 countries), F 
(United Nations 2008), G (Transparency International 2009)(out of 180 countries), H 2000 to 2005 (de Wasseige et al. 
2009) I(UNDP/ARPEN 2006), J(Solefack 2009), K(Lescuyer et al. 2009),L(Kaufmann et al. 2010) (average 6 indica-
tors, rank for 213 countries 3 = high 1= low, 1996-2009), M(Trefon 1994; Camos Daurella et al. 2009) N (Ministry of 
Planning Programming and Regional Development 2007), O(National Institute of Statistics 2007), P (Ibrahim Foun-
dation, 2009) (out of 48 countries). Indicators cover study period. See Appendix 12 1 for exchange rates used 
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These forests have shaped the region economically, socially and politically, affecting 
social relations and development (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005), and have 
an important impact on climate change, both causal and in mitigating the impacts (FAO 
2011). The International Year of Forests in 2011 symbolised the culmination of two 
decades of increasing international recognition of the critical role of forests in providing 
a multitude of supporting, provisioning, regulating and cultural services, with a Came-
roonian from the Highlands celebrated as a ‘forest hero’1. Their importance is increas-
ingly recognised regionally, with the 2005 Central African Heads of State Summit initi-
ating a biennial State of the Forest process to observe, monitor and manage these forests 
more integrally (de Wasseige et al. 2009). Attention has increased as these forests have 
become progressively threatened and their quality degrades, measured in terms of re-
source extraction and disturbance (Topp-Jørgensen et al. 2005). Peering closer through 
the green forest light, many of the provisions from these forest ecosystems become 
more visible. Looking through the trees, resources termed non-timber forest products 
(Box 1.1), can be distinguished.  
 
 
The term NTFP has multiple meanings depending on who is asking, their motives 
and understanding. An NTFP thus needs to be put in the context of its source and use. 
The negative terms used for these products (‘non’ timber and ‘non’ wood) appear to rel-
egate them to secondary importance as the anti-thesis of timber. It also refers, for some, 
to the product’s physical characteristics (i.e. a product that is not timber). This catch-all 
term illustrates the paradox of how short-term and economic factors prevail in the lan-
                                                 
1  Paul Mzeka, Forest Hero award winner (URL: http://www.un.org/en/events/iyof2011/forests-for-
people/awards-and-contests/award-winners. retrieved 20 January 2012. 
Box 1.1     Non-timber forest products (NTFPs)  
The word product is interchangeable with a good or commodity, denoting a thing of use or 
advantage, produced by or resulting from a natural, social or historical process. In econom-
ics a product is commonly a thing of profit or commerce, an exchangeable unit of economic 
wealth, especially as a primary or raw material. NTFPs are defined here as products of bio-
logical origin (plants, fungi and animals) other than timber, derived from natural, modified or 
managed forested landscapes and other wooded land and trees outside forests. All parts 
can be used: for plants this includes fruits, nuts, seeds, leaves, stems, bark, essences, fi-
bres, resins, exudates, roots, flowers and wood. For animals flesh, hides, hair, horns, hooves 
and feathers are commonly used (Ros-Tonen et al. 2005b). Excluded are exotic species 
such as rubber (Hevea brasiliensis) and quinine (Chinconia spp.), planted and also now 
growing wild in the Congo Basin, NTFPs are often classified by their use: food, forage, fuel 
and energy, materials, utensils, construction, medicines, aromatic products, dyes and color-
ants, fuelwood and its derivatives; and objects of ornament, art and cultural value. NTFPs 
are denoted in legal frameworks in the Gabon and CAR but are not clearly defined in Came-
roon. Although the FAO (Walter 2001) prefers the term Non-Wood Forest Products 
(NWFPs), using it to exclude all woody raw materials, fuelwood and small woods used for 
domestic tools/equipment. In Cameroon species producing fuel and tools have not been 
regulated as timber products and are thus classed in this thesis as NTFPs. Timber denotes 
trees grown for their wood, and wood suitable for building, carpentry or other uses (i.e. large 
squared, dressed wood ready for use or as part of a structure). Wood refers to the hard fi-
brous substance consisting largely of xylem, which constitutes the majority of stems, 
branches and roots in trees and shrubs, and to a limited extent in herbaceous plants. A sec-
ond meaning is that it is suitable or prepared for use (i.e. burning or building).  
8 
 
guage used for products. NTFPs possess broader and longer-term social, cultural or en-
vironmental values, often not expressed in monetary units. NTFPs are however now in-
creasingly being presented more positively, using terms such as ‘gifts’ (ITTO 2009a), 
‘wealth’ (van Dorp et al. 1998) and ‘riches’ (López et al. 2004). NTFPs have progres-
sively featured higher on the agendas of academics, conservation and development prac-
titioners, following on from pioneering publications in the late 1980s (Peters et al. 
1989).  
To understand NTFPs, the term forest needs to be clear, as in Cameroon it has many 
and very different meanings (Turnbull 1961; Sharpe 1998). Bush is the Pidgin term in 
general for forest (ladde in Fulfulde, la brousse in French), which can include long fal-
lowed forested areas. The pidgin term black bush refers to spatial, biophysical and im-
plicit governance aspects, indicating dense expanses of humid lowland and highland 
forest, far from habitation, uninhabited, not owned or cultivated in recent memory. It is 
a place of potential (for hunting and gathering) and/or realm of the fantastical, mythical 
and magic (Fardon 1991). In English, the term forest is used mostly by foreigners, often 
located far from forests and with little daily experience. In French speaking areas, forêt 
can, as in the Anglophone western of Cameroon, refer to commercial forest reserves and 
plantations set up in colonial times (Hédin 1930), as well as protected areas, known as 
forest reserves. This study uses a broad definition presented in Box 1.2, which encom-
passes Cameroonian and Western understandings of a forested landscape with a contin-
uum from fields with trees, to fallow, to secondary and primary forest that is spatially 
and temporally dynamic.  
 
 
NTFPs were seen as a panacea to integrate development and conservation objectives 
– as one of the dominant dialogues concerning forests and rural poverty in the 1990s 
(Ros 1995; Wunder 2001). Practical challenges to realising both forest conservation and 
development goals have increasingly highlighted the governance and ‘good governance’ 
(Mayers et al. 2002; Brown et al. 2003) – see Box 1.3 – and sustainable management of 
forests and their products. Studies on common resources since the 1960s have led to a 
body of work on forest and product governance (Ostrom 1999b; Agrawal et al. 2008). 
Continuing our walk through the forests, a juju2 may be encountered, tied onto a partic-
                                                 
2  The supernatural or magical power ascribed to an object fetish or charm, and the use of such objects 
by Central and West African peoples (Valentin 1980). Examples include grass and leaves twisted into 
a knot, indicating a claim to a particular resource and/or warning not to enter or interfere with it.  
Box 1.2     Forests 
A forest is an ecosystem or assemblage of ecosystems dominated by trees and other woody 
vegetation. It is an area where living organisms interact among themselves, with the non-
living environment and people. FAO (2000) characterises forests as an area of at least 0.5 
hectare with a tree canopy cover of over 10% and determined both by the presence of trees 
and absence of other predominant land uses. They include natural forests and forest planta-
tions. The trees should be able to reach a minimum height of 5 m and young stands are ex-
pected to reach a crown density of 10% and tree height of 5 m, as are temporarily un-
stocked areas. The term includes forests used for production, cultural, protection, multiple-
use and/or conservation (i.e. national parks, nature reserves and other protected areas) and 
forest stands on agricultural lands. Excluded are tree stands primarily for agricultural produc-
tion and trees planted in agroforestry systems (FAO 2000).  
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ularly ripe tree full of fruits, or a battered sign seen next to a path indicating this is a 
particular community’s forest. This is a physical sign of governance, visualising the link 
between the place, its forests and products, with people and their livelihoods. If and how 
forests are governed can have far reaching resource related outcomes, particularly de-
pending on who governs, why, the rights and rules, which have implications for the sus-
tainability of livelihoods (Mayers et al. 2002; Laird et al. 2010). Rights are authorised 
demands to a resource and decision-making about that resource, a socio-technical rela-
tionship of political inclusion and exclusion that embodies, shapes, and is shaped by 
power relations (Boelens 2009).  
 
 
This tropical stroll emphasises the different links between forest, people, products, 
places and poverty. The following summaries of these linkages serve to set the broad 
scene for this research. 
Forests, products and poverty 
People, the products of forests and poverty have complex links. The many people who 
live within or adjacent to forests in the Congo Basin depend upon forest products to a 
high degree for subsistence and income (de Wasseige et al. 2009; FAO 2009d) and for-
est services, such as fertile soils (Gibbs et al. 2010), as the majority of inhabitants de-
pend on small-scale slash-and-burn shifting agriculture for subsistence, a farming prac-
tice which uses the forest as a land reserve for expansion (Sadio 2009).  
The link between forest dependence and poverty – defined in Box 1.4 – has been 
much discussed in the last decade (FAO 2008; IUCN 2008a), pushed by the Millennium 
Development Goals setting a poverty reduction agenda and the high levels of spatial 
coincidence between tropical forests and the majority of the world’s rural poor 
(Sunderlin et al. 2008b). Whilst difficult to quantify and largely ‘guesstimates’, global 
estimates of the correlation between poverty and forests abound. About 70 to 75% of 
the world’s poor live in rural areas where they depend directly on ecosystem products 
Box 1.3     Governance 
The term governance has multiple meanings. As an analytical concept it is used to refer to 
public, civil society and private interactions, initiated to solve societal problems and create 
opportunities (Kooiman and Bavinck 2005) and to make and implement decisions in econom-
ic, political and social affairs. It is the way a society organises itself to make and implement 
decisions – achieving mutual understanding, agreement and action. It comprises the mecha-
nisms and processes for citizens and groups to articulate their interests, mediate their differ-
ences and exercise their legal rights and obligations (UNDP 1997). It includes the systems, 
formulation and applications of values, principles, policies, the mechanisms and processes 
guiding those interactions and practices, and the institutions (Kooiman and Bavinck 2005). 
The latter are defined as the “rules of the game”; humanly created formal and informal mech-
anisms that enable and shape individual, group and social expectations, interactions, and 
behaviour (Ostrom 1990). It also refers to the state of being governed and the act or process 
of governing (Kooiman 2008). Governance is also used to indicate a government or admin-
istration, and the specific ways in which a system is ruled; the state of being governed and 
implies accountability for consistent, cohesive policies, processes and decision rights. Gover-
nors, also known as stewards or custodians, are thus the people and organisations (groups of 
people with a common purpose to achieve objectives, such as councils, enterprises, associa-
tions, cooperatives and unions) carrying out acts of governance. A normative use of govern-
ance is a value laden expression of ‘doing things right’.
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and services for their livelihoods, food, water, energy, shelter, medicine, income and 
clothing (FAO 2007). Not only those living near the forest, but millions of people 
worldwide from a local to global scale, also benefit, directly and indirectly, from the 
products and services provided by forests (Louman 2009). Forest resources have been 
estimated to directly contribute to the livelihoods of 1.6 billion people worldwide 
(World Bank 2001). In particular they contribute to the livelihoods of some 90% of the 
1.2 billion people living in extreme poverty, with an estimated 25% of the world’s poor 
depending fully or partly on forest products for subsistence needs, and indirectly sup-
port the natural environment that nourishes agriculture and the food supplies of nearly 
half the population of the developing world (World Bank 2004). Depending upon the 
location, community and cultural and economic practices, forests may be the major 
source of livelihood, or make an important contribution. For example, 60 million indig-
enous people are almost wholly dependent on forests and almost 70 million people – 
many of whom are also indigenous – are estimated to live in remote areas of closed 
tropical forests (World Bank 2004).  
 
 
In Africa over 66% of the population is estimated to rely directly or indirectly on for-
ests for livelihoods (Anderson et al. 2006). Whilst the major beneficiaries of forest rev-
enues, particularly timber exports, have been companies and states, for timber sold in 
domestic markets, benefits accrue mostly very locally and have only recently been 
quantified (Lescuyer et al. 2011). For NTFPs, their role in alleviating poverty is more 
pervasive than timber, given the large numbers of people using and being dependent 
upon them for subsistence (Hoare 2007). NTFPs also contribute to household energy 
and food security, providing nutrition and medicinal products (Wunder 2001), as well as 
a host of other uses. Forests and their products can act as safety nets in times of stress, 
shock and crisis (Shackleton 2005) and increase household resilience (Yemiru et al. 
2011).  
Box 1.4     Poverty  
Poverty is defined as the state of pronounced deprivation in well-being (Haughton and 
Khandker 2009) and is relative to place, time and level specific (individual, household and 
geographic). A conventional view of poverty primarily links well-being to command over 
commodities, characterising the poor as those without enough income or consumption to 
place them above an often arbitrary but easy-to-measure minimum income threshold. Rela-
tive income is thus one of the most common measures of poverty, such as the Millennium 
Development Goal’s extreme poverty threshold of US$ 1.25 a day in 1990 (in 2005 prices). 
The first Cameroon Poverty Reduction Strategy used a US$ 1.50 benchmark and defined 
poverty in terms of material deprivation, food insecurity, lack of access to social services 
(health, education and basic training), decent employment, safe drinking water, social protec-
tion, reliable information, housing, transportation, and the lack of involvement in decision-
making. (International Monetary Fund 2003), Other measures of deprivation take into ac-
count living standards, including material deprivation and social exclusion from ‘the ordinary 
patterns, customs and activities’ of society (Haughton and Khandker 2009). The broadest 
approach to poverty embraces well-being and focuses on the human capability (‘capital’) to 
function in society, and how they have access, rights and entitlements to use natural, physi-
cal, social, financial and political capital. This understanding is at the core of the Sustainable 
Livelihoods Approach (Scoones 1998, Widner et al. 1998, Bebbington 1999), and is how 
poverty is understood in this thesis. Adverse incorporation and exclusion from access and 
rights to capitals, such as natural resources and markets, underpin chronic poverty (Hickey 
et al. 2007).  
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The distinctiveness of forest-based poverty, relative to rural and urban poverty is 
highlighted by Sunderlin and partners (2008b). They contend that forests are important 
for the poor, not just because of the goods and services they provide but also because 
they tend to be located where the poor are, with a significant positive correlation be-
tween high natural forest cover and high poverty rate. They differentiate the spatial co-
incidence of poverty and forests by quantifying the patterns, distinguishing poverty by 
type (i.e. rate and density) and distance from urban areas. Measuring poverty as the pro-
portion of people who are poor in a given area and poverty density as the absolute num-
ber of poor per unit area (individuals/km²) in a given area, they make a strong case that 
remoteness and forests are positively related to poverty rate and inversely related to 
poverty density. However Chomitz et al. (2007) argue that many factors muddle this 
relationship. Whilst agreeing that remote areas tend to have high forest cover and high 
poverty rates, they also usually have low absolute numbers of poor people. These forest 
dwellers can prosper when they can profitably access forest resources – or suffer when 
those resources are meagre or controlled by others. A strong negative correlation has 
been found between forest reliance and household income (Vedeld et al., 2004). Hence 
the poorest appear to be more dependent than the non-poor in relative terms, while in 
absolute terms better-off households tend to use the forest more. Preliminary data 
(Angelsen et al. 2011b) indicate that this relationship is less pronounced with forest in-
come important not just for the poorest, but also the wealthier. 
There have also been long ranging, heated and inconclusive debates on the sustaina-
bility of people’s livelihoods based on NTFP trade. On the one hand, the contribution of 
NTFPs to and sustenance of livelihoods of people living close to forests has been pro-
moted as fulfilling dual objectives of poverty alleviation and development, and trigger-
ing forest conservation (de Beer et al. 1989). In cases from 17 countries (Vedeld et al. 
2007) forest incomes were found to contribute significantly to the production of goods 
and services and to welfare, with a relatively ‘small’ contribution being critical for sur-
vival. A positive association between forest income and total income was found, and 
only a weak trend of dependence (declining relative forest income as total income in-
creased). Wild food and fuelwood accounted for an average of 70% of a household’s 
forest products. A clear pattern in the distribution of forest income is visible with the 
poor being more dependent on forest income, and forest income having a strong equal-
izing effect on local income distribution (Wunder 2001; Sunderlin et al. 2003). Trade in 
NTFPs provides income and economic and employment generating activities, in rural 
and urban areas. For many poor people, using NTFPs is a way of life and necessity. It is 
often accessible to marginalised members of communities, with low start-up costs or 
barriers and requires little land or labour. Trade can lead to unsustainable extraction, 
reduce biodiversity and, given certain market conditions and actors, even exacerbate 
poverty (Ndoye 1994; Ambrose-Oji 2003). NTFP trade can equally act as a poverty trap 
- the difference being highly circumstantial and temporally specific (Shackleton et al. 
2004; Delacote 2009; Völker et al. 2010). Poor, marginalised and forest-based or adja-
cent people are often disadvantaged in trade. This is particularly so if they are without 
rights to access forest resources; are remote with poor access to markets, information, 
infrastructure and capital, capacity or resources; have limited opportunities for product 
transformation; are poorly educated; and have inappropriate or low levels of social or-
ganisation. They may also be further disadvantaged by being marginalised ethnic or re-
ligious groups (Oberndorf et al. 2007; van den Berg et al. 2007). Trade in many NTFPs 
has led to higher levels of exploitation than the natural carrying capacity (Kusters et al. 
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2006). This has led to concerns biodiversity loss and subsequent need for conservation 
(Cunningham 1991). In the Congo Basin fears that some NTFPs may become extinct as 
national and international trade lead to possible over-extraction of wild stocks, com-
bined with low levels of domestication and cultivation (Sunderland et al. 1998; Tchatat 
et al. 2006). These tensions lead to conflicting interests amongst individuals, private and 
public organisations and states concerning conservation versus immediate subsistence 
needs and long-term livelihood needs based on their trade. Despite the initial enthusi-
asm, it has been increasingly realised that conservation and livelihood trade-offs are in-
evitable and that win-wins are rare (Arnold et al. 2001; Kusters et al. 2006). The oppor-
tunities to create significant and sustainable livelihood benefits from commercialising 
NTFPs and break out from a vicious circle of poverty thus often remain out of reach, 
unless interventions in chains are specifically pro-poor. This thesis contributes to fill 
this knowledge gap by indicating the benefits from commercialising NTFPs and impli-
cations for household livelihoods.  
Forest products, people and places: value chains  
People and forests and their products and places are intricately linked. Value chains 
bring together products, people and places. The large numbers of forest-dependent peo-
ple include not only those living near the forest, but also those people worldwide who 
use forest products to satisfy a diversity of human subsistence, every day and luxury 
needs (see Box 1.1). Value chain analysis (VCA) is becoming increasingly popular in 
development circles and conservation rhetoric (Merlin 2005; DFID/SDC 2008; SNV 
2008). The approach has gained ground since the new century, particularly for products 
with a global trail to consumers. It has recently been applied to forest products and is 
defined in Box 1.5. An example is chains of custody, used to ensure and monitor good 
governance and law enforcement in the timber trade (Brown 2006). For NTFPs, VCA 
has been mainly used as an entry point for initiatives by development organisations to 
intervene and redress inequities and increase sustainability, with stakeholders making 
conscious choices about difficult poverty-conservation trade-offs (ILO 2006; SNV 
2009a). Value chain analysis is a conceptual framework for mapping and categorizing 
the economic, social and environmental processes in product value chains: understand-
ing how and where enterprises and organisations are positioned in chains, and identify-
ing opportunities and possible leverage points for upgrading. It encompasses the organi-
sation, coordination, equity, power relationships, linkages and governance between or-
ganisations and actors (see Chapter 2) (Helmsing et al. 2011). Emphasising the integra-
tion of economic and social development with conservation, the notion of sustainable 
forest-based enterprises emerged in the mid-1990s (Macqueen et al. 2009), focussing on 
timber and non-timber products. 
The increasing presence of NTFPs in market economies has emphasised how the 
‘livelihood value’ of a product and the forest can change dramatically. NTFPs may be 
harvested and consumed by the same person at the same location, but equally may be 
exchanged, processed, traded and consumed in another location and known as a differ-
ent product and by another name. The term now commonly used for this range of activi-
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ties – the value chain, reflecting that often (but not always), the economic and financial3 
value of a product changes and increases once it is sold. Social and cultural values may 
also change.  
 
 
Thus when NTFPs move from subsistence use to commercialisation, the economic 
and social livelihoods of actors become interlinked through demand and supply interac-
tions. Hence, there is a growing recognition that traded forest products can be seen in 
terms of chains. This has widened the view that forest livelihoods concern only rural, 
forest edge harvesters and that there are other activities and actors involved in getting a 
product to the final consumer. NTFPs often form the basis for a wide range of urban-
based activities with actors being involved in transformation, processing, transportation, 
wholesaling, export and retailing (Belcher 1998; Ribot 1998; Shively et al. 2010). Cer-
tain actors and processes in chains appear key to spreading success and offsetting poten-
tial negative consequences, such as the negative exploitation of actors upstream (e.g. 
collectors and processors) (Shackleton et al. 2004). There are often wide variations in 
income generation, profit margins and access to consumers and information between 
                                                 
3  Financial value denotes the market price of a product or service. Economic value includes non-market 
incomes (such as foraged food) and opportunity costs for which no market price mechanism may ex-
ist.  
Box 1.5     Forest product value chains 
The term value chain (also known as market, supply or commodity chain, production to con-
sumption system, and filiére) uses the interlinking connections of a chain to symbolise activi-
ties involved in bringing a product from the forest, through processing and production, to de-
livery to final consumers and ultimately disposal (Kaplinsky and Morris 2000), such as har-
vesting, cleaning, transport, design, processing, production, transformation, packaging, mar-
keting, distribution and support services. A chain can range from a local to global level. This 
range of activities may be implemented by various actors for example harvesters, proces-
sors, traders, retailers and service providers. The relations between actors and control of 
chains have been termed chain governance (Gereffi et al. 2003, Helmsing et al. 2011). 
Chains and products embody multiple relations of value – often explicitly economic but also 
social, cultural and environmental. A forest product value chain concerns tree, timber and 
non-timber forest products, and refers to the full series of value-generating activities in a val-
ue chain from the products origin as a tree or from the forest. Being based on natural re-
sources, often wild sourced, sustainability is a core aspect that differentiates forest product 
from agricultural commodity chains. The sustainability of a forest product value chain de-
pends to a large part upon how sustainable the product is, which in turn depends on factors 
such as (1) the abundance (in the wild and cultivated) of the species from which a product 
originates, (2) threats and vulnerabilities to species populations, both anthropogenic and nat-
ural, (3) inherent species vulnerability which depends on the part(s) harvested, and (4) a 
species’ tolerance to harvesting (Cunningham 2001; Ticktin 2004). The second core differen-
tiating aspect is how chains are governed, in terms of arrangements regulating access to 
species and the forest in which they originate, and regulating access to markets. In contrast 
to harvest for subsistence use, there are generally negative associations between commer-
cialisation and species sustainability and conservation (Arnold et al. 2001; Kusters et al. 
2006) unless institutions effectively avoid, control and if necessary, mitigate unsustainable 
exploitation. These two aspects of sustainability and governance have not been explicitly 
addressed in literature forest product chains to date. A third aspect is the link between forest 
product commercialisation and poverty, due to high levels of spatial coincidence between 
tropical forests and the world’s rural poor (Sunderlin et al. 2008b) and millions of poor people 
worldwide benefitting from forest products (Louman 2009).  
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rural, forest edge collectors and those operating nearer the consumer end of chains. 
Globalisation, opening up new niche markets, combined with increased access to infor-
mation and traceability of products strengthens this trend (Ros-Tonen 2004; OECD 
2007). It also presents challenges, with distance creating information gaps between ac-
tors with many not knowing how the product they harvest ends up being used, in what 
form or price, beyond the next stage in the chain (Donovan et al. 2006). As forests 
shrink, populations increase and poverty continues, understanding chain dynamics be-
comes increasingly important. Additionally, demand and supply interactions in different 
markets and along chains also have differing effects on the sustainability of extraction. 
Understanding these interrelationships and drivers of NTFPs chains with differing uses 
is important to understand their sustainability. 
The modest number of value chain analyses of forest products, and paucity of com-
parative studies of products makes it difficult to generalise the arrangements which con-
tribute to sustainable trade and livelihoods or prove that sustainable chains are possible 
in the longer term. Whilst guidelines and standards have been developed, such as the 
International Standard for Sustainable Wild Collection of Medicinal and Aromatic 
Plants (ISSC-MAP) (Medicinal Plants Specialist Group 2007) and FairWild Standard 
(FairWild Foundation 2010), and a handful of products such as Brazil nuts (Bertholletia 
excelsa) have received Fair Trade certification (Vantomme 2010), none have existed 
long enough to be proven sustainable. In examples of value chain interventions, indirect 
actors’ emphasise sustainability heavily. Perspectives on indigenous systems which cre-
ate sustainable chains are lacking. There are no such examples from Central Africa. 
This situation is far removed from the well-developed sustainability standards for tim-
ber such as Forest Stewardship Council certification. This thesis addresses this know-
ledge gap by providing comparative eight value chain analyses of forest products com-
mon in the Congo Basin. The analyses include participatory analysis with Cameroonian 
and international actors on their perceptions of sustainability and on the process of de-
veloping certified chains.   
Places, poverty and forest products 
Value chains bind places, products and people. There has been a preoccupation in eco-
nomic, development and livelihoods agendas and literature with the importance of place 
in determining wealth, or, at the opposite end of the continuum, poverty, and many links 
have been proposed (e.g. Sunderlin et al. 2005 and 2008). The multitude of measures of 
wealth and poverty reflect geographical spaces, from global to national to local. The 
classical economic labour theory of value (espoused by Ricardo, Smith and Marx in the 
late nineteenth century), postulated that the value of products is related to the labour 
needed to produce them. The price of labour differs according to time and place. For a 
long time, developing continents such as Africa have provided cheap and plentiful sup-
plies of largely unskilled labour, resulting in competitive raw and semi-processed mate-
rials, largely based on natural resources (Lewis 1954). Globalisation and the increased 
integration of macro-regional economies has resulted in changes in labour costs, the 
production, appropriation and allocation of value, and different economic organisations 
(Smith et al. 2002). Cheap labour alone has become insufficient to create competitive 
advantages in the face of economies of scale and vertical integration (Gibbon et al. 
2005), refuting Smith’s theory of labour. Labour is also often either undervalued or un-
valued in developing economies (Cavendish 2002), such as in Cameroon. It is problem-
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atic to measure labour when it is not directly paid, but nonetheless contributes to in-
crease product value, as in the process of harvesting NTFPs. From a non-capitalistic and 
traditional Equatorial African perspective, the value of labour also had a different con-
notation as ‘wealth in people’. Productivity was increased by organising and controlling 
people and accumulating human dependants, as a sign of wealth and power. The rem-
nants of this practice are still visible today in politics and culture (Geschiere 2007). 
Aside from labour, many commodities in traditionally non-capitalist economies such as 
in Cameroon, have not been valued monetarily or were used as currency. These include 
well known NTFPs such as ivory and cola nuts, which played important roles till the 
mid nineteenth century. It is notable that classical economic concepts of growth do not 
apply to such commodities, which tend to maintain continuous values over time (Guyer 
1993).  
On a commodity and consumer level, the economic value of forest products is re-
flected in measures such as retail prices and retail price indexes, which measure the cost 
in a given period of goods and services purchased by a typical household or consumer 
in a base period. On a national level, gross national product (GNP) is a comprehensive 
economic comparison measure that is applicable to monetary amounts of all types – 
commodities, services, income, property, wealth and expenditures both within the coun-
try and those held by a country’s nationals abroad. Gross domestic product (GDP), is an 
index of the economic condition: the market value of all officially recognized final 
goods and services produced within a country within its borders in a given period of 
time. Sachs and colleagues (2000), using GNP per capita as a single indicator of pros-
perity, highlight the huge geographical gap between rich and poor nations: with great 
majority of the poorest countries in the geographical tropics and majority of richest 
countries in the temperate zones. A disadvantage of these measures is that informal and 
unrecorded products and services are not included in such measures, such as NTFPs 
(Cunningham 1991; Campbell et al. 2002c; Shackleton et al. 2007; Tieguhong et al. 
2008b; Roitman 2005; RRI 2009a, WIEGO 2011).  
By defining regions by climate rather than by latitude, among the 28 high income 
countries categorised by the World Bank (with populations of at least one million), only 
2% of people in high-income regions are in the tropics. Almost all temperate-zone coun-
tries have either high-income economies or middle-income economies. There is a strong 
temperate-tropical divide within countries straddling both climates types such as Brazil 
and India. The importance of access to the sea is also evident, with landlocked regions 
considerably poorer than their coastal counterparts. In contrast, Bloom et al. (2003) re-
ject such geographic determinism in favour of a poverty trap model. Thus while geog-
raphy is highly correlated with poverty and wealth, with geographical concentrations of 
persistent poverty (Brons et al. 2007), it remains unclear when it is a cause or an effect, 
and exhibits characteristics of both.  
Geography – the how and where (Pattison 1990) – has important implications for 
forests, poverty and the product value chains. Physical-geographical variables are major 
factors determining ecoregions and forest types, and thus the species providing NTFPs 
originating from any specific place. Three broad phytogeographic regions cover the 
Congo Basin (Brenan 1978), within which 23 ecoregions: large biogeographic land are-
as containing distinct assemblages of natural communities and species, have been rec-
ognised (WWF & Saundry 2008) and seven major forest types occur (de Wasseige et al. 
2009). Those relevant to this study are the Guineo-Congolian dense, lowland humid 
forests, the Sudano-Zambezian phytogeographic region savannah forests and mosaics 
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and Afromontane forests. These determine the availability, distribution, abundance and 
density of species providing NTFPs. The implication for this study is that the forest type 
is a major determinant of species and thus of potential products.  
People also influence the places where species are found, altering natural distribution 
patterns, density and species composition, by unknowingly or consciously domesticat-
ing useful plants. Examples are Irvingia gabonensis groves found along major footpaths 
from the forest to villages around Takamanda in Cameroon (Sunderland et al. 2009) and 
the spread of Cola spp. across Central and West Africa tracing major trade routes 
(Tachie-Obeng et al. 2001). The opportunities thus presented in any particular location, 
in terms of potential products and their quantity, are thus highly people dependent, spa-
tially variable and geographically specific. Not all species are used as products in differ-
ent places, and of those used only a proportion has commercial value. This is the result 
of the interaction of physical-geographical variables with economic factors. These in-
clude access to infrastructure, information and markets (Schreckenberg et al. 2006; 
Macqueen et al. 2009), socio-cultural associations and history of forest use (Focho et al. 
2009).  
As a product moves along the chain towards consumers, a strong spatial link is creat-
ed between products, people and wealth. Whilst an NTFP has an innate value, its value 
is strongly influenced by its place of origin and location of each stage in a chain. Value 
chains (see Box 1.5 for definition) are embedded in economic, social, cultural and politi-
cal relations and operate over different geographical scales (Helmsing et al. 2011), high-
lighting the importance of the considering the spatial dimension in any assessment of 
the relations between people and forest products. The importance of geographical origin 
is also enshrined in trademarks and schemes which seek to guarantee the origin as a sign 
of quality (Vandecandelaere et al. 2009). That the physical geography of a region influ-
ences its economic performance has been known for centuries (Smith 1776), such that 
the economies of coastal regions, with easy access to sea trade, usually outperform the 
economies of inland areas. Cameroon has a 402 km Atlantic coastline on its western 
border. Hausmann (2001) reiterates that geography continues to be a pervasive influ-
ence, above market and development policies, and remains the determining factor in the 
economic development of tropical, landlocked nations. Whilst the implications of geog-
raphy for timber value chains have been touched upon (Smith 2006), the relation be-
tween geographical factors and NTFP chains has not been researched with the same 
depth as in Chapters 7 to 10.  
Poverty has been traditionally defined geographically, by classifying countries ac-
cording to aggregated average per capita income and GDP levels. In the last decade 
more holistic measures such as Human Development (HDI) and composite Human Pov-
erty Indexes (HPI) have emerged (UNDP 2009). Using these classifications for 182 
countries, 41 fall into a medium HDI category (34% of which are African, including 
Cameroon), and 13% of countries are categorised by ‘low’ HDIs. The low and medium 
categories are dominated (84%) by African states. Both non-tropical ends of Africa are 
much richer than tropical Africa (Bloom et al. 1998). The world’s poor live in four 
places: 12% in low-income fragile states, 16% in stable low-income countries, such as 
Cameroon, 61% in stable middle-income countries, and 11% in fragile middle-income 
countries (Sumner 2010). That the ‘new bottom billion’ of poor people (72% of the 
world’s poor) live in what are classified as middle-income countries, when in 1990, 
93% lived in low-income countries, raises major questions for aid and development pol-
icy (Summer 2010). Two lines of thought about poverty have thus arisen: one focusing 
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on income-related categories such as poor and middle-income countries. The other fo-
cuses more on politics (Kharas et al. 2012), distinguishing between poverty in fragile 
and stable economies, seeing governance as the main pathway out of poverty by ensur-
ing that public spending is equitably distributed to the poorest, wherever they live. Col-
lier (2007) argues that a new development narrative is needed, focussing on poor peo-
ple, rather than poor places and going beyond the Millennium Development Goals to 
address inequality as much as the lack of resources. Widening these measures and creat-
ing new metrics of wealth and economic performance that include social progress and 
environmental aspects (Stiglitz et al. 2009), has become the recent mantra guiding poli-
cymakers. Major overhauls of national environmental and forestry frameworks and pol-
icy in Central Africa were implemented in the 1990s, increasing recognition of the 
many values of NTFPs, including livelihoods. This has recently led to revised national 
and regional policies (FAO 2009a). Other livelihood measures seek to capture wellbe-
ing, happiness and sustainability (Zidansek 2007; Frey 2011). However overcoming 
cultural interpretations of these measures to allow comparisons geographically, across 
ethnic groups and between rural and urban lifestyles is difficult (Reyes-García et al. 
2011). 
Factors influencing Africa’s poverty are many. They include colonial legacies and 
manipulations, the dependency upon a small number of primary exports with volatile 
trade markets, internal politics characterised by authoritarianism, corruption4, instabil-
ity, economic policies characterised by protectionism, statism and fiscal profligacy, rap-
id demographic change and social conditions characterised by ethnic divisions, ethno-
linguistic and religious diversity and conflict, and low levels of social capital (Meredith 
2006; Konings 2009; Dietz 2011). Bloom and colleagues (1998) put the prime cause for 
poverty in Africa on the ‘extraordinary disadvantageous geography’ which shapes so-
cieties and their interactions with the world. Sachs et al. (2004) agree, adding that gov-
ernance is a problem, but that the challenges run much deeper, proved by countries that 
are well governed but remain stuck in poverty. Their explanation is that tropical Afri-
ca’s poverty trap means it is too poor to achieve robust, high levels of economic growth 
and, in many places, simply too poor to grow at all. Policy and governance reform alone 
are deemed insufficient to overcome this trap. Bloom (1998) proposes that a ‘big push’ 
in public investments is needed to produce an increase in Africa’s productivity, both 
rural and urban. Dietz (2011) provides a more optimistic view of ‘the Dark Continent’ 
moving forward and surrounded by a silver lining, drawn from African perceptions and 
statistical data. Thus commentators have found diverse causations of poverty and 
wealth, making it difficult to untie cause and effect but highlighting that geography has 
a strong influence. Focussing further on people and places, the geography of where an 
actor in a value chain is located in an urban, rural or forested area also has been shown 
to impact livelihoods and prosperity. The population of the developing world is still 
more rural than urban: around 55% of the total population lives in rural areas. Although 
poverty in urban areas is substantial and increasing, global poverty remains predomi-
nantly a rural phenomenon. Forecasts estimate a 50% population increase by 2050, with 
most growth expected in developing countries. Between 2020 and 2025, the total global 
rural population is expected to peak and then start to decline, when the developing 
world’s urban population will overtake its rural population (International Fund for 
                                                 
4  Defined as the misuse or abuse of entrusted power for private gain (Transparency International, 2011). 
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Agricultural Development (IFAD) 2010). Rural ecosystems include forests (see Table 
1.1), many of them public commons (see Box 1.6), provide the majority of goods need-
ed for survival, provisioning both urban and rural residents, rich and poor. It is also in 
these areas where forest governance happens in practice.  
 
 
The intimate connections between urban and rural spheres continue, with much ur-
ban poverty beginning as rural poverty, exported from the countryside through rural-to-
urban migration. Equally, rural and urban economies are intertwined through flows of 
remittances from diaspora in cities both in the same country and internationally, back to 
family members in the country, up to an approximately 5% share of GDP in 2007 in 
Cameroon (UNDP 2009). The massive scale of such remittances has been recognised in 
the last decade, and thus the influence of diaspora on foreign direct investment, markets, 
technology transfer, philanthropy, tourism, political contributions, knowledge flows, 
new attitudes and cultural influence. The ability to tap into such remittances has been 
seen to create a dividing line between poverty and sufficiency (Campbell et al. 2002b). 
Tabuna (2000) highlights how diasporas create new value chains for NTFPs in urban 
Europe. There is however little data of their precise impacts upon national, urban and 
rural economies (Sander 2003). This thesis contributes to this gap by quantifying and 
characterising the urban and rural locations of actors involved in the chain and quantify-
ing their incomes and product turnover.  
Mobility between rural and urban areas can help mitigate the worst effects of increas-
ing poverty. In Cameroon, poverty alleviation programmes disproportionately favour 
rural and semi-urban areas, ignoring rural-urban interplays (Baye 2006). Forest-rural-
urban links mean that a neat geographical distinction between forest, rural and urban 
Box 1.6     Common goods 
A public good – also referred to as commons, common goods, common property, common 
pool resources, public goods and open-access regimes – is an economic and social concept. 
It indicates goods which are non-rivalrous and non-excludable, according to criteria of wheth-
er their consumption by one person precludes consumption by another (rivalrousness) and 
whether it is possible to exclude others from consumption of the good i.e. it is available for 
everyone to use (excludability), exemplified by forests (Hardin 1968). The following defini-
tions are used to distinguish between the terms: a property right is an enforceable quality 
recognised by an authority to undertake particular actions in specific domains. Rights of ac-
cess, withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation can be separately assigned to dif-
ferent individuals and viewed as a cumulative scale from the minimal right of access to pos-
sessing full ownership rights. All of these rights may be held by single individuals or collec-
tively. Some attributes of common pool resources are conducive to communal proprietorship 
or ownership and others are conducive to individual rights to withdrawal, management, ex-
clusion and alienation. Open access property regimes (where no one has the legal right to 
exclude anyone from using a resource) can be distinguished from common property regimes 
(better termed common pool) (where the members of a clearly demarked group agree to a 
right to exclude non-members of that group from using a resource and to limit their individual 
claims to a resource). These regimes share two economic attributes: (1) it is costly to exclude 
individuals from using the good either through physical barriers or legal instruments and (2) 
the benefits consumed by one individual subtract from the benefits available to others. These 
enable the identification of problems facing individuals when more than one person uses 
such resources for an extended period of time. Using ‘property’ to refer to goods reinforces 
the impression that goods sharing these attributes share the same property regime. For 
common pool resources and public goods, it is difficult to develop physical or institutional 
means of excluding beneficiaries (Ostrom 1999a).  
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poverty can never be completely disentwined. Even when significant proportions of a 
population move to and live in urban areas and urban-ward migration continues, alt-
hough these people may be counted as urban residents, they are often still ‘present’ in 
rural areas. They remain members of multi-sited households, continuing to participate in 
rural-urban networks and in rural land-use decisions, and in harvesting NTFPs. Despite 
their general poverty, such migrants also affect urban markets for forest products for 
energy, food and construction materials, maintaining rural patterns of consumption and 
knowledge and affecting the areal extent of forests and forest composition (Padoch 
2008). The persistence of such consumption patterns in cities results in increased de-
mand for forest products, creating and maintaining value chains for these products.  
High levels of urban migration have, counter-intuitively, been associated with lower 
pressure on tropical forests. However forest loss has been positively correlated with ur-
ban population growth (Robiglio et al. 2010), international demand for agricultural 
products (Ndoye et al. 2000; DeFries et al. 2010), such as palm oil and cocoa (German 
et al. 2010). These may negatively influence supply but also rural and urban demand for 
forest products. This suggests that policies to reduce deforestation concentrating on ru-
ral populations will not address the main cause. A focus on industrial-scale, export-
oriented agricultural and agroforestry production is needed, concomitant with efforts to 
increase yields in non-forested lands to satisfy demand for agricultural and forest prod-
ucts. These tensions highlight the ‘loggerheads’ between forest, urban and rural inter-
faces (Chomitz et al. 2007, Ingram 2012a). Chomitz et al. distinguish three interfaces (i) 
forest-agriculture mosaics with forest dwellers, with high production and ecosystem 
services values, (ii) frontier and disputed areas characterised by agricultural expansion, 
increasing land values, conflicts over forest use, intensive rural development and access 
to off-farm employment, and (iii) forests beyond agricultural frontiers, containing, with 
a low number of forest dwellers and many indigenous people, providing essential ser-
vices and products for forest, rural and urban populations. 
Justification, research objectives and questions 
The foregoing section illustrates how the interactions between forests and poverty lead 
to people taking products from Cameroonian forests – forming a value chain, and that 
the places where activities in the chain occur are intricately linked, also with the forms 
of governance arrangements controlling forests, products and people.  
 
Relevance 
The persistent and grave issues outlined in this introductory chapter and the numerous 
proposals in practice and in the literature to address these “wicked problems” by poli-
cymakers, development organisations, politicians, business and academics, justify the 
need for the study of how governance arrangements influence the sustainability of live-
lihoods based on forest products from Cameroon. This study seeks to be relevant to the 
theoretical, societal and policy arenas outlined in this chapter. These arenas have driven 
the objectives of this study and how the research questions have been formulated. 
From a theoretical perspective, this study seeks to advance knowledge on forest 
product value chains, their governance and their values. Whilst theoretical frameworks 
are well developed for value chains, governance and forest-based livelihoods, the liveli-
hood impacts of non-timber forest product value chains and their governance have not 
been specifically addressed. The impacts of governance arrangements have not been 
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explicit in the conservation-livelihoods-development debates concerning NTFPs, except 
for Ros-Tonen and Kusters (2011). There is no tried and tested holistic valuation meth-
odology for forest product value chains.5 This research seeks to fill these gaps. Its inno-
vativeness is in taking an interdisciplinary, historical and contemporary approach to for-
est product values and addressing governance arrangements along the chains. It is the 
first study to describe and compare governance and market arrangements in NTFP value 
chains from a major forest region. This study thus attempts to contribute to social sci-
ence theory by:  
 Presenting empirical data on NTFP value chains and their values from economic, en-
vironmental and social perspectives. 
 Providing a tested methodology for the holistic valuation of NTFP chains.  
 Assessing how governance arrangements influence NTFP chains.  
 Incorporating development and sustainability further into the value chain concept.  
 
From a societal perspective, concerns have been raised about the over-extraction of 
some NTFPs, negative impacts on forest ecosystems and sustainability of NTFP trade 
and livelihoods. As noted earlier in this chapter, there are currently only a few practical, 
scientifically-credible guidelines for sustainable NTFP harvesting worldwide and none 
for the Congo Basin. Information enabling chain actors, policymakers, enforcement 
agencies, development and conservation organisations to improve livelihoods and re-
duce the environmental impacts of NTFP trade is lacking for Cameroon. This study 
helps to fill this void, specifically by providing information on: 
 Who, how many, and where actors are involved, how they benefit and the values of 
NTFPs and how these differ for actors and chains – enabling a policy focus; 
 If NTFPs provide sustainable livelihoods;  
 How governance arrangements affect livelihoods of actors in NTFP chains. 
 
From a policy perspective, the research topic is topical and highly relevant to forestry 
and development policies in Central Africa and Cameroon. This is demonstrated by the 
Resolution on Forests for People, Livelihoods and Poverty Eradication adopted at the 
United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF9) in February 2011. This resolution called for 
action to foster the role of forests in contributing to poverty eradication based on sus-
tainable forest management. The 2011 International Year of Forests was used to raise 
awareness, promote additional government commitments to sustainable forest manage-
ment and implement a non-legally binding ‘Forest Instrument’. Governance is a major 
concern of governments and NGOs in the region, particularly regarding the transparen-
cy, equity and fairness of trade based on indigenous knowledge and biological re-
sources, and their fair compensation. These concerns are exemplified in multi-stake-
holder initiatives such as the Forest Governance Facility in Cameroon, the EU Forest 
Law Enforcement and Governance ministerial processes and Trade Action Plan, and the 
Convention of Biological Diversity. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organi-
sation (FAO) and the Central African Commission on Forests (COMIFAC) have lob-
bied for more coherent links between enforcement regimes for NTFPs. NTFP govern-
ance is the subject of policy-focussed work by the Centre for International Forestry  
Research (CIFOR), World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF), International Institute for  
                                                 
5  CERUT-AIDEnvironment (1999) developed a simple methodology but did not test it.  
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Environment and Development (IIED) and the Netherlands Development Organisation 
(SNV). This study seeks to inform such decision- and policy-makers, by providing  
information on: 
 The importance of (sustainable) forest products to livelihoods; 
 The challenges and opportunities for creating conservation and livelihoods win-wins;  
 Governance and policies resulting in sustainable livelihoods and chains. 
 
Objectives  
Considering increasing concerns about the sustainability of NTFP trade and livelihoods 
and its contribution to poverty alleviation, the objectives of this thesis are to enable in-
sights into how governance arrangements and geographical dimensions affect sustaina-
ble livelihoods; to contribute to global and national knowledge on forest governance; 
and to inform stakeholders about constraints and opportunities to improve sustainable 
livelihoods based on forest product chains.  
 
Research questions 
The primary question this research seeks to answer is how governance arrangements in 
non-timber forest product value chains originating in Cameroon influence sustainable 
livelihoods. This question is divided in the following sub-questions:  
1. In which environmental, livelihood and governance contexts are the NTFP value 
chains embedded and what trends can be observed? 
2. How are NTFP value chains originating in Cameroon configured in terms of prod-
ucts (uses and sources), actors, activities and values? 
3. What arrangements are used to govern NTFP chains? 
4. How do these governance arrangements impact the livelihoods of actors along the 
chain and their sustainability? 
5. How do these governance arrangements impact chain and product sustainability? 
 
To answer these questions, the value chains of three products originating in Cameroon 
were selected as cases for in-depth study: eru (Gnetum spp.), apiculture products (from 
Apis mellifera adansonii and pygeum (Prunus africana). A further five NTFP chains 
were also analysed: cola (Cola spp.), raffia (Raphia spp.), bush mango (Irvingia spp.), 
bamboo (Yushania alpina and Oxytenanthera abyssinica) and gum arabic (Acacia spp.). 
These five allow triangulation of the three cases, add breadth and understanding of the 
chains and products and allow the influence of contextual factors to be contrasted and 
compared.  
Thesis structure 
Part I of this thesis provides an introduction: Chapter 1 has set the scene and objectives, 
paving the way for the conceptual orientation underpinning the study in Chapter two 
and research design and methodology in Chapter three. Part II presents the contextual 
analysis: the results on the context of the study area in which the value chains are set 
and which shapes governance arrangements and their outcomes. Chapter 4 analyses the 
forest capital base and Chapter 5 livelihood aspects in terms of socioeconomic and en-
trepreneurial context. In Part III, the results of the empirical research are presented. 
Chapter 6 analyses the governance contexts, currently and from a historical perspective. 
The three in-depth value chain analyses are presented in Chapter’s 7 to 9, covering the 
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Gnetum spp., apiculture and Prunus africana value chains respectively. Chapter 10 pro-
vides summaries of the analysis of the five additional value chains. Part IV presents the 
conclusions, comparison and synthesis. The final chapter analyses and summarises how 
governance arrangements have shaped these chains, answering each research question 
in turn, presenting the key findings and reflections. 
 
 
 
2  
 
Conceptual framework 
This section presents the multi- and interdisciplinary embedding and conceptual frame-
work. The concepts used to examine the research themes and subjects (Table 2.1) are 
introduced and discussed. The main concepts are the sustainable livelihood framework, 
forest product valuation, governance and institutions and value chains. The connections 
between these concepts concerning forests, goods, people and places over time and 
space are explored. A bricolage1 of multiple methods of inquiry and diverse theoretical 
and philosophical social sciences concepts (Kincheloe 2001) allows an exploration 
through different lenses, reflecting the reality of the research subject, with different con-
cepts guiding the methods used as well as quantitative and quantitative analysis. Brico-
lage is also a line of thought on institutional governance (Cleaver 2002), in philosophy 
and anthropology (Lévi-Strauss 1966), referring to spontaneous action or borrowing of 
concepts from a heritage: all relevant for this study.  
Table 2.1 Disciplinary embedding 
Discipline Themes Subjects   Research concepts                           Research question 
Human geog-
raphy 
Poverty alleviation Sustainable 
livelihoods 
Sustainable livelihoods, pro-poor markets, 
value chains, place-space, social context  
1, 4, 5 
Development  
Economics Institutional eco-
nomics 
Development, 
globalisation 
Trade-offs, institutions, markets,  
value chains, capital valuation 
1, 2, 3 
Environmental 
economics 
Ecosystem ser-
vices 
Natural & social capital valuation 1, 4 
Political 
science 
Governance 
Political ecology 
Governance Governance, power relations, tenure, 
commons theories, institutions 
3, 4, 5 
Law Pluralism Law, governance Legal pluralism, governance 2, 3 
Anthropology History, cultural 
anthropology 
NTFP use, trade Cultural values, commodification  1, 3 
Ecology Conservation 
biology 
Ecosystem 
goods, Inventory
Valuation trade-offs conservation &   de-
velopment, forest inventory 
1, 4, 5 
Botany Economic botany, 
Ethnobotany 
NTFP use and 
trade 
Product use, socio- cultural values, botan-
ic  assessment 
1, 4 
                                                 
1  French for ‘fiddle tinker’ or do-it-your-selfer making creative use of whatever materials are available 
to complete a task, regardless of their original purpose. 
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These foreign expressions and the diverse understandings of concepts depending on the 
disciplinary background justifies why definitions of the key terms used in this study are 
provided. Whilst a bricolage approach does not do justice to the disciplines it is neces-
sary, as no one concept or discipline sufficiently embraces all the research questions.  
Understanding sustainable livelihoods 
To answer the second research question concerning the values of forest products and the 
fourth and fifth question on livelihoods and sustainability, the sustainable livelihoods 
approach (SLA) (Scoones 1998) is used. This integrates assets, vulnerability contexts, 
structures and processes to allow poverty at a household2 level to be understood holisti-
cally (Figure 2.1). A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets, entitlements and ac-
tivities required for an acceptable means of living (Ibid.). The SLA originated in the 
concept of sustainable development, and sees a livelihood as sustainable when it can 
cope with risks and recover from stresses, shocks and maintain or enhance its capabili-
ties and assets, both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource 
base (Chambers and Conway 1991), building on Brundtland (1987). The SLA is a con-
ceptual analytical framework, a goal and a set of principles guiding interventions of de-
velopment and conservation actors which makes understanding the philosophy of their 
approach important. This dual role makes the approach attractive for participatory ac-
tion research. At the core of the SLA six material and intangible ‘capitals’ or ‘assets’ 
can be distinguished (Scoones 1998; Widner et al. 1998; Bebbington 1999):  
 Human (education, knowledge, skills, labour opportunities, nutrition, health abilities, 
knowledge, skills, and employment opportunities); 
 Natural (forests, water, soil); 
 Economic/financial (earnings, money, credit, and financial security (including access 
to financial provisions from governments such as pensions); 
 Social-cultural (community sense, family and social networks, trust, cultural norms); 
 Physical (human-made assets such as roads, markets, transportation, schools etc.); 
 Political (rights of participation and political empowerment).  
These capitals represent building blocks and are to an extent, substitutable. However, 
this implies an element of choice often not possible in practice. Capital use is a dynamic 
process, with often unpredictable changes in context, constraints and opportunities, var-
ying across time and space (Farrington et al. 1999). The choice of activities and capital 
building are driven by multiple factors, preferences and priorities, vulnerabilities, 
shocks, price and resource trends, seasonal variations and access to capital types. 
NTFPs are forms of natural capital. Many NTFPs are common pool resources (CPRs) 
(Box 1.6), which are often used as capital by the poor (Ambrose-Oji 2003; Ros-Tonen 
et al. 2005b; Timko et al. 2010). This implies that knowledge of the capitals, their 
abundance or scarcity, and use, is essential to understand the links between poverty and 
wellbeing. A commodification process (defined as the ways in which ‘things’ (sic) and 
social relations are affected by the market) affects values (van Binsbergen 2005) occurs 
when NTFPs move from subsistence use to commercialisation. The livelihoods of chain 
actors thus become interlinked through demand and supply interactions. The SLA con-
                                                 
2  A household is defined as a group of people (normally family members) living under the same roof 
and pooling resources (labour and income) (adapted from (CIFOR 2007: 21).  
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cept provides an alternative view of ‘adding value’ from the traditional economic per-
spective, corresponding with a holistic view of ‘value’ in the concept of value chains. 
Value is not only economically increased by harvesting, but may change: a product (and 
the ecosystem it originates from) acquires new and multiple types of capital values de-
rived from the processing, trade and use of the product, for direct and indirect actors. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Sustainable livelihoods approach  
Source: Adapted from de Haan et al. 2005; Townsley 2007. 
 
 
Policy and institutional arrangements (the central diamond in Figure 2.1 play a trans-
forming role in relationships, determining strategies used, access to capitals, decision-
making bodies and power. They affect the terms of exchange between capital types and 
outcomes of livelihood strategies. They operate at all levels and in all spheres, public 
and private, and influence how livelihood strategies are achieved. Despite the critical 
role of these arrangements, the “methods for conducting cost effective, linked policy 
and institutional analysis at multiple levels are not well developed in the SLA” (DFID 
1999). Access to opportunities is governed by socio-cultural relations, institutions and 
organisations and so rights and entitlements to power are important but often over-
looked explanatory variables in the strategic or unintentional exclusion from capitals or 
inability to optimise them (Dietz 1996; de Haan et al. 2005). Analysis of the macro-
micro links, formality and institutional factors influencing livelihood outcomes is im-
portant (Scoones 1998). An explicit focus on institutions is thus needed to overcome 
this weakness, which is addressed in the section on Examining institutions. 
Understanding and tackling poverty is at the core of the SLA. The many dimensions 
of poverty highlighted in Chapter 1 indicate the need for a multi-dimensional approach. 
Focussing on the forest-dependent poor3 provides insights into how forest products re-
late to multiple dimensions of poverty (health, education. income, physical safety, em-
                                                 
3  Dependence meaning reliance on forests and their products that is difficult or impossible to replace, 
for a portion of environmental services, subsistence needs, safety net, gap-filler functions and poverty 
elimination (Sunderlin et al. 2005).  
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ployment and empowerment). For example, material deprivation can be addressed di-
rectly by increasing income through access to harvesting, processing and markets. In-
creased income at the household or community level can in turn improve access to edu-
cation and health services, enhancing economic opportunities and well-being and reduc-
ing vulnerability to social change and environmental stresses. Participatory processes 
supporting poor people’s involvement in decision-making on managing and using for-
ests and NTFPs can foster political empowerment and opportunities for marginalised 
voices to be heard more broadly (Oberndorf et al. 2007). Health is also impacted as for-
est products are used to meet nutritional and healthcare needs (Colfer 2008; Arnold et 
al. 2011). 
Measures of poverty over time in absolute or relative terms commonly use pre-
defined poverty lines to measure and compare composite aspects of poverty such as the 
human development index (HDI), gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in purchas-
ing power parity US dollars (PPP US$), and the Human Poverty Index (HPI). Human 
development is broader than any single composite index can measure, making measur-
ing and comparing poverty across geographical populations difficult (Sumner 2010). 
Nonetheless such measures have been the driving force for assessing the outcomes of 
SLA interventions. In 2010, the World Bank called for a profound “change [in] how we 
conduct development research”.4 This reflects a turnaround from assessing develop-
ment-oriented aid and its effectiveness in addressing persistent poverty. New indicators 
to meet this challenge have emerged that go beyond classical economic and social 
measures to embrace wellbeing and livelihoods (Zidansek 2007; Stiglitz et al. 2009; van 
den Bergh 2010; Reyes-García et al. 2011), and are relevant to this study. 
Assessing the sustainability side of the sustainable livelihoods equation requires an 
evaluation of the effect of using the natural capital, and if and how the resource is un-
dermined by this use. Such frameworks have developed from the disciplines of econom-
ic botany, ethnobotany and forestry in the form of guidelines for the sustainable harvest 
of wild species (CITES Scientific Authorities 2000; Medicinal Plants Specialist Group 
2007). These highlight that the first step is to understand the resource, its population 
biology and availability (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity 2001; 
Newton 2008). A standardised inventory or survey provides a baseline benchmark of 
the status of the resource at a particular point in time. There is no one universally ac-
cepted or used inventory methodology for NTFPs, unlike timber (Baker 2000; Wong 
2003b). This is due to the particular characteristics and global diversity of NTFPs and 
their uses. Such an absence makes it difficult to provide comparable data across ecosys-
tems, cultures, regions and countries and leaves any NTFP inventory open to critiques 
about its appropriateness and rigour (Ruíz Pérez et al. 1999; Tewari 2000; Marshall et 
al. 2003). The participation of local forest-based communities and users in inventories 
has been advocated (Baker 2000; ETFRN 2000; Lynch 2004; Lawrence et al. 2008). 
This can increase knowledge and ownership of the resulting course of action (Lawrence 
et al. 2001; Lynch 2004; Mbile et al. 2005). The second step is to understand how an 
NTFP is harvested, using observation, mapping, surveys and focus groups (Lawrence et 
al. 2008). The effects of harvesting on a species population depend indirectly on social, 
economic, ecological and institutional factors and directly on the part(s) harvested, 
                                                 
4  URL 
http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=17155748&CFID=154527
261&CFTOKEN=51027732. Retrieved 31 September 2010. 
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method, quantity, intensity, frequency and timing of harvesting (Medicinal Plants 
Specialist Group 2007; Lawrence et al. 2008). Ethno-botanical research provides further 
data on use and the effect of harvesting in a given geographical and cultural context, 
such as for Prunus africana (Stewart 2003; Cunningham 2006a; Stewart 2007a) and 
Irvingia spp. (Ayuk et al. 1999; Ainge et al. 2001). The third step is to interpret and an-
alyse this data to assess the impact upon the species and possibilities for sustainable 
harvest and production. The definitions of sustainable forests, products and chains used 
in this study are provided Box 2.1. 
 
Box 2.1     Sustainable forests, products and chains  
Sustainable forest management is the stewardship and use of forests for economic, ecologi-
cal and social ends, at local, national, and global levels (SMCPF 1993) and refers to “the 
process of managing forest to achieve clearly specified objectives of management, with re-
gard to the production of a continuous flow of desired forest products and services, without 
undue reduction in the forest’s inherent values and future productivity, and without undue 
undesirable effects on the physical and social environment”, implying continuously satisfying 
the needs for goods and services provided by forests, supporting the food security and liveli-
hood needs of forest‐dependent communities and assuring an equitable sharing of the bene-
fits from forest uses (Blaser et al. 2011).  
Products are economically sustainable if the value, adjusted for inflation, increases or re-
mains constant. Economic sustainability may not be consistent with ecological sustainability. 
Over-harvesting may lead to continuing population decline while persistent demand keeps 
market value constant. As NTFP species populations become depleted and products scarc-
er, economic returns can increase even when demand remains constant. Scarcity may in-
crease extraction costs, further driving prices upward and reducing demand (Homma et al. 
1992). With complete resource depletion, there is no sustainability, only local population ex-
tinction and eventually species extinction. Economically, the effects of unsustainable extrac-
tion take a long time to be detected, especially for long-lived species. Ecologically, extraction 
is sustainable if the harvest has no long-term deleterious effect on the reproduction and re-
generation of populations being harvested in comparison to equivalent non-harvested natural 
populations and if there is no discernible adverse effect on other species in the community, 
or on ecosystem structure and function. These effects can be determined by comparing har-
vested to un-harvested systems ((Hall et al. 1993). Going further than extraction, a product 
can be deemed sustainable when the species from which it is derived can be extracted with-
out undermining the natural resource base (ecosystem) and the resulting products have ei-
ther neutral or positive environmental, social and economic benefits through its life cycle or 
value chain. 
For sustainable chains, the focus is on sustainability throughout a product’s life cycle. Dif-
ferent interpretations of sustainability are apparent. From an enterprise’s perspective, a sus-
tainable chain is the strategic, transparent, integrated, systemic coordination of key inter-
organisational business processes to improve the long-term economic, social and environ-
mental performance of a company and its chain (Carter et al. 2008). In contrast, Kaplinsky 
(2000) suggests that chains, particularly global ones, are sustainable when they provide for 
sustainable and equitable income growth – referring to financial capital. Ponte (2004) and 
Vurro et al. (2009), although not explicitly defining the term, indicate that sustainable chains 
are those where sustainable practices taking account of ethical, economic, social (labour, 
contractor, and community) and environmental impacts are integrated into the management 
and governance of a chain by enterprises and/or on a sectoral or industry level. These may 
be demonstrated by standards and codes.  
These definitions highlight two main disciplinary perspectives: sustainability of natural, 
social and financial capital, and that sustainability can be interpreted from a product, firm, 
sectoral, or chain viewpoint, as well as from the direct and indirect chains actor’s (i.e. state, 
development organisations, standard or certification organisations and communities) view-
points. There may also be implicit trade-offs at policy level between livelihood needs, where 
normative, political judgements of equitable benefit sharing are inevitable.  
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The SLA highlights that to achieve sustainability, stocks of the various capitals need 
to be maintained (Adams 2009). In practice trade-offs are made, explicitly and often 
implicitly, particularly in the short term. In situations where populations are vulnerable 
to poverty, such as in mountainous (Ellis-Jones 1999) and forested areas (Ndoye et al. 
2004), trade-offs between natural capital use can lead to increases in poverty and de-
creases in biodiversity in the long term. Much debate has focused on how to limit the 
degradation of natural capital whilst increasing, or at least not constraining, economic 
growth (Barbier 2000). Studies on the trade-offs between conservation and development 
based on NTFPs have highlighted that it is extremely difficult to achieve a balance, 
known as a ‘win-win’ (Kusters 2009; McShane et al. 2011). Only in 9% of 55 NTFP 
cases were positive livelihood outcomes also equated with positive conservation out-
comes (Kusters et al. 2006). The indictors and variables used in Kusters’ study provide 
a starting point for exploring the interactions between development based on NTFP 
trade and sustainable livelihoods. The complexity of the outcomes of interactions de-
pends not only on individual strategies and market conditions, but also on strategies 
chosen by others to maximise the rewards of group(s) of interacting decision makers.  
The term win-win situation, derived from economic game theory, is a situation by 
which cooperation, compromise, or group participation leads to all participants benefit-
ing. The rational outcome of a game is phrased in terms of ‘win’ and ‘loose’ and the 
institutional, socio-economic or policy factors associated which affect outcomes (Persha 
et al. 2011). Laboratory-based ‘games’ popular in testing common pool natural re-
sources are impractical for value chain studies given the dispersed geographical nature 
of actors and institutions in the ‘game’. However, exploring the ‘rules of the game’ 
(Ostrom et al. 1994) is practical for value chains.  
The SLA acknowledges the importance of politics and policies in shaping livelihoods 
of the poor. However, how policies and politics condition opportunities is poorly under-
stood, because the SLA reflects livelihoods at a micro level (Pasteur 2001). This limits a 
full understanding of NTFP chains, as these extend from individual and household level 
to collective and macro levels. To resolve this gap an analytical approach incorporating 
livelihood pathways, policy and politics as a dynamic and iterative process can be used 
(Pasteur 2001; Blaikie et al. 2001; Brons et al. 2007). This highlights the importance of 
analysing policy and people/policy interactions. Political ecology explicitly politicises 
environmental issues and phenomena, and can be used to examine the relationships be-
tween political, economic and social factors and actors with environmental issues and 
changes (Bryant et al. 1997). By analysing conflicts over resources and their links to the 
larger political-economic processes and environment-development discourses, control 
over natural resources on various scales can be shown (Dietz 1996). Although local 
livelihood strategies are given special weight in the SLA, forest uses cannot be under-
stood within narrow boundaries. This is particularly relevant when a value chain ap-
proach is used to examine livelihoods, as global practices affect local forest use practic-
es. Political ecology’s broad scope, interdisciplinary nature and attention to multi-scalar 
linkages are suitable for this study. Bryant & Bailey’s (1997) thoughts on relationships 
provide a useful guide. These are threefold: that costs and benefits associated with envi-
ronmental changes are unequally distributed, affecting society in a heterogeneous way 
such that political, social and economic differences (between people, over nature, over 
other people) account for uneven distribution of costs and benefits. This unequal distri-
bution inevitably reinforces or reduces existing social and economic inequalities with 
any change in environmental conditions affecting the political and economic status quo. 
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The unequal distribution of costs and benefits and the impact on pre-existing inequali-
ties has political implications in terms of the resulting altered power relationships. Thus 
the relationship between poverty and environmental degradation can be seen as a func-
tion of uneven access to environmental resources. Multi-level connections between lo-
cal and global phenomena, with causes at multiple levels of scale are highlighted 
(Adams 2009). Political driving forces at various scales have been found to play a sig-
nificant role in local level institutional functioning. In particular, inappropriate state-led 
interventions into land-use planning can weaken local level institutions and reduce the 
ability of the linked social-ecological system to cope with change and uncertainty 
(Cundill et al. 2010).  Thus for this study, perceptions of power and access to it, and 
control over resources by actors at different levels in value chains and resulting costs 
and benefits, is relevant. Mixed methods (see Chapter 3) help triangulate results to pro-
duce narratives capturing differences in access to, control over and local knowledge of 
resources particularly for sensitive and marginalised groups (Nightingale 2003).  
Unpacking forest product values  
To answer the second question about configurations of activities and values in chains, 
the nature of forest product values can be unravelled using different concepts. The term 
forest product has multiple meanings. Economic metrics are one of the most common 
ways to measure value. However, the value of a product may also be, social, cultural 
and/or environmental and can be understood holistically in terms of its contribution to 
people’s livelihoods and wellbeing.  
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) provides a framework explaining the 
provisioning functions of forests and how these are linked to wellbeing (Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment 2005) and incorporates many of the livelihoods capitals men-
tioned in the SLA. The MEA posits that people are integral in ecosystems (as empha-
sised in the definition of forests in Box 1.2) and that a dynamic interaction exists be-
tween people and ecosystems. The changing human condition drives, directly and indi-
rectly, ecosystem changes and thereby causes changes in human wellbeing. In parallel, 
social, economic and cultural factors unrelated to ecosystems alter the human condition 
and many natural forces influence ecosystems. Despite this explicit link between prod-
ucts from ecosystem (such as NTFPs) and well-being, the MEA does not provide meth-
ods for evaluating these apart from economic values, although intrinsic, spiritual and 
cultural non-market values are mentioned. It does however advocate that non-market 
values are incorporated into resource management decisions (Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment 2005). 
Economics provides a range of concepts to value products. The most well-known are 
product prices and margins, calculated at the stages of when value is added. These allow 
monetary valuation of a product, its market or chain, of product profitability and fixed, 
variable and labour costs (Marshall et al. 2006a; Jensen 2009). Economic value is relat-
ed to market type (defined in Box 2.2), which is related to power and control (and thus 
governance) of chains, and implies that understanding the market structures in chains is 
essential (ILO 2006). Forest products values have been mainly measured by their actual 
or potential economic value (Peters et al. 1989; Angelsen et al. 2011b). In Central Afri-
ca, values have been largely unrecorded in national statistics because their subsistence 
(non-market value) and local market value is difficult to determine and measure 
(Vantomme 2003). The MEA emphasizes that many non-market values contribute to 
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well-being by maintaining health (e.g. medicines and food), providing a wide range of 
basic materials, resources and rents (e.g. access rights and income from forest products); 
increasing forest production values (e.g. payment for environmental services); and 
maintaining social relations – for example cola nuts used during religious and signifi-
cant life events (Sunderland et al. 2004c). The trade-offs between provisioning services 
– from which NTFPs result – and regulating and cultural ecosystem services have been 
highlighted (Raudsepp-Hearne et al. 2010).  
 
 
Four types of NTFP markets in the humid forest zone of Cameroon have been char-
acterised (see Box 2.3). Prices are important economic measures, but may say more 
about particular market dynamics than the product or its importance to livelihoods. Oth-
er ways of valuing products include consumer preferences (Bishop 1998; Bush et al. 
2004; DEFRA 2007), substitution alternatives (van Dorp et al. 1998; Ruiz-Pérez et al. 
2004; Riisgaard et al. 2008) and access to alternatives to determine the safety-net func-
tion (Paumgarten 2007). Market values can be understood not simply as momentary 
quantitative measurements of opportunity costs, but also as social processes in which 
people continually assess present circumstances and options in terms of their under-
standings of the past. As history can be read in more than one way, market values can 
be ambiguous. Economic history however can be used to chronicle the responses to lo-
cal and global forces and human needs over time, with taking an anthropological per-
spective, allows reflection on how people and events come together in economically 
enabling or destructive ways in particular times and places (Berry 2007).  
Box 2.2     Markets 
A market is defined here in the broad sense as to offer for sale or to sell and as verb, mean-
ing;  
 A public gathering held for the transaction (buying and selling) merchandise or services i.e. 
Marché Central, Yaoundé.  
 A physical or non-physical place (i.e. internet) where products are offered for sale.  
 A shop selling a particular type of merchandise i.e. The Body Shop. 
 The business of buying and selling a specified commodity: i.e. the honey market. 
 A geographic region considered as a place for sales: i.e. safou for the foreign market; the 
Central African market.  
 A subdivision of a population considered as buyers: i.e. honey cosmetics for the upscale 
market. 
 The opportunity to buy or sell and demand for products: i.e. a big market for organic foods.  
For a potential transaction to take place, buyers must offer something in exchange (usually 
money, but can be goods or services (i.e. barter or exchange) for there to be a transaction. 
Market value is thus the actual monetary price that a buyer pays a seller for a product.  
A monopoly refers to a situation in which an individual or enterprise has sufficient control 
over a particular product to determine the terms on which others have access to it and the 
selling price. They are characterised by a lack of economic competition to produce the good 
and a lack of viable substitute goods. A monopsony is a single entity's control over a market 
to purchase a good or service, and an oligopoly is where a few entities exert considerable 
influence over an industry and its products. 
Source :http://economics.about.com/cs/economicsglossary/g/market.htm. Retrieved 10 September 
2010. 
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Financial value includes market-priced costs and returns from activities, while eco-
nomic value includes non-marketed returns (i.e. household consumption) and opportuni-
ty costs which may impact capitals. Chapter 1 highlighted that different interpretations 
of value make it impossible to provide a single measure of the worth of a product to 
livelihoods. However, different measures of social-cultural, economic and environmen-
tal value provide a broader framework to understand values (van Dorp et al. 1998; 
Donovan et al. 2009; Shayoh et al. undated). Sheil & Wunder (2002) reinforce this, 
stating that value is not the inherent property of an entity, but a measure of a relation-
ship between a subject and the object of valuation within a specific time frame and geo-
graphical context. This implies balances between individual versus societal perspectives 
and normative judgments about which outcomes are socially preferable (Costanza et al. 
1997). NTFPs often have multiple parts, uses and processing routes, resulting in differ-
ent products, values and chains originating from the same species and ecosystem 
source. In classical value chain analysis, processing adds value. However a high level of 
transformation does not always result in a higher product value, as value can be added 
by consumer perceptions based on historical, cultural and religious significance and 
origin (Jensen 2009).The implications for this study are that while economic indicators 
of value remain important, composite measures of NTFP values by the research subjects 
are also needed. Examples of such indicators are the Poverty Environment Network 
(PEN) methodology (Lee 2012), the NTFP conservation-development trade-off model 
(Kusters et al. 2006) and the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IFRI 
2008). These consider different capitals and link individual and household levels to 
community and society level. 
The ability and desirability of compensating for degraded natural capital depends on 
how capitals are valued, as trade-offs can be made explicit if the values are comparable 
and external environmental costs are explicitly included in the price of a good. This is 
difficult for some intrinsic values, which are essentially philosophical, and for non-
substitutable values of some natural capitals. While economic value can be used for 
products subject to monetary exchange, it does not realistically capture barter or ex-
change, or the value of products auto-consumed. Economic values may also not take 
account of other costs even though they have a monetary value – such as labour 
(Luckert et al. 2002). Economists’ attempts to capture natural capital values have used 
potential value based on inventories (Peters et al. 1989). Padoch & de Jong (1989) em-
phasise that realised production is a more realistic indicator of economic value, and is 
generally much lower than potential production. The Peters et al. study also highlighted 
that sample location and extrapolation needs to be carefully delineated, with assump-
Box 2.3     NTFP markets  
The spatial characteristics of buying zones and selling areas and associated with volumes, 
prices, product types and dependence have been classified as follows (Ruíz Pérez et al. 
2000):  
Type I: Small, local markets with a high level of self-sufficiency and proximity to supply 
zones, high levels of local supply and exchange, suppliers for regional and national markets.  
Type II: Medium-sized markets of regional importance, medium level of self-sufficiency, sec-
ondary nodes for type I and intermediate markets and bulking points for type III markets. 
Type III:  Large urban markets with national projection, large product range, weak self-
sufficiency, reliance on close and far supply areas, type I & II hubs. 
Type IV: Frontier markets with small to high value transactions, high dependence on supply 
from other areas and specialisation in high volume products. 
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tions made explicit. Local markets often have highly elastic prices related to demand 
and supply – caused by seasonal product availability, such that unit prices and extrac-
tion revenues habitually fall with an increased supply of forest products, which does not 
necessarily reflect problems with decreasing resource availability, often until too late. 
An example is the economic value of threatened NTFPs5. Levels of threat can be based 
on local perceptions or scientific assessment, such as the IUCN Red Data listing, CITES 
status or national schemes of protected species. Threat may – or may not – be reflected 
in market prices, for example, the costs of complying with permit and monitoring re-
quirements and enforcement activities. Products without a market value due to auto-
consumption or bartering can use proxies such as distance to the market – which affects 
how people use forests now (Godoy et al. 2002). Financial value is generally stated in 
only the local currency (Ndoye et al. 1997/98; Ruiz-Pérez et al. 2004), saying little 
about value in comparison to other countries or regions, or relative value to other prod-
ucts. When converting to a common currency, exchange rates and value fluctuations 
over time need to be made explicit (Smith et al. 1998; van Dorp et al. 2001; Sheil et al. 
2002). Values also need to be placed in a local economic and social context (Kambewa 
et al. 2007) and the allocation, scale and distribution of resource flows clarified (Daly et 
al. 1996). 
Getting to grips with governance 
To answer the third research question about governance arrangements and subsequently 
the fourth and fifth questions of how they affect livelihoods and sustainability, concepts 
on governance are used. Governance is a multidisciplinary, multi-faceted normative and 
subjective concept which has emerged over the last 15 years, with theories (Pierre 2000) 
and practice grounded in development and politics. For this research, the definition used 
(Box 1.3) emphasises that governance embraces the decisions and processes that define 
expectations, grant and exercise power6, and/or verify performance. It stresses the role 
of the state, private sector and civil society as a multi-stakeholder practice and process, 
moving away from equating governance only with government, in all its manifestations. 
Governance occurs at different policy and administrative levels, embracing stakeholder 
diversity in interests, perceptions and ambitions (Kooiman et al. 2008). Government, 
particularly at meso and micro levels can strongly influence daily lives, particularly of 
poor people (Cleaver et al. 2005). Remote highland and forest areas, and fragile states 
in contrast are marked by state absence (Scott 2009). This broad definition reflects the 
realities of the research subject and area. 
The term governance arrangement, used in preference to Kooiman & Bavinck’s 
(2005) ‘governance system’ (the semantic difference highlighting that an arrangement 
may not always be an integrated whole, as the term system implies), describes the inter-
play of interactions, institutions, actors, principles, policies, mechanisms and processes. 
Explanatory variables of governance outcomes include the characteristics of the re-
source and of products, users, institutional arrangements, the external environment, 
availability of necessary information, ability to deal with conflict, compliance with 
                                                 
5  NTFPs from species which are, or could be, threatened with extinction at a population or national lev-
el, in particular because of their nature, the frequency of their exploitation or an ecological factor. 
6  Power is defined as the possession of control, authority or influence over others and the ability to en-
force wishes when opposed, including when livelihoods are threatened. 
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rules, provision of technical, institutional and physical infrastructure, and ability to 
adapt and change (Agrawal 2007). Links between governance, sustainable development 
and poverty alleviation were made at the 1997 International Conference on Governance 
for Sustainable Growth and Equity and subsequently to forests (Kaimowitz 2003; Ros-
Tonen et al. 2011). Kooiman et al. (2008) reiterate the growing consensus about how 
governance impacts sustainable livelihoods and that societal change through ‘learning 
to adapt’ plays an important role in improving governance. Thus creating and maintain-
ing institutions are not ‘given’, with sudden or planned events acting as change agents. 
The governors managing the rules are key figures whose function and relationship need 
to be considered. The norms, values and principles shaping institutions mean that these 
need to be examined, including the legitimacy of the institutions, principles guiding the 
acceptability of institutions and coherence between the three ‘orders’ (i.e. day-to-day 
management, institutions and norms and values that shape them) (Kooiman et al. 2005). 
The interaction process involves a ‘system-to-be governed’ and a ‘governing system’ or 
arrangements. The relationships and interactions between the two constitute the govern-
ance interactions affecting the natural system and setting limits to resource users’ poten-
tial (Kooiman et al. 2005).  
Governance consists of separate processes and/or as part of management or leader-
ship processes. Often used as a synonym for management, it is different: management is 
the act or art of managing (conducting or supervising) something and the judicious allo-
cation of resources to achieve specific objectives. It involves decision-making processes 
related to resources, carried out within administrative boundaries by specific groups (for 
example, managers of an enterprise). Management requires interaction by managers 
with stakeholders to achieve outputs, whilst governance describes the interactions be-
tween stakeholders to achieve outcomes. Management can be planned and implement-
ed; governance evolves from political relationships of different societal groups. Gov-
ernance sets out the framework in which management can thrive (Ros-Tonen et al. 
2008).  
Recognising the impact of governance on development and for sustainable natural 
resource management, ‘good’ governance has often (implicitly) been assumed to be pro-
poor governance (Brown et al. 2003). Good governance assumes that development ob-
jectives such as the millennium development goals can be attained as a way of ‘doing 
things better’ (Cleaver et al. 2005). This normative expression has led to principles re-
flecting the value-laden norms and judgements of stakeholders from specific cultural 
settings (Box 2.4). Kishor and Rosenbaum (2012) offer a framework with a sample set 
of many of these indicators and guide for how to measure them. Good governance prin-
ciples have been promulgated by influential political and development organisations 
such as the United Nations, World Bank and OECD. Principles have focused on ensur-
ing respect for human rights and the rule of law, democracy and the representativeness 
of governments, and the (in) efficiency of non-market systems (Weiss 2000). Though 
generally accepted by many countries and organisations – highlighted by the consensus 
of terms used – these principles remain ambitious and have been contested. A conten-
tion is that the good governance agenda is based on am incomplete or partial under-
standing of governance, using an abstract set of principles lacking contextualisation and 
localisation to understand how governance processes are shaped and influenced 
(Cleaver & Franks 2005). 
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Box 2.4     Governance indicators  
 Accountability: individual or collective actor(s) who have account to other actor(s) or institu-
tion(s), who dependent upon their appreciation, can impose negative or positive conse-
quences on the former. Involves democratic accountability, human rights and civil liberties, 
government censorship, institutional permanence and representativeness. 
 Voice/citizen/private sector participation/voice/engagement: influence in decision-making 
that affects livelihoods – built on concepts of freedom of association and speech, civicness 
(right to vote & be voted) and the right for all to have a voice in decision-making, either di-
rectly or through legitimate intermediate institutions representing their intentions.  
 Political stability and absence of violence: Degree of decline of central political authority 
threatening to political stability and degree to which armed protest/unrest/conflict/terrorist 
threat/extremism or political protest/rebellion threatens political stability, including extent of 
which conflict management mechanisms are in place (World Bank 2009). 
 Government effectiveness: competence of the bureaucracy and the quality of public ser-
vice delivery. It also covers efficiency, i.e. the extent to which limited human, financial and 
natural resources are allocated without unnecessary waste, delay or corruption. 
 Regulatory and policy existence and quality: incidence of market unfriendly policies, bur-
densome administrative regulations, unfair competitive practices, tax effectiveness and 
riskiness of investment and regulatory enabling environment, inclusion of non-market and 
socio-cultural (including indigenous) values and resource assessment requirement in poli-
cies and regulations, extent of conflicts between legal (and informal) rights. 
 Safety and rule of law: consistency, clarity, strength and impartiality of the legal system, 
popular observance of the law and perceptions of the state as legitimately representing its 
citizens, levels, losses and costs of crime, legal safeguards, quality of contract enforce-
ment and performance of police and courts (including the independence of the judiciary). It 
covers fairness (degree to which rules are applied equally in society) and decency (degree 
to which formulation and stewardship of rules avoids humiliating or harming people). 
 Control of corruption: severity of corruption within state and business systems, public trust 
in financial honesty of politicians, levels of red tape, losses and costs of corruption. 
 Sustainable economic opportunity: Public and private management of the economy includ-
ing quality of management, currency, inflation and debt ratios, competitive environment, in-
vestment climate, quality and access to infrastructure, environmental sustainability includ-
ing role of environment in policy, regulatory framework resources for rural development 
and dialog between government and rural organisations. 
 Human development: extent to which leaders and public have a ‘strategic vision’ a broad 
and long-term perspective on good governance and human development, along with a 
sense of what is needed for such development, specifically relating to health, welfare, edu-
cation, taking account of historical, cultural and social contexts. 
 Fairness & equity: the degree to which societal groups have access to needed re-
sources/decision-making to improve their well-being. Equity refers to rights and duties and 
infers that states undertake necessary measures to realise rights to development and en-
sure equality of opportunity for all in the access and control of basic resources and liveli-
hood assets. The historical context is critical in determining equity.  
 Transparency: the degree of clarity and openness in decision-making, in political parties, 
information provision by the government and freedom of the media. 
 Decency: encompasses human rights and freedom of expression, peaceful competition for 
political power, personal security of citizens, mutual respect between citizens and civil 
servants and government’s respect for property rights. 
 Legitimacy: the moral grounding of power, involving social and cultural norms and expecta-
tions concerning behaviour of those governing, the social relationship between rulers and 
the ruled, trust, reputation and force and balance between authority and obeisance. Legiti-
mate institutions enable voice in decision-making and representation.  
 Efficiency and effectiveness: processes and institutions produce results that meet needs 
while making the best use of available resources. Implies a legislative function affecting 
policy, merit based systems in government and efficient judicial systems.  
Sources: (Graham et al. 2003; Hyden et al. 2008; Ibrahim Foundation 2010; Kaufmann et al. 2007; 
Kishor and Rosenbaum 2012; Ribot et al. 2008; World Bank 2010a). 
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Grindle (2004) criticises the ‘good governance’ agenda as unrealistic, overly demanding 
and lacking priority setting. She suggests instead ‘good-enough’ governance, where 
governance is a learning process sensitive to existing capabilities and contexts. Jabeen 
(2007) argues that good governance is not universal and needs to be embedded in its 
cultural context. Governance outcomes can be ‘bad’ as well as ‘good’ for certain groups 
in society (Cleaver et al. 2005), indicating that a focus on the impact of outcomes for 
different actors of interventions is important. Bodegom and Klaver (2007), Klaver 
(2009) and Wollenberg (2001) show that local good governance definitions however 
can be developed by multiple actors to embrace diverse perspectives and norms. Bode-
gom and Klaver asked the Central African Forest Commission’s (COMIFAC) Task 
Force on Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) to formulate good 
governance principles. They included being accountable at all levels; transparency and 
legitimacy towards constituencies; equity and equitable sharing of forest revenues and 
costs; respect for all stakeholders and promotion of the public interest; justice, sanctions 
and fighting corruption; information, education and communication; decentralisation of 
forest management and decision-making; respect for the rights and traditions of local 
and indigenous people; enforcement of laws and other rules and regulations; and im-
proving forest monitoring and control systems.  
Forest governance combines notions of process with resource characteristics and can 
be defined as the informed and faithful representation by decision makers (both gov-
ernment and non-government) of their constituency interests towards the efficient allo-
cation and use of scarce forest resources for both the local, national and international 
good (Macqueen et al. 2004). Although rather top-down and hierarchical, this definition 
highlights three related elements of the processes through which governments, custodi-
ans and representatives are informed about and interpret the priorities of their constitu-
ency (including conflicts of interest); the process by which forest resources are securely 
and transparently distributed and used in line with local, national and international pri-
orities (including negotiated trade-offs); and the process by which the agreed distribu-
tion of economic, social and forest goods and services are monitored and reviewed (in-
cluding what is and is not enforceable). Kooiman & Bavinck’s (2005) definition of in-
teractive governance applied to forest governance stresses that other, non-government 
actors in forests can also take a lead in governance (Derkyi 2012).  
Tenure consists of bundles of rights that include access, withdrawal, management, 
exclusion and alienation (Schlager et al. 1992), which may be held by different people 
at different times and relates to land but also to NTFP species and the products derived 
from them. Fortmann (1985) distinguishes between rights to own or inherit trees, to 
plant and use trees and tree products and to dispose of them. While influencing each 
other, land and tree tenure do not always coincide (Fortmann et al. 1988). Tenure is also 
important in determining who benefits or loses in competition for the goods and ser-
vices provided by forests. Tenure systems can determine the outcomes of governance 
arrangements (Larson et al. 2010b), including in Central Africa (ITTO 2009b). Tenure 
signifies who owns and can use what resources for how long, and under what condi-
tions. Customary tenure systems are determined locally and often based on oral agree-
ments. Statutory tenure systems are applied by governments, codified in law. Secure 
forest tenure can provide a foundation for social identity, personal security and cultural 
survival of forest–based indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities. Tenure security can 
be a prerequisite for (formal) capital investment, while conversely conflicts over tenure 
can discourage investment, undermine management and may constrain capital accumu-
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lation and returns. Duration, assurance, robustness and exclusivity have been identified 
as the main legal elements for secure tenure arrangements (Baye 2008). Clarifying ten-
ure rights can mitigate insecurities impinging on poor people’s access to forest re-
sources (Wiersum et al. 2005). The reasons for insecurity vary: people may have cus-
tomary and statutory tenure rights, but be unable to oppose claims made by outsiders. 
Customary arrangements may be clear and accepted locally, but contradicted or nulli-
fied by statutory arrangements, or unable to serve their function (outdated, unenforced 
etc.). This implies that tenure holders have assurance that they can benefit from returns 
on their investments without interference. Tenure security can also motivate forest pro-
tection, destruction or conversion. Evidence shows that devolving tenure and manage-
ment authority to local communities and households, under certain conditions, can fos-
ter improved forest conditions (Sunderlin et al. 2008a; Larson et al. 2010b). An under-
standing of tenure issues and trends is thus an essential component of sustainable liveli-
hoods (Alden Wily 2006). Kusters (2009) also showed that perceived (rather than factu-
al) security promotes investments in agroforestry hence sustainable practices. Decentral-
isation, devolution, privatisation and community-based forest management have in-
duced rapid changes in forest ownership patterns and increasingly complex stakeholder 
relations (FAO 2009c; Hatcher et al. 2009).  
The echelons of rights concept (Boelens 2009) stresses how rules and rights cannot 
act on their own but are enforced and shaped by social forces, beyond the formal, creat-
ing practice and process, highlighting the often pluralist nature of rights. Sustainable 
forest management (see Box 2.1) has been associated with institutions fitting the local 
context, monitoring and enforcement and secure rights (Tucker 2010). As formal forest 
ownership in Cameroon is largely vested in the state (shown in Table 1.1), this raises 
questions about the tenure, regulation of access to and control of resources – all of 
which have been shown to influence how product chains are arranged and values de-
rived (Barry et al. 2008; Larson et al. 2010b). They also influence the sustainability of 
the product and ecosystem it originates from and ecosystem resilience (Dietz et al. 
2003; Weiland et al. 2010). Four resource-related rights have been emphasised: rights to 
access, infrastructure and materials; rules (the formulation and contents of rights, obli-
gations and operational rules regarding management of the resource; regulatory con-
trol); authority and legitimacy to establish and enforce rules and rights; and regimes of 
representation (the discourses and ontologies that inform or challenge resources). The 
echelons of rights concept highlights how conflicts occur over the material control of 
resources and rights to define, politically organise and discursively shape their exist-
ence. Struggles over rights may simultaneously concern resources and the legitimacy to 
formulate and enforce rights as individuals or organisations. This political ecology ap-
proach and attention to conflicts echoes Tsing’s work on how friction shapes change 
(2004). 
Collective action concerns the combined efforts of more than one person in order to 
achieve a common goal (Ostrom 2004). Different organisational structures are possible 
such as cooperatives, informal organisations, associations and private companies 
(Penrose-Buckley 2007; Bernard et al. 2008). In forest exploitation and management 
such organisations have been shown to be feasible when people can cooperate and de-
velop rules, incentives and sanctions, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms 
(Komarudin et al. 2006; Ostrom 2009; Rustagi et al. 2010; Singh et al. 2010). Coopera-
tion and conflict shape these interactions, with the level of conditional cooperation with-
in groups correlated with an increased likelihood of successfully managing forest com-
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mons, including ‘costly’ cooperation enforcement (Rustagi et al. 2010; Vollan et al. 
2010). Participation rights for local forest users in rulemaking is a key factor in getting 
win-win trade-off outcomes, with greater likelihood of a forest being below average for 
both subsistence livelihoods and biodiversity when local forest users do not have this 
right (Persha et al. 2011). Collective action can empower individual and group chain 
actors to ensure and assert control over resources, resulting in higher profits, property 
and access (Mwangi et al. 2007; Donovan et al. 2008; Seixas 2010). Collective action 
and cooperation is not a given: the prisoner's dilemma refers to the paradox that indi-
vidually rational strategies lead to collectively irrational outcomes, challenging the no-
tion that people will cooperate on natural resource management and are rational crea-
tures (Ostrom 1988). Factors such as reciprocity, trust and shared knowledge structure 
appear critical to overcome such dilemmas (Ansell et al. 2008; Ostrom 1988; Vollan & 
Ostrom 2010).  
However, creating the conditions that facilitate self-organisation and particularly 
cross-scale institutional linkages is a major challenge, particularly when co-management 
or pluralistic governance arrangements prevail. Factors such as community perceptions 
of support from outside agencies, access to long-term funding for adaptive decision-
making, access to reliable information about changes in resources and legal options for 
forming decision-making bodies with long-term and well-funded social facilitation are 
important (Cundill et al. 2010). Exploring these features in the interactions by individu-
als and organisations is thus important.  
Examining institutions  
To answer the third research question about governance arrangements and subsequently 
the fourth and fifth questions of how they affect livelihoods and sustainability, the SLA, 
collective action and governance concepts are used, all of which focus on the role of 
institutions. Theories of institutions (Hayek 1945; Schmitt 1996) have disciplinary un-
derpinnings in anthropology, economics and political science and have been applied to 
environmental resources increasingly in the last two decades (Ostrom 1999, Young 
2007). In the absence of one universally accepted definition, this study refers to an insti-
tution as the formal and informal norms, rules, procedures and processes defining how 
individuals interrelate, act and make decisions within and outside of organisations. Insti-
tutions may not be clearly defined or static in terms of time or space, can be formal or 
informal and are interlinked with issues of knowledge, power and control. Leach et al. 
(1999) emphasise that informal institutions are upheld by socially shared usually un-
written rules, created and enforced among the actors involved (Arnold and Perez 2001). 
Formal institutions include rules enforced by outside third parties, such as laws. Infor-
mal and formal institutions guide interactions, assign roles and influence rights and ac-
cess to resources and resulting livelihood strategies (North 1990, Scoones 1998, Young 
2007). Institutions shape access to resources, the demand for resources in rural (and ur-
ban) livelihoods, the dynamic interactions between social and natural systems, and in-
teractions between social and natural systems across scales of analysis (Agrawal et al. 
1997). Institutions are critical in regulating uses and trade-offs between capitals and key 
to achieving sustainability (Levin 2009). They also shape access for different actors at 
different scales to markets (Gereffi et al. 1994; Raikes et al. 2000). Operative norms, 
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incentives, rules-in-practice and representations such as organisation charts can help 
identify an institution7. Institutions are important in perpetuating or changing insecurity 
and inequity. The combination of institutional arrangements, market forces, political 
change and demographic pressures on natural resource management ‘matters’, as peo-
ple, ecosystems and species can become (more) vulnerable when these overlap: 
The manner in which communities create, follow, and break formal and informal rules regarding the 
resources they control, the extent to which their autonomy of action is constrained, modulated, and fa-
cilitated by their interactions with the state, and the internal differentiation within communities along 
gender, case, and class dimensions are critical to understanding how resources will be used. (Agrawal 
et al. 1997-7). 
Institutions are different from organisations. The term organisation is used here to re-
fer to a group, association, agency or firm as a structure of recognised and accepted 
roles or positions ordered in some relationship to each other to achieve specified goals. 
In an organisation, the structure of positions can influence or reinforce operative norms 
or practices. Government, donor policies and customary norms can change organisation 
structure. Thus organisations provide a framework in which processes and procedures 
are played out, but these processes and procedures can also change the structure of or-
ganisations (Bingen 2000). Organisations matter in sustainable livelihoods. For exam-
ple, government services – whether decentralised, de-concentrated or devolved – deter-
mine the autonomy and authority with which organisations act, and thereby directly im-
pact people’s livelihood strategies. There are dynamic interrelationships that exist be-
tween organisations and institutions. They can be seen as both enabling (providing 
means through which people negotiate their ways through the world) and constraining 
(providing rules for action) (Bingen 2000).  
The SLA stresses processes and dynamics and institutions as the products of social 
and political practices (Mehta et al. 2001). Institutions can favour or constrain sustaina-
ble livelihoods, as they embrace two important elements: the rules and normative frame 
conditions that govern social interactions and the way in which organisations operate in 
both the public and private sector, based on explicit and implicit values. Political partic-
ipation, market systems, concepts of social orders (such as tribes, clans, etc.) belong to 
this field of investigation. Institutions – their policies and processes – are however not 
stand-alone factors either supporting or constraining livelihoods, as they are embedded 
in the context: risks and vulnerabilities, opportunities and enabling agencies and ser-
vices and service providers, shown in Figure 2.1. This highlights that an understanding 
of these the contexts (presented in Chapters 4 and 5) is as important as understanding 
the institutions. How institutions are designed impacts the many management and gov-
ernance challenges posed by common pool resources as social spaces where local values 
attached to resources are institutionally mediated, politically nuanced, economically in-
terpreted and historically situated. Ostrom’s (1990) work has resulted in eight empiri-
cally well-supported institutional design principles. They however miss local and exter-
nal socio-economic contexts and the polycentric, multi-level dynamics between local 
institutions and other governance scales (Andersson et al. 2008). Other factors influenc-
ing institutional outcomes include the size of user groups, heterogeneity within or be-
tween user groups, the government regime within which users operate and interactions 
between biophysical and institutional variables (Cox et al. 2010). Dietz et al. (2003) 
                                                 
7  As these norms endure over time an ‘organisation’ becomes ‘institutionalised’. 
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also emphasise the impact of variety and mixture of institutional types, highlighting that 
connections are needed to inform, deal with conflict, provide physical, technical and 
institutional infrastructure and encourage change. Agrawal et al. (2008) add that the 
strength and durability of institutions is significant in explaining the success of institu-
tions governing commons. Summarised in Box 2.5, these ten principles provide a 
framework for analysing institutions. Complying with all, to have robust institutions, is 
however virtually impossible, indicated by the difficulties in achieving good governance 
and proposition for ‘good enough governance’ (Grindle 2004). 
 
 
The concept of bricolage has been used to look beyond formal social relations to ex-
amine organisations (Baker et al. 2005) and institutions (Wollenberg et al. 2001; 
Cleaver 2002). People draw on existing mechanisms (social, cultural, symbolic re-
sources and relationships) to form new institutions under conditions of ‘stress’ on an ad-
hoc basis or by combining existing institutional and organisational activities and inter-
actions in novel ways. Institutions may be shaped historically by previous ‘needs’, bor-
rowing from different cultures, incorporating rules and meanings from one area of life 
to another, and drawing on the repertoire of local forms of decision-making. They can 
also be created, sometimes from nothing, using physical, social and/or institutional in-
puts (i.e. capitals) in alternative configurations. Forest practices have been noted specif-
ically to be subject to processes of institutional bricolage in which actors (individuals, 
organisations and institutions) construct their own institutional frameworks by aggregat-
ing, altering or articulating elements of existing disparate institutions, whether intro-
duced by government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or other already exist-
ing organisations: these processes of institutional bricolage can be either conscious and 
strategic of nature or less conscious and unintentional (de Koning 2011). Institutional 
bricolage can be a process something people do, which cannot be managed and institu-
tional bricolage as the patchwork of institutions. The multi-scalar aspect of bricolage is 
emphasised by Cerny (2010) who sees a ‘thorny problem’ of how international regimes, 
institutions and other forms of so-called global governance with ad hoc, trial-and-error 
Box 2.5     Institutional design principles 
1. Clear, well-defined boundaries of legitimate individual/household/collective users, their 
rights and of CPR boundaries. 
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and conditions, with rules 
adapted to local social and environmental conditions and benefits proportional to inputs. 
3. Collective-choice arrangements: most interested and affected parties can participate in 
developing and modifying operational rules.  
4. Present and active monitoring of users’ compliance with appropriation and provision rules 
by accountable monitors, with resource monitors being accountable to users  
5. Appropriators violating operational rules likely to be assessed against context-dependent 
graduated sanctions by appropriators, accountable to these appropriators, or both. 
6. Rapid, low cost, accessible conflict-resolution mechanisms/arenas exist among appropri-
ators or between appropriators and officials.  
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organise and devise their own institutions. 
8. Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance 
activities are organised in multiple layers of nested enterprises. 
9. Strength and resilience of institutional enforcement. 
10. Durability and longevity of the institution. 
Source: adapted from (Ostrom 1990; Scott 2001; Agrawal et al. 2006; Cox et al. 2010). 
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and issue-specific character interact. The result is fundamentally uneven and very often 
inefficient quasi-superstructures for both top-down tackling of global or transnational 
challenges, and the bottom-up pursuit of those interests and values most highly priori-
tised by transnational, as well as domestic and local, interest and value groups. 
An anthropological lens provides a valuable alternative view of institutions, focusing 
on traditional and localised practices in fulfilling modern ‘development’ functions and 
overcoming problems of collective action. Roitman (2005) provides a rich perspective 
on bricolage and pluralistic governance, relevant to the study area. Pressures of econom-
ic crisis and austerity programmes promoted by international financial institutions have 
given rise to ‘shadow states’ and ‘shadow economies’ characterised by informality. 
These economic activities are typically found in marginal, border and ‘bush’8 areas, re-
quire and establish highly organised trade modalities and are based on distinct hierar-
chies of authority relations and may be linked to international financial networks and 
private strategies for capital accumulation. Semantics are clarified with the term ‘unreg-
ulated’ preferred: this avoids common binary oppositions such as legal-illegal, formal-
informal or official-unofficial, which do not reflect the complexity in which the infor-
mal economy operates. These activities can be at the heart of productive economic life, 
one of the few means available of accessing hard currency and producing wealth in 
times of austerity. They can serve to mediate between the state and global economy, 
providing important resources for (state) representatives, providing new rents and redis-
tributing national politics and power. This theoretical perspective underpinning the real-
ities in the study area resonates strongly with the context and operation of informal and 
unregulated NTFP chains in Africa (Campbell et al. 2002c; Shackleton et al. 2007). The 
distinctions made between state power and regulatory authority, and modalities in 
which power manifests itself are useful for this study, as is the stress on understanding 
the present by looking at the historical context.  
Such unregulated economies have been demarcated from the official economy and 
state administration by referring to a particular shared characteristic: how they circum-
vent state economic regulation and institutions. Distinguished by this absence, institu-
tional voids can be characterised by an absence of institutional arrangements and poli-
cies that regulate market exchange, mobilise economic resources and coordinate social 
activities (Hajer 2003; Burki 2012). Countries (such as Cameroon) which have experi-
enced civil unrest, patrimonial politics or long periods of colonial or dictatorial rule, of-
ten have weak or eroded state institutions regulating economic activities and transac-
tions in terms of enforcing contracts, protecting ownership and promoting development. 
In remote rural areas, the absence of the state (Scott 2009) affects the delivery and 
availability of services and people’s awareness and knowledge of their rights and their 
ability to exert pressure for changes that affect their livelihoods. Such institutional voids 
can be filled by unconventional actors/organisations that, in the process of negotiating 
rules, resources and discourses with formal and informal circuits of power, contribute to 
the emergence of alternative governance arrangements. A growing number of empirical 
studies of emerging markets with entrepreneurial actors – public, NGO and private, or-
ganisational and individual – show the trespassing of formal rules and institutions to 
create formal and informal governance arrangements which also perform development 
functions (Teegen et al. 2004; Mair et al. 2009). Management and organisation studies 
                                                 
8  Bush is the Pidgin term for the forest, also known as ladde (Fulfulde) and la brousse (French). 
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on firm-level governance (Khanna et al. 2006) highlight how enterprises use institution-
al voids as opportunities, effecting organisational transformation, overcoming bureau-
cratic barriers and replacing public institutions to govern resources and coordinate  
development.  
The concept of regulatory pluralism provides insights into this phenomenon, by see-
ing laws as an instrument of power and authority and integral part of governance. Draw-
ing on von Benda-Beckmann (2002), legal pluralism means the co-existence, interaction 
and duplicatory character of legal forms or mechanisms, conflicting in context, rationale 
and orderliness. The result can be a gap between the intention of the law and its out-
comes, common in post-colonial African states. By acknowledging pluralism, norma-
tive complexity in interactions can be better appreciated. This is especially so for con-
flicts of interest that hinders or facilitates social interactions. Legal pluralism can result 
from the co-existence of imported European and prevailing customary laws. The con-
cept of pluralism stresses that where social life is not the focus of law enactment, but the 
state is, legal complexity increases. Legal complexity increases uncertainty that may 
have a negative impact on behavioural incentives aimed at by laws (Awafong 2003). 
Pluralism recognises the inevitable existence of differing, often conflicting, positions 
where groups may be autonomous and independent, sometimes interdependent, with 
legitimate claims and different positions on substantive issues (Anderson et al. 1998). 
These differences are based on separate values, perceptions, objectives and knowledge 
and result in a dynamic interplay – sometimes conflict – between different ideologies, 
interests and organisations. Tamanaha’s (2008) six-pronged framework for analysing 
this complexity, uses categories of official legal systems and normative customary, reli-
gious, economic/capitalist, functionalist and community/cultural systems. These distin-
guish the social spaces that regulations originate from, when and how they clash, what 
fuels them based on power and heterogeneity (between groups and individuals), rela-
tions and strategies for conflict resolution.  
Multi-level governance concerns increased complexity, proliferating jurisdictions 
and increased rise and participation of non-state actors. These phenomena make deci-
sion-making a process of ‘complex overlapping networks’ rather than ‘discrete territori-
al levels’ (Bache et al. 2004), with transformations in the role of the state challenging 
conventional ideas of democratic accountability. Globalisation and decentralisation as 
related processes mean that linkages across different spatial scales and governance lev-
els need to be understood. Multi-level governance looks at the links between humans 
and their environment, which may occur vertically (from local to global) and/or hori-
zontally (at the same level), leading to collaboration and contestation among parties 
with a stake in forests (Mwangi et al. 2012). Thus ‘multi-dimensional linkages’, includ-
ing multiple scales, multi-level institutions and other types of multiples, are important in 
offering a broad perspective which is less likely to overlook important institutions, ele-
ments, relationships, or processes (Poteete 2012). 
Institutional and regulatory pluralism and multilevel governance with their diverse 
and multiple dimensions, linkages, levels, scales, overlaps and voids have given rise to a 
corresponding diversity of economic and political spaces and new policies that address 
these gaps, explicitly paying attention to collaborative governance (Ansell et al. 2008). 
When deliberate, this process aims to replace adversarial and managerial policymaking 
and implementation by bringing public and private stakeholders together to engage in 
consensus-oriented decision-making. Critical variables influencing successful collabora-
tion include histories of conflict or cooperation, incentives for stakeholder participation, 
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power and resource imbalances, leadership and institutional design, face-to-face dia-
logue, trust building, and the development of commitment and shared understanding 
(Ansell et al. 2008). A virtuous cycle of collaboration can develop when collaborative 
forums focus on small wins that deepen trust, commitment and shared understanding. 
Collaborative governance is not however always harmonious, with the shift from state 
governance to a more fluid, evasive geo-governance9 creating new challenges (Paquet 
2005). This is a new and subversive game, argues Paquet (2003), where geographical 
space plays a lesser and different role, where the state has lost (or never had) a grip on 
governing, the game is without a master and collaboration is the new imperative. This 
can lead to an expropriation of power from traditional and well-established institutions. 
Conflict can occur when groups recognise they cannot be rid of systems, partners or op-
ponents or compromise. The appearance and effects of friction and conflict in inducing 
change and new dynamics in governance arrangements, particularly resulting from 
commodification, are echoed by Tsing (2004). Institutional bricolage, institutional 
voids, legal pluralism and multilevel governance can be seen as related concepts and 
together provide a multi-faceted view of institutions.  
Connecting the views on value chains 
Value chains (see Box 1.5) and value chain analysis (VCA) offer frameworks to map, 
categorise and analyse activities, and understand who are actors and why and how they 
are positioned in the process of taking a product from the forest, production, transfor-
mation and processing to delivery to final consumers. VCA highlights that situation-
specific geographical scales, from households to a global level and territoriality are im-
portant factors in the activities, nodes and flows within a chain and have implications 
for actors at different locations (Gereffi et al. 2003). Territoriality influences the relative 
share and perception of value (Rammohan et al. 2003). Once a product becomes com-
moditised, the actors involved increase the network of governance relationships, intro-
ducing agents affecting value and motivated by economic and non-commercial objec-
tives (Le Heron et al. 2002). Societies have been shaped and transformed by such pro-
cesses – shown by the long histories of trade networks, with globalisation and commod-
ification increasingly resulting in unexpected and unstable interactions (Tsing 2005).  
Value chain governance links the division of labour along a chain with resource allo-
cation and the distribution of benefits (Kaplinsky and Morris 2000). Regulating institu-
tions and rules determine the playing field and how a chain is regulated and enforced. 
These define access and control to capital, creating opportunities and constraints 
(Raikes et al. 2000; Larson et al. 2007). Governance arrangements are critical in influ-
encing who controls what along a value chain, determining power between actors and 
institutions, and affecting cost and benefit distribution (Ribot 2005). The configuration 
of a chain can also have significant effects on access to and the value of products for 
different actors in the chain (te Velde et al. 2006), illustrated by the timber sector 
(Dykstra et al. 2003; Nasi et al. 2006). Power relations in value chains (Gereffi et al. 
2005; ILO 2006), can be viewed along a continuum: (a) market-based, where enterpris-
es deal with each other in ‘arms-length’ exchange transactions, there are many custom-
ers and suppliers, repeat product transactions are possible, information flows are limited 
                                                 
9  The ways in which effective coordination is effected in a world where resources, knowledge, and 
power are distributed though geographical space such as territorially based jurisdictions. 
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and there is no technical assistance; (b) balanced network, where enterprises form net-
works in which no one exercises undue control over others, suppliers have various cus-
tomers, there is an intense information flow in both directions, and both sides have ca-
pabilities and commitment to solve problems through negotiation; (c) directed network, 
in which enterprises form networks directed by a lead enterprise (for example a buyer-
driven chain with one major buyer of at least 50% of output), the customer defines the 
product and provides technical assistance, and there is imbalance of information; and 
(d) hierarchy, where firms are vertically integrated and the parent company controls its 
subsidiaries who have limited autonomy to take decisions. Highly governed chains can 
reduce production costs, increase quality and production speed and provide information 
to improve skills and production flows (ILO 2006). They may not however be equitable. 
Chain governance arrangements can be changed by identifying opportunities, entrance 
and leverage points, and using change agents to influence external and internal (prod-
uct-specific) factors in time and space, processing and management (Kaplinsky and 
Morris 2000; Keane 2008). Inclusion and/or exclusion conditions (Bush et al. 2007; 
Smith 2009) determine whether actors who wish to participate and benefit from a chain 
can do so. Changes can improve the distribution of gains along the chain (Humphrey et 
al. 2001).  
Pro-poor development has been area of explicit intervention and study in value 
chains (Grieg-Gran et al. 2005; van den Berg et al. 2007; Will 2008; Webber et al. 
2009). Development may be pro-poor when it has impacts beyond income increases, 
strengthening economic, social and organisational capacities – leading to increased con-
trol and power in chains by the poor and capacity to upgrade their position and increase 
or appropriate a greater share of profits. The increase of control and capacities is con-
ceptualised in the term economic rent (KIT et al. 2006), referring to the ability of actors 
to appropriate value and compete with others in a chain (Kaplinsky & Morris 2000). 
Liberalisation and globalisation mean that sustainable income growth in less developed 
countries is based on the efficient use of resources, as competitive forces continually 
drive down terms of trade. Pro-poor, sustainable development depends on the capacity 
to identify and appropriate value. Economic rents arise when scarce attributes are creat-
ed or possessed creating (temporary) entry barriers. New configurations can create prof-
it and competitive dynamics. As innovations occur, profit is whittled away and prices 
fall, leading to renewed innovations, either by the same actor or others, in pursuit of 
profit (Kaplinsky & Morris 2000). Profit can also be gained by competitive advantage – 
through innovations in governance arrangements such as access or control of (scarce) 
resources and infrastructure, controlling technologies, access to capital, better marketing 
capabilities and/or brands, possessing superior knowledge and information systems, bet-
ter human capital than competitors, superior organisation, better relationships with sup-
pliers and customers, creating and operating efficiently or due to entry barriers for com-
petitors. Pro-poor chains can be conceptualised by assessing changes in actor’s posi-
tions and activities, the involvement of (poor) actors in governing chains, value, transac-
tion costs, benefits and profits over time (KIT et al. 2006). Pro-poor focuses have in 
practice focused on those at the beginning of chains such as farmers and harvesters 
(Koch 2005; Lecup 2006), ignoring non-rural actors and demonising intermediaries and 
traders as bad guys profiting at the expense of the poor (KIT et al. 2008). A robust clas-
sification of ‘poor’ actors, drawn from Chapter 1, however goes wider than financial 
capital alone, embodying the capital types referred in the SLA. Vurro and colleagues 
(2009) model indicates that centrality (the extent to which an organization occupies a 
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central position in a network or chain) influences enterprises attentiveness to stakehold-
er concerns and willingness to accommodate requests. This leads to integrated ap-
proaches and increasing interconnectedness, progressively creating attitudes aimed at 
joint value creation among chain partners.  
As chains are temporally dynamic, understanding their historical context is important 
(Wardell 2005; Boomsma et al. 2011). This allows insights into the causes and drivers 
of change, values and configurations of rent over time, actors, how traditional know-
ledge has been used, and environmental and economic sustainability (COPLA 2009; 
Boomsma et al. 2011). Ethno-botany and anthropological approaches (Burham 1980; 
Cunningham 2001; Goheen 1996) can provide of historical information by using partic-
ipant observation, interviews and surveys. Harilal et al. (2006) stress the importance of 
going beyond a specific production location, micro or project level, to examine the con-
texts influencing chains. The economic context includes sources of demand, supply, al-
ternatives and scale (Donovan et al. 2008). Comparing NTFP-related income with other 
sources and livelihood characteristics provides the socio-economic context (Jensen et al. 
2008), particularly when products are seasonal and labour is uncosted (Tewari 2000; 
Belcher et al. 2005; Jensen 2009). Culture influences value, with social constructs – tra-
ditional and modern, influencing governance arrangements and value (Harilal et al. 
2006; Hughes et al. 2008). Social contextual factors include how NTFPs relate to other 
products auto-consumed and traded to understand substitution and seasonality 
(Purnomo et al. 2009). These allow value and product availability over time and in rela-
tion to incomes to be assessed. Fluctuations occur over time when abundance changes. 
Measuring these variables can be achieved through empirical fieldwork, recall, diaries 
and triangulation with trade data (Campbell et al. 2002a). Gender aspects have also 
been highlighted as important in chains (Bolwig et al. 2008; IFAD 2008). The political 
context on different scales affects values and livelihood strategies (Gibbon et al. 2005; 
Bernstein et al. 2006) as do the policy and legal arenas (Geldenhuys 2004; Ndoye et al. 
2009).The sources of forest products – the ecological context – has been recognised as 
critical for long-term livelihoods (Marshall et al. 2006b). Values have been shown to 
change significantly over time as harvesting methods and market arrangements affect 
the abundance of NTFP species (Zapfack et al. 1999; Lawrence et al. 2000; Ngobo et 
al. 2004, Geschiere 2007) and scarcity affects value (McLain et al. 2004). Evaluations 
of resource availability and harvesting have tended to lack systematic quantitative data 
over time (Jensen 2009) or focus predominantly on economic valuation, largely ignor-
ing environmental costs and benefits, with occasional exceptions (Kambewa et al. 
2007). Using appropriate inventory methodologies to assess specific NTFP resources 
has been stressed (Baker 2000; Wong et al. 2001), with participatory approaches incor-
porating indigenous resource knowledge adding context and information (van Dijk 
1999).  
Linking the concepts 
Meeting Elinor Ostrom, one of my academic ‘heroes’ at the 2010 International Union of 
Forest Research Organisations (IUFRO) Conference in South Korea, I asked how she 
might approach the governance of value chains with an eye on sustainable livelihoods. 
Her response confirmed that bricolage was an appropriate concept: that a multifaceted 
cocktail could give a rounded perspective. Also that using interdisciplinary research 
methods and concepts for common pool resources such as forest products was im-
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portant. Ostrom’s response reinforces that bricolage is appropriate as no one theory or 
concept completely embraces the subjects of forest products, value chains, governance, 
sustainability and livelihoods.  
So, how to ‘bricole’ something useful from this inter and intra-disciplinary assort-
ment of concepts that is relevant to the research questions? The Sustainable Livelihoods 
Approach (SLA) provides a key framework to examine the livelihoods of those in-
volved in forest product value chains, superimposed with VCA. VCA provides an ana-
lytical tool to operationalize and compare chains, but it is insufficient to examine insti-
tutional interactions. Political ecology and the Institutional Analysis and Development 
framework allow the interactions between politics, policy, institutions, organisations 
and actors to be incorporated into the SLA and VCA and assessed. Trade-offs between 
different types of capital can be examined using the SLA, measured primarily in eco-
nomic terms using monetary units. As there is no such common denominator for non-
monetary capital, actors’ perceptions of social and environmental capital are used. This 
draws on social and livelihoods indicators generated from the disciplines of human ge-
ography, anthropology, ecology and economic botany. Forestry and economic botany 
guidelines provide inspiration for evaluating sustainability, using surveys, inventories 
and participative approaches, combining local and scientific knowledge. Trade-offs can 
thus be framed in terms of political decisions between capitals. Political ecology pro-
vides a framework to examine explicit and implicit outcomes. The importance of con-
text is stressed by all the concepts in varying degrees. To understand the ecological, cul-
tural, economic, political and legal contexts in which the chains operate, anthropology, 
concepts from human geography, political sciences and law are used.  
 
 
 
Photo 2.1 Bricolage in action!  
Making a beehive from raffia, grasses, leaves and bamboos, 
Yaoundé, December 2008 
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Figure 2.2 Conceptual scheme 
 
 3  
Methodology 
This chapter explains the research methodology. It first describes how the conceptual 
framework was translated into a methodology. The research design is then outlined and 
the choice of subjects (chains, geographic regions and actors) justified. The methods 
used to answer the research questions are described and their limitations discussed. The 
overall limitations of this study are also deliberated. 
From conceptual framework to research methods 
The methods used to gather and analyse data were guided by the conceptual framework 
in Figure 2.2. They combine the sustainable livelihood framework (DFID 1999; Far-
rington et al. 1999) with value chain analysis (ILO 2006; Kaplinsky & Morris 2006; Le-
cup 2006). Putting value chain analysis at the core implies an analysis of (i) actors along 
the chain (harvesters, processors, traders, retailers, consumers) (Chapters 7 to10) and 
(ii) governance arrangements and institutions, acknowledging that multiple governance 
structures (customary authorities, statutory government, projects, etc.) set their own 
‘rules of the game’ (Ostrom et al. 1994, Ostrom 1990). Also that hybrid arrangements 
(chain platforms and networks) emerge from collective action. Governance arrange-
ments and institutions are analysed in Chapter 6, and chain-specific arrangements in 
Chapters 7 to 10. Methods inherent in value chain analysis include content analysis of 
policy documents and literature, interviews and observations of governance arrange-
ments; literature and secondary data analysis for the analysis of product values and trade 
data; interviews and observations of interactions between actors and stakeholders and 
the impacts of changes in the chains; and interviews and participatory action research to 
collect data on product use and social-cultural perceptions of values. 
Using the sustainable livelihoods framework implies that livelihood and sustain-
ability outcomes are analysed for the actors involved in the chain, based on an analysis 
of context (Chapter 5) and how actors combine assets and capitals (Chapters 7 to 9). 
Attention to sustainability aspects implies an analysis of environmental aspects, with a 
focus on the resource base (Chapter 4) and the sustainability of extraction (Chapters 7 to 
9). Literature review and situational analysis (Dietz 1999; Ostrom 1988; van Kersber-
gen & van Waarden 2004; Wollenberg et al. 2001) provided contextual information on 
the ecoregions and forest capital (Chapter 4) and the socioeconomic context of liveli-
hoods (Chapter 5). Resource assessments were conducted to determine chain-specific 
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forest product values (Chapters 7 to 9). Household surveys and interviews provided data 
on livelihood outcomes and perceptions of chain sustainability. Further details of the 
research methods are provided after the outline of the research design, which is summa-
rised in Table 5.4.  
Research design  
The research subjects were selected by defining the subject, spatial and temporal cadre, 
drawing on the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 2. The reasoning behind the 
choices is presented, with the selection criteria and results summarised in Table 3.1. 
 
Country selection 
Cameroon was selected as the study country. It is one of the most stable and peaceful 
countries in Central Africa with high levels of forest cover, low development, signifi-
cant poverty and inequality levels, high corruption, difficult business operating envi-
ronments and shift from predominately rural to urban habitation, with many ethnic 
groups having traditionally forest-based livelihoods. Cameroon faces increasing pres-
sure (differing by ecoregion) from shifting cultivation, population growth, extractive 
and plantation industries affecting land and forest-use and degradation. Its colonial past, 
similar to other Congo Basin countries, has resulted in overlays of customary tenure and 
many local variants of land tenure, regulation, policy, politics and administration. This 
allows a comparison of different contexts. These ingredients make the country relevant 
for a societal and developmental perspective, meeting the research objectives. Living in 
Cameroon for over six years also made this selection a very pragmatic choice, enabling 
in-depth empirical data collection on the context.  
 
Selection of forest phytogeographic regions and ecoregions  
Three ecoregions in which the NTFP value chains originate were selected. This enabled 
a contextual comparison of the geographic, political, ecological, economic and social 
similarities and differences to be explored and governance arrangements to be com-
pared. They also provide a boundary for the analysis of governance. 
 
Selection of NTFP chains 
Using the literature review, stakeholder interviews and situational analysis, a long list of 
NTFPs used and traded in Cameroon was prepared (presented in Appendix 2). The eco-
nomic, social and environmental contexts in which the chains operate were analysed, 
the results of which are elaborated in Chapters 4 to 6. Each NTFP was scored using the 
value scoring system in Table 3.2, based on the criteria in Box 3.1. The results are pre-
sented in Chapter 4, Appendices 2 and 3. From this long list, eight high value chains 
(i.e. with a value score of three or higher as explained in Table 3.2) originating in the 
three selected ecoregions were selected for further research. Three chains were studied 
in-depth, as examples of the initial three types of governance arrangements anticipated 
(Table 3.3). The results are presented in Chapters 7 to 9. Five chains provide a broader, 
representative view of products, actors and governance arrangements, presented in 
Chapter 10. It is notable that all chains are plant-based. High value animal-based chains, 
such as bushmeat and forest fish, did not meet all the selection criteria in Table 3.1. Da-
ta was collected on these chains and analysed partly through the opportunities presented 
by the organisations and projects mentioned in the Preface. 
49 
 
 
Table 3.1  Overview of selection criteria and research subjects 
Target popu-
lation  
Selection criteria  Variables selected  
Non-timber 
forest prod-
ucts 
High value  
 Significant consumption  
 Significant trade 
 Multiple use/products species  
 Multiple parts of species used 
 Ecological status (abundant or 
vulnerable) 
 Unsustainable extraction 
Priority NTFPs (Chapter 4) 
Priority NTFPs  
Ecoregions  
 
 
Ecoregion 
 
Origin by forest type  
 Humid Guineo-Congolian 
 
 Afromontane  
 Sudano-Zambezian savannah  
Ecoregions/forest capital (Chapter 4) 
Honey, Prunus africana, bamboo, Cola spp., 
Raphia spp. 
Gnetum spp., Irvingia spp., bamboo 
Honey, bamboo, Acacia spp. 
NTFP chains  Technical  
 Valuable and sizable chain  
 Sustainability issues apparent  
 Gender, participation & equity 
issues apparent 
 Production area and markets 
known 
Logistical  
 Support partners present in area  
 Accessible production zone  
 Support requested by actors 
NTFP value chains (Chapters 7 to 10) 
(See Table 3.3)  
Prunus africana, Gnetum spp., Irvingia spp.,  
honey, Cola spp., Raphia spp., bamboo, Acacia 
spp. 
Governance  Type of governance arrange-
ments  
 Statutory regulations  
 Customary regulations  
 Unregulated  
Governance arrangements (Chapters 6 to 10) 
Formal: Prunus africana, Gnetum spp., Acacia 
spp. 
Customary: Prunus africana, Gnetum spp.,  
Raphia spp., Cola spp., Acacia spp., honey 
Unregulated: Honey, bamboo 
Location of 
chains  
Location of chain activities  
 Major production zones 
 Major markets  
 
Production and market areas (Chapters 7 to 10) 
Gnetum spp. – SW, Littoral, Douala & Yaoundé 
markets, cities in Cameroon, Nigeria, Europe 
Prunus africana – NW, SW and Adamaoua, cities 
in Cameroon, Europe, USA, China 
Irvingia spp. – SW, Centre, South East, Yaoundé 
& Douala markets  
Honey – NW, SW, West, Adamaoua, 5 markets in 
cities in Cameroon & in Europe 
Bamboo – Centre, South, Littoral, NW, SW, East, 
Adamaoua and markets  
Cola spp. – Centre, NW, East, West, markets  
Raphia spp. – Centre, NW, East, West, markets.  
Actors in 
chains 
Main actors per value chain 
 Directly involved in chain 
 
Actor groups livelihood context (Chapters 5, 7 
to 10) 
Harvesters, processors, traders, wholesalers,  
exporters, importers, retailers, consumers 
Timing  Time span of study  
 Seasonal production & main 
sales periods  
Timing (Chapters 6 to 10) 
Peak of high season and market offer  
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Table 3.2  Value scoring system 
Score Value and use 
1 Minor consumption (for cultural, medicinal, food, tools, construction use) 
2 Multiple use species (own consumption) 
Limited trade (local trade or barter/exchange) 
3 Multiple use and local regional trade  
4 Wide-scale trade (important revenue source, regional, national and international trade) 
Multiple use species (own consumption and trade) 
Major consumption (important cultural, medicinal, food, tools and construction uses) 
Species ecological status – classified as protected or vulnerable  
5 Major consumption and wide-scale trade nationally and/or internationally and/or protected 
 
 
In the value scoring system in Table 3.2, scores were allocated derived from the con-
ceptual framework. Environmental, social and economic values were scored in parallel, 
reinforcing the holistic and multidimensional values of NTFPs for well-being and live-
lihoods. Social value was inferred if the product is consumed or used by harvesters, is 
bartered, or was indicated as important by local populations in the literature and situa-
tional analysis. Social and economic value was scored as higher if a species has multiple 
uses, and if multiple parts of a species are used (Ingram et al. 2012b). When multiple 
uses or social or economic importance were not indicated, a ‘minor consumption’ score 
was given. Environmental value was assessed based on the level of threat or vulnerabil-
ity to a species. This was derived if demand for a product exceeds supply, if extraction 
methods are unsustainable, if there are low levels of cultivation or domestication, and/or 
if the species is classified as protected under national laws1, or is a CITES or Red Data 
                                                 
1  For wildlife under the 1994 Forestry and Wildlife Law, Section 78 (1) and Order No. 0648/MINFOF 
of 18 December 2006 classifying animal species into three protection classes, and for flora under Sec-
tion 9.2 of the 1994 Law as a Special Forestry Product (SFP) and Decision No 0336/D/MINFOF of 
2006. 
Box 3.1     A definition of priority NTFPs 
The selection logic of the ‘key’ or ‘major’ plant NTFPs identified by Wilkie (1999) was un-
clear: the nineteen ‘major’ species include those with low trade volumes and own use. The 
criteria do not appear to be based on current economic, social or environmental values. Two 
studies subsequently reiterated existing key NTFPs (FAO 1999; Mbolo et al. 2002), embed-
ding these in popular development and forestry mind-sets and being repeated verbatim 
(Noubissie et al. 2008). ‘Priority’ or ‘key’ NTFPs have also been defined (Zapfack et al. 
1999; Clark et al. 2004) as those:  
1. Which have a high economic trade value or are important for auto-consumption (i.e. val-
ue for livelihoods); 
2. Where demand for the product exceeds supply i.e. unsustainable exploitation. This is a 
function of in-situ conservation priority status and domestication.  
Adding to this list, other criteria drawn from the conceptual framework (see Chapter 2) are: 
3. Species which have multiple uses, including conflicting uses;  
4. Species from which multiple parts are used; 
5. Species’ ecological status: classified as vulnerable or protected (for example, on the Red 
Data list, CITES listed and/or protected by national laws) due to either their rarity or to 
threats to their ecosystem. 
These five criteria together address economic, social-cultural and environmental values.  
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listed threatened species. If a value assessment was indicated in the literature, this was 
used. To compensate for the predominance of data on economic value, a scoring system 
was developed. This builds upon studies (Wilkie 1999; Clark et al. 2004) shown in Ta-
ble 3.2. Species with multiple uses and from which multiple parts are used, were scored 
higher (Zapfack et al. 2001b).  
 
Selection of chains demonstrating alternative governance arrangements 
The number of chains was narrowed from the eight shown in Table 3.3 to three for in-
depth case study: Gnetum spp., apiculture and Prunus africana. These chains have dif-
ferent types of governance arrangements (shown in Table 3.1) but have major produc-
tion areas in the same geographical region, providing similar ecological, cultural, social 
and political contexts. At the time of selection, honey was not regulated and customary 
regulation unknown. Prunus africana was highly regulated by projects, markets, nation-
al and international regulations and customs. The Gnetum spp. chain was known to be 
governed by some formal and informal regulations. A further five chains were selected: 
Cola nuts (Cola spp.), bush mango (Irvingia spp.), raffia products (Raphia spp.), bam-
boo (Yushania alpina and Oxytenanthera abyssinica) and gum arabic (Acacia spp.). 
These products and chains originate from the same three ecoregion study areas. They 
provide both complementary and contrasting views on chains configurations (the prod-
ucts, location, actors, activities and values), their governance arrangements and sustain-
able livelihood outcomes. They allow a broader view of products and chains, repre-
sentatively reflecting the range of NTFPs used and traded in Cameroon. The common 
geographical area reduced costs and fieldwork time, maximised stakeholders interac-
tions and efficiencies of scale in participatory action research (PAR) interventions. 
 
Selection of value chain actors  
The selected populations were the people and organisations (hereafter termed ‘actors’) 
involved in chains. Although each chain has specific actors and terminology, similar 
populations of direct (harvesters, processors, intermediaries/wholesalers, exporters, re-
tailers and consumers) and indirect actors (such as support, development, regulatory and 
other organisations governing the chain) were selected to aid comparability. Only con-
sumers in Cameroon were interviewed. Snowballing and situational analysis was used 
to estimate the type and number of actors at each stage of the chain. The 2,195 actors 
selected and interviewed, shown in Table 3.4, represent an estimated 25% sample (ex-
cept for consumers) of actors in each chain from the main production zone of study. 
 
Selection of research locations 
Using the literature review, interviews and situational analysis, chains were traced from 
the main harvest areas to retailers in Cameroon and Nigeria and consumers in Came-
roon. This allowed the selection of research sites shown in Figure 3.1. Within the har-
vest areas, villages were selected by stratified purposive sampling to include those with 
easy and difficult access to markets.  
 
Timing 
To aid recall for the seasonally harvested NTFPs (Irvingia, honey and Cola spp.), inter-
views were timed to coincide just after production and peak market or sales periods. 
When not possible, observations and trade data gathering coincided with subsequent 
peak seasons. Respondents were asked to recall a period of three subsequent years. 
52 
 
Table 3.3  Overview of NTFP value chains studied  
Species 
scientific name 
Common 
product 
names1 
Vernacular 
product 
names 
Life form Ecoregion & 
forest type 
Parts used Uses 
Gnetum african-
um 
G. buchholzianum 
Gnetum Eru, okok, 
koko 
Climbing 
vine, 10 m 
height 
Guineo-
Congolian 
Primary, sec-
ondary and 
farm bush 
Leaves, 
stem 
Food,  medici-
nal 
Apis mellifera  
adansonii 
Honey, miel 
wax, cire 
propolis 
Honey,  
D’or des 
abeilles 
Insect  Afromontane 
Sudano 
 
Secondary 
products 
honey, wax, 
propolis 
Food, medici-
nal, cosmetic, 
material 
Prunus africana Pygeum, 
African cher-
ry, red stink-
wood 
Pygeum, 
kanda stick 
Evergreen 
tree to 40 m 
height, 150 
cm diameter 
Afromontane, 
primary &  
secondary 
forest,  
on farm 
Bark, seeds, 
leaves, 
timber 
Medicinal, 
carving, timber, 
fuelwood, 
forage 
Cola acuminata, 
C. nitida,     
C. anomala 
Cola nuts Abel, cola, 
goro,  
Bamenda 
cola, ehbe, 
ebii 
Evergreen 
tree 20 m 
height 50 cm 
diameter 
Afromontane 
Guineo-
Congolian 
Seeds, bark Stimulant, 
medicinal 
Irvingia gabonen-
sis, 
I. wombulu 
Bush mango 
mangue 
sauvage 
 Ndo’o, 
andok 
Evergreen 
tree to 40 m 
height, 100 
cm diameter 
Guineo-
Congolian 
Primary, sec-
ondary, on 
farm 
Fruit, seed, 
bark,  
timber 
Food (condi-
ment, oil), dye. 
medicinal, 
construction 
fuelwood 
Raphia farinifera, 
R. vinifera, 
R. hookeri 
Raffia 
 
Raffia, cane 
Indian bam-
boo, mimbo 
Palm 10 m 
tall 30 cm 
diameter 
Afromontane 
Guineo-
Congolian 
riverine 
gallery,  
planted 
Stems, sap, 
leaves, 
seeds 
Materials, 
construction 
tools, crafts, 
wine, food 
Yushania alpina, 
Oxytenanthera 
abyssinica 
Bamboo, 
Chinese 
bamboo, 
cane 
 
 
Intomtom 
ebtotom, 
tomtom 
kehweh  
kok-ko, 
men-
tomtommba-
setutuy 
Grass to  
10 m height, 
10 m clump 
diameter 
Afromontane 
Sudano  
Primary, river-
ine, planted 
Stems Materials, 
construction 
tools, crafts, 
fuelwood, 
forage 
Acacia senegal,  
A. polyacantha,  
A. laeta, A. seyal, 
A. sieberiana 
Gum arabic Gum, gum 
acacia, 
gomme 
arabique 
Deciduous 
tree 5-12 m 
height, 10 m 
diameter 
Sudano, culti-
vated 
Resin,  
bark, 
leaves, 
timber 
Cosmetic, food, 
medicinal, 
material, for-
age, timber 
 1 In English and in French. Source: Research results 
53 
 
Figure 3.1 Map of research sites 
Market 
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Table 3.4   Overview of NTFP value chain actors interviewed 
Value chain Gnetum Honey Prunus Irvingia Acacia Bamboo Cola Raphia Total 
Region1 SW, 
L 
NW, 
Ad 
NW, 
SW 
SW,C,
S,L,E 
N, 
ExN 
NW,W 
SW, E 
NW NW  
Number of interview sites  
No of villages  21 46 9 36 16 16 28 33 205
No of markets  9 6 5 27 2 4 30 31 130
No of nurseries 4 9 36 1 5  1  56
No of plantations   3 22  18  2  45
Value chain actor interviews conducted 
Harvesters 76 340 132 203 24 39 91 77 475
Processors 3  8  5 38   82
Intermediaries 6 40 9 2     39
Retailers 66 70 4 193 3 31 63 45 73
Wholesalers 14 6  60 2    5
Exporters  12 10 4 11 2    8
Consumers  30 2   41   16
Restaurants 5        25
Community forests    8      86
Importers 10 4 2      232
Support/NGOs  4  6  15    61
Nursery workers 3 1 36  44  2  475
Indirect stakeholders   98 10 12 112   82
Focus groups 11 17 13 19  1   39
Total  210 518   322   498  107   262   156   122  2,195 
Year of VC inter-
views 
2009/ 
2010 
2006/ 
2010 
2006/ 
2009 
2007/ 
2009 
2007 2010 2010 2010  
1 Regions: Ad=Adamaoua E=East L=Littoral S=South SW=Southwest N=North W=West ExN=Extreme North  
                  NW=Northwest  
 
Research and analysis methods 
This section justifies the methods chosen to translate the research questions into an ap-
plied enquiry drawing on the interdisciplinary conceptual framework outlined in Chap-
ter 2. This approach meant that a range of data sources and collection methods were 
used to obtain quantitative and qualitative data, illustrated in Table 3.5.  
The main approach was to use comparative, field-based case studies of the selected 
NTFP value chains. Case studies allow tailoring of the design and data collection pro-
cedures to research questions, enabling the contextual nature of contemporary phenom-
ena in real-life contexts and the presentation of holistic, in-depth investigation (Tellis 
1997). Case studies are a conventional but good method for multi-level analysis 
(Agrawal 2007), but are subject to significant criticism in terms of their statistical con-
clusion, external and construct validity. Meyer (2001) therefore recommends that case 
studies are explicit about the choices made and decisions on design, data collection, 
analysis, validity and reliability. Yin (2009) highlights that an average case is often not 
the richest in information but that extreme and different cases are more revealing. For 
this reason, different and similar products that met the selection criteria were chosen. 
This allowed a clarification of the causes of different governance arrangements and their 
impacts. Three chains were researched in-depth to increase internal and construct validi-
ty. Literature reviews, trade data and observations were used to increase external validi-
ty. Given the paucity of official data, recall sensitivities and the sensitivity of questions  
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Table 3.5     Overview of research methods used per research question 
Methods used Research question 
Literature review: to describe and understand the status of the NTFPs, actors, activities, 
processes and interactions in chains. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
Stakeholder interviews: to understand how, where and when the actors, activities, 
products, processes and interactions in value chains occur and why. 1, 3, 4, 5 
Situational analysis: describe and understand the contexts in which the chains exist and 
explain arrangements. 1, 2 
Value chain analysis (VCA): to analyse how and why interactions between actors, 
products and processes occur in chains. Included interviews and observation. 1, 2, 3 ,4, 5 
Trade data: to identify actors, processes and interactions in chains. Understand demand 
and supply interactions over time, provide current and historical livelihood value. 1, 2, 4 
Participatory action research (PAR): to understand how actors interact, how activities 
in chains are conducted. 1, 2 
Resource assessment: to inventory Prunus africana, bark regeneration and harvest 
methods to assess impact of harvesting on resource sustainability. Apiculture forage 
source inventory to explain sources of bee forage. Identification of Gnetum species har-
vested and harvesting methods to identify vulnerabilities and threats. 
1, 5 
 
 
concerning governance, wealth and household, income and markets (van Dorp et al. 
1998) which are notoriously difficult to obtain reliable data on (Campbell et al. 2002c), 
a triangulated approach was necessary. To also compensate for data weaknesses and 
obtain primary and secondary data on NTFP values, a significantly large-sized sample 
and multiple data sources and methods were used. The selection of actors also involved 
a balance between data quality, cost and time restraints and so value chain interviews 
were limited to direct actors (harvesters, processors, traders, retailers, consumers and 
their associations, shown in detail in Table 3.4) in the chains. Gaps in findings from the 
value chain analysis raised the need for resource assessments to determine sustainabil-
ity, address weaknesses in construct validity and increase internal validity. An overview 
of methods used per chain is shown in Table 3.6, with the methods used described in 
detail in the following section. 
 
 
Table 3.6   Overview of methods used per NTFP value chain  
Chain Literature 
review 
Stakeholder
interviews 
Situation 
analysis 
VCA Trade 
data 
PAR Governance 
arrangements 
Resource 
assessment 
Gnetum spp. X X X X X X X X 
Apiculture X X X X X X X X 
P. africana  X X X X X X X X 
Gum arabic X X X X X X X  
Bamboo X X X X X X X  
Irvingia spp. X X X X X X X  
Cola spp. X X X X X  X  
Raphia spp. X X X X X  X  
 
 
Literature review 
A review of literature was conducted concerning NTFPs used and traded in Cameroon. 
This included scientific and local names, uses, parts used, values and volumes, levels of 
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domestication, harvest impact and the main production (phytogeographic regions and 
ecoregions). This secondary data provided information on the contexts and helped veri-
fy and triangulate primary data. The majority of the publications used were grey litera-
ture, due to a paucity of scientific articles (Pouris et al. 2009). From 500 grey publica-
tions, 92 were retained, including recipe books to provide an insight into food uses. 
About 600 peer-reviewed scientific journals and books were reviewed, 242 of which 
were retained. Academic theses and reports from research institutes in Cameroon (the 
Cameroonian Institute for Agricultural Research (IRAD), the French Centre for Interna-
tional Agricultural Research and Development (CIRAD), the French Institute for Re-
search and Development (IRD), Tropenbos International-Cameroon and the World Ag-
roforestry Centre (ICRAF)) were also reviewed. The detailed results are presented by 
species (Appendix 3), subject (Appendix 4) and region (Appendix 5). A content analy-
sis of policies and regulations was conducted to provide advice on the revision of the 
1994 Forestry law. This was conducted first alone, supported by CIFOR and presented 
through their contribution to the Circle of Partners of MINFOF (CCPM). It was further 
developed as part of FAO-CIFOR-SNV-ICRAF NTFP project guidance for a national 
Prunus management plan and a national, participatory review of the law. In 2013, rec-
ommendations for revisions of the law and implementing texts on NTFPs were further 
elaborated upon the request of the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife through the GIZ-
managed ProPSFE. This resulted in recommendations presented to MINFOF (FAO 
2010, FAO 2010a, 2010b, 2010c; FAO et al. 2008), and published recommendations 
(Laird et al. 2010; Ingram et al. 2009). 
 
Stakeholder interviews 
Stakeholders are defined as groups of people and organisations with a right, mandate 
and/or interest in the NTFP and their value chains. These indirect actors included cus-
tomary authorities; regulatory authorities; research organisations; NGOs and CSOs; pro-
ject, donor, multilateral, and bilateral organisations; convention and certification agen-
cies and service providers. ‘Constellations’ were drawn up to cluster and identify stake-
holders and indicate their interactions, authority, roles and activities in the chain. These 
constellations were verified with stakeholders, enterprises, associations of NTFP actors 
and researchers. These were further elaborated into maps, pinpointing the locations of 
actors at each stage of the chain, the locations of markets, consumers and stakeholders. 
As these stakeholders can also be information gatekeepers, people in different stake-
holder groups were asked the same questions about numbers and types of actors in 
chains – including main characteristics of stakeholders such as age, gender, ethnic 
group. This aimed to avoid bias, verify and triangulate the target population and enable 
representative sample sites to be selected. Further interviews, discussions and corre-
spondence were also held with stakeholders and with knowledgeable informants work-
ing in the NTFP sector. This yielded additional literature and helped gain a further un-
derstanding of the chains and products. Interviews were written up and both qualitative 
and quantitative data were triangulated with data from value chain questionnaires and 
quotes presented as personal communications. The results were incorporated into Chap-
ters 7 to 10. 
 
Situation analysis  
To define the context of each specific value chain, seven situation and problem analysis 
workshops were held with multiple stakeholders. These were held in Yaoundé, Buea 
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and Bamenda from 2006 to 2010. Building on the literature review for each chain, situa-
tion analysis (IUCN 2008b) was used to understand the individuals and organisations in 
chains, the contexts they operate in and their perceptions. This allowed institutions and 
arrangements influencing the chains to be understood and identify key issues and trends 
affecting people’s livelihoods, the chains they operate in and ecosystems in the region. 
It also helped further identify and refine stakeholders. The results of the situation anal-
yses were incorporated into Chapters 7 to 10.  
 
Value chain analysis 
Based on the conceptual framework concerning value chains described in Chapter 2, for 
each selected NTFP a value chain analysis was conducted as a case study. Specific ac-
tivities carried out as part of the value chain analysis are detailed in Appendices 6 and 
13. The analysis was built up in the following stages: 
 
1. Structured questionnaires were developed based on the value indicators (detailed in 
Appendix 7). These were drawn from the conceptual framework, inspired by Tewa-
ri’s (2000) argument that a classical economic evaluation does not address changing 
markets and currencies, externalities, indirect, optional and existence values. Also 
recognising the need for a holistic livelihoods approach (van Dorp et al. 1998; Sheil 
et al. 2002; Hiremath 2004; Bennett 2006), incorporating environmental aspects 
(Bush et al. 2004), political, socio-economic and cultural factors (Hiremath 2004; 
Ticktin et al. 2011). The questionnaire elicited data on economic value (production, 
costs, prices, profits and household incomes), social aspects (socio-economic data, 
values, household and NTFP incomes and expenses, wellbeing, happiness), cultural 
aspects (ethnic, gender and cultural use and value of a product) and environmental 
aspects (species source, harvesting methods, perceptions of sustainability, abun-
dance, scarcity and vulnerability) for the previous three years of activities. The ques-
tionnaires were adapted to each chain and to actors (producers, trader, wholesalers, 
retailers, exporters/importers and consumers), tested and revised to produce a final 
version for each chain and actor group.  
2. Teams of multilingual, mainly student enumerators, seventeen in total2, were recruit-
ed and trained to conduct the interviews using the appropriate questionnaires for each 
chain and actor group (see Appendix 7). At the start of each round of interviews, the 
enumerator’s comprehension of the questions and answers was verified. In most of 
the chains, the enumerators also acted as translators if respondents did not speak (or 
did not like to use) English, French3 or Pidgin, the main fieldwork languages. How-
ever, the ethnic diversity of interviewees meant that local translators were also used 
to ensure accuracy when specific groups were encountered in the production areas 
(Baka, Fulani and Peul in the Irvingia spp. and Acacia spp. chains). 
3. Interviewees were selected using non-probability sampling techniques, including 
convenience sampling (for example, being approached during chain activities) or 
snowball sampling (where other actors in the chains suggested appropriate respond-
ents) (Henry 1990). A total of 2,195 one-to-one interviews were conducted in the 
                                                 
2   See Acknowledgements for details. 
3  Cameroon is officially bilingual, but in practice people in the Southwest and Northwest are mainly 
Anglophone and speak pidgin, the rest of the country is Francophone. Local languages are commonly 
spoken, particularly among the elderly, illiterate and in remote areas. 
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field with actors in the chain using the appropriate questionnaires (see full question-
naires in Appendix 7). Interviews were mostly conducted early in the morning or late 
in the afternoon or at night, either in households, forest-farm edge or in public places 
(meeting houses, markets, bars etc.) to avoid conflicts with other activities and en-
sure that children and women were also available for an interview. In markets, some 
traders and wholesalers were extremely busy and were interviewed whilst on the job. 
Importers and exporters were interviewed by telephone, email and in person, mainly 
at their offices or warehouses. Random interviews with 673 consumers (including 
restaurants) were conducted in markets. Limitations of the interview method includ-
ed poor memory recall and an almost complete absence of written records by most 
actors. Where possible people were interviewed during or just after the main harvest 
season (if applicable), as some actors are present in the production areas and markets 
only during the season. This aided recall and provided a larger population sample for 
random selection. Some of the products have biennial peak and low years, and for 
products with short harvest seasons (notably Cola spp. and Irvingia spp.), and with 
irregular harvests (bamboo and Prunus africana), it was not always possible to coin-
cide fieldwork precisely. Data for these products may thus have a lower degree of 
representativeness. 
4. A total of 61 focus groups were held in villages and markets, facilitated by myself 
and the enumerators, guided by a questionnaire (see Appendix 7). Focus groups were 
usually held after a day or so of interviews in the village, upon explaining the study 
and seeking permission of traditional and/or local authorities. They allowed further 
populations to be targeted and met, and actors not previously interviewed to be ques-
tioned, such as women, youths and different ethnic groups. They were used to facili-
tate group discussion, enable data triangulation and clarification of points raised in 
interviews. Meetings were also timed to include as many actors as possible. In the 
villages and markets selected, the total population of potential target actors were 
never all available.  
5. Data analysis was conducted in four phases. Data was entered into Excel or directly 
into SPSS version 16. With support from a statistician4 the data was checked for con-
sistency of names, and units and measures calibrated (see Appendix 8). Common 
metric units of measurement from field units were calculated and extrapolated to an-
nual volumes and values. Data were extrapolated from an individual to actor group 
and village and study region level. Where annual volumes and values were not given, 
but data was provided in terms of weeks or months, data was extrapolated to a 12-
month period for non-seasonal products (e.g. Gnetum spp. and Prunus africana). 
Where only seasonal production data was available, this was used without extrapola-
tion. Seasonal fluctuations and natural changes in productivity and supply and de-
mand changes were also calculated as annual averages. Statistical and quantitative 
analyses were conducted with twelve equations used to calculate annual quantities, 
annual production costs, profits, income and aggregated values (shown in appendix 
9) . Profits were calculated using only stated costs, as actors normally did not provide 
an economic value or opportunity cost for their own time engaged in NTFP chain- 
related activities. This is a frequently occurring problem in quantifying livelihood 
costs and benefits (Campbell et al. 2002c; Angelsen et al. 2011a). If labour was hired 
                                                 
4  See Acknowledgements for details. 
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and paid for, these costs were included. Logic regression analysis was used to ex-
plain dependency on NTFPs and the Gini coefficient to test inequality in NTFP in-
comes and whether, and to what extent, NTFP income helps reduce income inequali-
ties. Details of the equations used are presented in Appendix 9.  
6. Research findings were verified with stakeholders during chain meetings and three 
regional workshops in 2009 and 2010, organised and supported as part of the FAO-
CIFOR-SNV NTFP project. They were also cross-checked in meetings with repre-
sentatives of the Central African Forests Commission (COMIFAC) and Cameroon 
government, FAO, the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) and national research 
organisations.  
 
The resulting analyses of the three selected in-depth value chains – Gnetum spp. apicul-
ture and Prunus africana – are presented in Chapters 7 to 9 and the five other chains in 
Chapter 10. Detailed reports of the value chain analyses are provided in Appendices 6 
and 14.  
 
Trade data  
Official trade data was obtained from the Ministry of Forestry (MINFOF) on quotas al-
located and quantities exploited of Special Forestry Products (SFPs); the MINFOF Da-
tabase of Commercialised Species in Cameroon (COMCAM) detailing export quanti-
ties, importing countries and exporters of forest products exports since 2004; annual re-
ports from MINFOF to CITES; and customs records in the Port of Douala. The database 
of Forestry Information (Système de Gestion de l’Information Forestière, SIGIF) was 
investigated but did not contain any data on NTFPs. Internet sales sites were reviewed. 
These offered a guide to products and prices, but actual sales prices were expected to 
differ from those advertised. Variations between government data (SFP permits and 
COMCAM), actor’s reports and internet sources indicated that not all NTFPs traded and 
exported are captured by government statistics, the results of which are indicated in 
Chapters 4 and 7 to 9. The lack of long-term and consistently recorded trade data made 
it difficult to establish baselines to track prices and volumes for all products. For the 
apiculture chain, in collaboration with the Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries and Animal 
Industries (MINEPIA), data from a 2008-2009 survey on beekeepers and their organisa-
tions, numbers and types of hives, year of commencement of operation, annual volumes 
and prices of honey and other apiculture products, was obtained, checked, cleaned and 
added to data obtained from workshops and questionnaires. General trade data is pre-
sented in Chapter 4 and Appendix 10; trade data for the specific chains studied in Chap-
ters 7 to 10 and exported NTFP trade data is shown in Appendix 11.  
To triangulate the trade data and literature review, traders and market managers were 
interviewed and the products, prices and volumes traded were surveyed once in ten 
towns: Abong Mbang, Bafoussam, Bamenda, Dschang, Idenau, Kribi, Limbe, Lomié, 
Makenene and Yaoundé in between 2008 and 2010. This method did not allow seasonal 
variations to be addressed but enabled a verification of all the traded NTFPs and espe-
cially small quantities of condiments and barks not captured by the trade data and the 
literature. Data and reports from the SNV Market Information System (MIS) and the 
CIFOR NTFP databases provided complementary information. The results are also pre-
sented in Chapter 4 and Chapters 7 to 9. Limitations of this method include difficulty in 
distinguishing species, as some products are sold generically and are processed and thus 
difficult to identify. For example eru is the common name for two species: Gnetum 
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buchholzianum and Gnetum africanum, which are not distinguished when traded. Simi-
larly, bush mango, ndo’o and mangue sauvage are trade names for two species (Irvingia 
gabonensis and Irvingia wombulu), the dried kernels of which are not distinguishable, 
although species can be distinguished by harvesters. Bushmeat (monkeys, duikers and 
small rodents in particular) are often sold by generic names and difficult to identify vis-
ually once dried or smoked. Many caterpillars are often known only by their local 
names or by the host tree. For some caterpillar, insect and mushroom species, the scien-
tific name has not been identified (Hoare 2007). For many condiments traders referred 
to the names of barks, herbs and spices by their use (for food or medicinal use) such as 
epice d’nkui and achu spices.  
As part of the FAO-CIFOR-SNV NTFP Project (see Preface), a national apiculture 
market survey was conducted according by a team of researchers.5 The report is provid-
ed in Appendix 10. This set the baseline of actors, prices and volumes and enabled lon-
gitudinal data to be gathered from 2006 to 2010 with 465 individuals during 18 focus 
group meetings and workshops with beekeepers, traders, exporters, importers and con-
sumers. At each meeting trade data and volumes were tracked and validated by actors. 
Market prices for Prunus africana were also tracked from 2006 to 2010 during partici-
pation in Prunus Platform meetings. A limitation of this method is the accuracy of recall 
by producers and traders of seasonal and annual variations, which was an issue as most 
do not record sales, values and volumes. This was minimised by limiting the data to the 
last three years or to written records and verifying data against current and historical 
data from the literature and market observations. 
Also as part of the FAO-CIFOR-SNV NTFP Project, Market Information Systems 
(MIS) were initiated to track the impact of interventions once the value chain analyses 
had provided a baseline. MIS are tools to help build capacity and empower marginalised 
and poor actors in forest chains to design, provide and use market information (Ribot 
1998; Lecup et al. 2000; Scherr et al. 2003). The MIS were piloted in response to re-
quests of actors. Market prices, the dynamics and how information flows affect interac-
tions were tracked monthly. Details of the MIS results were published as project reports 
(Mekongo et al. 2008; SNV 2009c; b; Fon 2010; SNV 2010a; SNV 2010b)6.  
Databases were consulted and analysed to provide long-term data on key NTFPs and 
the selected products, providing a historical perspective, verifying and triangulating the 
production and consumption regions and values derived from interviews. The Conven-
tion on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) 
database from the United Nations World Conservation Monitoring Centre (WCMC)7 of 
internationally traded species was accessed to evaluate the value and volumes of CITES 
listed NTFPs from Cameroon. There is a discrepancy between the Cameroon govern-
ment data and CITES data regarding trade in Prunus africana over the period 1995 to 
2007. This may be due to different definitions in the early 2000s about dried, powered 
and fresh bark. Although data was not available for all years from either database, ulti-
mately these databases were judged as sufficiently accurate. CIFOR’s NTFP databases 
were also analysed. These contain the results of weekly monitoring of 27 NTFPs in 28 
predominately food-based markets in the Centre, South, East, Littoral and Southwest 
regions of Cameroon. The markets were visited by CIFOR staff on average twice in 
                                                 
5  See Acknowledgements for details and Box 3.2. 
6  URL: http://www.fao.org/forestry/enterprises/nwfp-centralafrica-eu/en/, retrieved 10 June 2012. 
7  URL: http://www.unep-wcmc.org/citestrade, retrieved 10 January 2010. 
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1995 (interviewing 253 traders) and three times in 1996 (interviewing 315 traders), and 
a sample of retailers, wholesalers and producers surveyed between June and August 
1997. Full details of the results are presented in Appendix 14. The methods follow those 
detailed by Shanley et al. (2009). A single database containing all annual data was then 
created in Excel and transferred into SPSS and subsequently updated with baseline sur-
veys covering harvest seasons in the period 2007 to 2010.  
From these data sources, trade volumes and values were averaged to minimise the ef-
fect of seasonal variations. Annual values are calculated from the different data sources 
dating from 1990 to 2010. As the methods of calculations were not always explicit, the 
results of combined values for different products and years are therefore approximate. 
Prices have not been adjusted for inflation as in the study period inflation remained low 
(0.3% from 2006 to 2007, 5.4% from 2007 to 2008, and 3% from 2008 to 2009 
(Trading Economics 2011). Although the basic goods prices increased in 2007 to 2008, 
leading to violence in February 2008, this was followed by government subsidies and 
price regulation of some staple and imported goods, and local foodstuff prices remained 
stable (Central Intelligence Agency 2009). If not quoted, prices were converted from 
FCFA to US$ using the historical, inflation-linked equivalent US$ exchange rate8 to 
provide equivalent terms for 2010 and enable a comparison (details shown in Appendix 
1). Values provided are either ‘forest gate’ (i.e. value to harvesters) or retail market val-
ues. Where no export prices were available, prices advertised on the internet were used. 
Total values and volumes were calculated by selecting the most recent data for a spe-
cies. If several discrete geographical studies provided information, all these were used 
when there was no overlap. Where no details of values and volumes were found, this 
has a distorting effect on the selection based purely on economic values, particularly for 
products where exchange, gifts and non-cash trade can be significant (Willcox et al. 
2007; Wright et al. 2010b). 
 
Participatory action research 
A participatory action research (PAR) approach was used to address specific gaps about 
the products, their ecology, governance, management and markets. The PAR approach 
combined science and capacity building. PAR is an eclectic and dynamic field with 
multidisciplinary roots and fast evolving (Sithole 2002). The core of PAR is to increase 
understanding of how change in actions or practices can mutually benefit a community 
of practitioners (McNiff & Whitehead 2002). It is based on a continuous, cycle of sys-
tematic planning, taking action, observing, evaluating and reflecting, prior commencing 
the next cycle (Wadsworth 1998). The method tests ideas on value chains and imple-
ments action with the direct participation of the value chain actors concerned in a dy-
namic research process, while monitoring and evaluating the effects of the researcher’s 
actions with the aim of improving practice. The approach attempts to avoid extractive 
and unaccountable research (Shanley 2009, Shanley & Lopez 2009). 
Ideally PAR is by and for local people with results directly applied to the problems. 
In practice, as an obviously foreign researcher, (‘le blanche’, ‘white man’ or ‘sara’9 
were frequently heard cries whilst doing fieldwork), this was achieved by being part of 
locally embedded organisations (SNV and CIFOR), working with the Western High-
lands Nature Conservation Network (WHINCONET) in a professional capacity with 
                                                 
8  URL: http://www.usinflationcalculator.com, retrieved 10 January 2010. 
9  ‘Sara’ and ‘white man’ are pidgin for a white (Caucasian) person, both male and female. 
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SNV and working with an enterprise, Guiding Hope (see Box 3.2). Chambers (1983) 
points out a limitation of PAR where the intrinsically political and external ‘outsider 
seeking to change things’ results in empowering participation, but which is also politi-
cal, as a development organisation/researcher relationship affects power dynamics. Out-
comes of PAR are notoriously difficult to predict. Achievements depend on the re-
searchers and targets and context. Results can be difficult to causally attribute to the in-
terventions implemented (SNV 2008). To overcome these problems, questions and 
comments were invited at the beginning and end of each questionnaire and focus group, 
and for every meeting or workshop an anonymous evaluation form was provided and 
analysed. The main PAR activities are listed in Appendix 12. With SNV, quarterly 
monthly monitoring and feedback sessions were conducted, leading to revisions of ac-
tivities and approaches. Annual monitoring and evaluation of the FAO-CIFOR-SNV 
NTFP Project yielded lessons learnt, aiding planning of subsequent activities. With 
Guiding Hope, annual evaluations allowed results and impacts to be evaluated. 
 
Aware of the (deliberate and possible unintended) effects of disclosing and dissemi-
nating value chain data in terms of changes to power and relations between actors, mar-
kets, gender and ethnic groups, these dynamics were periodically reviewed both as part 
of the projects and personally, with action taken to further inform or correct, where ei-
ther actors noted perceived imbalances in power or relationships or they were perceived.  
Box 3.2     Participatory action research  
Whilst working with SNV, WHINCONET and its members were clients with whom I worked to 
develop and implement capacity building and collaboration contracts concerning governance, 
collaborative natural resource and forest management, pro-poor tourism and private sector 
development from 2004 to 2008. I became an individual, honorary member of the Network 
and continued to work with them from 2008 to date, providing advice and assistance to devel-
op and conduct new activities, projects and research, to monitor and reflect on their progress, 
activities, challenges and successes.  
In 2006 I met three of the eventual co-directors of Guiding Hope when they successfully ten-
dered for a market study of apiculture in Cameroon (Erasmus et al. 2006), a project I man-
aged as part of my work with SNV. Nine months later, I was presented with a wax candle, 
symbolising the opportunities they had seen whilst conducting the study and subsequently 
turned into action. This resulted in the registration in 2007of Guiding Hope as common initia-
tive group (CIG), a type of small enterprise, and their buying and eventually exporting a con-
tainer of wax to Europe, sourced from beekeepers across the Northwest and Adamaoua re-
gions. They had realised the long-held visions of the founders to create a for-profit, ethically 
operating enterprise based on sustainable apiculture. This pathway is described in Ingram 
and Njikeu (2011b). Guiding Hope did not receive capacity building from SNV, but collaborat-
ed with SNV and provided consultancy services in support of SNV’s Northwest apiculture 
chain programme from 2008 to 2010. Upon leaving SNV in 2008, Guiding Hope invited me to 
continue collaborating with them, to conduct my PhD research and become a director in the 
business. The benefits of these unusual participatory action research arrangements were an 
extremely close working relationship with the people, organisations, networks and chain ac-
tors. In-depth knowledge and understanding was gained from being able to observe, imple-
ment, reflect, learn and improve as part of the Guiding Hope team and as partner and subse-
quent member of WHINCONET. The challenge was to maintain objectivity, impartiality and a 
critical view. Realising that PAR can create dependency, and given both personal and SNV’s 
experiences, clear agreements were made with Guiding Hope concerning my, and the other 
director’s roles, the use of and publishing of data. With WHINCONET, a contract, quarterly 
appraisals and an agreed exit strategy were used to support the PAR approach whilst working 
with SNV. 
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Governance arrangements 
To evaluate the presence and intensity of governance arrangements identified in the 
NTFP chains studied, a two stage assessment was used. First, drawing on the conceptual 
framework, criteria were elaborated to assess whether a particular governance arrange-
ment existed and its ‘intensity’ of influence or pervasiveness, inspired by the govern-
ance indicators (shown in Box 2.4) and institutional design principles (see Box 2.5). 
Those design principles and indicators used to provide a normative judgement of 
whether design or governance is ‘good’ or not were not included. The intensity of gov-
ernance arrangements were identified and interpreted from the literature review, stake-
holder interviews, situation analysis and value chain analyses. This resulted in the de-
velopment of eleven parameters which enable the intensity of arrangements to be as-
sessed:  
1. Existence of an institution (institution is named and rules/norms)  
2. Boundaries of rights known/ by actors in chain 
3. Level of monitoring and compliance with rules 
4. Frequency of use of sanctions and enforcement 
5. Use of conflict resolution mechanisms 
6. Use of individual and collective action in developing and modifying rules 
7. Nesting horizontally (e.g. local-global level) and/or vertically (value chain)  
8. Level of accountability and dependence on actors  
9. Moral grounding/legitimacy of power  
10. Location of decision making clear to actors 
11. Longevity of institution and participation of actors  
These parameters were scored using an ‘informed ranking’ from which the intensity of 
arrangements was situated on a continuum from strong to non-existent, scored from ten 
to one and shown in Table 3.7. In between the five score shown in the table are grada-
tions where some, but not all of the criteria were met. The full details are shown in Ap-
pendix 13, along with individual scores per chain. The different data sources were used 
to deductively inform and allocate scores. These scores are summarised diagrammati-
cally in Chapters 7 to 10 and superimposed for comparison in Chapter 11. Secondly the 
method and scores were shared with a panel of seven experts10 to gather their opinions 
and subsequently adjusted taking into account their feedback. The scores were averaged 
and displayed as percentages to provide the final scores, summary and diagrammatic 
representations presented in Chapter 11 and in Appendix 13. 
The PAR activities were undertaken in response to problems identified in 1989 
(Paterson 1989) for the Northwest apiculture chain and again in in 2006 as part of local, 
regional and national problem-solving workshops supported by SNV and FAO, and the 
situational analysis. These analyses were used to develop capacity building interven-
tions by SNV such as business skills training, market analysis, exchanges, trade shows 
and export stimulation. For Prunus africana, the elaboration of a national management 
plan, including inventories, studies, actor platforms and exchanges, support in develop-
ing project proposals and disseminating information were the main PAR activities. For 
Gnetum spp., activities focused around cultivation and nurseries. These activities fed  
 
                                                 
10  Mirjam Ros-Tonen, Julius Chupezi Tieguhong, Aaron Russell, Koen Kusters, Jolien Schure and Ruth 
Meinzen-Dick. 
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Table 3.7   Intensity scoring of governance arrangements 
Score Criteria 
Strong  
 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Institutions existence clearly stated, well known by all actors in chain 
 Boundaries of rights well known/stated by actors in chain 
 High level of monitoring and compliance with rules 
 Frequent use of sanctions and enforcement 
 Use of conflict resolution mechanisms 
 Individual and collective action engaging in rule development & modification  
 Well-nested horizontally (e.g. local-global) and/or vertically (chain)  
 High level of accountability and dependence on actors  
 Strong moral grounding/legitimacy of power  
 Location of decision-making clear to actors 
 Long lived institution with frequent actor participation  
Clear  8  Institution stated to exist (named, rules/norms known) by majority of actors 
 Boundaries of rights well known to actors in chain 
 Frequent monitoring and compliance with rules 
 Use of sanctions and enforcement mechanisms 
 Use of conflict resolution mechanisms 
 Use of individual/collective action developing and changing rules  
 Nesting (horizontal e.g. local-global) and/or vertical (chain)  
 Moderate accountability and dependence on actors  
 Moderate moral grounding of power  
 Location of decision-making known for all actors 
 Long to medium term existing institution with regular actor participation  
Reasona-
ble 
5  Institution stated to exist (named, some rules/norms known)  
 Boundaries of rights known to most actors in chain 
 Occasional monitoring and compliance with rules 
 Infrequent use of sanctions and enforcement mechanisms 
 Sporadic use of conflict resolution mechanisms 
 Occasional use of individual/collective action developing and changing rules  
 Some nesting (horizontal e.g. local-global) and/or vertical (chain)  
 Low level of accountability and dependence on actors  
 Weak moral grounding of power  
 Location of decision-making uncertain for all actors 
 Moderate lived institution with occasional or infrequent actor participation  
Weak  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Existence of institution not clear (no or few rules/norms stated/discernible)  
 Boundaries of rights little known to actors in chain 
 Little monitoring and compliance with rules 
 Little use of sanctions and enforcement mechanisms 
 Little use of conflict resolution mechanisms 
 Little individual or collective action in rule development and modification  
 Little nesting (horizontal e.g. local-global) and/or vertical (chain)  
 Little accountability and dependence on actors  
 Weak moral grounding of power  
 Location of decision-making vague to unclear to actors 
 Temporal institution and actor participation  
Non-
existent 
0  Existence of institution not stated 
 Boundaries of rights not known to actors in chain 
 No monitoring and compliance with rules 
 No use of sanctions and enforcement mechanisms 
 No use of conflict resolution mechanisms 
 No individual or collective action in rule development and modification  
 No nesting (horizontal e.g. local-global) and/or vertical (chain)  
 No accountability and dependence on actors  
 No moral grounding of power  
 Location of decision-making not clear to actors 
 No institution and no actor participation 
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multi-actor and stakeholder discussions, stimulated further actions for multiple actors in 
the chain to create change, provide benchmarks for monitoring and reflection, and fur-
ther seek support from other partners. The advantage of conducting this research over a 
period of over six years is that it allowed the challenges and outcomes to be understood 
and actions to address these to be implemented and assessed. From August 2010 obser-
vation was conducted with a much lower level of engagement. 
 
Resource assessments  
In response to concerns about the lack of data on the resource base during the value 
chain analysis, Prunus africana inventories were conducted. I supervised the studies, 
which were jointly conducted with experienced foresters and botanists.11 This activity 
was supported by the FAO-CIFOR-SNV NTFP project. The initial selection of harvest 
zones occurred after a review of data and interviews with stakeholders to identify the 
location of wild and cultivated trees in the Northwest, Southwest and West. Based on 
this, inventories were conducted from November 2007 to March 2008 in natural forests 
in the three major production zones: Mount Cameroon and Mount Muanengouba in the 
Southwest and Kilum Ijim in the Northwest. Methods were adapted from previous in-
ventories (see Ingram et al. 2009 for details). At each site a sampling plan was defined 
taking into account the species characteristics, along 1,500 m long principal transects, 
with secondary transects varying between 250 and 1,000 were used. Within these sam-
pling plots of 5,000 m² (250 x 20 m) were mapped. Adaptive cluster sampling (ACS) 
was used in 480 hectares to observe 8,743 Prunus trees in the wild. For plantations, 23 
sites were surveyed in which 2,962 trees were counted in 18 plantations in the North-
west and 13 in the Southwest. In each plantation of at least 100 trees, the diameter and 
height was measured for 5% to 10% of the trees, and data collected from owners using a 
questionnaire. The inventory assessed available stock by measuring diameter at breast 
height (dbh) and classifying them into two categories: those over 30 cm dbh as trees 
suitable for exploitation and those over 30 cm dbh as trees with potential for regenera-
tion. Large and small-scale regeneration and planting activities over the last 20 years 
were collected, with numbers, ages and health status gathered from primary and second-
ary data collection and interviews with 32 people. Data was analysed using SPSS and 
Excel, and interpretation satellite images and maps produced from the GIS survey. Pre-
liminary findings were presented and verified in two actor meetings in Oku in June 
2007 and Yaoundé in April 2009. Subsequent discussions on the methodology, its pros 
and cons led to a revised inventory and harvest standard as part of the development of 
National Management Plan for Prunus africana. This data has been used in Chapter 9, 
where sustainability issues are addressed. The management plan can be found in Ap-
pendix 14. 
To respond to the lack of data on traditional harvesting highlighted during the value 
chain analysis, an in-depth study of bark harvest methods was undertaken, the results of 
which have partly been used to assess the sustainability of the Prunus value chain in 
Chapter 9. The aim was to observe the differences in tree health and mortality and de-
termine sustainability. Traditional harvesting practices were observed, photographed 
and written up during field and village meetings with 18 bark harvesters and traditional 
                                                 
11  See Acknowledgements section for details. 
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medicinal practitioners in Mboh Bolem (July 2007), Mbi (January 2008) and Oku 
(March 2007). This data is presented in Chapter 9. 
Responding to concerns by stakeholders during the value chain analysis about the 
lack of data on the regeneration of Prunus africana bark and harvest sustainability, an 
in-depth study was undertaken, supported by the FAO-CIFOR-SNV-ICRAF project in 
collaboration with the University of Dschang and conducted by a MSc student11 whom I 
supervised. From April to August 2009 710 uneven-aged Prunus africana trees in 14 
sites were assessed: wild trees at eight sites and four planted sites (Ichim, Vikhovi, 
Bova and Cameroon Development Corporation), permanent forest domain (Foungoi, 
Yangare, Nsoung, Kupe, Mann’s Spring and Viambi) and community forests (Kilum 
CF and Bikhov CF) in four main harvesting regions (Mount Cameroon, Mounts Kupe 
and Muanengouba, Kilum Ijim and Tchabal Mbabo). In each site a meeting was held 
with stakeholders to introduce the study, identify harvesters and those with knowledge 
of the forest. Based on this, former harvesters and porters were recruited and trees locat-
ed. In forests, trees equal to or above 30 cm dbh were located using transects, cutting 
paths or using hunting paths. In each site up to 60 trees with dbh above 30 cm and 5 cm 
(in the forest and planted respectively) were measured, except in Mt Muanengouba and 
Kupe, where insufficient trees were found. Bark samples of approximately 100 g were 
collected from 10 trees at each site, weighed and measured. The number of trees de-
barked and underexploited (less than twice ¼ bark diameter removed), normally ex-
ploited (twice ¼ bark diameter removed) or overexploited (more than twice ¼ bark di-
ameter removed) were recorded. Seedling regeneration rates were assessed by counting 
all trees (excluding seedlings) below 30 cm diameter at breast height within 20 m radius 
of the enumerated trees. A classification system was used of zeros (stems indicating no 
regeneration), less than two stems as poor, three to four as average, and more than five 
as good regeneration. The distance of 20 m was obtained based upon Stewart (2009). 
To estimate recovery rate and bark yield post-harvest, for each tree the bole height 
was measured using a Bitterlich relaskope. Breast-height diameters were measured us-
ing a diameter tape and diameters at 2 m intervals were measured to calculate tree vol-
ume. Bark thickness was measured at breast-height levels using a Priestler bark gauge 
for harvested and un-harvested bark. The recorded values were averaged for four read-
ings taken at four breast height diameter (dbh) points. The difference between the har-
vested and unharvested values indicated the level of regeneration after a given period. 
To determine the rotation age, a graph of recovery rate on ages was traced based on the 
fact that each tree had reached a specific age after harvest. The same reasoning was ap-
plied to determine the sustainable diameter for harvesting since the mean recovery rates 
per diameter class were computed. Samples were taken to measure and compare dry 
weights. The bark yield volume per tree was calculated. Bark weight was measured us-
ing an electronic scale balance to allow conversion from harvested fresh weights to ex-
ported dry weights, as well as bark volumes to weights. The health status of each tree 
was evaluated and classified following the Biodiversity International/ Austrian Devel-
opment Service (BFW) method (Bioversity International 2009) to assess crown condi-
tion. The trees were examined for pests and diseases in the bark and on the leaves and 
the effects noted. Data analysis was carried out using two main distinctions, to enable a 
comparison between harvested and planted areas using means and standard deviations 
per site and across different altitudinal levels. The measured parameters were standard-
ised by taking their rates according to age (height increase was obtained by dividing the 
actual height measured by age of the corresponding individual). Growth rate data were 
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analysed using Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA). For comparison pur-
poses, area means were separated using the Duncan multiple range test. The results are 
presented in Chapter 9, with the full report contained in Appendix 14. 
The apiculture value chain analysis indicated a lack of knowledge about the resource 
base. Knowledge of the species foraged by bees is essential to determine livelihood and 
sustainability impacts and to characterise apiculture products from the two areas. A two-
pronged approach was used to examine forage sources and analyse hive products (hon-
ey, wax and propolis) to determine botanical sources and geographical origin. An as-
sessment of bee forage sources was made. Multiple methods were used: field observa-
tions from June 2004 to November 2010 in the Kilum Ijim forest at Mt Oku in the 
Northwest, around Tombel, Kumba and Mt Muanengouba, around Buea to Mount 
Cameroon in the Southwest region, and around Ngaoundal in Adamaoua region. Sup-
port with identification was provided by botanists and additional fieldwork was con-
ducted by MSc students12 whom I supervised. Species identification was complemented 
with a literature review; discussions with botanists from the University of Dschang, Na-
tional Herbarium and Royal Botanic Gardens Kew; interviews with beekeepers; discus-
sions following a presentation of forage species during the SNV Beekeepers Training of 
Trainers Workshop in Bamenda 2007; and pollen analysis of two 50 g samples of honey 
from the Northwest and Adamaoua region by the APPICA Lab in Germany in 2010, 
using microscopy to analyse botanical and geographical origin. A physical and chemical 
analysis of apiculture products (see Appendix 15) was conducted to identify the physi-
cal and chemical properties of hive products, which are determined by the vegetation 
which bees forage upon. A laboratory analysis was commissioned of solubility, flavo-
noids, antioxidants, phenols and microbial activity of twelve propolis samples from the 
Northwest and Adamaoua regions, by the University of Zagreb. As there is no standard 
for analysing propolis, parameters were defined using a literature review (Marletto 
1984; Woisky et al. 1998 ; Peña 2008). Antimicrobial activities were determined using 
agar-diffusion and other parameters using a spectrophotometer. Secondly, laboratory 
analyses were commissioned of chemical residues, chemical and physical properties of 
honey and wax, performed by APPICA Lab in Germany and VIMTA Labs in India, us-
ing European Council Directive 2001/110/EC of December 20th 2001 relating to honey 
standards. The results are presented in Chapter 8 with the detailed report available in 
Appendix 15. 
Limitations of the study 
During this study ‘research fatigued’ people and communities were regularly encoun-
tered: just one too many researchers or development workers had quizzed them and 
failed to give anything back. The interviewee or subject, whilst perhaps curious and 
faintly amused the first or second time, was apt to be sceptical after several such en-
counters – resulting in what may be unreliable research results. Although it was rare to 
find someone unwilling to collaborate, maybe the next researcher or development work-
er who comes along may encounter more resistance. A negative view of outsiders, de-
velopment and so-called capacity building was encountered. The personal experience of 
living and working in Cameroon for six years has led to several convictions. First is 
                                                 
12  See Acknowledgements section for details. 
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support for Shanley & López’s (2009) observation that most of the world’s population 
deriving livelihoods from forests are out of the information loop, being systematically 
excluded from access to scientific research results. This has expensive and negative 
ramifications for conservation and development. Second is a belief in the need to avoid 
and to actively reverse traditional extractive research, by giving back information to 
build capacity of those less privileged and making an ‘impact’. Third, agreeing with van 
Dijk and colleagues (2003), is the need to be accountable to one’s research subjects. 
Fourth is the need to maintain impartiality and neutrality, particularly whilst working 
for a development organisation and as director of one the organisations studied (see 
Preface and Box 3.2).  
To balance the challenges and limitations of being embedded in organisations which 
were also active in the chains and neutrality, triangulation, mixed data sources and veri-
fication was used. PAR was also used to breach what Shanley (2009: 3) describes as “a 
chasm between where knowledge is generated and where it is needed” that “rarely leads 
to positive ecological or livelihood outcomes where the work was conducted”. The PAR 
activities conducted are listed in Appendix 12. Rigour was maintained by using partici-
pation methods that developed mutual trust and open communication; using multiple 
concepts, methodologies, data sources and methods of data collection; and critical re-
flection, feedback and review processes where preliminary results were presented and 
disseminated for critical feedback by stakeholders and actors.  
To make this research available in suitable and accessible formats to inform policy 
and practice, a publication strategy was developed to disseminate the results and ensure 
their social and political relevance. The results of this approach are listed in the final 
chapter on Outputs and a reflection on the process is presented in Chapter 11. Actively 
seeking feedback, monitoring and assessing impacts of interventions further helped to 
limit some these classical problems, creating more acceptable and reliable research and 
positive development outcomes.  
As the research was conducted in a limited sample of chains, based on a sample of 
production areas, markets and very limited number of consumers, the economic (trade 
value and  number of active actors), social-cultural value, and environmental value (in-
cluding abundance and vulnerability) are based on best estimations and  extrapolations. 
The estimations of the total market value of NTFPs in Cameroon, based on sporadically 
collected data over a time period of ten years, also means that the values presented are 
estimates. 
Another limitation was my physical distance from my supervisors whilst being in the 
field. To overcome this, support from researchers in the region and a CIFOR mentor 
were solicited (see Acknowledgements). A further challenge was to collect sufficient 
quality data for a reliable assessment with limited resources: ideally data would have 
been collected periodically over longer time-periods to provide more robust information 
on the values, impacts of interventions, particularly of PAR activities, using control 
groups and creating baselines. This challenge I hope to be able to address in future re-
search. Difficulties dealing with the multiple languages spoken in the study area were 
overcome by collaborating with other researchers, using translators and taking French 
lessons. 
Finally, an understanding of how governance arrangements impact livelihoods for 
actors in NTFP value chains has been hindered by a lack of comparative case studies 
using common approaches and multiple, mixed methods. The methods used here aim to 
fill this gap. The results obviously depend on how cases were selected and thus have 
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limits to their possibility for extrapolation to other NTFP chain actors, countries and 
products in the Congo Basin and elsewhere. The study was designed to provide insights 
into the products and value chains and the social, economic, political, social-cultural 
and natural capital, and livelihood and governance contexts in which they operate. The 
results are presented in Part II and in Part IV of this thesis. In Chapter 11 the implica-
tions of using these methods are reflected upon. 
  
 
 Part II: Contextual analysis 
Part I introduced the multiple spatial and temporal links between people, poverty and 
development, places, forests and their products and provided the conceptual and meth-
odological framework underpinning this study. Part II goes deeper into the forest: pre-
senting the context based on existing literature. Current gaps are filled and new 
knowledge created on the contexts in which the NTFP value chains are embedded and 
operate. This enables the contexts of the areas in which the value chains originate and 
operate to be introduced and analysed, showing how these shape governance arrange-
ments and their outcomes, currently and from a historical perspective. Chapter 4 covers 
the environmental context – the forest resource base and Chapter 5 the livelihood as-
pects in terms of socioeconomic and entrepreneurial context. Part II thus responds to the 
first research question concerning the contexts in which governance arrangements of 
NTFP value chains are embedded and observable trends, and the second question con-
cerning the nature of products, uses, sources and values. Chapter 2 stressed that a histor-
ical perspective and broad context is essential to understand value chains, with detail 
and breadth needed to appreciate the impact governance arrangements have on liveli-
hoods and their sustainability. This multi-dimensional analysis of the context in which 
the values chains operate also follows the bricolage line of inquiry adopted for this 
study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multiple forest governance institutions: A community forest, protected area, project and 
customary rules in Kilum Ijim, Northwest region, November 2009 
  
 
  
4  
 
Forest capital contextual analysis1 
This chapter elaborates on the scene set in Chapter 1 and travels deeper into the study 
area. It provides answers to the first research question concerning the contexts in which 
governance arrangements of NTFP value chains are embedded and the trends therein, 
with a focus on natural ‘forest’ capital. It also addresses part of the second research 
question regarding the products and their values. The bio-physical context creating natu-
ral capital is presented using an ecoregion approach. This allows an analysis of how the 
capital base provides species and in general terms shapes the subsequent products, their 
characterisitcs, uses, values and vulnerabilty, which in turn impact the value chains and 
sustainable livelihoods. Detialed in Chapter 3, this chapter draws on data from the lit-
erature review, interviews with key stakeholders, trade data and resource assessments. 
The values provided are best estimates, given the widely varying quality and sporadic, 
unsystematic nature of secondary data upon which the majority of this chapter is based. 
The origin of the value chains: forest ecoregions  
Cameroon is situated in the Afromontane, Guineo-Congolian and Sudano-Zambezian 
phytogeographical regions. Within these are ecoregions: relatively large contiguous, 
biogeographic land areas around 50,000 km2 or more containing distinct assemblages of 
ecological communities and species, with boundaries approximating the original extent 
of natural communities prior to major land-use changes (Gunn 2007). They have specif-
ic climatic characteristics and dominant plant communities including natural and plant-
ed forests, agroforestry and agriculture. The NTFPs in this study originate from seven 
ecoregions (the codes of which are indicated in brackets in the text and shown in Figure 
4, which are grouped by phytogeographical region. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1  This chapter draws on peer-reviewed, published work written or contributed to by the author (Cerutti 
et al. 2009; Ingram et al. 2012a; Ingram et al. 2012d; Ingram et al. 2013b). 
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Figure 4.1 Forest ecoregions in Cameroon 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from http://worldwildlife.org/science/wildfinder/ 
 
 
Afromontane forests 
The Prunus africana, Raphia spp., Cola spp., honey and bamboo chains originate in the 
Afromontane phytogeographical region, specifically the Cameroonian Highlands forests 
(AT0103) and Mount Cameroon (AT012) ecoregions. These span the Gulf of Guinea 
Highlands, a chain of volcanic mountains stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to Mount 
Cameroon (4095 m), the Bamenda Highlands and Mount Oku (Mt Kilum) at 3011 m. 
Seven ecosystems can be differentiated with increasing altitude from montane forest, 
afroalpine bamboo forest, to open mixed montane forest and montane grasslands 
(Ingram et al. 2009). Within the Cameroon Highlands ecoregion, the Bamenda High-
lands (18,100 km2) contains the largest remaining patches of afromontane forest in West 
Africa and has 920 known plant species (Cheek et al. 2000). The Mount Cameroon 
ecoregion has six altitudinally distinct ecosystems ranging from lowland forests to sub-
alpine grasslands identified (Ingram et al. 2009) and contains 2,435 plant species, 42 of 
which are endemic and 50 near-endemic (Cable et al. 1998; Cheek et al. 2000). Due to 
their biological uniqueness, they are considered as hotspots of biodiversity, rarity and 
endemism on a continental scale (Jetz et al. 2004; Bergl et al. 2007). Recognising this, 
the forests in this ecoregion have been prioritised by the WWF and Birdlife Internation-
al as “Important” and “Endemic Bird Areas” and by Conservation International as a 
“biodiversity hotspot”.  
Human activities have resulted in increasingly fragmented, degraded and isolated 
forest patches and diverse production systems. Archaeological and botanic evidence in-
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dicates that the Bamenda Highlands were once forest covered and inhabited by forest-
dwelling people (Nkwi et al. 1982; Cable et al. 1998). Human interventions resulted in 
ecoregion landscape changes from 2,000 years ago (Tamura 1990). In the 1950s forest 
cover and large mammals were common (Durrell 1953; 1954) and approximately 37% 
of the region was forested (Kaberry 1952). The decrease led to the area to be referred to 
as the Grassfields and by 1965 forests were around one third of their original extent 
(Hawkins et al. 1965). From 1958 to 1988, over 50% of montane forest was lost (Royal 
Botanic Gardens Kew 2003). The deforestation rate was three times higher than the na-
tional average from 1978 to 2001 (Solefack 2009). Forest regeneration from 1988 to 
2001 resulted in 7.8 % of the 1988 forest recovering. From 1995 to 2004 the forest 
boundary remained static, marking the community forests and the Plantlife Sanctuary 
reserve, with regeneration occurring inside these limits (Royal Botanic Gardens Kew 
2003). Since the end of the Bamenda Highlands Forest Project in 2004 degradation con-
tinued inside the forest boundaries (personal observations, confirmed by Enchaw 
(2010). An estimated 95 km2 of continuous montane forest now survives, with smaller 
remnants spread across the region. Deforestation and degradation are caused by conver-
sion to agriculture; grass burning (ankara) by farmers, graziers and hunters; hunting; 
and wood collection for subsistence energy use and for construction. The high popula-
tion density (see Table 5.2) increases pressure, with soil degradation common 
(UNDP/ARPEN 2006; Cerutti et al. 2009). Forest and land-use conflicts have been 
common since colonial times (Dafinger et al. 2006; Enchaw 2010; Mbah 2010). The 
impact of deforestation on biodiversity has been devastating, with most large mammals 
now locally extinct (Maisels et al. 2001) or highly threatened (Ingram et al. 2008). Alt-
hough new species are still being discovered (Cheek et al. 2000; Harvey et al. 2004; 
Cheek et al. 2010), the impact on flora is less known. The loss of faunal seed dispersers, 
combined with grazing and fire (Chapman et al. 2007), impacts ecological composition, 
further decreasing forest regeneration (Ayodele et al. 2002; Bergl et al. 2007) and 
threatening the NTFP resource base. 
 
Guineo-Congolian lowland humid forest 
The Gnetum spp. and Irvingia spp. value chains originate in the Guineo-Congo phyto-
geographical region, specifically the coastal area of Southwest Cameroon and Nigeria in 
the Cross-Sanaga-Bioko Coastal Forests ecoregion (AT0107), the Atlantic Equatorial 
Coastal Forests ecoregion (AT102) and Northwest Congolian Lowland Forest ecoregion 
(AT0126). The latter ecoregion encompasses a vast swathe of lowland, with humid, 
tropical forest covering the majority of the Congo Basin. The Cameroon variant covers 
south and southeast Cameroon and typically has heavy rainfall during one nine month 
long season. The moist broad-leaved deciduous and evergreen forests are relatively in-
tact with high levels of endemic flora and a high animal species diversity (White 1983), 
with 950 flora and 541 animal species known in Takamanda national park (Comiskey et 
al. 2003); 1,100 plant and 1,964 animal species in Korup national park (Mount CEO 
2007); and 724 animals (WWF 2009a) and 2,297 plants in Campo Ma’an national park 
(Tchouto et al. 2006). Terrestrial megafauna act as major seed dispersal agents (de 
Wasseige et al. 2009). This species diversity indicates a long history of permanent for-
est cover (Comiskey et al. 2003). 
Over the last 10 million years, climate fluctuations have affected the proportion of 
forest to savannah (WWF & Saundry 2008). Continuous forest loss over the last 40 
years is apparent (Robiglio et al. 2010), although slowing from 0.08 to 0.03% from 
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2000 to 2005 (de Wasseige et al. 2012 . Whilst low compared with the Amazon and 
Asia (FAO 2011), more significant degradation occurs in highly populated areas and 
around urban areas (Wilkie et al. 2001; Duveiller et al. 2008). Population density varies 
significantly. The rainforests of the east (7.5 inhabitants per km2) and south (12.5 inhab-
itants per km2) are sparsely populated whilst the Littoral region has 105.2 inhabitants 
per km2, containing Doula, the largest city in Cameroon with an estimated 2 million in-
habitants. Deforestation and degradation are caused by conversion to agriculture and 
plantations, logging, infrastructure extension and fuelwood extraction (Robiglio et al. 
2010; Dkamela 2011).  
 
Sudano-Zambezian savannah 
Situated in the Sudano-Zambezian phytogeographic region, channels of the honey and 
bamboo chains also originate from the Northern Congolian forest-savannah mosaic 
(AT0712). This region contains one of the most northernmost African savannah wood-
lands, forming a narrow transition zone and abrupt habitat discontinuity between the 
lowland rainforests and Sudanian/Sahelian grasslands. The mosaic landscape is the re-
sult of climatic fluctuations over the last five thousand years, with indications of a dry-
ing climate in the past three decades (UNDP/ARPEN 2006). The region’s high species 
richness, with at least 965 plant and 417 animal species (WWF 2009b; Froumsia et al. 
2012), is due to these diverse habitats (WWF & Saundry 2008). The forests are domi-
nated by Daniella oliveri and Lophira lanceolata (Letouzey 1968), multiuse, mellifer-
ous species (Fohou et al. 2010). The climate is characterised by single wet and dry sea-
sons, with forested areas exhibiting high dry season relative humidity. Frequent fires, 
increasing since about 50,000 years ago and aggravated by human-induced clearings in 
the last 3,000 years, have reduced tree densities, creating wooded grasslands (WWF & 
Saundry 2008). Historic land-use patterns reflect plant-soil interactions, with nutrient-
poor oxisols left after forest slash-and-burn agriculture. The region has a low population 
density with 0.12 per km2, particularly outside the major population centres of Ngoun-
déré, Tibati and Ngaoundal (UNDP/ARPEN 2006). Small-scale agriculture occurs 
around settlements and is increasing around Ngaoundal (UNDP/ARPEN 2006). Nomad-
ic cattle herding is common, although decreasing significantly over the past 30 years 
(Mitchard et al. 2009).  
The gum arabic (Acacia spp.) chain originates from the Sahelian Acacia savannah 
ecoregion (AT0713). The ecoregion has a tropical, hot and strongly seasonal climate 
with a six to eight month dry season, when fires are common and hot, sand-laden Har-
mattan winds blow from the north. Wooded grassland is widespread with six Acacia 
species dominating (UNDP/ARPEN 2006), most of which are bee pollinated. Although 
not particularly biologically rich, these savannahs once supported large and diverse un-
gulate communities, reduced by over a century of hunting and habitat loss. The original 
Acacia bush land has been altered to grassland over thousands of years by climatic 
changes and anthropogenic actions (FAO 1977). Deforestation, soil degradation, salinity 
and desertification are increasing and major problems (UNDP/ARPEN 2006). 
 
From ecoregion, to species, to product  
These distinct ecoregions together contain over 10,007 plant species, 55 of which are 
threatened and 3,000 endemic, with new discoveries regularly occurring (Secretariat of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity and Central African Forests Commission 2009; 
77 
 
Thompson 2009). The species used by people and how they become products, illustrat-
ed in Box 4.1, are presented and analysed in the next section.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-timber forest products in Cameroon  
This section presents the results of the data review and shows the species in Cameroon 
which become products, their characteristics, uses and vulnerability. Their values are 
analysed, and in doing so, the representativeness of the selected NTFPs in terms of their 
economic, social and environmental values is ascertained.  
 
NTFPs re-inventoried 
The literature review confirms Dounias’ (2000) observation that Cameroon is over-
represented in Central African ethno-botanical literature, attributed its phytogeograph-
ical diversity, social, political and logistical factors, colonial legacy and largely stable 
politics allowing access for Anglophone, Francophone and local researchers. Data is 
classified into: 
1. Single species studies, focussing predominantly on highly commercialised species 
(Appendix 3), such as Irvingia spp., Gnetum spp. and Prunus africana (Appendix 
14).  
2. Specific geographic location studies (Appendix 5), associated with conservation and 
ethnographic projects, particularly covering four administrative regions and the 
Guinean-Congolian and afromontane forests. The studies show how in areas where 
local populations, such as the Tikar (Dounias 1996; Zapfack et al. 1999) have not 
had a close or historically long relationship with forests. Use and knowledge of forest 
products is significantly less than for forest-dwelling ethnic groups such the Baka, 
forest-adjacent groups such as the Nso, Oku and Kom in the Northwest and Bantu in 
Dja and Campo Ma’an. These studies also show that NTFPs are found in less bio-
diverse, degraded and peri-urban landscapes and in fields and agroforests.  
3. Specific uses, particularly food, medicinal (Vasisht et al. 2004; Jiofack et al. 2008; 
Focho et al. 2009; Jiofack et al. 2009a) and for trade (Appendix 3). Data collection 
has not been consistent over time and clusters around specific geographical areas, 
shown in Appendix 5. For medicinal plants, traditional uses and the efficacy of spe-
cies for Western style medical use has been the main focus of literature. 
4. General studies (Appendix 4) initially analysed trade and economic values (Trefon 
1994; Ladipo 1998). In the late 1990s ‘key’ or ‘major’ plant NTFPs were identified 
Box 4.1 From species to product: bamboo and Raphia spp.  
In the process of commodification, the values and social understanding of relations between 
people and a product change (van Binsbergen 2005). One species can give rise to one product, 
with multiple uses, or multiple products with similar and/or different uses. As a product is used in 
different ways, particularly if it is traded, different values may be associated with the species and 
product(s). Where multiple parts of a species are used, these can create further products and 
other values. Illustrative examples are bamboo, the stems of which are used to create at least 45 
products for energy, material and cultural use. Some are highly culturally valued, but of low eco-
nomic unit value: palm wine is cheap, compared with bottled beer, and bamboo furniture, per-
ceived as of low quality, rustic and artisanal compared to wooden or plastic furniture (Ingram & 
Tieguhong 2012). Nearly all parts of Raphia spp. palms are used, producing at least 30 product 
types, by both the owner and a chain of different processers. These products provide materials, 
tools, food and energy (see Chapter 10).  
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(Wilkie 1999) and assessments of regional and national trade conducted (Ndoye et 
al. 1997/98; Sunderland et al. 1998; Tabuna 1998; CERUT-AIDEnvironment 1999; 
Ruiz-Pérez et al. 1999; Tchatat 1999; Ruis Pérez et al. 2000; Walter 2001). Two re-
gional studies reiterated existing statistics (FAO 1999; Mbolo et al. 2002). Studies2 
provide details on values, volumes, socio-economic and environmental aspects, not-
ing 205 plants used (Fomete et al. 1998; Betti 2007b), 300 edible fruits (Vivien et al. 
1996; Eyog Matig et al. 2006), 86 plants in the Highlands (Neba 2006), 200 plants 
used for food in the humid ecoregion (van Dijk 1999) and 839 plants with medicinal 
uses (Adjanohoun et al. 1996).  
5. Recommendations to revise the regulatory framework including trade, taxation and 
monitoring (Mbile et al. 2005; Betti 2007a;b; Ebamane 2008); (Walter et al. 2006; 
Bonannée et al. 2007) (Appendix 4).  
 
The review findings highlight the range and depth of existing knowledge but also 
gaps. These concern locally traded species used for tools, construction and materials, 
and specific administrative regions (West, East, Adamaoua, North and Extreme North), 
and products wild or of domesticated origin. Regularly collected temporal and spatial 
statistics do not exist and most values are estimates. The difficulties in gathering data – 
highlighted in Box 4.2 – explain why these gaps occur. To compensate for these gaps, 
the market survey, market information systems, tracking and observation provided data 
                                                 
2  Including those conducted for the FAO-CIFOR-SNV NTFP project. 
Box 4.2 NTFP data deficiencies 
Timko et al. (2010) indicate that the paucity of socioeconomic data in Africa is due to the am-
biguous definition of NTFPs, their origins from both the forest and farming systems and their 
role being poorly defined. In Cameroon they fall under the jurisdiction of Forestry and Wildlife 
Ministry, but their different characteristics from timber, exacerbate data gathering difficulties:  
Visibility: Products are often physically small, less visible than timber and once processed 
their cultivated or wild origins are difficult to differentiate. Many NTFP species are difficult to 
identify and some have low turnovers, making them less visible. Diversity: over 200 NTFP 
species are traded, compared to 10 species comprising the majority of exported timber 
(Cerutti et al. 2009) and around 80 artisanally traded (Koffi 2005).  Value: Most NTFPs are 
sold in non-standard units, in values of less than US$ 1 and weigh under 1 kg. Unit prices are 
variable, changing by market and season (see Appendix 9 and 14), unlike timber measured in 
roundwood and sawnwood in m3 (Fometé et al. 2008; ITTO 2010). Data collection points: The 
diverse and diffuse market channels make determining data collection points difficult and cost-
ly compared to the high visibility of timber, particularly exports. Collecting responsibilities: 
NTFP data collection is fragmented and uncoordinated between DPT, COMCAM in Douala, 
CITES authorities (ANAFOR and MINFOF) and Customs phyto-sanitary officials. National 
trade data is not collected. Export: There is a perception that only a few NTFPs are exported 
(Tabuna 1998). Timber in contrast has a high turnover and is easily visually identified at ex-
port locations, aiding data collection which is used to generate significant revenues for the 
state. Multiple origins: NTFPs are collected in numerous locations and by many people: at 
least 283,000 people work in just the 9 NTFP chains studied (Ingram 2011c). Whereas most 
of the timber (91%) originates from 93 Forest Management Units (2010) and 169 Sale of 
Standing Volume titles (2000 to 2008) (Cerutti et al. 2010), employing 163,000 people in 2006 
(Auld et al. 2008).  
Lack of coordination: Too little and insufficient coordination between research, development 
and conservation organisations means when data does exist it is often under-utilised 
(Republique du Cameroun 2008). 
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on species, products and prices in 18 markets, and trade data and databases were used to 
source exported product values and quantities. From these sources a database of 710 
NTFPs was established (Appendix 2), detailing local and scientific species names, 
quantities sold, market type, values, vulnerability status, habitat, plant type, parts used, 
uses and level of cultivation. 
 
Analysis of priority NTFPs  
Analysis of these data sources shows how species are used, the proportion traded, a 
large number of species with multiple uses and from which multiple parts are used, and 
levels of vulnerability of specific species to certain harvesting methods – given their 
population and ecosystem status. This enabled priority NTFPs to be established and the 
NTFPs studied to be situated in context. Data gaps occur where no details were found 
on environmental, social and economic values. For example where exchange, gifts and 
non-cash trade is significant, such as for Irvingia spp. by the Baka’a pygmy, Anyang 
and Becheve ethnic groups. Using the scoring system elaborated in Box 3.1 and Table 
3.2, all NTFPs were ranked so that priority species and products could be determined, 
shown in detail in Appendix 2 and Appendix 16, and summarised in Table 4.1. This 
aids understanding of the context in which chains studied are located and their repre-
sentativeness. 
 
Table 4.1 Summary of prioritised NTFPs in Cameroon 
Value 
score 
Number of spe-
cies 
Percentage of 
total species 
Average 
number of 
uses 
Number of 
products 
Average 
number of 
parts used 
Estimated annual 
value US$ 
Plant Animal Plant Animal 
5 16 - 7 0 3.5 ≥ 41 2.0 406,372,712 
4 > 53 >41 10 27 1.5 ≥81 3.5 622,562,719 
   3  5 - 1 0 1.5 ≥9 2.8 No data 
2 138 53 24 56 1.9 ≥200 2.3 No data 
1 290 >9 59 17 1.3 ≥300 2.7 No data 
Total 589 121 100 100 1.94  2.6 1,028,935,431 
Source: Research results 
 
Of the 710 species assessed, only 2.3% merited the highest value score of five, due to 
their wide-scale consumption and/or large-scale trade. Many more species might be in-
cluded if all those used for fuelwood were known. A further 3% of all NTFPs received a 
value score of four, denoting either (i) a wide-scale regional, national or international 
trade which provides an important revenue source for livelihoods; (ii) multiple use spe-
cies and species where trade is combined with large-scale consumption for important 
uses (such as cultural, medicinal, food, tools or construction); or (iii) species classed as 
protected or vulnerable. For animals, 38% scored four, representing the most hunted 
species for consumption and trade, those with high cultural values and most vulnerable 
species. Traded species include those sold for meat, the international pet trade, to zoos 
and for research. Just 1% of plants and no animals were scored three, denoting species 
with both multiple uses and a local trade. For multiple use species where there was ei-
ther only consumption but no trade, or a small, limited trade, these were ranked lower 
with a score of two, and comprise the majority of animals (51%) and a 285 of plants. 
The highest number of plants (58%) and a small proportion of animals (8%) were val-
ued with a score of one: these have minor use, and/or a small trade or low-level con-
sumption. The highest valued categories (scored three, four and five) were classified as 
‘priority NTFPs’. The priority NTFPs in Cameroon closely mirror those prioritised in 
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other Congo Basin countries (FORENET 2010) and include all the NTFPs studied ex-
cept for bamboo. This similarity can be explained by the similarity in forest ecoregions 
and the comparable social, cultural and economic contexts. This suggests that the values 
of the eight NTFPs studied in Cameroon generally reflect the values of NTFPs across 
the Congo Basin and suggests that a limited extrapolation can be made. 
 
Subsistence use and traded NTFPs  
A result of the data review is that more NTFPs are shown to be used and traded (Table 
4.2) than previously recorded. The market surveys highlight the much larger number of 
plant species traded, especially medicinal plants, than previously indicated, particularly 
in government statistics. NTFPs not well studied, but having high economic and social 
value, include firewood, fish, cola nuts (Garcinia cola, Cola nitida, C. anomala and C. 
acuminata), insects (such as palm grubs, larvae, caterpillars, termites and grasshoppers), 
mushrooms, resins, seeds and barks for condiments and medicinal use. The number of 
animal species used and traded are likely to be higher as bird, bat, reptile and rodent 
species were often not specified and except for large mammals, savannah fauna was 
largely absent in the literature. Around 1,000 freshwater fish species are eaten (Essama-
Nssah et al. 2000; Stiassny et al. 2007), although mainly clariid catfishes and tilapias 
from the Sanaga River basin and Lake Chad are traded (Randall Brummet, World Fish 
Centre, pers. com.). Most NTFP plant species (65%) originate in the humid forest 
ecoregion, 16% from the montane and 9% from the savannah, with 14% occurring in 
more than one ecoregion. The proportion of NTFPs from the humid forests is slightly 
higher than the area (60%) this ecoregion covers in Cameroon. 
 
Table 4.2 Overview of NTFP species and products in Cameroon  
Species and products Number  Percentage Percentage traded  
Animal species used as NTFPs 121 17 83 
Plant species used as NTFPs 589 83 21 
Total number of species used as NTFPs 710 100 32 
Animal based products  130 8  
Plant-based products 943 92  
Total estimated number of NTFPs 1,073 100  
Source: Research results. Note: Products calculated using number of uses per individual species multiplied by the 
species 
 
The data illustrates that Cameroonian NTFP trade has a long history. Since at least 
the 7th century (Oliver 1999) trade in palm oil (Elaeis guineensis), elephant ivory, pep-
per (Piper guineensis), honey, beeswax and cola nuts (Cola acuminata and Cola nitida) 
has occurred between Central and North African countries. Melegueta pepper 
(Aframomum spp.) has been traded outside of Africa since the Middle Ages (Pakenham 
1991; Sunderland et al. 2004b). Inter-African and international trade increased with co-
lonial improvements in infrastructure and communications (Langbour et al. 2010), lead-
ing to gum arabic (Acacia spp.) (see Chapter 10), ivory (Pakenham 1991), palm oil 
(Kaberry 1952; Chilver et al. 2009) and especially wild rubber (Funtamia elastica) 
(Geschiere 2007) becoming big business, fuelling Western industrial revolutions and 
encouraging the scramble for Africa (Pakenham 1991). Inter-African trade continues to 
flourish for gum arabic, Raphia spp. palm wine (see Chapter 10), cola nuts and honey. 
Wild rubber and iboga (Tabernanthe iboga) (Kingsley 1897; Pakenham 1991) trade has 
now virtually ceased. Scarce historical data exists on values and products traded interna-
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tionally, comprising exports to Europe (Tabuna 1999), ivory (Johnson 1978; Feinberg et 
al. 1982; Chaiklin 2010) and cola (Kaberry 1952; Fomine 2009).  
At least 225 of the products, 32% of the total, are traded. Of these 80% are animal 
species and 20% plants. Data on the quantity and specific species of animal products 
traded is scarce (shown in Appendix 9, 10 and 14 in Ingram and Schure (2010)). Since 
1996, 22 plant-based products have been recorded as dominating lowland humid forest 
ecoregion markets, of which Irvingia gabonensis (see Chapter 10 and Awono et al. 
2009 in Appendix 14 for details); Gnetum spp. (see Chapter 7) and Dacryodes edulis 
together constitute 86% of the volume. The details of volumes and prices are shown in 
Appendix 10. Five NTFPs from four species (seeds from Ricinodendron heudelotii, fruit 
‘pepper’’ from Piper guineensis, Cola acuminata nuts and Garcinia kola barks and 
nuts) were also sold in significant quantities, amounting each up to 10% of total market 
volume. The remaining products, originating from at least 11 species (although the ex-
act number of insect species is unknown), each constitute less than 1% of annual market 
volumes traded. Many of these products are condiments with good storage properties or 
are highly seasonal. On average, seven products were traded in the main Type II NTFP 
markets in the lowland humid forest ecoregion, varying by location (detailed in Ingram 
& Schure 2010 in Appendix 14). Over 20 NTFPs from across Cameroon were offered in 
the Type III urban markets of Douala and Yaoundé. The Type II regional markets such 
as Limbe, Buea and Ebolowa have a smaller range of on average 10 products. Local 
type II markets which generally offer a smaller range of products sourced from the vi-
cinity in larger quantities. These findings reiterate Ruiz Pérez et al.’s (2000) market ty-
pology, with the same NTFPs continuing to dominate markets. The market value is 
however much higher than previously reported (CERUT-AIDEnvironment 1999; FAO 
1999; Ruiz-Pérez et al. 1999; Hoare 2007). Detailed in Appendix 16, the approximate 
total annual value of NTFPs with a score of five (indicating a high social-economic and 
environmental value) was at 406,373,712 US$ and for those with a score of four, 
622,562,719 US$. The total estimated annual market value of Cameroonian NTFPs is at 
least 1,028,966,931 US$. This is unrecorded in official statistics. To place this figure in 
context, the  value of exported and domestic timber in 2008 was 1.41 billion US$ (see 
Table 1.1) and agriculture3 was 4.68 billion US$ in 2005 (World Bank 2009b). 
The review resulted in a large number of NTFPs reported as exported and higher in-
ternational trade quantities and values. At least 50 plant-based species providing 70 
products and an estimated 135 animal species are exported or have been in the last thirty 
years (detailed in Ingram and Schure 2010 in Appendix 14 and in Appendix 10). This is 
much larger than previous studies indicate (FAO 1999; Tabuna 2000; Mbolo et al. 
2002). The exported products fall into four categories:  
 
1. Diaspora products comprising around 15 products consumed mainly by Central Afri-
can diaspora located in Europe and the USA, via markets and specialist retail outlets 
in major urban areas such as Paris, London, Brussels and Amsterdam. These popular 
condiments and foods include Gnetum and reflect those traded in Type III markets in 
Cameroon. Bushmeat exports are difficult to estimate, being informal, illegal and 
undocumented except for Tabuna (2000) and Chaber et al. (2010) indicating at least 
eight species – and probably many more. 
                                                 
3  Includes forestry, hunting, fishing, cultivation of crops and livestock production.  
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2. Regional exports of a few high value, larger volume, raw and processed products 
such as eru (Gnetum spp.), bush mango (Irvingia spp.), honey, ebaye (Pentacletra 
macrophylla), njangsang (Ricinodendron heudelottii) and cola nuts (Cola spp).  
3. Industrial ingredients either raw or partially processed NTFPs used as medicines, 
foods, and materials such as Acacia spp., Prunus africana, honey and wax.  
4. From 1973 to 2010, 267 CITES-listed species were exported: 127 animal species 
mainly as trophies, for trade, research and zoological purposes and five plant species, 
dominated by Prunus africana, orchids (Bulbophyllum spp.) and Pericopsis elata 
(CITES 2011).  
 
Multiple parts of species used as NTFPs 
Table 4.3 shows that for just over half of all plant-based species, more than one part is 
used and for most animals just one part (the flesh) is used. This finding emphasises that 
only a small number of plant-based NTFPs have high multiple part use values.  
 
Table 4.3 NTFP species with multiple parts used in Cameroon 
Number of parts used 
Plants (n=582) Animals (n=121) 
Number of spe-
cies 
Percentage of 
total species 
Number of 
species 
Percentage of 
total species 
1 354 61 116 96 
2 129 22 5 4 
3 45 8 0 0 
4 37 6 0 0 
5 17 3 0 0 
Multiple parts used (>1) 228 39 110 96 
Source: Research results 
 
The uses of plants and their parts varies by cultural groups (Schippmann et al. 2002). 
Following Betti (2007b), plant species were classified according to 11 commonly used 
parts and for animals 8 parts. Compared to Betti’s findings, a lower percentage of fruits, 
similar proportion of barks and higher proportion of leaves were found (shown in  
Table 4.4). The difference may be due to the wider range of data sources and inclusion 
of traded and consumed products. The review highlights that most animals are used for 
their flesh, indicative of their food use. 
 
Multiple uses of NTFPs 
How NTFPs are used differs significantly with biological origin. Most animals are used 
only for food (Table 4.5) with few having multiple uses. A smaller number are used as 
cultural objects, materials and medicines. Plants have a much wider variety of uses, with 
up to 19 uses of any one species. Medicinal use dominates, followed closely by food 
and for tools. These proportions mirror ethno-botanical studies (Thomas et al. 1989; 
Tame 1993; Zapfack et al. 1999, 2001a, 2001b; Cheek et al. 2000, 2001, 2004, 2010; 
Betti 2004; Gwet 2004; Harvey et al. 2004; Lykke et al. 2004; Ilumbe 2006; Neba 
2006; Focho et al. 2009; Jiofack et al. 2009b; Simbo 2010). The number of species used 
as fuel is probably vastly under-recorded (Ibrahima et al. 2007; SIE-Cameroun 2009) 
and differs by ecoregion, according to the availability of energy sources and fuelwood 
species, agricultural and agroforestry practices (Robiglio et al. 2011). Different ethnic 
groups use species in different ways, but despite such differences, the proportion of spe- 
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Table 4.4 Parts of animal and plants harvested for NTFP use in Cameroon  
Plant part used Number of species (n=582) Percentage of total species* 
Bark 189 32 
Leaves 188 32 
Fruit 116 20 
Wood/timber 105 18 
Stem 95 16 
Seeds 97 17 
Root 50 9 
Exudate 40 7 
All 11 2 
Sprout/shoot 1 0 
Animal part used Number of species (n=121) Percentage of total species 
Flesh 107 88 
All – live 13 2 
Fur 1 1 
Horns 1 1 
Feathers 2 2 
Skins 1 1 
Spines 1 1 
By product 3 3 
Source: Research results. *Multiple parts of one species can be used, thus the percentage score can exceed 100. 
 
 
Table 4.5 Major uses of NTFPs in Cameroon  
Use category Plants (n=582)  Animals (n=121)  
Number# Percentage of total Number# Percentage of total 
Medicinal 289 41 2 2 
Food  264 38 112 95 
Tool/equipment/material 104 15 1 1 
Construction 77 11 0 0 
Cultural 45 13 17 7 
Timber/wood1 41 6 0 0 
Fuelwood 41 6 0 0 
Condiment 35 5 0 0 
Oil 18 3 0 0 
Bee forage 14 2 0 0 
Forage 13 2 0 0 
Wrapping 12 2 0 0 
Ornamental 11 2 0 0 
Aphrodisiac 9 1 0 0 
Poison 5 1 0 0 
Host species for caterpillars & insects  9 1 1 1 
Insecticide 3 1 0 0 
Agroforestry 3 0 0 0 
Cosmetic 4 0 2 2 
Source: Research results. Notes: #More than one use is possible, therefore total can exceed 100% *where explicitly 
recorded in literature review and market observations.1 Species used for timber included if also a source of NTFPs. 
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cies in each use category in different ecoregions is similar, suggesting common needs of 
forest-product using people. 
At least 33% of species have multiple uses, shown in Table 4.6. Multiple uses add 
holistic value to a species and the forest it originates in (Asseng Ze 2008; Guariguata et 
al. 2011). At least 39 species have timber and non-timber uses over which conflicts 
were noted, often due to overlapping customary and formal governance regimes which 
confuse ownership, access and rights for different users. The highest value often takes 
precedence, for example, Prunus africana is sold mainly for its medicinal bark rather 
than for its traditional subsistence uses for carving, firewood or charcoal. 
 
Table 4.6 Number of uses of animal and plant species as NTFPs  
Number of uses of a  
species 
Plants (n=582) Animals (n=121) 
Number Percentage of total Number Percentage of total 
1 349 60 91 91 
2 115 20 8 7 
3 80 14 1 1 
4 21 4 2 2 
5 14 2 0 0 
Multiple uses (>1) 240 34 11 9 
Average 1.6  1.0  
Source: Research results. Note: *Data deficiencies mean that not all the uses of all species are known.  
 
At least 62 NTFPs (11% of the total) have cultural values (see Appendices 3 and 9). 
Cultural value is difficult to quantify (Campbell et al. 2002a; Forest Peoples Programme 
2010) and so many NTFPs unintentionally not be included, despite being embedded in 
local cultures, often with non-substitutable values. These products and sometimes the 
places they originate are sacred or taboo, placing constraints on how they are used, by 
whom and who views them as valuable. This makes quantitative valuation almost im-
possible. Combined with the dynamic temporal and spatial nature of culture, their value 
may change over time and differ markedly by ethnic and social group.  
 
Abundance and vulnerability of NTFP species 
Using the definition of priority NTFPs (Box 3.1) species classified as environmentally 
vulnerable or having a protected status (see Table 4.7) and/or facing threats to their eco-
system were scored as higher value. In the absence of indicators and reports of abun-
dance (Redford et al. 2013) abundance is taken (de facto) to be where there is no indica-
tion of vulnerability or threat.  
Table 4.7 shows that the majority of species are not classified as vulnerable or pro-
tected. A higher proportion (14%) of animals are classified as vulnerable and/or protect-
ed than plants (5%). There is little correspondence between the different vulnerability 
classifications for plant-based NTFPs: of the thirteen products classified as Special For-
estry Products (SFPs) in the 1994 Forestry and Wildlife law (see Chapter 6 and Box 
6.1), only 7% are also CITES and Red Data listed. Most vulnerable species classified by 
CITES and Red Data are thus not captured by the SFP. This incongruence, discussed 
further in Chapter 6, is despite all three protection statuses being complementary. 
Abundance refers to the overall number of individuals and the diversity of individu-
als within a group (Gaston 2011). As the counterfactual to species vulnerability, it is 
another measure of value, as an ecological feature that maintains other species – in- 
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Table 4.7 Vulnerability classification of NTFPs in Cameroon 
Classification  
                        Plants                               Animals 
Number of spe-
cies 
Percentage 
of total 
Number of species Percentage 
of total 
Red Data listed 15 2.1 14 11.6 
Legal protection (Class A or B)  0 0.0 18 14.9 
Special Forestry Product list 33 5.0   0   0.0 
CITES listed Appendix 1 0 0.0 18 14.0 
CITES listed Appendix 2 1 0.1 186* - 
Sources: IUCN Red list. MINFOF. *CITES Appendix 2 (CITES II) lists of 186 species. The data review did not 
yield a specific enough list of animal species used as NTFPs to be identify exactly the CITES II listed species. 
 
cluding humans – and ecosystems. It is however difficult to ascertain, given that it is not 
a common indicator (Redford et al. 2013) and for the majority of species used as 
NTFPs, little data is available on abundance, except for some geographically specific 
areas (see Appendix 5). For the eight selected NTFP shown in Table 4.8, a variety of 
sources were used to provide indications of abundance and vulnerability, using the clas-
sification shown in Table 4.7. 
 
Table 4.8 Abundance and vulnerability status of selected NTFP species 
Species  Abundance1  Vulnerability 
Gnetum africanum Locally abundant Near threatened (RD list) 
Gnetum buchholzianum Less common* Near threatened (RD list) 
Apis mellifera adansonii Common* No listing 
Prunus africana Locally common (also cultivated) Vulnerable (RD list), CITES), SFP  
Cola acuminata  
Cola nitida 
Cola anomala 
Common 
Common (also cultivated) 
Common (also cultivated)  
No listing 
No listing 
No listing 
Irvingia gabonensis Common Lower Risk/Near threatened (RD list) 
Irvingia wombulu Common, low density  No listing 
Raphia farinifera 
Raphia vinifera  
Raphia hookeri  
Common* 
Common* 
Common* 
No listing  
No listing  
No listing 
Raphia regalis  Uncommon Vulnerable (RD list) 
Bambusa vulgaris  
Yushania alpina 
Oxytenanthera abyssinica 
Common*  
Locally common* 
Less common* 
No listing 
No listing 
No listing 
Acacia senegal  
Acacia seyal  
Acacia polyacantha 
Common (also cultivated) 
Common 
Common 
No listing 
No listing 
No listing 
Key: 1Abundance in the wild in the study ecoregion, and if cultivated, indicated in brackets. RD= Red data list. 
Sources: Shiembo 1986; C. Freeman 1987; Cable and Cheek 1998; United Nations Environment Programme 1998; 
Cheek et al. 2000; Tachie-Obeng et al. 2001; Chupezi et al. 2004; Clark et al. 2004; Eyog Matig et al. 2006; Ekpere 
2007; Laird et al. 2008; CITES 2008; Cheek et al. 2010; IUCN 2010; Peltier et al. 2010; Samndong 2010; Ingram et 
al. 2012c; Ingram et al. 2012d, Prota database www.prota.org *Actors perceptions gathered from interviews. 
 
Table 4.9 illustrates this relationship for the plant-based study species, distinguishing 
vulnerability to harvesting based upon Ticktin (2004) and Cunningham’s (2001) classi-
fication. Whilst only a small proportion of plant species are collected in their entirety, 
harvesting an entire plant is often easier than selecting parts in situ. Collecting stems 
and roots, common for nearly a third of species reviewed, can lead to vulnerability as 
harvesting damages or kills the plant. Bark harvesting, practised for a third of species, 
can lead to sickness and mortality, although small quantities may not significantly affect 
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productivity, exemplified by the traditional small-scale harvesting practices of Prunus 
africana and Irvingia spp., among others (Cunningham et al. 1993; Sunderland et al. 
1999b; Guedje et al. 2001). Leaves constitute almost a third of the plant parts collected. 
Again, the risk of over-harvest damaging or killing individual plants suggests unsus-
tainability, as many trees are unable to withstand even low harvest rates (Ticktin 2004). 
Harvesting seeds and fruits, particularly from trees, is generally benign and non-
destructive (Guedje et al. 1998). Harvesting fruits from a long-lived tree presents a low-
er threat to the long-term species survival than collecting seeds from an annual plant as 
if the seed ceases to exist, so does the plant. Ndoye et al. (1999) however point out that 
it may have long-term effects on population structure. In contrast, very high levels of 
fruit or seed harvest can permit long-term population persistence, but may have a nega-
tive effect on community populations. This excludes seed or fruit harvesting that dam-
ages the tree when harvest is not restricted to collecting fallen fruit. When species have 
several methods of reproduction, such as seeds and rhizomes (as in the case of 
Aframomum spp.), and where only fruits or only leaves are harvested, populations are 
not seriously threatened by harvesting (Cunningham 1995). Harvest impacts may be 
complex for slow-growing trees reproducing from seed and producing only a few, large 
fruits – increasing their susceptibility to over-harvest. However, no such examples were 
found among the NTFPs in Cameroon. Tolerance to harvest also varies with life history. 
For instance, perennial herbs can withstand higher harvest rates than trees, which tend 
to be slower growing and longer lived (Clark et al. 2004). The selective harvest of parts 
can be sustainable at individual or population level but requires an understanding of the 
ecological impacts including growth and reproductive characteristics, harvesting tech-
niques and management practices that may mitigate negative impacts and/or promote 
positive impacts. This would allow sufficient reproduction or regeneration. Unfortunate-
ly, this basic information remains incomplete for most taxa in the region (FAO et al. 
2008; FAO 2009a).  
 
Table 4.9 Relationship between plant life cycle, form and vulnerability of NTFPs  
Life cycle  Timber Stem Bark Root Resin/Sap Leaf Flower Fruit/Seed 
Annual  
High High  High High Medium Medium Medium High 
- - - - - - - - 
Biannual 
 
High  High  High  High Medium Medium Medium High 
- - - - - - - - 
Perennial 
 
High Medium Medium High Medium Low-medium Low Low 
P. africana 
Irvingia spp. 
Acacia spp. 
 
Y. alpina 
O. abyssinica
Raphia spp. 
Gnetum spp. 
P. africana 
Irvingia spp.
Cola spp. 
Acacia spp. 
- Acacia spp.
Raphia spp.
Gnetum spp. 
Raphia spp. 
Acacia spp. 
- Irvingia spp.
Cola spp. 
Raphia spp.
Source: Research results 
 
Sustainable extraction 
For most (85%) species, no information was available about the sustainability of harvest 
techniques. For 6% of plants the impact of harvesting appears to be sustainable, for 5% 
harvesting is highly destructive. For 2% of animals harvesting appears to be sustainable 
(for bees and snails). Table 4.10 shows that most species are wild harvested, with culti-
vation mentioned for 18% of plant species, including Raphia spp., Cola acuminata, and 
C. nitida. For animal-based NTFPs the majority are wild sourced. Only a few species 
are domesticated on a small scale and in specific areas, including bees.  
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Table 4.10 Level of cultivation and domestication of NTFPs in Cameroon 
Level of cultivation 
Plants (n=582) Animals (n=121) 
Number of  
species 
Percentage
of total 
Number of  
species 
Percentage
of total 
No data (suspected wild harvest only) 481 82  69 57 
Wild harvest only 75 13 46 37 
Small scale cultivation  11 2 6 5 
Cultivated or domesticated 8 1 0 0 
Main harvest from cultivated sources 1 1 0 0 
Integrated agroforestry/farm systems  6 1 0 0 
Source: Research results 
 
Indigenous knowledge of sustainable harvest techniques differs widely across species 
ranges, such that successful and sustainable techniques when used may not be widely 
known. An example is Gnetum spp. cultivation technique used in the Southwest but 
largely unknown in the Centre and Littoral regions (Patrick Shiembo ex-IRAD, pers. 
comm. 2011; Erik Wirsiy, CENDEP pers. comm. 2011; Joseph Nkefor, Limbe Botanic 
Garden pers. comm. 2009). The effects of harvest on different ecological levels are also 
little known. Sustainability at one level may or may not coincide with sustainability at 
another. For example, Prunus africana populations are genetically different in Ada-
maoua compared to wild and domesticated populations in the Northwest and Southwest 
(Kadu et al. 2011). However, few studies have assessed the effects of harvesting on ge-
netic diversity (Laird et al. 2010), let alone in Cameroon. As the long-term health of 
cultivated NTFP species depends on the gene pool contained in wild populations (Reis 
1995), such information is necessary to maintain long-term sustainability in wild and 
cultivated NTFP species.  
 
The selected NTFP value chains in context  
Summarised in Table 4.11, the eight NTFP species studied can be seen as representative 
of Cameroon and of the Congo Basin (FORENET 2010). This is despite the products 
originating from just 16 species, a tiny proportion (3%) of the total number of estimated 
NTFP species. The 30 products generated from these species represent a small propor-
tion of NTFPs traded (less than 1%), however they form a considerable proportion of 
total economic value of NTFPs in Cameroon. These NTFPs originate from all three 
phytogeographical regions, four each from two ecoregions. They are all auto-consumed 
and traded with multiple parts used, and have widely differing uses with food, medicinal 
and materials dominating, similar to the majority of NTFPs in Cameroon. Their envi-
ronmental values differ markedly, reflecting ecoregion diversity in Cameroon, species 
characteristics and life form (including resilience to harvesting techniques, frequency 
and effect on population structure and regeneration). Social values are linked to use and 
whether the NTFP is traded. Half of the eight NTFPs studied are environmentally vul-
nerable, associated with high trade levels. Further threats derive from habitat changes, 
proximity to densely populated areas and land-use changes, particularly in the montane 
and savannah forests (Duveiller et al. 2008), and for the montane species due to their 
relative rarity globally, restricted range and narrow ecological preference (Kingdon 
1990; Bergl et al. 2007).  
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Table 4.11 Overview of value scores of the NTFP value chains studied  
Species scientific 
name & product   Own use and trade Vulnerability
Ecoregion origins1 & 
cultivation 
Number of 
parts used 
Number 
of uses 
Value 
score 
Gnetum spp. 
Eru 
Own use Low-
medium 
 
Humid 
Wild & cultivated 
2 3 5 
Local, national and 
international trade 
Apis mellifera 
Apiculture 
Own use Low Afromontane, humid, 
savannah, 
Wild & cultivated 
3 4 4 
Local, national and 
international trade 
Humid, savannah 
Wild 
4 
Prunus africana 
Pygeum 
Own use, local and 
international trade 
High-
medium 
Afromontane 
Wild & cultivated 
4 5 5 
Irvingia spp. 
Bush mango 
Own use, local, 
national and inter-
national trade 
Not Humid 
Wild & cultivated 
4 6 4 
       
Cola spp. 
Cola nuts 
Own use, local, 
national and inter-
national trade 
Low Afromontane, humid 
Wild & cultivated 
2 1 4 
Raphia spp. 
Raffia 
Own use, local 
trade 
Medium Afromontane, humid, 
savannah, 
Wild &cultivated 
4 6 4 
Yushania alpina, 
O. abyssinica 
Bamboo 
Own use, local and 
national trade 
Medium Montane, savannah 
Wild & cultivated 
6 4 3 
Acacia spp. 
Gum arabic 
Own use, local and 
international trade 
Low-
medium 
Savannah 
Wild & cultivated 
4 6 4 
Source: Research results Key: 1 Afromontane = Afromontane forest; Humid = Guineo-Congolian lowland humid 
forest; Savannah = Sudano-Zambezian savannah forest. 
Conclusion: paradoxical products  
Responding to the first research question concerning the contexts in which governance 
arrangements of NTFP value chains are embedded and trends therein, this chapter 
shows how the forest ecoregions generate natural capital. Although the physical nature 
of the ecoregions differs greatly, interactions between people and these environments 
give rise to at least 710 species being used as products. This is higher than previous 
studies have found, due to the methodology capturing more data sources and geographic 
areas. It is impossible to indicate trends in use and commercialisation of the 1,000 plus 
products given the lack of data. Plants are the most important product sources, provid-
ing 92% of products, supporting the focus of this study on plant-based products. The 
predominance of plant-based products is because multiple parts are used from 39% of 
species and as 34% of plants have multiple uses, with up to 19 product types originating 
from one species. The majority of products are used as medicines, food and materials. 
However, over a third of animal species scored highly, reflecting the importance of 
bushmeat for consumption and trade. Harvest for commercialisation is prevalent: over 
200 species are traded, 185 of which are exported, with an estimated annual market of 
trade of at least 1,000 million US$ annually, higher than the timber trade. This finding 
justifies descriptions of NTFPs as assets, as ‘gifts’ (ITTO 2009a), ‘wealth’ (van Dorp et 
al. 1998) and ‘riches’ (López et al. 2004) of the forest. It also highlights that measured 
economically, socially or environmentally these commodities play multiple roles in the 
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livelihoods of people in Cameroon, other African countries and globally and continue to 
be common in households and in markets across Cameroon and the Congo Basin. 
Ecoregion characteristics shape both the products and the chains. The montane forests 
are a haven for endemism and biodiversity, providing a bounty of species. Species with 
high local abundance and multiple uses, in an area of high population density, have lent 
themselves to becoming commercialised. However degradation and deforestation, both 
human-induced and due to climatic changes negatively affects the ability of the eco-
region to continue providing these products, which combined with intensive harvest for 
commercialisation. Similar trends, although at lower rates, occur in the savannah and 
lowland humid forest ecoregions. 
Responding to second research question, this chapter makes explicit the multiple 
values of NTFPs. The products studied are representative of the phytogeographic re-
gions, but are equally exceptional, ranked in the top 5% of ‘priority’ NTFPs due to their 
high economic, social and environmental value. The data review indicates that data on 
NTFP values generally continues to be patchy, inconsistent, imprecise, incomplete and 
difficult to obtain, except for a few better studied species and geographical areas. The 
paradox is that for the majority of these treasures, their multitude and ubiquitous uses 
and trade mean that although they are highly visible in the livelihoods, both rural and 
urban, of those engaging in the chains, their values remain poorly captured in statistics 
and policy. This makes their contribution to livelihoods and economies invisible to de-
cision and policymakers. This finding confirms other studies (Cunningham 1991; 
Campbell et al. 2002c; Shackleton et al. 2007; Tieguhong et al. 2008b). To shed the 
cloak of invisibility and unravel the paradox of substantial but hidden riches, the social, 
economic, political and institutional and governance contexts are further examined in 
Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
  
5  
 
Livelihoods context1 
Different histories of habitation, knowledge, institutions, economic and cultural prefer-
ences, practices and tastes determine which species are used and become products. This 
chapter contributes to the first research question concerning the contexts in which the 
NTFP value chains are embedded and trends, with a focus on the livelihood context. 
Given the long history and rich and diverse cultural and geographic fabric in which the 
value chains originate, the chapter concentrates on the social and economic contexts of 
the livelihoods of people collecting, using and trading NTFPs which influence chain 
governance. Continuing the bricolage theme, this section weaves the study results – par-
ticularly the surveys, stakeholder interviews and workshops (detailed in chapter 3) – 
with the literature review to present and analyse the contexts. Livelihood aspects specif-
ic to the chains are further detailed in Chapters 7 to 10. Livelihoods data is highly tem-
poral, context and location specific and as such, is intended to provide context to the 
specific chains and locations studied. Where this is generalizable to NTFPs in Came-
roon, this is indicated. 
Socioeconomic context  
Although the term ‘NTFP’ is a couple of decades old (de Beer et al. 1989), Chapter 4 
showed that such products have been used and traded for centuries. Many have main-
tained subsistence; economic, social and cultural values for local people but their values 
have waxed and waned on national and international markets. Examining the historical 
and current socio-economic context helps to map swings in value and subsequent shifts 
in importance to livelihoods across time and societies: from subsistence products to im-
portant commodities during colonial periods to secondary resources, and more recently 
a re-entry in the national and international spotlights concerning their trade, conserva-
tion and development. This has led to different regulations, policies and institutions ad-
dressing NTFPs (see Chapter 6) and consequently different governance strategies. A 
                                                 
1  This chapter draws on the following, peer-reviewed published work written or contributed to by the 
author: Beauchamp and Ingram 2011, Cerutti et al. 2009, Ingram 2012, Ingram, Ndoye et al. 2012a 
and 2012b, Ingram 2012, Ingram et al. 2013, Laird et al. 2010.  
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more rounded view of the NTFPs, their chains and sustainability can be gained from 
understanding these spatio-temporal and socio-political aspects. 
 
Historical socioeconomic context 
To understand the current context in which the chains operate, it is critical to understand 
their history. A brief trip through time and across what is now Cameroon reveals how 
history influences the chains today. Around 2,800 years ago the earliest inhabitants of 
the Congo Basin (Verdu et al. 2009) were semi-nomadic hunter gatherers. The Mbenga 
ethnic groups (Geyele, Baka/Baka-aa, BaKola, Aka and Kongo) – often referred to as 
pygmies – continue to inhabit the lowland humid forests and have intricate knowledge, 
use and customs associated with the forest (Turnbull 1961; Bahuchet et al. 1991; van 
Dijk 1999; van Dijk et al. 2003; Hattori 2005). Whilst many of their forest-based tradi-
tions have remained unchanged, their contact with market economies, subsistence and 
cultivation activities and the relationship with Bulu and Bantu-speaking farmers has led 
to increasing exploitation since the 1950s of NTFPs for cash (Wilkie 1989; Hewlett 
1996). The market surveys evidence how bush mango (Irvingia spp.) (see Chapter 10) 
and Gnetum spp. (see Chapter 7) are increasingly commercialised by the Baka. Move-
ments2 to defend their traditional rights and counter marginalisation and exclusion re-
spond to the threats posed by agriculture, settlement, large infrastructure projects, min-
ing and timber concessions on their traditional lands (Egbe 1997; Young-Ing 2006; 
Larson et al. 2010a). 
From around 500 BC Bantu people migrated in waves into and across southern Cam-
eroon. By AD 500 Northern Cameroon was gradually inhabited by Arabic, Hamitic and 
Negroid peoples (Neba 1999). By the end of the 16th century the Fulani, a nomadic, pas-
toral Islamic people had developed a strong presence in the north and by the mid-18th 
century they had moved into the Highlands. Portuguese explorers arrived on the River 
Wouri in 1472. Subsequent adventurers and traders set up sugar plantations and built 
upon the existing north-south slave trade run by local chiefs, which endured for 400 
more years. Heightened demand for ivory, wax, cola and rubber allowed previously 
subjugated and isolated peoples to rise to economic prominence using the ancient slave 
routes. These form the foundation for today’s trading routes and explain the preponder-
ance of certain ethnic groups in the cola and gum arabic chains.  
 Numerous small-scale chiefdoms emerged by the 17th century with ornate and luxu-
rious courtly and funerary arts, these as well as everyday objects feature forest animals 
and plants as symbols of spiritualism and power (Metropolitan Museum of Art 2010). 
They remain evident today, particularly in the Highlands. The influence of the Bantu 
coastal clans grew, extending to Adamaoua by the 16th century but by the late 1770s and 
early 1800s, Fulanis defeated and displaced many of the largely non-Muslim inhabit-
ants, further developing the slave trade and creating a powerful feudal empire ruled 
from Sokoto, Nigeria. From 1844 onwards, starting in the Southwest, missionary cen-
tres were established, followed by European settlement and conquest from the late 
1870s, aided by quinine (Cinchona spp.) cultivation to combat malaria. Germany signed 
a treaty with Douala and Bamiléké chiefs in what are now the Littoral and Western are-
as, encountering strong opposition in parts of Adamaoua, the Southwest and Northwest. 
                                                 
2  Lobbying and advocacy organisations include the Rainforest Foundation, Rainforest Alliance, Forest 
People’s Programme, Centre d'accompagnement des Autochtones Pygmées et Minoritaires Vulnéra-
bles (CAMV) and Cercle pour la Défense de l'Environnement (CEDEN). 
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The Northwest and West regions however particularly were, and still are, strongholds of 
highly organised kingdoms (Fondoms) from the semi-Bantu Chamba and Tikar groups 
that migrated to the fertile highlands from the North and Nigeria from the 16th century. 
Among the Fulani, Grassfielder tribes, Bamiléké and Bamoun, social organisation was 
traditionally based on hierarchical relations between members of groups with different 
status (royalty, nobility, commoners and slaves). They traded in slaves, ivory, palm oil, 
kola nuts, salt, oil, iron, cloth, pearls and cowry shells. During the 19th century the High-
lands – increasingly known as the Grassfields – were still largely outside the trading 
networks of the Benue and Adamaoua, although these spread into the Bamenda High-
lands at the end of the 19th Century (Chilver 1961). This opened possibilities for differ-
entiation and commodification (Rowlands 1978; Warnier 1985) and the cultivation of 
the most valuable products, such as cola nuts in the Northwest (Geary 1980). Their cul-
tural and economic value derives from this period. 
In the South, Bantu-speaking groups such as the Fang and Beti migrated into south-
east Cameroon by the end of the 18th century. They are characterised by a clan-based, 
societal organisation in which age and gender are the major social stratifiers. The 
coastal Duala, Bakweri and Bakossi are sedentary, village based, hierarchical clans dis-
tinguishing between indigenes and slaves who have different land entitlement rights. 
There is a high degree of social inequality among some of the northern and Highlands 
ethnic groups. Adamaoua is a melting pot of Bantu and Fulani origins, with the Gbaya 
an acephalous, tribal, patrician-based people with dispersed communities with contin-
gent membership and permissive subsistence ecology. Current social inequalities based 
on access to political power and formal education level now coexist with these indige-
nous forms of stratification in all the study areas. Although a cosmopolitan lifestyle has 
developed among the wealthy and intelligentsia, these culturally distinct markers and 
obligations to kin and ethnic compatriots remain. This affects socio-economic life, with 
ethnic origins reflected today in customary governance arrangements, the choice of trad-
ing partners, food preferences and celebrations and attitudes to forest products. 
The exploitation of natural resources initiated by the Germans continued after the 
World War I handover to Britain and France. Cocoa, coffee, cotton, timber and palm oil 
were developed into major export revenue sources. The economy remained buoyant up-
on these until the economic crisis of the late 1980s. This is reflected today in the policy 
focus on timber and agricultural commodities. The basic road and rail infrastructure 
present today was developed during the colonial period (USAID 2010). The generally 
poor state of this infrastructure now presents major problems for harvesters – evidenced 
by it being ranked as the first or second most major barrier to trade by all actors the 
chains in the interviews. In 1955 the Union of Cameroonian Peoples commenced an 
armed struggle for independence that led to self-government for French Cameroon. 
Ahidjo was the first prime minster of the independent Republic of Cameroon, unifying 
Francophone Cameroon with the largely Christian, Anglophone Southern Cameroons. 
On-going political, ethnic, language and cultural tensions still exist between Franco-
phone and Anglophone regions and peoples as a result of the colonial divide and reuni-
fication. Administrative, educational and political systems have been heavily influenced 
by the colonial systems, imprinting land tenure and state relations with customary au-
thorities. A Beti ethnic coalition gained political dominance as the Cameroon People’s 
Democratic Movement (CPDM) in 1985, with the still ruling President Biya at its helm. 
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Ethnicity 
This rich and chequered history is reflected today in Cameroon’s cultural and ethnic di-
versity, with over 247 ethnolinguistic groups (Ndongo-Semengue et al. 1999). In 1987 
an estimated 32% of people had migrated intra-nationally in Cameroon (Schrieder et al. 
2000), mainly outside of their original ethnic areas, to urban areas and to regions offer-
ing employment, such as plantations and timber concessions in the Southwest (Diaw 
1997; Sunderlin et al. 2002). The survey results (see Table 5.1) reflect this diversity and 
mobility, with 9% of all harvesters not being indigenous to the harvest area. An illustra-
tion of this is the blurring of linguistic boundaries such that forest-based gastronomic 
terms such as eru and achu3 have become commonplace in Cameroonian French and 
English (Echu 2002).  
 
Table 5.1 Ethnic origins of harvesters in value chains 
NTFP chain Region % non-indigene harvesters Origin of immigrant harvesters 
Gnetum spp. Southwest 0 Southwest, Littoral, Northwest 
Littoral 0 Northwest, Nigeria 
Apiculture 
 
Northwest 22 Southwest, Northwest 
Adamaoua 10 Adamaoua, North 
Prunus africana Northwest 15 Northwest 
Cola spp. Northwest & West 0 West, Northwest, Littoral 
Littoral 14 West, Southwest 
 
Irvingia spp. 
Southwest 10 Southwest, Littoral, Northwest 
Centre, South & Littoral 13 North, Centre 
East 2 East 
Raphia spp. Northwest & West 0 West 
Bamboo Centre, South, West, Northwest 15 All regions 
Acacia spp.  North & Extreme North 10 North 
Average  9  
Source: Research results 
 
Another impact has been increased exposure to, and popularity of forest products once 
used only by specific tribal groups (Poubom Ngundam 1997), such as eru and cola nuts. 
There has been increasing dissemination (encouraged by academic and development 
organisations) of rich oral myths, folktales, riddles, and proverbs. Many include ac-
counts of NTFPs use such as ‘Tales of the grasslands and the forest’ (Nzuh 1999), ‘Kola 
nut divination’ (Dah 1995) and ‘Rituals in the Grassfields’ (Mzeka 1996). The recogni-
tion of tribal affiliation, deference to some customs and maintenance of maternal and 
paternal languages remains common, although mobility and changing social relations 
mean that the institutions ensuring adherence to such traditions are weakening. Thus 
myths upon which customary arrangements governing forest use are founded no longer 
have the same power to shape or control activities (Paul Mzeka, ANCO, pers. comm. 
2008; George Bang, Oku Honey Cooperative pers. comm. 2010). This aspect is ruled by 
upholders of those traditions (Fon of Oku, pers. comm. 2009; Fon of Pinyin, pers.  
 
                                                 
3  The Bayang term eru signifies a dish of sliced Gnetum spp. leaves cooked in palm oil with ground, 
fermented cassava. Achu originates form the Grassfields and is a yellow soup of palm oil and NTFPs 
(Tetrapleura tetraptera, Ricinodendron heudelottii, Piper guineensis and Afrostyrax kamerunensis), 
served in a pounded cocoyam and plantain porridge with meat, usually beef or goat. 
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Table 5.2 Population statistics of study areas 
Region/State Division Capital Surface area km2   Population1, 2 Population density km² 
Estimated no. adja-
cent villages 3, 4 
Estimated population 
villages3, 4 
Cameroon 
Southwest 
Total Southwest Buea 25,410 1,316,079 51.8 27 10,000 
Fako  Buea 2,093 46, 412 222.8 14 10,000 
Kupe-Muanengouba Bangem 3,404 105,579 31.0 3  
Meme Kumba 3,105 326,734 105.2   
Manyu Mamfe 9,565 181 039 18.9 8  
Ndian Mundemba 6,626 122,579 18.5 2  
Northwest 
Total Northwest Bamenda 17,300 1,728,953 99.9 26 62,500 
Bui Kumbo 2,297 321,969 31.5 11 29,000 
Mezam Bamenda 1,745 524,127 34.5 1  
Boyo Fundong 1,592 124,887 30.5 13 30,000 
Donga Mantung Nkambe 4,279 269, 931 32.3 1 2,500 
West Total West Bafoussam  13,892 1,720,047 37.5   Ménoua Dschang 1,380 285,764 42.5   
Littoral Total  Douala 20,248 2,510,283 124.9 
6  
Mungo Nkongsamba 3,723 379,241 101.9 6 n/a 
Adamaoua 
Total Adamaoua Ngoundéré 63,691 884,289 7.7 14 11,800 
Mayo Banyo Banyo 8,520 187,066 22.0   
Faro et Déo Tignere 10 435 82,717 7.9   
Djerem4 Tibati 13,283 82,717 9.4 14 11,800 
Centre Total Centre Yaoundé  68,926 3,098,044 24   
Extreme North Total Ext. North Maroua 34,263 3,111,792 90.8 13 n/a 
Total5/5  17,463,836 37,5 73 72,500 
Nigeria 
Cross River Total Calabar 20,156 3,104,446 154   
Akwa Ibom Total Uyo 7,081 4,805,451 679   
Total 5    170,123,740 184   
Sources: 1 Institut National de la Statistique 2011, 2005 census 2 United Nations Population Fund 1999, 1999 census 3 Community Forest Simple Management Plans and MOCAP  
2007, 4 Fieldwork. 5 URL: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html accessed June 2011. NA= data not available.  
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comm. 2008; Yamma Peter, ASSOKOFOMI, pers. comm. 2007; Bakia Besong, SNV, 
pers. comm. 2008). 
Poverty 
NTFP’s contribution to livelihoods can be seen in the socioeconomic context of where 
the chains operate, shown in Table 5.2. The chains all originate in the poorest regions of 
Cameroon (National Institute of Statistics 2007). Poverty still dominates (see Table 
1.1), despite the Government’s plans to create a socially acceptable, middle-income 
country (Republic of Cameroon 2009). The main vehicle to do this has been the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Programmes, started in 2003 with the second published in 2009 
(Premier Minister 2009). Among the indicators used to measure poverty in Cameroon, 
poverty is defined as less than 738 FCFA/day (1.47 US$/day) (National Institute of 
Statistics 2007). The last household survey (National Institute of Statistics 2007), indi-
cated that poverty still affects 40% of the population, a slight decrease from 2001 and 
1996. Women and children are particularly vulnerable as half of the members of poor 
households are under 15 years old and the majority of people living in rural areas are 
women. In urban areas, poverty has declined, particularly in Douala and Yaoundé and 
increased in rural areas, particularly in the Extreme North (25% of poor), the Northwest 
(15%) and North (9%). The national average household size was 5.1 persons in 2001 
and 4.0 in 2007 (Tandes 2010). Shown in Table 5.3, the average household size of ac-
tors in all the NTFP chains was 6.1 persons (SD 1), inferring higher than average 
chance of poverty.  
 
Table 5.3 Average value chain actor’s household size  
Chain and region 
of origin 
Chain  
Average 
Average household size 
Harvesters Processors Wholesalers Retailers Exporters 
Average 6.1 7.0 5.5 6.2 6.1 7.0 
Gnetum SW, L 5.9 5.0   6.0 7.0 
Apiculture NW 8.3 7.0     
Apiculture Ad 7.0 8.2     
Prunus NW,SW 7.0 9.5   7.0  
Cola spp. NW 6.0 6.1     
Irvingia spp. SW 7.0 7.0  8.0  6.0 
Irvingia spp. L 5.6 7.0     
Raphia spp. 7.3 7.3     
Bamboo NW 5.0 6.8 5.5  5.0  
Acacia spp. ExN 7.0 8.0     
Source: Research results. Key: Regions:Ad=Adamaoua L=Littoral S=South SW=Southwest N=North W=West 
ExN=Extreme North NW=Northwest  
 
The empirical results shown in Table 5.4 show that on average 53% of people active 
in the NTFP chains primary school education, which is comparable to the national aver-
age of 55% (National Institute of Statistics 2007). However, chains varies significantly. 
Acacia spp. harvesters in the extreme North and Prunus Africana harvesters in the 
Northwest are more likely to have no schooling and few of them have secondary educa-
tion, as is the case for harvesters of Cola spp.. The highest levels of education were 
found among Gnetum spp., Irvingia spp. and bamboo harvesters. Some of these trends 
can be explained by gender, such as women dominating harvesting in the Acacia spp. 
chain. A high proportion of gum arabic harvesters in the Extreme North are females 
who, due to their culture and Islamic religion, tend not be sent to school. According to 
the ECAM III survey only 18% of rural women have secondary-level education and 
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women in the North and Extreme North regions are the least educated. Education also 
varies by actor type, with processors and exporters having higher than average levels of 
schooling. This may be influenced by their urban habitation and thus better access to 
education, but also generally higher incomes. These figures reflect the 75% average na-
tional literacy rate., with 92% and 89% respectively for urban men and women, and 
65% and 52% respectively for rural men and women (National Institute of Statistics 
2002). 
 
Table 5.4 Average education level of actors in value chains  
Chain and region of 
origin 
% of total actors attaining education level (N/P/S/U) 
Average Harvesters Processors Wholesalers Retailers Exporters
Gnetum spp.SW, L 0/57/43/0 0/68/32/0 - - 0/68/31/0 1/36/63/0 
Apiculture NW 10/55/29/02 20/54/24/02 - - 12/53/33 - 
Apiculture A 07/77/16/0 07/77/16/0 - - - - 
Prunus africana NW 28/53/17/2 28/53/17/2 - - - - 
Cola spp. NW 16/77/05/0 16/77/05/0 - - - - 
Irvingia.SW,C,S, L,E 9/24/52/15 25/44/30/0 - - 05/25/65/5 1/18/54/27 
Irvingia spp.E 3/66/30/02 3/66/30/02 - - - - 
Raphia spp.NW 16/77/05/0 16/77/05/0 - - - - 
Bamboo NW 01/48/36/10 13/59/26/03 3/68/24/5  03/48/34/15 - 
Acacia spp. ExN 92/08/0/0 92/08/0/0 - - - - 
Chain average  19/53/25/4 25/55/22/1 3/68/24/5  7/43/44/10 1/18/54/27 
Source: Research results. Key: Regions: Ad=Adamaoua E=East L=Littoral S=South SW=Southwest N=North 
W=West ExN=Extreme North NW=Northwest. Schooling: N= None, P= Primary, S = Secondary, U= University.  
 
Actors’ NTFP incomes present a very mixed picture. Table 5.5 highlights how Gne-
tum spp. harvesters earn almost double the lowland forest zone average, but Irvingia 
spp. harvesters earn less. Cola spp., Raphia spp. and Prunus africana harvesters on av-
erage all earn less than the Highlands average, whilst bamboo actors (see Chapter 10) 
earn above the average. Honey harvesters in Adamaoua earn slightly less than the sa-
vannah average, although gum arabic harvesters earn almost double the average. These 
differences are related to product value, costs, markets and quantity harvested. The ur-
ban based actors in the chains33 – the exporters and wholesalers – all earn significantly 
more than the average, whilst retailers earn less. The average income for all harvesters 
is slightly less than the average for rural inhabitants in Cameroon. The wide variations 
in incomes per chains reflect issues such as demand, product value, scarcity and differ-
ent market types and access. This highlights that only in specific chains and for specific 
actors (wholesalers and exporters) who add value, take most risks and earn the highest 
profit, does trade in NTFPs provide an above national average household income. To 
interpret these findings, it is necessary to compare with spatially disaggregated data. For 
example, in 2001, average annual income for households engaged in informal non-
agriculture was 931,000 FCFA (1,308 US$) and for informal agriculture 391,000 FCFA 
(549 US$) (ECAM II). Annual average rural income per adult equivalent was 276,335 
FCFA (388 US$) in the humid forest zone, 297,146 FCFA (417 US$) in the Highlands 
and 283,902 FCFA (399 US$) in the savannah, 565,112 FCFA (794 US$) in Yaoundé 
and 522,947 FCFA (735 US$) in Douala and 444,292 FCFA (624 US$) in other cities 
(National Institute of Statistics 2002). By 2005, people based in the rural lowland forest 
                                                 
33  FCFA US$ exchange rate fluctuations in the period 2005 to 2007 were 1.10, making the 2005 and 
2007 figures comparable and inflation rates stable at 1 to 2% (Konings 2009).  
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area showed the greatest decreases in poverty (17%), however in the rural savannah 
zone poverty increased by 1.3%. Average urban incomes per adult were 497,896 FCFA 
(699 US$) and 280,233 FCFA (393 US$) for rural adult inhabitants (National Institute 
of Statistics 2007). Actors’ NTFP incomes reflect this pattern of uneven economic 
growth and activity across the country and social categories, with poverty reducing in 
urban areas, but remaining high in rural areas.  
 
Table 5.5 Contribution of NTFPs to household income per actor and chain 
Source: Research results. Key: - signifies no data. 
 
NTFPs are generally of strategic importance for the livelihoods of harvesters and 
their households. Shown in Table 5.6, many of the NTFPs studied contribute to a signif-
icant proportion of harvesters’ incomes for long periods of time, with harvesters having 
been active on average for 8 years. In three chains the NTFP studied was more im-
portant than farming. Often the product studied is one of several harvested, indicating 
the strategic importance of NTFPs to household livelihoods. 
 
Table 5.6 Importance ranking of NTFPs in harvesters’ household incomes  
Source: Research results. Key: - signifies no data collected  
 
Gender 
Summarised in Table 5.7, the surveys indicate that men dominate chains numerically, 
compromising 60% of all actors (Ingram et al. 2013). Their presence varies per chain 
and stage, with processing, retail and wholesale stages generally dominated by women. 
Gathering forest products in general is gender differentiated. This mirrors other activi-
ties, as in most areas, regardless of ethnic background, labour and family duties are 
strongly segregated by gender (Sunderlin et al. 2002). Women are responsible for feed-
NTFP chain Contribution to annual average household income (US$) 
Harvester Processor Wholesaler Exporter Retailer Average 
Gnetum spp. 1,276 - 818 - 1,654 1,249 
Apiculture  469 377 - 8,953 2,458 3,064 
Prunus africana 374 213 - 11,563 - 4,050 
Cola spp. 184 - 347 - - 266 
Irvingia spp. 331 - 10,437 - 620 3,796 
Raphia spp.  432 - 325 - - 379 
Bamboo  536 1,010 - - 1,608 1,051 
Acacia spp.  1,105 - - - - 1,105 
Average 588 533 2,982 10,258 1,585 3,189 
NTFP 
chain 
% ranking 
NTFP as pri-
mary house-
hold income 
source 
% ranking 
farming as 
primary 
income 
source 
Average 
number of 
years har-
vesting 
NTFP 
Average 
number of 
income  
sources 
NTFP as % of 
total income 
from all NTFPs 
produced 
Average 
number 
of all 
NTFPs 
harvested 
Gnetum spp. 33 43 11 5 28 10 
Apiculture   54 38 6 5 54 3 
Prunus africana  80 40 17 8 37 6 
Cola spp.  49 60 9 6 32 2 
Irvingia spp. 37 38 18 6 31 18 
Raphia spp. 49 33 4 7 40 5 
Bamboo  18 56 11 8 97 3 
Acacia spp.  18 49 8 3 - 9 
Average 42 45 11 6 46 7 
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ing the family and growing staple food crops, while men grow cash crops, own trees, 
clear the land and provide the traditional luxuries of meat, oil, and salt. Such customs 
have been largely unchanged for centuries at least up to the 1950s (Goheen 1996). This 
has led to women collecting traditionally low-value products (plant-based and fish) for 
family use and men focusing on timber and high value, traded species – particularly 
hunting (Ndoye et al. 2006). Among specific ethnic groups, such as the pastoral Mbo-
roro and Fulani in the Extreme North, Northwest and West, men traditionally herd the 
livestock and women process dairy products and do not enter the forest or stray far 
alone from their homes. These practices are both linked to their Islamic traditions (van 
Santen 1998) and the specific Mbororo and Fulani culture. The male-female ratio of ac-
tors in specific chains is determined by the products’ value, physical activity in harvest-
ing and processing, harvest distances and forest type (farm-fallow or ‘black forest’). 
Women generally, but not always, harvest NTFPs closer to home in farm and fallows. 
However, for certain products such as bush mango, women will, often with families and 
in groups, camp in the forest for several days of harvesting. However, perceptions of the 
suitability of heavy, physical work appear gender-differentiated: it is common to see 
women in the Highlands carrying traditional rucksacks and head loads of fuelwood, po-
tatoes and maize that at approximately 25 kg (Kaberry 1952; Davis 2001), weigh 
around the same as the pygeum barks and full beehives that men carry. This observation 
mirrors observations in other African countries where women still transport most crops 
and carry similar weights (Calvo 1994; Starkey 2001).  
 
Table 5.7 Male-female ratio of actors in value chains 
Chain and region 
of origin 
Average 
Male/female 
% actors male 
Harvesters Processors Intermediaries Retailers Wholesalers Exporters
Gnetum spp. 31:69 21 20 100 0 5 41 
Apiculture NW 63:37 94 60  34   
Apiculture A 71:29 96 90 60  60 50 
Prunus africana 99:01 99      
Cola spp. NW 58:42 91   25   
Cola. Littoral 91:09 91      
Irvingia SW 51:49 25  83 30 50 58 
Irvingia. CSL 28:72 29   30 53  
Irvingia. East 59:41 84  100  53  
Raphia spp. 75:25 99 99  5 100  
Bamboo 94:06 90 100  93   
Acacia spp. 35:65 35      
Average 60:40 71 62 86 31 54 50 
Source: Research results. Key:Regions: NW=Northwest, SW =Southwest A =Adamaoua CSL= Centre, South & 
Littoral. Blank = no data. 
 
Women often retain informal power within households, enforced by their control of 
subsistence activities, their role as conduits to female ancestors and their role in cultivat-
ing and domesticating species (Brown et al. 2002). However the proportion of women 
involved in chain activities tends to decrease with commercialisation and increasing 
product value. This has led to men collecting, for example eru (Chapter 7) and bush 
mango (Chapter 10). The research findings highlight that women continue to dominate 
petty NTFP trade, particularly prevalent in markets. This trend has remaining un-
changed over the last fifteen years (Ruíz Pérez et al. 2003). Among forest product trad-
ers, there is also strong gender differentiation related to business size, product speciali-
sation and market strategies. Gender differences account for half of the variability in 
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profit margins, with family status and age being important factors. Gender disparities 
however diminish among younger traders, echoing previous research (Ruiz Pérez et al. 
2003). Other explanatory factors are that in general, men have higher social status than 
women. Men generally have more rights with regard to marriage, divorce, and land ten-
ure within most local systems of social organisation and more access to government bu-
reaucracy and the courts. The more recent entry of women into retailing, wholesale and 
export in contrast to harvesting highlights the changes afoot, despite increases in farm 
work associated with the economic crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s (Fon-
chingong 1999), with more women entering paid employment. This corroborates trends 
of women starting businesses, obtaining higher education levels and entering tradition-
ally male-dominated sectors (Veuthey et al. 2009). Gender equality and empowerment 
of women have been recognised as critical for poverty alleviation, enshrined in one of 
the millennium development goals. 
Entrepreneurial operating context 
The challenges in the business environment affect how individuals, groups and busi-
nesses operate (Bowen et al. 2007) and form a significant aspect of the contexts, influ-
encing governance arrangements in the chains.  
 
Trade 
The nature of Cameroon’s international trade has changed dramatically over time, im-
pacting poverty levels, employment and incomes. Colonial rule saw the rapid amalgam-
ation of governance and government units, with ‘modernisation’ achieved at the ex-
pense of the indigenous structures and through the exploitation of the African peoples 
(Oliver 1999). Despite unification upon independence, the colonial legacy has left plu-
rality of languages, administrative and government systems, and politics, which are still 
apparent today. Cameroon remains a member of both the Commonwealth of Nations 
and La Francophonie and associated economic, cultural, social and educational ties such 
as the Alliance Française, British Council and Goethe Institute. The EU has remained 
Cameroon’s major trade partner since independence (with 41% of imports and 57% of 
exports). France, the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK are the most important partner 
countries (DG Trade 2011). Major export products include petroleum oils (48% of rev-
enues in 2005), followed by timber (14%) and agricultural products (DG Trade 2011). 
Trade with other members of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa 
(CEMAC) appears to be very limited, at around 3.4%. 
However unrecorded, informal regional trade figures are not included34 and the find-
ings of this study suggest that trade in Gnetum spp. Acacia spp., Irvingia spp. and other 
NTFPs is substantial, with trade in the eight chains worth an estimated 32 million US$ 
annually (see Chapter 4). Around 34,227 people are active in different stages of the 
chains of these products, shown in Figure 5.1. This lack of data is despite Cameroon 
being a member of the CEMAC and sharing the Central African Franc (FCFA) currency 
with the five other sub-regional states. Nigeria is officially the third major trade partner 
(accounting for 7% of all exports and imports). New economic links are also apparent, 
with China rising from a low position in 2005 to become the second most important 
                                                 
34  World Trade Indicators 2008 database URL: http://www.worldbank.org/wti2008. Retrieved 29 June 
2011. 
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partner (12% of imports and exports) by 2010 (DG Trade 2011). Since 2000 China and 
other emerging economies have been increasingly securing trade and control of chains 
such as timber and oil palm at source (Roda 2009; Cerutti et al. 2011). These new mar-
ket entrants shape trade patterns and forest management (Cerutti et al. 2011). This is 
mirrored in, for example, increasing sales of medicinal NTFPs such as Prunus africana, 
Voacanga africana and Pausinystalia johimbe to China. 
 
Figure 5.1 Number of people active in eight NTFP chains 
 
As 41% of NTFPs have medicinal uses (see Chapter 4), and given the levels of pov-
erty, and poor access to modern health services (Republic of Cameroon, 2009a), their 
trade has implications for health, and in turn for poverty, with health central to two of 
the millennium development goals. Traditional practitioners, such as herbalists, ngambi 
(diviners) and ritual specialists, use a wide variety of plant and animals in such treat-
ments, a number of which have been inventoried (see Appendices 3 and 7). Current 
healthcare systems are typically a mix of biomedical treatment, traditional medicine, 
witchcraft (closely bound to traditional religion) and Islamic medicine. The combination 
depends on beliefs, cost, proximity and the advice of family and friends. Traditional 
practices remain strong, despite shifts in the last century and commonly see power as 
simultaneously attractive, dangerous and traceable to occult forces, causing both mental 
and physical health and illness and affecting material success. Over the last two decades 
there has been a gradual tendency towards herbalists and individual treatment, away 
from the use of ritual specialists and community-wide treatments. Many practitioners 
specialise in treating particular afflictions and people often consult practitioners from 
different cultural groups. These practitioners have adapted to societal changes by incor-
porating new ideas and medicines into their practices and treating modern illnesses such 
as AIDS. Ethnic groups with reputations for witchcraft, such as the Maka in the south 
and Oku in the Northwest (Geschiere 1997) continue to draw substantially on forest 
products for their cultural and medicinal powers. Pharmaceutical enterprises and re-
search organisations35 have been investigating the efficacy of traditional NTFPs. This 
has resulted in scientific articles and closely guarded local compendiums. The rights to 
                                                 
35  Centre de Naturopathie et d'Action Humanitaire du Cameroun (CENAHC), the Institute de Recherche 
Médicales & Etudes des Plantes Médicinales (IMPN) and Centre de Recherche en Plantes Médici-
nales et Médicine Traditionnelle (CRPMT). 
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use, maintain and protect traditional knowledge have been debated and guidelines for-
mulated in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). This has resulted in Came-
roonian cases on access and benefit sharing of traditional knowledge (Laird et al. 2008; 
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity and Central African Forests 
Commission 2009; Union for Ethical Biotrade 2010).  
Informality  
Most NTFP commerce, as in other African economies, is informal (Roitman 2005; RRI 
2009a). Most NTFP traders are also small scale (Trefon 1994; Ndoye et al. 1997/98; 
Ladipo 1998). Informal denotes commercial operations not being registered as enter-
prises (with the Chamber of Commerce or the Ministry of Small and Medium Enterpris-
es, Social Economy and Handicrafts (MINSME) and includes economic activities, en-
terprises and workers unregulated or protected by the state. In developing countries the 
informal economy is estimated to comprise between half to three quarters of the non-
agricultural labour force (Economic Commission for Africa 2010). The informal econ-
omy is also estimated as the main source of job creation in Africa, providing between 
20% and 75% of total employment in most countries (Economic Commission for Africa 
2010). It has been viewed positively as a pool of entrepreneurial talent, cushion during 
economic crises and source of livelihoods for the working poor, and problematically as 
avoiding regulation and taxation (WIEGO 2011). Links between informality, growth, 
poverty and inequality have become more apparent (WIEGO 2011). In inter-African 
trade informality is stimulated by urban development (Portes et al. 1991). Informal in-
stitutions can shape political behaviour and outcomes even more strongly than formal 
rules (Helmke et al. 2004).  
Despite such informality, prevailing regulations have some influence on NTFP 
commerce. Trade is formally regulated by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Small and Medium Enterprises, and employment by the Ministry of Employment. Dis-
cussions indicated that there is little, if any, coordination between them. Trade in physi-
cal markets (including traditional country Sunday markets), is generally controlled by 
the local council, which decrees times, days, location and area of marketplaces, and 
grants annual and daily permits to sellers. Interviews and workshops (see Appendix 12) 
indicated that traders make conscious choices whether to work informally or register, 
with 17% in total being part of a group – the majority (95%) in Common Initiative 
Groups (CIG). This is the easiest and cheapest form of profit-making organisation. Reg-
istered at regional level, they are governed by Law 92/006 of 14 August 1992 related to 
societies, cooperatives and common initiative groups. Taxation is a major worry for 
most enterprises, with 95% of actors in the Northwest and Southwest indicating that 
they did not register or formalise their activities to avoid taxation. Registering as a CIG 
or an NGO provides tax exemption36. However, to obtain a SFP permit, individuals or 
communities must be registered companies or approved and accredited as forest re-
source harvesters, which only 14 operators have achieved since 2008. As a result, the 
majority of SFPs are traded without permits: interviews indicate that over 90% did not 
have a permit. Sudano-Sahelian inter-African trade networks have a strong ethnic com-
ponent, providing a social structure and informal institutions. A trader’s ethnic group 
often reflects a product’s origin or main consumers, such as in the cola chain (see Chap-
                                                 
36  Law No. 73 -15 of 7/12/73 relating to the roles and regulations governing cooperative societies and 
Law No. 92/006 of 14 August 1993 relating to Cooperative societies and CIGs. 
102 
 
ter 10) where traders from the Northwest and Extreme North dominate. These ethnically 
determined institutions compensate for weak formal institutions, incompetent adminis-
trative systems and rampant corruption. Based on trust, they enable trans-national eco-
nomic exchanges, dispute settlement, financial support, information sharing and trade 
facilitation (Langbour et al. 2010). 
 
Business challenges 
The difficulties of launching a business in Cameroon were iterated by the majority of 
actors in the chains and deterred many from operating formally. These challenges have 
been confirmed by the World Bank’s Doing Business indicators which measure the 
strength of legal institutions and procedures required to establish a business, the associ-
ated time and cost, and minimum capital requirements. In the study period, Cameroon 
continued to score poorly on an African and international scale, worsening from a rank 
of 147 in 2006 to 167 out of 175 in 2009 (World Bank 2007; 2010b). Compared to the 
average for Sub-Saharan Africa and lower-middle income countries, Cameroon’s per-
formance in the areas of government effectiveness, rule of law and control of corruption 
was much lower (World Bank 2009c). This is despite significant improvements since 
the late 1990s and early 2000s. Rigid labour laws make hiring and firing difficult and 
focus heavily on individual protection and national insurance contributions for pensions, 
which can be onerous for small enterprises (Jacques Nyam Eben, Ministry for Small 
and Medium Enterprises, Social Economy and Craftspersons, pers. comm. 2009). As a 
result, formal employment contracts were not common among the enterprises inter-
viewed. 
Obtaining credit is also difficult for the NTFP sector and for women in particular 
(Awono et al. 2010a). The scope, access and quality of credit information available 
through public organisations or private sector is very low, compared with the region and 
OECD average and twice as costly (World Bank 2009c). This results in a low uptake of 
credit though such formal channels and reliance on informal credit, such as tontines, 
particularly in the NTFP sector (Awono et al. 2010a). Whilst finance for micro-entre-
preneurs is fairly new, informal financing has a long history (Rogerson 2001). Tontines, 
njangi37, micro-savings schemes and gifts or informal flexible loans from friends and/or 
family and own capital are very important for entrepreneurs in the NTFP sector (Awono 
et al. 2010b). Interviews confirmed these as the major sources of capital for traders and 
retailers who needed to invest in stocks, equipment, premises and transport prior to 
starting a business.  
Taxes levied on NTFP trade include general businesses duties (profit and VAT) and 
local council taxes for market traders. Since 1996 traders have been required to pay a 
flat business tax of 12,000 FCFA (25 US$) per year. The total tax burden for small-
scale traders can be significant, adding to the burden of ‘informal’ taxes. Larger traders 
and companies are also subject to significant taxation, including regeneration taxes for 
SFP quotas at 10 FCFA (0.02 US$) per kilogram of SFP exploited. Revenues from SFP 
regeneration taxes are small compared to timber: from 2000 to 2005, the state annually 
received around 16 million US$ from timber concession area taxes (Cerutti et al. 2006), 
ten times the value from SFPs. The export of raw, unprocessed SFPs requires payment 
of another, progressive and volume-based tax. In the mid-1990s, an export tax of 15% 
                                                 
37  Informal associations of individuals along neighbourhood, professional, age, gender or ethnic lines, 
often with a cultural and/or credit and saving function. 
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was instituted on all NTFPs, but was reduced as it became apparent that the tax pushed 
the trade underground and forced many companies to close, such as the pharmaceutical 
NTFP-exporting company Plantecam. Measures to improve the transparency and man-
agement of the tax and customs in the Autonomous Port of Douala were not seen as 
producing improvements by the exporters interviewed. All interviewees indicated that 
negotiating bribes with officials from customs, tax, agriculture and MINFOF inspection 
services are part of their daily business.  
Collective action has been seen by Macqueen et al. (2006) as a strategy to overcome 
the bottlenecks of informality and difficult business environments, when few other sup-
port structures exist. Successful associations can achieve cost reductions, adapt strategi-
cally to new opportunities and lobby for more supportive policies. The interviews con-
firm this, with 17% of harvesters, 6% of processors, 12% of traders and 14% of retailers 
working collectively, with variations found in specific chains and regions, partly linked 
to social culture. For example in the Northwest and parts of the Southwest the tradition-
al cultures encourage and support collective action, with people accustomed to working 
collectively, dating back to colonially instigated farmer cooperatives. A survey of col-
lective action in the Northwest and Southwest confirms this (Ingram et al. 2007), indi-
cating that collective action and networking helped groups to meet their goals. The less 
hierarchical societal cultures more common in the Centre, South and Adamaoua regions 
make collective action more uncommon and problematic. On average, 18% of actors 
surveyed engage in collective action. 
Conclusion: Visible for livelihoods – invisible for policy  
The social-economic context in which NTFP chains are embedded highlights their on-
going, long-term importance for subsistence and trade. Many NTFPs are everyday items 
and common sights in households and markets. Trade has been highly dynamic, with 
booms and busts dependent upon a combination of factors involving supply and de-
mand, as well as changing alternatives, tastes, uses and consumers. Diverse trade and 
consumption practices by ethnic groups have merged and melted as mobility, urbanisa-
tion and globalisation increases, creating further opportunities for new products and 
markets. The economic benefits of trade are not equally distributed. On average, those 
involved in NTFPs gain equivalent to average national income. However, certain actors 
and products provide above average, substantial, highly valuable economic contribution 
to livelihoods. The unmeasured, non-economic benefits are also apparent – their use in 
healthcare, as food and their cultural importance. For other people, mainly women, rural 
harvesters, minority ethnic groups and large households who are more likely to be poor, 
NTFP trade provides an important economic and social contribution to their livelihoods 
but they remain poor. For others, it is a minor contribution, an opportunistic practice, 
diversification and safety net. The benefits from trade are easily controlled by the actors 
in the chains with the most economic and/or political power. The poorest, most margin-
alised and most dependent on NTFPs have less control.  
NTFP business is fraught with challenges, many inherent in Cameroonian socio-
economic culture and its politics. This has meant that trade has remained largely infor-
mal and reliant on family and ethnically based networks. Informality aims to avoid the 
costs of state interference and corruption, but also means that bribery is rife as there is 
no formal safeguard. Informality, whilst breeding creativity, is also a barrier to gaining 
support from the government, research and support organisations that are present or ac-
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tive, albeit uncoordinated, in the chains. It also forms a barrier for people and enterpris-
es in the chains to access financial capital. Collective action is one way that people in 
the chain have sought to generate more power to counter such practices, but it is not 
widespread in all chains and segments. 
Informality is also equated with lack of policy attention: the importance of the NTFP 
sector’s contribution to national economies, livelihoods, food security and health has 
been unknown or under-estimated. Politically it has been almost invisible, except for a 
handful of economically important and/or threatened products. The formal framework 
does little to promote or support vibrant NTFP-based entrepreneurship. Corruption adds 
an unpredictable and often costly layer of arrangements. However, in the last two dec-
ades an increasing trend of attention is apparent. Regional and national level discourses, 
institutions and networks of actors have emerged. However, this has yet to be translated 
into practices on the ground, in the forest, fields, villages and markets. The lack of har-
monisation between government agencies means there is no differentiation between 
wild and cultivated NTFPs and subsequent policies and practices related to the majority 
of chains. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Part III: Governance and value chain  
analyses 
This section further presents main empirical results of this study. Chapter 6 provides an 
analysis of governance arrangements, identifying statutory and customary, but also vol-
untary and market-based arrangements, projects, international conventions and corrup-
tion. Chapters 7 to 9 present the in-depth value chain analyses for the Gnetum spp., api-
culture and Prunus africana value chains. In Chapter 10, the five additional chain anal-
yses are summarised. These illustrate a representative range of NTFPs found in Came-
roon. They include bamboo, cola (Cola spp.), raffia (Raphia spp.), gum arabic (Acacia 
spp.) and bush mango (Irvingia spp.) Each of these four chapters addresses the second 
research question concerning how chains are configured in terms of products (uses and 
sources), actors, activities and values. The governance arrangements specific to each 
chain are described, to answer the third research question on governance arrangements. 
This allows question four on sustainable livelihoods and question five on the impact on 
product sustainability to be answered. Each chapter describes and analyses how these 
governance arrangements affect the livelihoods of actors along the chain and how these 
impact on chain and product sustainability. 
 
Pygeum (Prunus africana) hoe handle sellers, Belo market, Northwest region September 2009  
  
 
  
6  
Governance analysis1 
This chapter answers the first research question concerning the governance context and 
arrangements in which NTFP value chains are embedded and observable trends. The 
chapter draws on data from the literature review, content analysis of policy and regula-
tory documents and interviews with key stakeholders (Chapter 3). After outlining the 
policy and institutional context, it sets out how NTFPs are governed, building on the 
definition in Box 1.3. The principles and systems guiding interactions around NTFPs 
and institutions that enable these interactions are focused upon. The multiple govern-
ance frameworks existing in Cameroon are described, with a focus on the main geo-
graphic areas from which the value chains originate. Originally, the research sought to 
examine the formal, regulatory system and traditional and customary regulations. How-
ever the existence of other governance arrangements became apparent during the re-
search: those based on voluntary and market-based schemes, projects and international 
agreements, and the impact of corruption, all of which have introduced systems and 
practices by creating, adapting and/or enforcing formal and customary regulations and 
policies. The specific governance aspects in each value chain are subsequently detailed 
in Chapters 7 to 10. 
Political and institutional context 
This section introduces the prevailing forests, poverty and trade politics and policies. It 
presents and analyses the institutions impacting individuals and groups in NTFP chains.  
Development policy  
Compared to other African countries and many of its neighbours, Cameroon enjoys 
relatively high social and political stability, being largely peaceful since battles with 
German, French and British invaders in the late 19th century and political unrest in the 
early 1990s and 2008. Sporadic conflicts today arise from mainly pressure groups advo-
cating for greater autonomy of the Anglophone Northwest and Southwest regions 
                                                 
1  This chapter draws on the following peer-reviewed documents written or contributed to by the author: 
Cerutti et al. 2009, Colfer et al. 2011, Ingram et al. 2011c, Beauchamp and Ingram 2011, Laird et al. 
2010,   
108 
 
(Konings et al. 2003). Slow moves towards democratic reform have been made since 
the CPDM ceased to be the only legal political party and multi-party elections recom-
menced in December 1990. Political power has remained firmly in the hands of Presi-
dent Biya since 1982, currently the second longest running African president after Mu-
gabe. The president has broad, unilateral powers including creating policy, administer-
ing government agencies, negotiating and ratifying treaties. He appoints government 
officials at all levels.  
Political, institutional and juridical reforms have been enacted to support develop-
ment-oriented strategies since the 1980s when agreements were negotiated with the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. These were accompanied by 
slashing the civil service, public finance reforms, state governance changes and industry 
privatisation. Though they have had some effect, meaningful and visible reform, espe-
cially on corruption, have not occurred (International Crisis Group 2010). Currently all 
developmental strategies, policies and external support fall under the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Document (PRSP), adopted in 2003 (International Monetary Fund 2003). This 
embodies a decentralisation and participation rhetoric, prioritising a stable macroeco-
nomic framework, growth through economic diversification and private sector revitali-
sation (International Monetary Fund 2003). Failing to meet the conditions of the first 
four IMF programmes, the government was forced to adopt the IMF-supported Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) from 2005 to 2008. A new constitution was 
adopted in 1996, espousing democratisation, economic liberalisation and decentralisa-
tion. Emphasis was placed on governance and fighting corruption, leading to a National 
Governance Programme in 2003. Democratisation appears though to have halted after 
the return to political pluralism. Current politics are reminiscent of the post-indepen-
dence monolithic political period, with elites regaining political and economic privileg-
es associated with autocratic rule (Mbuagbo et al. 2004). Civil society has been com-
promised by the creation of political and social structures promoting autocratic rule and 
remains mired in cleavages, ethnicisim and regionalism. In this context ‘good govern-
ance’ has remained a persistent dream (Nkwi 2010).  
Forest policy 
Under pressure from the international community, the government was more or less 
forced to adopt reforms. The Bretton Woods institutions2, used conditionalities linked to 
structural adjustment programmes to drive a new forest law. Heavily influenced by the 
Rio Summit (1992) they attempted to reconcile economic forest exploitation and biodi-
versity conservation and to mobilise new sources of state income by introducing a forest 
tax (Topa et al. 2009). Local communities, business and civil society were poorly repre-
sented in the process, undermining the positive impacts the reformers wished to pro-
mote (Assembe-Mvondo 2009). The Forest and Environment Sector Policy (FESP) was 
adopted in 1999, becoming operational in 2006. It aims to be a comprehensive policy 
for accountable and sustainable management of forest resources and has five main activ-
ities: environmental management of forest activities, valorisation and processing of 
NTFPs, biodiversity conservation and valorisation of wildlife, community management 
of forest resources, and institutional capacity building, research and training. Govern-
ment actions are complemented by a basket of tied donor funding that eventually be-
                                                 
2  Established post World War II to assist European reconstruction and provide mechanisms for interna-
tional cooperation managing global financial systems, includes the World Bank, IMF, and IFC.  
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came available in 2008. Progress indicators3 strongly focus on timber and conservation, 
poverty and governance, with no specific indicators for NTFPs. A result has been im-
proved governance and sustainability of forest management in timber concessions, bet-
ter conditions for adjacent communities and enhanced timber-based economic growth4 
since the mid-1990s, with the resulting regulatory framework culminating in the 1994 
Forest and Wildlife law – considered by some as the most progressive in Central Africa 
(Topa et al. 2009). 
Although non-state actors were foreseen as partners in policy development and im-
plementation, MINFOF acknowledges that their participation remained below par5. Alt-
hough the FESP is a government programme, donor input to and steering was, and still 
is, strongest. This has mainly been through the 20 strong Circle of Partners of the Minis-
try of Forestry and Wildlife (CCPM), a group of international donor organisations, em-
bassies and support organisations active since 1999. Timber and conservation generally 
dominate the FESP and CCPM agendas, although periodically attention has been paid to 
NTFPs. The Forest Governance Facility (FGF) in 2007, initiated by the UK Department 
of International Development (DFID), the Netherlands Development Organisation 
(SNV) and local partners aimed to stimulate civil society, private sector, research and 
elected and traditional representatives involvement. But after three years it failed to 
gather momentum. The FESP is implemented by the Capacity Building for Community 
Managed Forest and Fauna Resources Initiatives Project (RIGC) set up and managed by 
the MINFOF with Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC) funds. It supported 
community-based activities, including NTFP extraction and processing until 2010. The 
National Forestry Action plan (PAFN) supported and revitalised the semi-dormant Na-
tional Reforestation Agency (ANAFOR)6. NTFPs were not specified in the PAFN. 
Largely stimulated by the FAO, a national policy framework (FAO 1999; Mbolo et al. 
2002) been developed within the context of Central Africa Forest Commission 
(COMIFAC) (Mbolo et al. 2002; Betti 2007b; Djeukam 2007; FAO et al. 2008; FAO 
2009a, 2009b).  
 
Governance actors 
A range of government agencies have been and are involved in implementing policies 
concerning NTFPs in Cameroon, shown in Figure 6.1. Alongside the direct actors In the 
1990s, the competent ministry – the then Ministry of Environment and Forests 
(MINEF), now Forestry and Wildlife (MINFOF) – created a sub-directorate for NTFPs. 
Located in the Directorate of Promotion and Transformation of Forest Products (DPT) it 
concerns the commercialisation, transformation and development of forest products. 
The DPT was also tasked with centralising data collection for these products. The de-
partment had to compete with more powerful directorates for influence and resources 
and accomplished little. Although MINFOF has been streamlined since the late 1990s, 
the same problems continue, and the DPT continues to have limited influence compared 
with the directorates concerned with timber and conservation. It has been dependent for 
                                                 
3  URL: http://data.cameroun-foret.com/?q=fr/node/10588. Retrieved 13 July 2012. 
4  URL: http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb%5Ccpo.nsf/projEn/A031537005. Retrieved 13 July 2012. 
5  Cf. Introductory Note, MINFOF Conference, Ten years of Forest Management in Cameroon 1996-
2005, Yaoundé 25-28 April 2005. 
6  ANAFOR succeeded the National Office for Forest Development (Office National de Développement 
des Forêts, ONADEF) as part of the reorganisation of MINFOF to implement the FESP.  
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its operating budget on donors, allowing them to influence priority setting. It has so few 
resources that it is unable to collect basic statistics on most NTFPs (Walter et al. 2006; 
Betti 2007b; Ingram 2009b), a major obstacle to drafting, implementing and monitoring 
NTFP regulation. 
The National Reforestation Agency (ANAFOR) is responsible for regeneration and 
reforestation. A lack of funding has meant these activities have not been conducted, alt-
hough funding from CITES and the International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO) 
in 2010 enabled studies on Prunus africana. Other ministries include the Ministry of 
Livestock, Fisheries and Animal Husbandry (MINEPIA), regulating honey, classed as 
an animal product under the Veterinary Sanitary Inspection Law of 2000. Coordination 
within and among ministries of Forestry and Wildlife, Livestock, Environment and Na-
ture Protection and Sustainable Development (MINEP), Agriculture and Rural Devel-
opment (MINADER), Finance, Customs, Territorial Administration and Decentraliza-
tion (MINATD) and Small and Medium Sized Enterprises, Social Economics and Crafts 
(MINSME) on NTFPs does not happen on a regular or planned basis. The lack of col-
laboration is exacerbated by high staff turnover and extensive reshuffles every two or so 
years. Thus despite the large number of departments concerned with NTFPs, a bureau-
cratic, large, expensive, ineffective and unconnected apparatus exists.  
Figure 6.1 Direct and indirect actors in forest governance in Cameroon 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Whilst the state seems omnipresent on paper, fieldwork indicates an inverse correla-
tion between distance from the capital and physical presence of civil servants in region-
al offices and councils, and even stronger inverse correlation with presence at sub-
divisional posts, the field or forest. Remoteness and the lack of adequately trained staff, 
infrastructure, equipment, financial and logistics hinder implementation. Staff are often 
paid months late, hence ‘private settlements’ (another euphemism for bribes) is a neces-
sary practice. Per diems and support from projects supplement income and facilitate op-
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erations, such as transport, monitoring, meetings and control activities. Some govern-
ment staff work as consultants with research, conservation and development organisa-
tions while remaining civil servants. Shown in Figure 6.1, other actors include tradition-
al authorities, NGOs and civil society organisations (CSOs), community based organi-
sations (CBOs) such as community forests, and local community development organisa-
tions), research organisations (international and national universities and research insti-
tutes) and development organisations (international and local). Their roles are elaborat-
ed further in the following sections and specifically in each chain in Chapters 7 to 10.  
  
Regional political and institutional links 
Cameroon’s relations with African organisations, such as the African Union, are marked 
by an absence of active diplomatic initiatives (Konings 2009). Despite a shared colonial 
background with West African states, regional political and institutional affiliations are 
mainly directed towards Central Africa. At the first Central Africa summit on the con-
servation and sustainable management of tropical forests in 1999, heads of state pro-
claimed “their commitment to the principle of biodiversity conservation and the sustain-
able management of the forest ecosystems of Central Africa … [and] the right of their 
peoples to be able to count on the forest resources to support their endeavours for eco-
nomic and social development” (COMIFAC 2006). In 2005 the COMIFAC Treaty for 
the Conservation and Sustainable Management of Forest Ecosystems in Central Africa 
finalised commitments to sustainable forest management and created the legal basis for 
COMIFAC as a political and technical steering, coordinating, harmonising and deci-
sion-making institution, supporting and monitoring the implementation of international 
conventions and forest development initiatives. Cameroon is a member of the Congo 
Basin Forest Partnership (CBFP). This informal structure of about sixty COMIFAC 
member country institutions, NGOs, international institutions and private sector organi-
sations was launched during the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johan-
nesburg in 2002. The CBFP aims to enhance the effectiveness of technical and financial 
contributions and harmonise programmes implementing the COMIFAC Convergence 
Plan. Both initiatives have been strongly driven by the food security, conservation and 
development-related agendas of the EU, FAO, GTZ and USAID. In the last decade 
these four organisations have been major drivers of NTFP policies nationally and re-
gionally. A result has been that COMIFAC members have increasingly recognised the 
role of NTFPs in reducing poverty, economic development and biodiversity, leading to 
recommendations for the harmonisation of policy and regulatory frameworks (FAO et 
al. 2008). The two year revision process culminated in a participative multi-stakeholder 
activity (with a broad, but not entirely representative group of actors), to produce and 
validate a sub-regional Directive on sustainable management of NTFPs of plant origin 
in Central Africa in 2010 (Bigombe Logo 2010); (COMIFAC 2010). COMIFAC reiter-
ated the need to improve the legal and institutional frameworks for the sector in its 
Convergence Plan (FAO et al. 2008). These regional actions slowly filtered to a nation-
al level. The redrafting and revision of national policies that started in Cameroon in 
2008 has drawn on the sub-regional guidelines and seems to be approaching finalisa-
tion. A meeting of the NTFPs Sub-Group of the Central African Biodiversity Work 
Group produced “strong recommendations” to reinforce NTFP policies, programmes 
and projects (Congo Basin Forest Partnership 2011).Together with the Central African 
Forest Observatory (OFAC), these provide an opportunity for governing NTFPs nation-
ally and regionally.  
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Statutory frameworks regulating NTFPs 
Cameroon’s colonial legacy has bequeathed it with two operating legal systems: 
French-oriented civil law in the eight eastern and northern regions and English common 
law in the Northwest and Southwest regions. These recognise some customary laws, 
which, due to the country’s ethnic diversity, encompass multiple norms. In Muslim re-
gions, primarily in the north, Islamic legal principles have been incorporated into cus-
tomary law, and Sharia law was recognised in the 1996 Constitution.  
 
Forestry and environment laws 
In the 1990s international agencies, particularly the World Bank, pressured the govern-
ment to promote forestry laws incorporating forest products and services other than just 
timber. These policy processes culminated in the regulations shown in Box 6.1, in par-
ticular the 1994 Forestry and Wildlife Law. However well-intentioned, the 1994 law 
was developed without adequate or meaningful consultation with people using and trad-
ing NTFPs. It has since proved largely ineffectual and often undermines the objectives 
it sought to achieve (Njamnshi et al. 2008; Assembe 2009). These instruments have 
been strongly criticised for allowing over-extraction due to the multiplicity of actors 
involved and the weak and ineffective legal coverage, for limiting access to revenues for 
communities and customary users and the lack of specification of harvesting techniques 
(Djeukam 2007). The law also suffers from definitional problems. Article 12 of the 
1994 law establishes national sovereignty over genetic resources and describes require-
ments for free and prior informed consent7 and benefit sharing between prospectors, the 
government and local communities. Articles 64 and 65 of the 1996 Law also set re-
quirements for genetic resources. However distinctions between genetic resources sup-
plied for bioprospecting and those traded remain poorly elaborated. The 1994 law ad-
dresses plants and fauna and sets out three protection classes, but these regulate only 
animal species (Article 78). Although a classification is appropriate given the role of 
bushmeat and fish in the economy and livelihoods, the logic behind the selection of spe-
cies is conservation based and not on their livelihood or market value. A 2011 revision 
was strongly influenced by conservation concerns (Matthew LeBreton, CAMHERP, 
pers. comm. 2011). The lack of a similar classification for plants indicates the need for a 
legal and policy framework addressing the realities of their use and trade. The govern-
ment has clearly struggled regulating NTFPs, indicated by the lack of a definition. De-
veloping an appropriate legal framework has been limited as most NTFPs – unlike tim-
ber – do not have values or characteristics that can easily be captured by the govern-
ment. Thus the current legal framework largely maintains a status quo prior to the intro-
duction of the regulations: most NTFPs consumed locally traded are not formally regu-
lated but de facto by customary regulations concerning land tenure and resource rights. 
Only a handful of high-value products traded nationally, regionally and internationally 
are regulated.  
                                                 
7  Free prior and informed consent’ is the principle that a community has the right to give or withhold its 
consent to proposed projects that may affect the lands they customarily own, occupy or otherwise use. 
It is a key principle in international law and jurisprudence related to indigenous peoples. 
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Proposals for regulatory and institutional reform have been made since 2008 
(Ebamane 2008; FAO 2010c; b; Logo 2010), including specifically for Gnetum spp. 
(Ndoye et al. 2010) and for harmonisation across the Congo Basin (Walter et al. 2006; 
Mekongo et al. 2008). A consultative process to revise the 1994 law and address its per-
ceived deficiencies has been under way since 2009, with finalisation expected in August 
2013. Many of civil society organisations, parliamentarians and campaigners criticising 
the 1994 Law have contributed to its revision to counter the democratic failings of their 
state, pushing for increased participation in decision-making, greater fiscal accountabil-
ity and transparency. One result was the set of recommendations for reform developed 
with extensive stakeholder consultation processes with actors from the sector (FAO 
2010a)8 aimed specifically at NTFPs (FAO 2010a).  
                                                 
8  Findings from this research contributed to the recommendations.  
Box 6.1 Forestry laws in Cameroon 
The authorities in French Cameroon did not specifically regulate NTFPs. In the Western 
Cameroons, the British applied Chapter 75 of the Nigerian Forestry Ordinance, 1 February 
1938. This remained the main legislation governing forest resources in the Northwest and 
Southwest provinces until 1973.  It listed 25 product classes from timber, to plants, surface oil 
and minerals, beeswax and all produce from animals found in or brought from a forest. Since 
independence in 1960, Cameroon has enacted five relevant pieces of legislation: 
 Law No 68/1/COR of 18 July 1968 regulated forest resources in French-speaking areas. 
 Ordinance No 73/18 of 22 May 1973 and its decree of application, No. 74/357 of 17 April 
1974, were the first to cover all of Cameroon since independence and dealt exclusively 
with forest resources. Article 39 (73/18) used the expression “traditionally harvested prod-
ucts” and specified, with Article 64, fuelwood, charcoal, grains, roots, leaves, barks, me-
dicinal plants, flowers, eggs and feathers. Article 24 (74/357) used the term “secondary 
forest produce”. 
 Law No 81/13 of 27 November 1981 and three decrees of application, all issued on 12 
April 1983, had a wider scope, dealing with forestry, wildlife and fisheries resources. The 
Law Article 39 regulated fuelwood, charcoal, grains, roots, leaves, barks and medicinal 
plants, and Decree covered (literally) raffia, palms, bamboo, rattan, firewood, edible pro-
duce, sand, gravel, laetrile (Section 3), medicinal plants (Section 23), poles, firewood, 
wood for charcoal (Section 34), wood, roots, bark, leaves, fruit and sap (Section 54). 
 Law No 94/01 of 20 January 1994 on Forestry and Wildlife provides a national framework, 
replacing the 1981 law. It covers “forestry products of any nature except those from trees” 
(Article 21), “other forest produce” (Article 45), forestry products as ‘“essentially constitut-
ed, as vegetal products of wood and non-wood vegetal origin, as well as faunal and fish 
resources obtained from the forest” (Article 9) and ‘’special products’’ as “”certain forest 
products such as ebony, ivory, wild animal horns, certain animal, plant and medicinal spe-
cies which are of particular interest and shall be classified as special’’ (Article 9.2).It has 
three application decrees: 
 Decree No 95/466-PM of 20 July 1995 on wildlife.  
 Decree No 95/531-PM of 23 August 1995 on forestry, specifying (literally) raffia, palm 
trees, bamboo, rattan, foodstuff, fuelwood, deadwood and grazing products (Sections 
26(1) and 32(1) and fuelwood and poles from felled trees (Section 26(2).  
 Decision No 0336/D/MINFOF 6 July 2006 Setting the List of Special Forestry Products 
representing a particular interest to Cameroon, specified 13 timber and non-timber prod-
ucts. 
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NTFPs in Cameroonian law 
The measures enacted over the last 50 years (Box 6.1) have added to confusion by 
providing multiple, different definitions of regulated forest products. As the basis of a 
quota and permitting system, the terms ‘minor forest products’, ‘secondary forestry 
products’, ‘forest produce other than timber’ and ‘special forestry products’ (SFP) are 
used in Articles 9, 21 and 45 of the 1994 Law. No further clarification or definitions of 
the terms ‘certain’, ‘interest’ and ‘special’ are given. The majority of products listed are 
NTFPs, but not exclusively, shown in Box 6.2 by the list elaborated over a decade later 
(Government of Cameroon 2006). SFP lists have subsequently been published annually, 
including species and products that are both native and introduced, cultivated and wild 
harvested, exported and consumed locally, timber and non-timber.  
Quotas for the study period (detailed in Appendix 10) are determined annually by an 
interministerial committee headed by the MINFOF. The law states quotas should be 
based on surveys of species populations. In practice, they are determined by requests 
from exploiting companies. Interviews and inspections of the annual permit allocation 
and quota (bulletin de spécification des produits forestiers spéciaux) attached to way-
bills9 (lettre de voiture) indicated that quantities purchased from harvesters regularly 
exceed quotas. Species are regulated in some years and not others, due purely to de-
mand, rather than to availability or conservation status. Quotas, and the associated per-
mit and waybills are allocated to individuals or companies, who are rarely harvesters or 
exploiters themselves. It takes from several months up to a year to receive a permit, in a 
procedure involving several governmental bodies. Permit holders tend to have sufficient 
political and economic power to gather the necessary paperwork and follow up their 
dossier in the capital. This parallels the timber sector, where political patronage is deep-
ly embedded (Assembe 2009). Many quota holders sell their waybills at 250% to 500% 
of the permit value reported by the Ministry of Finance. This practice allows others to 
trade slightly easier than with no permit, albeit still illegally, and further stimulates in-
stitutionalised corruption. Some high-value NTFPs not included on the SFP lists are 
regulated by quotas and permits mutual agreements (gré à gré) granted by the Minister 
of Forests, based on regulations pre-dating the 1994 law. Examples since 2005 include 
rattan, charcoal, eru (Gnetum spp.) and bush mango (Irvingia spp.) (Detailed in Appen-
dix 10). Exported SFPs such as Prunus africana, require an additional export authorisa-
tion from MINFOF. Other exported NTFPs are neither subject to SFP or other permit 
systems.  
In summary, the quota and permit system for both national and export trade is not 
transparent and places enormous burdens on traders and exporters, increases costs and 
discourages trade and compliance with laws. The myriad of bureaucratic and expensive 
financial obligations, including high levels of corruption challenges the sector’s eco-
nomic viability. The annual nature of permits makes it impossible for businesses to plan 
and creates uncertainty for customers. Combined with the generally unsupportive busi-
ness climate, these factors have discouraged international investors, with at least one 
company reported being dissuaded from continuing and one from setting up NTFP-
processing operations in the period 2004 to 2010. 
 
 
                                                 
9  The part of the quota granting permission to transport SFPs and used by MINFOF for monitoring. 
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The quota and permit system does not accurately monitor or manage quantities trad-
ed, highlighted by the discrepancies between the permit quantities requested by traders, 
permits granted and actual sold in markets and exported (see details in Appendix 10 and 
11) as annual permitted quantities are far below actual quantities sold. For example, be-
tween 2007 and 2009 only one quota was allocated for 100 tons of Irvingia spp. from 
the Centre region. However, on average 5,089 tons was produced annually from just 36 
villages in the Southwest, Centre, South, East and Littoral regions and on average 4,448 
tons of safou (Dacryodes edulis) was sold annually from 1997 to 2007. Despite these 
high volumes, safou is not an SFP and does not require a permit.  
Box 6.2 Special Forestry Products in Cameroon 
Decision No 0336 of 2006 listed 13 SFPs in a mix of French, English, local and scientific 
names.  
Product* Species scientific name Local names NTFP Timber
Ebéne  Diospyros crassiflora Ebene, ebony  √ 
Eru Gnetum africanum, Gnetum 
buchholzianum 
Eru, ókok, koko √  
Pygeum  Prunus africana  Pygeum, kanda stick √ √ 
Yohimbé  Pausinystalia yohimbe Johimbe √ √ 
Wild rubber  Funtumia elastica Rubber, manjongo, ebongo, 
damb, damba, ndama, ntoh, 
akaine, etendamba, elé-
ndamba, domjongo 
√  
Rauvolfia  Rauvolfia macrophylla, R. 
vomitoria 
Yando-yotongo, ebtong, etong, 
esombo 
√  
Rattan  Eremospatha spp., Lac-
cosperma spp., Oncocala-
mus spp. 
Rattan, cane, √  
Gomme 
arabique  
Acacia spp. Gum, gum arabic, gavde √  
Tooth stick  Randia massularia, 
Garcinia mannii, Cola 
acuminata, Cola nitida 
Chewing stick √  
Candle 
stick  
Carpolobia alba, Carpolo-
bia lutea, Canarium 
schweinfurthii 
Cattle stick 
Candle nut 
√ √ 
Charbon de 
bois  
At least 27 species (see 
Appendix 2), excluding ex-
otic species#  
Charcoal, firewood, fuelwood, 
bois d’energie, bois de feu 
√ √ 
Aniegré   Aningeria robusta Aniegré, abam √ √ 
Poteaux 
d’eucalyptus 
Eucalyptus spp. Eucalyptus  √ 
# Such as Gmelina arborea, Eucalyptus spp. and Pinus sylvestris.*term used in SFP list 
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This results in less revenue being collected, actual quantities being not verified and 
possible over-extraction. Data collected at some ports, custom and highway checkpoints 
is not centralised. Information is not shared between different government agencies at 
Abang Minko and Kye Ossi on the Cameroon, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea border and 
Mamfe, Tiko and Idenau on the Cameroon Nigeria border where the MINFOF checks 
permits, waybills and certificates of origin; the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural De-
velopment (MINADER) checks phytosanitary certificates; and Customs verifies circula-
tion and tax certificates. Fieldwork indicated that it is almost impossible to calculate 
quantities of products sold locally and exported regionally. Only data concerning four 
exported non-timber SFPs is generated by the database of Commercialised Species in 
Cameroon (COMCAM) from the Port of Douala. Regional exports at other ports and 
border crossing are thus not captured in official figures. Comparing the NTFPs traded 
worldwide from Cameroon (see Appendix 10 and 11 for details) with those regulated 
indicates that both official government economic data and fiscal systems vastly under-
capture international exports of NTFPs. 
 
The criteria for inclusion in the SFP list are inconsistent. The SFP Decision indicates 
that species are included due to levels of threat or endangerment that make them ‘spe-
cial’. Chapter 4 highlights that only a small proportion of species recognised as vulner-
able are listed as SFPs and that despite the 1994 law naming ivory, animal and fish as of 
‘interest’ these are not listed. Fuelwood was also mentioned, although charcoal (which 
can be produced from a large number of different species) has only occasionally ap-
peared on annual quotas and permits, despite its enormous value indicated in Chapter 4. 
‘Interest’ is thus inferred to mean value, particularly economic. However the law is 
oblique and only names medicinal value, although only 9% of the SFPs have medicinal 
uses. Over the years, a number of other products have been classed as special and per-
mitted, but have not consistently appeared in the annual quotas and permits. The annual 
listing thus creates more confusion in practice, as products move on and off the list.  
Figure 6.2 Official exports of Special Forestry Products 2004 to 2009  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: COMCAM annual reports  
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A much wider range of products is traded than regulated, with 13 defined, in contrast 
to at least 123 plant and 100 animal species traded identified in Chapter 4. The SFPs 
also include products with very small trade. However highly traded products, such as 
Ricinodendron heudelottii (njangsang) and Dacryodes edulis (bush plum) are not in-
cluded (Ndoye 1995; Ndoye et al. 1997/98; Ruíz Pérez et al. 2003)(see Appendix 10 
and 11 for details). Whilst native forest species found wild but also grown or left stand-
ing on farms and fallows such as Cola spp. are excluded, introduced and cultivated Eu-
calyptus spp. are included. Construction materials such as rattan, Raphia spp., bamboo 
(see Chapter 10) and eucalyptus poles are mainly sold in separate markets to the food 
markets surveyed in the market surveys and databases, and their current trade quantities 
do not appear in any statistics. Permitted quantities of NTFPs grossly under-report actu-
al quantities traded. For exports, a similar phenomenon occurs: only 25 of the NTFPs 
exported required a permit and were monitored (see details in Appendix 10 and 11) and 
only five exported NTFPs were listed as SFPs (Figure 6.2), in contrast to 50 plant-based 
products actually exported in the last decade to many more countries than indicated by 
COMCAM. 
Section 8 of the 1994 Forest Law clarifies customary user rights (droit d’usage) for 
forest communities as being “to collect all forest, wildlife, fisheries products freely for 
their personal use, except protected species including subsistence fuelwood and wood 
for construction needs, but not timber for sale, from all unprotected areas”. This renders 
all products sold and processed that are not permitted SFPs illegal. Interviews indicated 
that 95% of harvesters did not know about permits and harvest rights. The result is ille-
gal trade. The wide gap between the intention of the law and customary use is due to a 
combination of an anomalous law, the lack of knowledge of most people of restricted 
customary rights and low levels of enforcement. The governance of NTFPs by Came-
roonian law thus does not reflect the reality of commodification, is illogical and incon-
sistent. It does not clarify why products are regulated and only a small proportion of 
those traded are controlled, mostly on only paper. In contrast to the high values shown 
in Chapter 4, one result of the legislation is a low level of revenue generated by taxes 
and permits. This perpetuates the myth of the limited value of NTFPs, such that few re-
sources are allocated to understanding and monitoring the sector and even less to devel-
oping, drafting and implementing effective measures to manage it. This finding con-
firms that of commentators on the sector (Nkuinkeu 1999; Awono et al. 2002; Sunder-
land et al. 2004a). The result is that NTFPs are formally regulated much as they always 
have been, with just an oddly assorted handful regulated de jure through a complex, 
burdensome system of quotas, permits and taxes, allocated untransparently to the most 
powerful exploiters or brokers. 
 
Land and forest tenure and rights 
Rights to resources are rarely a tidy set of rules (Fortmann 2001). Their histories impact 
the present, changing as tenure does. Also altering as informal arrangements emerge 
that may or may not be formalised but which have clear effects on the ground. Observa-
tions indicate that this requires looking at how the past affects the present to obtain a 
clear understanding of the different kinds of rights, users and uses. 
Statutory land rights have, like the legal system, grown from the mixed colonial her-
itage. Under British law, ‘vacant’ lands were considered the property of local communi-
ties and placed under the control of Native Authorities. Under French colonial law, all 
lands ‘vacant and without master’ belonged to the state. With unification and the merg-
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ing of legal systems in 1972, the British concept of communal land was replaced by the 
French. A common legal frame was set by the 1996 Constitution and 1974 Land Ordi-
nance which classify land into three major categories. Public state land refers to lands 
held by foreigners, usually large plantations which became state property after inde-
pendence. Some are managed by parastatals such as the Cameroon Development Corpo-
ration (CDC), some have reverted to natural forest cover and others are used for public 
purposes. Private land comprises land registered by private individuals (actual persons 
or international organisations). National domain land, which is all land not registered, is 
divided into two categories: vacant land and land occupied and worked by the local 
populations. Following the French model, in 1974 a large number of hitherto commu-
nally managed lands were transferred from customary control to state control. These 
areas include most secondary and primary forest and the resources found in them. The 
1994 law (art. 20) distinguishes two domains: the permanent forest domain – land per-
manently allocated to forests and/or wildlife habitats, and the non-permanent forest do-
main – forested lands that can potentially be allocated to other land uses. Additionally, 
ownership over naturally growing (but not planted) trees on private land and all trees 
planted or naturally growing on land without a title deed are considered state property.  
Legal recognition of customary rights falls into two broad categories. Free access is 
an usufruct right (Section 8, 1994 Law and Section 4, Decree 95/466) and may be exer-
cised in communal and community forests. Paid access refers to the right to exploit the 
SFPs following receipt of a permit from the government (Box 6.2). Despite the exist-
ence of an increasingly refined statutory framework, in practice most communities are 
unaware of statutory laws. Interviews indicated that 95% of harvesters were unaware of 
any formal rights and restrictions, or of their user rights. Additionally, when they are 
known or – as is often the case – arbitrarily enforced, statutory laws are viewed as ille-
gitimate, serving a small group of elites. This view is confirmed by Assembe (2009). 
Interviews and the evaluations of the Forest Environment Sector Programme (PSFE) 
reinforce that government enforcement capacity is weak. Its presence is manifested pri-
marily physically only when land is allocated for logging, mining or commercial agri-
culture, or when a protected area has the status of a national park. As a result, in rural 
communities customary law governing resource rights continues to be the dominant sys-
tem, with conflicts erupting when statutory law contradicts customary law (Barume 
2004; Assembe 2009). 
Most forested land now belongs to the state (see Table 1.1) and the vast majority of 
landholdings in rural areas, around 90%, do not have a title deed (Tonye et al. 1993; 
Egbe 1997). This is due to the expensive and bureaucratically complex registration pro-
cess, a lack of knowledge of the possibility and, often, a lack of need unless customary 
ownership is challenged creating a need for legal title. The permanent forest in the for-
est zone in the south is nearly all state-owned in a mosaic of timber production conces-
sions, protected forests, and around 345,000 hectares of communal forests. According to 
the 1994 Law, forests outside the public state land exist in three ownership categories: 
community forests, communal forests and private forest. Generally, people living in 
forest areas fully retain their traditional use rights in their communal areas within both 
the permanent and non-permanent forest domain. The permanent forest domain refers to 
land allocated solely for sustainably managed forestry or as wildlife habitat and includes 
protected areas, council forests and logging concessions. The non-permanent forest do-
main is land that not requires long-term forest maintenance and includes areas for the 
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sale of standing timber up to 2,500 hectares, and private, communal and community 
forests.  
Community forests (Article 37, 1994 Law) provided new opportunities for local ac-
cess, control and management of forest resources. They enable communities to gain the 
exclusive management and production (but not property) rights up to 5,000 hectares of 
forest resources in the non-permanent forest domain for up to 25 years. Introduced in 
1997, the number of community forests peaked in 2004. Just over 400 are now at some 
stage in the attribution process, although only 43% have approved management plans 
(Beauchamp et al. 2011). These are situated in diverse ecological, political, economic 
and institutional landscapes, with the majority in the lowland forest zone. NTFPs are 
often included in community forest management plans, although most attention has 
been on commercially valuable timber (Tchatat et al. 2006; Njomaha 2008). Typical of 
the definitional confusion in the 1994 law, a ‘community’ is not defined, paving the 
way for elite capture and the well-intentioned initiative promoted by the donor commu-
nity is poorly adapted to local conditions (Beauchamp et al. 2011). Community forests 
appear to offer few advantages, instead adding layers of bureaucracy and cost. They 
have generally been unable to solve sustainability and equity problems related to high 
economic value products and contributed little to species conservation. They have how-
ever helped some communities achieve greater control over forest areas and gain more 
significant benefits from timber production. Associations of groups of community for-
ests, such as the Association of Oku Forest Management Institutions (ASSOFOMI) and 
the Association of Kom Forest Management Institutions (ASSOKOFOMI) and the na-
tional network of community forests (Réseau Foret Communautaire, RFC) aimed to use 
collective action, providing a stronger voice at regional and national level, but have also 
struggled, for example, to revise the 1994 Law concerning community forests. The im-
pact on NTFPs however has been negligible, with most species continuing to be har-
vested according to customary law and individually, rather than according to a man-
agement plan and communally. Even when included in management plans, sustainable 
harvesting has not been assured. On the contrary, the institutional capacity that commu-
nity forests have built has been one factor contributing to the over-extraction of Prunus 
africana in the Northwest (see Chapter 9). These new institutions have led to conflicts 
between and within communities and have created competition between traditional in-
stitutions and the newly established institutions.  
A Technical Operations Unit (TOU) is legal entity by Prime Ministerial decree, de-
fined as “a delimited geographical area, based on ecological, socio-economic, cultural 
and political characteristics for the enhancement of integrated landscape management 
involving all stakeholders” (Republic of Cameroon 2006). This multiple land-use classi-
fication was devised at the request of external donors, primarily the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF) and builds on the 1994 Law by regulating activities, uses and access. 
There are, to date, six Technical Operations Units distributed throughout Cameroon’s 
humid forest zone. 
The 1974 Ordinance provided a framework to increase private property ownership by 
setting out the process to obtain land titles. This slow and difficult procedure requires 
the applicant to have sufficient money, understanding of the bureaucracy and govern-
ment connections. As a result only a small percentage of Cameroonians have registered 
land titles (Awafong 2003). The government thus legitimates a passive tenure relation-
ship with traditional authorities and landlords, who in many areas determine access and 
rights to land, forests and resources locally. Given this context it is not surprising that 
120 
 
disputes are common (Holmes 2005). Conflicts are exacerbated by the legacy of coloni-
al administrative systems, inefficient management of multiple resource claims and poor 
dispute resolution (Fonchingong et al. 2009). Examples are the eviction of traditional 
forest owners to construct the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline, Bakweri claims to CDC 
lands around Mount Cameroon (Konings 2009), and seasonal user-group conflicts over 
access between livestock herders, farmers and fishers in the Northwest and grand North. 
In these highly populated areas, disputes are inflamed by protracted multi-ethnic dis-
putes around legitimacy, precedence to land claims and access rights (Mbah 2009; 
2010). This has led to violent conflicts since 2004 in the Northwest in Kesu, Waindo 
and Aghem (Beseng 2004), Bali-Nyongha-Bawock, Oku-Mbessa, Oku (WHINCONET 
2005) and Ndawara.  
A response to such long-running and increasing disputes was the 2009 evaluation of 
the land system by the African Development Bank. This recommended a major reform 
of property and land rights laws and administration systems, to provide accessible, in-
expensive formalisation opportunities paying particular attention to protecting the rights 
of women, pastoralists and marginalised ethnic groups (USAID 2010). The support by 
major donors for private land registration has been strongly criticised for undermining 
collective, communal and some traditional ownership systems, and allowing expropria-
tion of valuable forest lands by the government and international interests (Nguiffo 
1998). 
‘Dash’ 
A major fact of life, also affecting forest-based commerce and livelihoods, is corruption. 
Conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain, corruption 
ranges from additional payments ‘to get things done’ in a private or business environ-
ment, to grand corruption in the political arena and the elites engaging in state capture. 
Corruption can be seen as the manifestation of a lack of respect of both the corrupter 
and corrupted for rules (customary and formal) governing their interactions, and hence 
has been seen as a failure of governance (Kaufmann et al. 2010). It has been seen as a 
cause of poverty (Harford 2006). Often euphemistically called ‘informal taxes’, the fre-
quently heard terms on the street are a ‘dash’ (in pidgin), ‘a little something’, “Donnez-
moi quelque chose” or “Ou est mon cadeau?”.  
Surveys such as the Governance Barometer, Governance Matters, Ibrahim Index and 
Global Corruption Barometer (see Table 1.1), discussions during any bush-taxi10 jour-
ney, and popular musicians such as Lapiro de Mbanga all reinforce the fact that corrup-
tion is ubiquitous, insidious and strongly institutionalised in Cameroon (Assembe 
2009). Cameroon ranks among the highest for corruption in public and business world-
wide (see Table 1.1). Systemic corruption is prevalent in all sectors and levels of socie-
ty, including forestry and trade (Assembe 2009; Alemagi et al. 2010). A 2009 Central 
African conference on forest tenure, governance and enterprise stated that corruption in 
forest management and institutions must be overcome (RRI 2009b). This was reiterated 
by MINFOF Minister, Elvis Ngolle Ngolle, who stated that there would be:  
 
                                                 
10  A shared taxi is the perfect vehicle in which to use the methodology of participant observation and 
immersion, enabling current popular opinion to be gathered. 
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Zéro tolérance de la corruption en 2011 dans le secteur forestier… aussi il a promis d’aligner sans 
cesse les actions de son département ministériel à l’opérationnalisation de la stratégie gouvernemen-
tale.11 
 
However, by August he was being probed for fraud and corruption12. On the Prime 
Minister’s website13, the government’s achievements page remained empty in 2011. 
The media have reported with relish and increasing openness14 on corruption in the for-
estry sector. A series of high profile anti-corruption campaigns and bodies have been 
enacted since 2000. The National Anti-Corruption Observatory established to investi-
gate and monitor political corruption and organise anti-corruption initiatives, however it 
has no legal enforcement powers. It has been criticised as ineffectual and representative 
of the government’s lukewarm approach to fighting corruption (Jimo et al. 2001). The 
sporadic enforcement of anti-corruption laws has proved largely ineffective in counter-
ing corruption (Peh et al. 2010).  
Hard evidence of the impact of corruption is difficult to obtain. It has been linked to 
deforestation (Koyunen 2009), misappropriation of forest lands and revenues (Veit et al. 
2009), the root cause of forestry policy failures (Blackman et al. 2010) and maintaining 
poverty (Veit 2006). Granting rights over state or public resources to legislators has 
provided them with opportunities for career advancement and private gains – allowing 
land titles and forest concessions to be been used as patronage resources to buy votes 
and pay for political favours (Veit et al. 2009). A consequence is a vicious cycle that 
hampers policy reforms to redress and improve the situation. The state loses its legiti-
macy to conduct reform vis-à-vis local state officials; the latter lose their own legitima-
cy to implement reforms regarding timber operators and the general population; mistrust 
and conflicts to control of networks of corruption increase whilst laws remain enforced; 
and state officials choose not collect or retain information as a way of maintaining their 
vested interests (Blackman et al. 2010).  Payments to gendarmes, police, forest guards, 
customs agents and others can consume up to 20% of NTFP traders’ gross sales during 
transport to markets (Sunderland et al. 1998; Tchatat 1999). Two decades later, similar 
statistics persist, with traders paying 530 US$ per truck of Gnetum spp., even when pos-
sessing permits (Ndoye et al. 2010). The interviews corroborate this, with corruption 
accounting for on average between 2 to 10% of trader’s costs, escalating in high-value 
chains to 37% of Cameroonian eru exporters’ revenues. This practice persists partly due 
to ignorance of the legal requirements by traders and government authorities, which 
creates openings for abuse and a lack of respect for the law. Similarly, ignorance of 
CEMAC free trade agreements resulted in corruption being reported as frequent at the 
border crossings near Idenau, Bang-Minko’o, Kye Ossi, Menguikom Tiko and Limbe. 
Corruption thus forms yet another amorphous, expected but often unpredictable govern-
                                                 
11  Idriss Linge. Exploitation forestière: Tolérance zéro pour la corruption. Journal du Cameroun. 
22/02/2011. URL:  http://www.journalducameroun.com/article.php?aid=8087. Retrieved 18 June 
2011. 
12  Ngolle Ngolle Probed Over Fraud. The Post. 29 August 2011. URL: 
http://www.thepostwebedition.com/Content.aspx?ModuleID=1&ItemID=6707. Retrieved 2September 
2011.  
13  URL: http://www.spm.gov.cm/en/important-projects/government-achievements.html. Retrieved 2 
September 2011. 
14  Au Cameroun, le trafic de bois illégal continue de prospérer. Cameroon Online. 14 May 2008. URL: 
http://www.centerblog.net/societe/37719-4912477-trafic-au-cameroun. Retrieved 2 June 2008. 
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ance arrangement foisted upon NTFP chains. It creates rules which affect how and 
where transactions take place in value chains and their costs. When nested within formal 
institutional and statutory structures, run in parallel by the same governors, it forms an-
other shadowy, pluralist layer in the governance of forest resources.  
Customary forest governance  
In contrast to the formal policy and regulations, the de jure reality is that forests are 
largely customary governed and owned common property. This makes people living in 
forests, according to the formal regulations, squatters on government-owned land and 
forests (Alden Wily 2011). However common property forests are not, as Alden Wily 
states, undivided and unanimously community owned, but subdivided by clan, family 
and individual ownership and use rights, which depending on the dominant ethnic 
group, are governed through complex systems of short and long-term leases, loans, gifts 
and inheritances. These customary laws address who owns resources and access them, 
where and in which quantities harvesting may take place, who benefits and in which 
ways. Although they differ across Cameroon, in general harvesting of NTFPs held by a 
clan or family may take place only with the family’s permission. On communal village 
lands any member of a community can harvest products for subsistence use, but for 
higher-value products intended for sale (particularly timber, but also some high-value 
NTFPs) approval is generally required from the chief or village council. Outsiders often 
require permission to harvest resources and provide some form of compensation (in 
kind or cash) before or after entering and harvesting, even if this rule is not supported 
by the wider community. This has been well-documented for timber rights (Cuny et al. 
2007) and has been largely the case for high-value NTFPs, such as Prunus africana (de-
tailed in Chapter 9) and moabi (Baillonella toxisperma) (Jochem 1995). The effective-
ness of customary law varies significantly. It is generally strongest in remoter, less ac-
cessible, rural and forest-based communities and weakest when undermined by factors 
such as proximity to urban centres with growing populations, with high levels of cultur-
al and social change and multiple ethnic groups (Colfer et al. 2011).  
Despite the dominance of customary law, the legitimacy of the traditional governing 
structures has been disputed. Some chiefs are seen to not represent indigenous institu-
tions, having been installed by colonial governments in search of cooperative counter-
parts to cement political power, reduce ethnic conflicts and power struggles (Geschiere 
1993; Konings 1999; Oyono 2004). In the study sites, local associations, NGOs and 
community groups have grown and been supported by external donors and project fun-
ders creating changes usurping traditional institutions to create equity and/or reconfig-
ure power and resources. This has resulted in conflict with some of the traditional insti-
tutions in the Northwest (WHINCONET 2005; Ingram 2008; Ingram et al. 2009) and 
Southwest (Ewusi et al. 2001). Given the local differences, customary governance ar-
rangements in the three main ecoregions where the value chains originate from are ex-
amined in the following sections. 
 
Highlands montane forests 
In the Northwest many traditional political structures and institutions of the former 
Tikar chiefdoms remain, evidenced by posters of traditional leaders and their lineage 
being common sights in bars, homes and public buildings. The traditional centralised 
political system operates with hereditary dynasties, rules and customs (Warnier 1985). 
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They are governed by a chief15 known as the Fon, whose chiefdom and ethnic group is 
known as Fondom with a hierarchical bureaucracy composed of hereditary titled men 
known as Ya and Bobo. Three Fondoms (Nso and Oku in Bui Administrative Division, 
covering Kilum Forest, and Kom in Boyo Administrative Division, covering Ijim For-
est) cover the majority of the Bamenda Highlands forests. The Fon and Kwifon are the 
custodians of land and natural resources and de facto owners Fai, shuufai, mforme and 
shey are titled males who have made contributions towards the community, manifested 
by the Fon presenting a red Bannerman’s Turaco (Tauraco Bannermani) feather, worn 
in a traditional cap. The Fon is the senior member of a regulatory council of elders, 
known as Kwifon (in Oku and Kom) and Nwerong (in Nso). Some members of the 
council of elders are elected; others are based on family succession (Nchindah in Oku). 
Villages and quarters are managed by village heads and quarter heads, supported by tra-
ditional councils, reporting to the Fon and Kwifon, with most village heads being 
Kwifon members. The Nwerong and Ngiri traditional societies fix socio-cultural activi-
ties and uphold rules, such as Country Sundays (two days in every ten in which farm 
work is prohibited) and the prohibition on killing bees or destroying natural forests. 
Immigrants such as the Fulani, living adjacent on the high grasslands, generally respect 
these traditional authorities.  
Traditionally land tenure was regulated by the Fons, allocating land to individual or 
entities for farming and goat grazing, and to the Ardo (Mbororo and Fulani traditional 
clan leaders) for distribution for cattle grazing, with the Fai and shuufai being the land-
lords. Tenure patterns (inherited patrilineal for Fulanis and in Oku and Nso and matri-
lineally in Kom with use rights devolving to specific patrilineages and matrilineages) 
originate from inheriting, giving, pledging and renting land, often accompanied by tra-
ditional gifts including cash and a symbolic calabash of Raphia spp. palm wine. Tradi-
tional symbols (sho-oh ngven) are used to acknowledge the tenancy of a traditional 
landlord and include the giving of a calabash of palm wine (Raphia spp.) and the stem 
of a peace plant (Dracaena deisteliana).Women traditionally own the food crops, sup-
porting a system of male-dominated wealth and power, who control the land and trees 
(Goheen 1996). Economically important palms and trees such as Raphia spp. and Cola 
spp. are owned by lineage heads, enabling them to control their trade, for which Nso 
and Batibo have become famous. The traditional institutions also address products such 
as fuelwood, honey, medicines, bushmeat and building materials.  
Forests generally are important as the source of most watercourses in the region and 
as significant cultural and spiritual values due to the presence of sacred areas, groves 
and shrines restricted to certain societies and social groups. Taboos have a significant 
impact on forest use with economic cultural and ecological implications. Individual sa-
cred species in Kilum-Ijim include Dracaena arborea, Dracaena deisteliana, Ensete 
gilletii and Kigelia africana, all which have restricted uses, acting as conservation strat-
egies (Cheek et al. 2000). The forest shrines in Kilum-Ijim forest, such as the Lumutu 
Sacred forest in Oku, Iwe-Awoi and Kongang sacred forest in Ijim, Kongang sacred 
forest in Kom and Akua-fichua in Laikom, are areas where entry and access are highly 
regulated and where Fon enthronement rituals and annual ceremonies to commune with 
ancestors to secure good health and harvests take place. New sacred sites can be set up 
by the Fon, Kwifon or Nwerong, such as the Oku Lake forest area, proposed as a pro-
                                                 
15  The government recognise different classes of customary chiefs: a Fon is a first class chief. 
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tected area in 2002 and gazetted as the Oku Plantlife Sanctuary in 2005. Fais, Shuufais 
and every family lineage also have sacred groves or shrines (Kimanen and Tokembon), 
often enriched with herbs with healing powers. Enchaw (2010) describes how the Lu-
mutu, Lake Forest, Akua-fichua, Iwe-Awoi and Kongang sacred forests have a core sa-
cred no-go area, with shrine-bearing areas representing a buffer zone and surrounding 
open access forest forming a transitional zone. These provide a seed bank and maintain 
tree cover (Ingram and Jam 2008). Other shrines are strategically located in watersheds 
and wetlands, maintaining ecological services. Hunting was also traditionally governed 
by taboos for specific periods (the dry season coinciding with lower animal reproduc-
tion periods), restrictions on who can hunt (only initiated people), species such as civ-
ets, musk deer, panthers, lions and elephants being sacred and restricted for royal use 
and the consumption of certain species, such as apes, forbidden. Other examples are 
shown in Ingram and Schure 2010 (in Appendix 14). However, the local extinction of 
many of these species over the last forty years (Maisels et al. 2001; Ingram et al. 2008), 
mainly caused by local people of the same ethnic group, indicates how customary prac-
tices to obtain food have been over-ruled by economic and food concerns. The Gods of 
Oku (Emyin me Ebkwou) also influence forest use, being a group of distinct named be-
ings, associated with sacred areas, prominent landscape features and the forest. They 
influence daily life and often appear to diviners or healers during unusual and extraordi-
nary events, often in the forest and in animal form, where they can observe behaviour 
and reward or punish people. The gods of the land (Emyin Menttieh) are associated with 
plants and animals in the fields and forest, are omnipresent and largely beneficial. Their 
spiritual force is the basis for the plants used in healing and witchcraft. In contrast to 
most West Africans who generally view their forests as areas of chaos and peril, the Ki-
lum Ijim forests are seen as areas of order and stability(Koloss 2000). Healers and di-
viners interact personally with emyin and may visit or call them in the forest. Tradition-
al practices such as using sticks (instead of cutlasses) to clear the sacred forest and har-
vesting fuelwood only one day a year for palace use, also act as conservation strategies. 
Certain rites also aim to ensure forest health (production) for which the Fai may receive 
tributes from forest users (such as honey, crops and rats). 
Traditional rules governing forest use have been increasingly diluted by formal legal 
land titles, by indigenes and outsiders seeking land for farming, grazing and cash crop 
plantations. Tenure rights are more decentralised in Oku and Nso than in Kom, where 
the Fon remains powerful, although lineage heads are increasingly contesting the Fon’s 
authority, leasing land with dues paid in cash, crops and honey. Traditional landlords, 
particularly in newer settlements such as Simonkoh and Semti, are seldom resident and 
thus unable to control actual land use, such that forest land has been often allocated to 
people from outside the community, who are less bound by customary regulations. The 
purchase of official land titles is also increasingly circumventing traditional authority. 
Enchaw (2010) notes that 9% of people have purchased land, particularly local elites 
and politicians. These changing practices, shown in Figure 6.3, have led to inter-Fon-
dom disputes and distorted traditional tenure relations, pushing disenfranchised and 
landless farmers to claim other, including forested, land. This has been exacerbated by 
the extension of the Ndwara tea estate and Ntock-Mbolong ranch in Ibal-Oku, restrict-
ing traditional access for graziers, leading to further forest conversion and encroach-
ment, notably in Upper Shinga Community Forest, and local conflicts.  
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Figure 6.3 Tenure, access and rights changes over time in Kilum-Ijim Forest 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                        
 
 
* Forest management institutions 
Source: Adapted from Enchaw 2010. 
 
 
With the introduction of community forests (CF) by the Kilum Ijim Forest Project 
(KIFP) (see section on Project governance arrangements), traditional authorities and 
legal regulations became yet more entwined and power shifted from customary to for-
mal, shown in Figure 6.3. The 1994 Forest Law requires a written forest management 
plan to be negotiated within the community and adjacent communities, by a responsible, 
legalised community-based institution, which is not allowed by the 1994 law to be a 
traditional authority. Local populations were divided into forest user groups and repre-
sented by Community Forest Management Institutions (FMIs), legalised with project 
support by the MINFOF. FMI executive committees were elected by the community, as 
a new form of democracy. This mixed the economically powerful with charismatic 
community leaders and token minorities, such as women and Fulani pastoralists, giving 
all of them unprecedented decision-making power over forests. The legal and project’s 
definition of community which embraced leaseholders and pastoralists as stakeholders 
(not normally included in decision-making and rule enforcement in traditional struc-
tures) differed to traditional definitions of villages and boundaries. The project ‘gave’ 
traditional authorities the role of coordinating user group activities and resolving con-
flicts between user groups or members of user groups (Asanga 2001). The government, 
depending on staff’s personal motivations, sometimes played a coordination and con-
flict resolution role thus creating an enabling environment, but sometimes hindered an 
enable environment. The FMIs in effect became the new forest custodians, more power-
ful than the traditional authorities and formally recognised by a majority of the local 
population, the legal system and by project organisations as legitimate custodians. Near-
ly 40% of the community members now believe that the FMIs are owners of land and 
resources in the Kilum-Ijim Forest (Enchaw 2010), indicating the confusion between 
ownership and access and leading to conflicts.  
To fulfil these wide-ranging management tasks and powers, FMI members were pro-
vided capacity building, technical support, funds and support to access funds to main-
tain the FMIs and their umbrella associations by the projects. Although empowered 
technically, the 17 Kilum-Ijim community forests have since 2004 been unable or un-
willing to counter many of the unsustainable practices in the forest. Despite many 
community forests benefiting from significant Prunus africana sales (see Chapter 9), all 
Land leased to              
users 
 
Timeline 
Traditional landlords  
with tenure rights 
Land users with no 
tenure rights 
Users gain quasi-
tenure rights 
 
Traditional landlords 
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 Kilum-Ijim Forest  
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the FMIs complained of insufficient financial resources. Some funds were misappropri-
ated by Executive Committees (punch drunk with new power and unable to resist the 
temptation), individuals, councils and traditional authorities. The majority (17 out of 18) 
of community forests had not paid any dues to the umbrella associations by 2009. 
Prunus africana revenues decreased with the 2009 trade suspension and tourism reve-
nues did not meet expectations. The lack of finances meant that FMIs were demotivated 
and unable to fulfil their forest management obligations, such as paying for patrols. This 
turned the forest into an uncontrolled area where unregulated and unsustainable extrac-
tion by community members, FMI members, elites, traditional authorities and external 
harvesters took place. It also allowed new entrants, such as large-scale goat herd owners 
with economic and social standing, to exploit the void to establish their own new access 
rights. Contributory factors to this free-for-all situation include the behaviour of Fon 
Ngum III of Oku setting a negative example by harvesting Prunus africana in the Oku 
sacred forest. Enchaw (2010) construes this as a backlash by traditional authorities to 
their usurpation of power. The former regional level MINFOF officials were also en-
gaged in illegal Prunus africana harvesting and the MINFOF hardly penalised malprac-
tices in community forests (Peter Yamma ASSOKOFOMI, pers. comm. 2007; Peter 
Bah, ASSOFOMI, pers. comm. 2008 and 2009; Phillipe Evoe, MINFOF, pers. comm. 
2007). Community members and members of FMIs also complained of poor govern-
ance within the community forests, misrepresentation and misuse of resources. Thus the 
formerly enforceable customary rights of individuals and communities were rendered 
passive in and, in some cases, detrimental to, forest governance. The survey data rein-
force this, indicating that 50% of respondents believe that the community owns the for-
est. However in times of conflict with traditional authorities, most turned to the local 
council as mediator (rather than to the traditional council) – indicating how formal and 
traditional roles have changed. 
In the Southwest around Mt Cameroon, under traditional Bakweri land tenure, natu-
ral forests are seen as common property of adjacent villages. Permanent tree crops, such 
as coffee, tend to be grown in fields near to the homestead with tenure over crops and 
land exerted by the farming family. The highest level of decentralised authority and or-
ganisation is at village level, with the chief and village council seeing themselves as 
guardians and owners. Conflicts occurred between this traditional system and the Ger-
mans in the late 19th century and by subsequent colonial authorities granting rights to 
immigrants to settle on Bakweri land (Schroder 2000, Watts, 1994) and by state authori-
ties such as the Cameroonian Development Corporation (CDC) for oil palm plantations 
and logging titles. Forested land has also been claimed by shifting cultivators for sub-
sistence farming. Clashes also occurred as migrants have deforested land. In the ethni-
cally heterogeneous community the already weak traditional authority combined low 
government implementation capacity and weak formal land tenure arrangements which 
has led to a low level of clarity over land ownership and regulations (Bellewang 2005). 
Many immigrants live close to Bakweri villages but do not participate or adhere to 
Bakweri customs, leading to land and forest management tensions and a degrading ad-
herence by some Bakweris to traditional leadership (Ndam et al. 2004). 
 
Savannah forest  
The Extreme North is characterised by the political and land tenure hegemony of the 
Fula customary political powers, the lamidos. A lamido is the clan head and spiritual 
leader, governing people and adjudicating land according to Sharia laws, being judge, 
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imam and arbitrator. Like the ardos, the lamidos have been stripped of their feudal pow-
ers and responsibilities, but are recognised as first degree chiefs by the government. 
Power is designated hierarchically down through to the village chief (lawan) and quar-
ter chief (chef de quartier or djaoro). These customary institutions have a feudal nature 
and have been maintained and strengthened following colonisation and independence. 
They control the plains, traditional livestock pastures and agricultural areas. The lami-
do’s power was strengthened by a post-independence alliance between the newly in-
stalled Cameroonian government authorities, mainly representing the interests of groups 
from central Cameroon, and the Fula chieftaincies of the North. Local government ad-
ministration has also been captured by the lamido, who organises new incomers’ access 
to land, granting (often precarious) use rights and charging harvest fees. These incomes, 
as well as farmer-grazier and other social dispute settlement fees, make land-related in-
comes the lamido’s principal sources of revenue (Cotula et al. 2007). The savannah for-
ests in contrast are open access, with few informal regulations governing traditional use 
of commonly collected NTFPs, such as the harvest of Raphia spp., palms, bamboo, rat-
tan, fruits, seeds and fuelwood. The main norms are largely connected to the predomi-
nant Islamic traditions concerning who is permitted to collect certain products (i.e. 
women and children collect fuelwood, men Raphia spp. and bamboo) and how far they 
may stray from the family compound, with women commonly not permitted to forage 
alone or far from the house for long periods.  
In the Adamaoua savannah, the Gbaya system of customary land regulation domi-
nates and covers mainly farm land. Claims to fertile riverine gallery forests (kò zér) val-
uable for maize farming and sometimes up to 40 km often near villages where kin live 
(Burnham 1980) are commonly marked out by individuals. Rights tend to be highly in-
dividualised and not characterised by a hierarchy of estates. Land is passed on through 
families, and headmen and elders are generally not responsible for land allocation 
(Burnham 1980). Individual sales of land close to towns have been occurring more fre-
quently since the 1960s. Fulbe pastoralists living or passing through a forest area may 
claim some areas for grazing, particularly if it contains water points. An open access, 
multiple use of forested land is tacitly permitted, with beekeepers, hunters and grazers 
taking account of each other’s activities (e.g. beekeepers place their hives high in trees 
so that it is not damaged by bush fires caused by hunters or grazers). Beekeeping and 
honey hunting do not require permission and usually take place in the immediate forest 
area of a village up to around a 10 km radius of the village. Whilst hives are owned, the 
trees in which they hang are not. Beekeepers tend to return to and use the same forest 
area, and the low population densities mean conflicts between beekeepers are uncom-
mon. Certain scarcer resources, such as rattan and bamboo, are often claimed by whole 
villages. Access is free to villagers but restricted for others and is often granted free of 
payment upon request to the chief or any villager also collecting in the area. The gather-
ing of wild fruits, yams and seeds such as kofia (Lophira lanceolata) is also open ac-
cess, on a first come first serve basis. Fruit trees in the village are usually common 
property, unless, rarely, they are known to be planted, when it can be claimed by an in-
dividual. Hunting, often in a group, occurs in gallery forests once cleared of maize with 
ownership of caught animals on a first come basis, regardless of where they are caught 
(Burnham 1980).  
 
128 
 
Lowland humid forest  
In the lowland forests of the Southwest region, the traditional council headed by a chief 
is considered the highest customary authority at village level. The council’s influence 
has traditionally been strong, and is considered the owner of resources and legitimate 
ruler over land use and resources and thus controls access to NTFPs, particularly by 
outside parties. The council enforces customary law and order in the village and typical-
ly serves as an administrative link between the village and the local administration. Alt-
hough women are represented in the village council, they often do not have the power to 
oppose unfavourable decisions about income-generating resources. For example, in 
some villages around Takamanda in the South West, women pay a token fee to the 
council before harvesting Gnetum spp. for sale, whereas men hunt and sell without re-
strictions. Also influential are the ékpe (leopard) and makwo, powerful and respected 
sacred societies to which many men in the Anyang, Boki, Bayangi and Banyang tribes 
belong. The village society ‘house’ is the highest indigenous village authority, working 
alongside traditional councils and managing regional and long-distance trade (Hacket 
1989; Zapfack et al. 2001a). Societies uphold laws, with a vigilant group acting as po-
lice. In Anyang villages, serious laws pass through the council to the makwo and then to 
the village. The makwo oversees edicts. Both institutions also solve conflicts, including 
access to resources and tenure and reinforce council decisions. Focus group interviews 
also indicated that these cultural practices remain strong but are deteriorating among 
youths, who are becoming increasingly disaffected and that societies have weakened 
with outmigration. Youths in some communities believed that they are being deprived 
of their rights by both stringent informal and formal controls on resource use, especially 
timber. Council decisions are increasingly criticised by community members if they do 
not benefit from revenues, such as from forest resources, and conflicts with ‘society 
elites’ are common. 
Customary rules dictate that high value NTFPs such as Irvingia spp., Gnetum spp., 
bush pepper vines (Piper guineensis) and cattle stick bushes (Carpolobia spp.) are not 
owned by individuals or families and that access to the resource is generally on a first-
come, first-served basis. In practice, the same families tend to harvest in the same area 
each year with tacit acknowledgements of resource access and ownership. This system 
leads to most (99%) harvesters from the village requiring no prior authorisation from 
any authority before collecting the NTFPs. Trees planted or maintained on farmland are 
owned by the landowner, with their permission  required for harvest. As species have 
increased in value, practices have changed. People have started to clear land around Ir-
vingia spp. trees in the forest and others have claimed trees hosting abundant Gnetum 
spp. vines to establish long-term collection rights. The extension of tenure through 
clearance usually relates to only farmland, with retained trees also considered as owned 
by the family clearing the land. In response to domination of the Irvingia spp. trade by 
Nigerian Igbo buyers, in early 2000 Matene villagers purchased Irvingia spp. to sell in 
Nigeria with revenues proposed to go to a community fund controlled by the village 
council. Interviews in 2008 found that this practice was effective with some visible ben-
efits, such as the construction of village hall in 2002.  
When harvested by outsiders and ‘strangers from Nigeria’, NTFPs, particularly those 
of high value, are controlled and ‘taxed’ by the traditional authorities and permission 
required from village chiefs or traditional councils. Some communities require Irvingia 
spp. buyers to register and pay before harvest. There is no standard rate: in Kajifu a 
buyer pays 11 US$ for the whole season (7 US$ for indigenes) while in Mbilishi the 
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cost is 4.7 US$ and an unspecified amount of palm wine for the council. This practice 
has increased since recorded in 2001 (Mdaihli et al. 2002) when neighbouring villagers 
could collect resources freely 20% of the time and paid traditional council in 80% of 
cases, and 25% of Nigerians paid the traditional council and occasionally the chief or 
others directly. Encroachment by Nigerians is a cause of much conflict in Obonyi I, 
Basho, Matene and Mobilise. Because of such conflicts, the Mbilishe people began 
planting both Irvingia species. Other traditional controls include prohibitions on felling 
individual Irvingia spp. trees and on climbing trees to harvest unripe fruit, restricting 
harvesting to ripe fruit that has fallen to the ground. Many villages also have rules re-
garding the harvesting of Gnetum spp. (see Chapter 7). Norms stipulate that only the 
leaves should be plucked and that the stem must not be uprooted, promoting regrowth. 
Although generally adhered to, Kajifu, Takamanda and Obonyi villages reported prob-
lems with destructive methods such as tree felling. Outsiders also require permits from 
the council for Gnetum spp. in some villages, registering and paying taxes varying from 
0.03 to 0.40 US$ per head load (about 1 kg of leaves) to 4.50 US$ in Obonyi, with col-
lecting periods restricted to four or five days per month.  
Across the humid forest zone, shifting cultivation has been a dominant mode of for-
est use for decades (van den Berg 2000; Dkamela 2011). Property and user rights are 
claimed by families on fallow and abandoned farmland, and parts of forests, particularly 
those destined as future farmlands. Tree tenure and property rights for forest resources 
vary according to the use, location, individual or collective claims and investments (Van 
den Berg 2000). Valuable trees, such as Irvingia spp., Garcinia kola and Baillionella 
toxisperma belong to the individual or group who has planted them, and often, but not 
always, wild trees are appropriated by the family whose compound and farms are clos-
est. These owners can then allocate use rights to others. Trees further away are open ac-
cess for individuals and the community, unless rights are established, such as by clear-
ing around them or marking them. Clearing primary forest, planting fruit trees and oil 
palm is also a way of demarcating land ownership. However, enforcement is often diffi-
cult to enact. Free holding has been the reserve of urban centres where the value of land 
has rapidly increased due to increasing demand by ‘foreigners’. Private ownership how-
ever has gradually permeated the rural milieu, changing traditional tenure relations clos-
er to larger urban areas and accommodating differences of power and decision-making 
roles. Such changes have occurred between Bantu and Baka, Bagyeli and Bakola com-
munities around the Dja and Campo Ma’an National Parks.  
The Baka in the humid forest zone have very different customary arrangements, 
largely at odds with the formal land tenure and forest governance arrangements. In the 
forest no tenure is acknowledged, with dwellings being temporary and lands not tradi-
tionally seen as owned. The entire forest is seen as belonging to them, given by a su-
preme deity, komba or jengi. Everyone has the right to use all the forest resources 
(game, wild fruits, tubers, medicines, etc.) on the condition that they do not destroy the 
forest or resource. Such traditional use leaves no permanent and little visible evidence 
of valorisation and occupation. This has left Baka forest to be considered ‘vacant land’ 
and classed as permanent state forest (CED et al. 2010). 
Voluntary and market-based governance instruments 
Voluntary instruments have been used to change the behaviour of actors along value 
chains and govern trade, often with ethical focus on economic, environmental, social 
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and cultural values. Market-based governance refers to institutions which control de-
mand and supply transactions in markets and chains and the interactions of actors, such 
as collective action (for example through unions and associations); the delegation of 
traditional governmental functions to private players; and voluntarily adherence to na-
tional and transnational schemes governing the production and sale of products, services 
and chains such as certification schemes. The use of market-orientated policy instru-
ments is nothing new, but as a mechanisms to delegate traditionally governmental func-
tions it has been recently associated with decentralisation and privatisation, with result-
ing questions of legitimacy and effectiveness (Gebers et al. 1998; Cashore 2003) and 
accountability (Donahue et al. 2002). 
The European Union has been behind several voluntary schemes in Cameroon. The 
Honey Monitoring Residue Scheme adopted by the European Commission in 1996 
(European Council 1996) aims to ensure the quality of honey imports to the European 
Union, detailed in Chapter 8 and Box 8.1. Voluntary in name, compliance is essential if 
exporting countries wish to sell to the European market, effectively making them com-
mercial requirements. 
Geographical Indication (GI) (appellation d ’origin) is regulated by EU Directives 
concerning protected ‘designations of origin’, ‘protected geographical indication’ and 
‘traditional speciality guaranteed’ promoting the quality or authenticity of products 
based on their geographical location and culture (European Council 2006). GIs are used 
to protect and preserve intellectual property related to traditional cultures, geographical 
diversity and production methods. Conditions for recognition are that it relates to a 
product which has qualities, a reputation or other characteristics clearly linked to its de-
fined geographical origin. The GI procedure involves identifying the product, qualifying 
it, ensuring reproduction and finding means for remuneration mainly from commercial 
activities. The goal is to brand a product which consequently protects it and increases its 
value, leading to other advantages such as tourism, investments, environmental and 
economic benefits. The GI concept runs the risk of being usurped as copycat products 
take market share, placing the focus of international and European trade law on legalis-
ing and protecting GIs internationally. The GI for White Oku Honey, focussing on Ki-
lum-Ijim in the Northwest is elaborated in Chapter 8. 
Certification is a market transformation mechanism aiming to ensure sustainable 
commerce (Auld et al. 2008). It has sought to convince or pressure harvesters and pro-
ducers to voluntarily adhere to standards and practices, driven largely by western con-
sumers and NGOs and persuade, cajole or force consumers to purchase these products, 
via advertisements, public procurement schemes, and/or shame and blame campaigns. It 
creates a barrier to market entry for those outside of schemes and seeks to create a com-
petitive opportunity for adherents. Certification has many faces: a marketing method, 
providing information on the impacts of products, and a tool to gain market access or 
advantage, capture price premiums and demonstrate responsible forest management 
through independent third party certification. It can influence how forests are managed 
and promote sustainable forest management, supply and consumption and mitigate risks 
for investors (Chupezi and Ndoye 2004). By 2008 around 50 NTFPs had gained certifi-
cation through numerous schemes worldwide (Shanley et al. 2008). Whilst NTFPs are 
explicitly addressed in the 2009 FSC Forest Management Standard for Cameroon, no 
NTFPs have been certified in the Congo Basin, in contrast to NTFPs in Asia and the 
Amazon (Rametsteiner et al. 2001). As certification is driven by a variety of sometimes 
conflicting interests, if information or awareness is missing or low at one more points of 
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the chain, it is unlikely to be adopted, however enthusiastic external, driving actors are 
(Chupezi et al. 2004). The International Standard for Sustainable Wild Collection of 
Medicinal and Aromatic Plants (ISSC-MAP) (FairWild Foundation 2010) has been pro-
posed in Cameroon for Prunus africana by support and donor organisations (Chupezi et 
al. 2004; Ekpere 2007; Akoa et al. 2010), but has not commenced. This is due to a lack 
of actor connectedness, accessibility, enabling conditions and the chain, reflecting is-
sues raised by Walter (2003) and Shanley et al. (2008).  
Organic certification is a process for producers of organic food and agricultural 
products. Organic is a ‘whole system’ approach to farming and food production, recog-
nising the interrelationships in the production system from the soil to consumer. It uses 
agricultural, social, environmental and food-processing principles to guide standards. 
Standards vary by country, certifying organisation, and, in Europe, EU directives. They 
generally involve standards for growing, storage, processing and packaging that involve 
no synthetic chemical inputs (e.g. fertiliser, pesticides, antibiotics, food additives, etc.), 
genetically modified organisms or irradiation; farmland free from prohibited synthetic 
chemicals for a number of years (often, three or more); maintaining an audit trail of de-
tailed written production and sales records; adhering to a strict physical separation of 
organic from non-certified products and undergoing periodic on-site inspections, over-
seen by the government and/or independent certification organisations. Commercial use 
of the term organic is legally restricted. Certified organic producers are subject to the 
same agricultural, food safety and other government regulations as non-certified pro-
ducers. In Cameroon, both the UK Soil Association – which maintains the strictest and 
highest organic standards in Europe – and the French Ecocert have certified agricultural 
products. Just one NTFP, honey, has been certified organic and ethical trade, by a small 
enterprise, Guiding Hope. The process and implications are detailed in Chapter 8. 
Ethical or fair trade is an umbrella term for business practices promoting socially 
and/or environmentally responsible trade and practices in a chain. Such trade seeks 
greater equity by offering better trading conditions to, and securing the rights of, mar-
ginalised producers and workers. The European Fair Trade Association, Fairtrade La-
belling Organisations International (FLO) and the International Federation for Alterna-
tive Trade (IFAT) collaborate to promote membership-based global networks of fair 
trade organisations, promote fair trade using certification and encourage people to 
change consumption patterns by buying fair trade. Commodity chain audits, certifica-
tion and labelling distinguish members adhering to a code of practice governing their 
chain. In Cameroon, in the honey sector, Guiding Hope has been certified as an ethical 
trade company with the Soil Association since 2010. There are also corporate ethical 
and environmentally based supply chain schemes. The Body Shop International, a mul-
tinational producing cosmetic and personal care products, has registered NTFP suppli-
ers, including honey and beeswax from Guiding Hope, as community trade suppliers, 
detailed in Chapter 8.  
Voluntary chain-based certification can provide potential benefits, but may only be 
suitable for certain products and markets (Walter 2003; Ekpere 2007; Shanley et al. 
2008; Vantomme 2010). The high set-up, maintenance and awareness-building costs 
and the uncertain environmental and social effectiveness of certification combine to 
pose challenges for small, remote, poor harvesters with often limited market connec-
tions and capital. Given this context, few schemes have been implemented in the Congo 
Basin, although several have been considered (Vermeulen et al. 2009). These schemes 
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form an additional set of governance arrangements, using national legislation as the 
base to go beyond regulatory requirements.  
Governance through international agreements and conventions 
International standards incorporated into national law and voluntarily complied with by 
states add another layer of arrangements. They are dynamic, reflecting species status, 
social-economic and political developments over time. They include the IUCN Red List 
of Threatened Species, which aims to guide and evaluate the status of plant and animal 
species worldwide. Since 1994 species conservation status has been determined using a 
baseline and subsequent monitoring of changes. If data is available, the level of threat is 
categorised, ranging from ‘extinct’ to ‘critically endangered’, ‘endangered’, ‘vulnera-
ble’, ‘near threatened’ and ‘least concern’. A red listing can trigger conservation actions 
from NGOs, governments and researchers (Thompson 2009). For example, a new coffee 
species helped justify protected area designation for the Oku Plantlife Sanctuary and 
Bakossi Forest Reserve, and inventories in the Southwest contributed to the Programme 
for the Sustainable Management of Natural Resources in the Southwest Province 
(PSMNR-SWP) lobby to upgrade Mount Cameroon and Takamanda Forest Reserves 
into national parks.  
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (CITES) is a voluntary, international agreement between governments in force 
since 1975 to which Cameroon acceded in 1981. It aims to ensure that international 
trade in wild animals and plants does not threaten their survival, which together with 
factors such as habitat loss, may deplete populations and cause species extinction. 
CITES accords varying degrees of protection to over 30,000 animal and plant species. 
Appendix I lists the most endangered species threatened with extinction, for which in-
ternational trade is prohibited except for non-commercial reasons. Appendix II lists spe-
cies not necessarily now threatened with extinction but that may become so unless trade 
is closely controlled though agreeing annual quotas. Although legally binding on its 
Parties, it does not replace national laws but provides a framework for implementing 
CITES within national legislation. By 2011, 18 animals were CITES Appendix 1, 186 
Appendix II and 29 plants (including Prunus africana) Appendix II listed. 
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) entered into force in 1993 and was 
ratified by Cameroon in 1994. It aims to conserve biological diversity and the fair and 
equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilisation of genetic resources, ensur-
ing the rights of countries and communities over their biological resources are respect-
ed. Also that access to traditional knowledge occurs with the approval of such know-
ledge holders, who should participate equitably in the resulting benefits, establishing a 
system for access and benefit sharing (ABS). It recognises that access to these resources 
must be subject to the prior informed consent of the provider country and based on mu-
tually agreed terms. These rules are enshrined in a National Biodiversity Strategy and 
Action Plan, developed and heavily supported by donors. It addresses trade and benefit 
sharing of products covered by this study (Prunus africana, Gnetum spp. and honey). 
To comply with Article 10(c) concerning the protection and encouragement of custom-
ary use in accordance with traditional cultural practices compatible with conservation or 
sustainable use requirements, support and lobby organisations for indigenous peoples 
and local communities documented sustainable customary uses (Forest Peoples Pro-
gramme 2010). This resulted in ABS studies on Prunus africana, influencing bodies 
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such as CITES (United Nations Environment Programme 1998; Schippmann et al. 
2002; Ekpere 2007; Rosendal 2010; Samndong 2010). The status of the NTFPs studied 
according to these three standards varies from unclassified to highly conservation status, 
shown in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1 Status of the NTFP species with respect to standards and conventions 
Sources: (United Nations Environment Programme 1998; Chupezi et al. 2004; Ekpere 2007; Laird et al. 2008; CITES  
2008; IUCN 2010; Samndong 2010). 
Project governance arrangements 
For the same reasons that Cameroon is much researched, it has become a donor darling 
and playground for experimentation by forestry projects (Topa et al. 2009). The terms 
project and programme refer to a collaborative activity, planned to achieve a particular 
aim, constituted by teams within or across organisations to accomplish particular tasks 
within a specific time frame, funded by foreign governments, the state, international de-
velopment and financing originations (‘donors’), development and conservation NGOs 
and philanthropic organisations through grants or loans to implementing organisations, 
national and local government, local and international NGOs and/or civil society organ-
isations (CSOs), consultants and private sector organisations. As each funder and im-
plementer has their own objectives and associated rules, these have added a layer of 
governance arrangements, having a significant effect on conservation and management 
practices (Sharpe 1998). Projects have compensated for deficiencies and voids in state 
services, particularly in protected areas. Where projects have had a long-term presence 
this has sometimes provided little incentive for the state to take on these activities. The 
scale of projects enacted ranges from product-specific, short-term projects of six months 
to a year, such as the NTFP value chain projects funded by SNV, to projects covering 
large geographical areas with long timescales of decades, several of which have particu-
larly impacted governance of the value chains studied in two of the ecoregions, and so 
are elaborated in more detail in the following sections.  
 
Species  IUCN Red List CITES CBD      Category Status 
Gnetum africanum Near threatened 
 
Pop. trend: 
decreasing 
Not listed  
Gnetum buchholzianum Near threatened Pop. trend: 
decreasing 
Not listed  
Apis mellifera adansonii Not listed  Not listed  
Prunus africana Vulnerable A1cd  Needs up-
dating 
Appendix II 
and Cameroon 
Case study: 
P. africana 
Cola acuminata, C. nitida, C. 
anomala 
Not listed  Not listed  
Irvingia gabonensis Lower Risk/ 
Near threatened 
Needs up-
dating 
Not listed  
Irvingia wombulu Not listed  Not listed  
Raphia farinifera, Raphia 
vinifera, Raphia hookeri  
Not listed  Not listed  
Raphia regalis  Vulnerable B2ab(iii)  Not listed  
Bambusa vulgaris, Yushania 
alpina, O. abyssinica 
Not listed  Not listed  
Acacia spp. Not listed  Not listed  
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Bamenda Highlands forest projects  
In 1932 the British colonial administration proposed a forest reserve around the Oku 
Mountain Forest, as a buffer zone for food and fuel. This was rejected by the local au-
thorities as unnecessary interference, given the elaborate customary rules, taboos and 
sacred areas governing forest use (Fisiy 1994). State management commenced from 
1961 when a protected area was again advanced by the administration. This led to forest 
guards in the 1960s, a penal sanction on the Kwifon in 1970 and demarcation of a for-
est-farm boundary in 1975. Between 1963 and 1987, an estimated 50% of the forest was 
destroyed or modified (Nurse et al. 1994), indicating that traditional institutions were 
unable to deal with increased population pressure and use by non-indigenes. The gov-
ernment also remained unable to adequately respond, despite prohibitions and prefec-
tural orders against degradation in 1983 and 1985.  
In response to this history, from 1986 to 2006, projects were continually active in the 
Bamenda Highlands, affecting the four NTFP chains originating from this region: bam-
boo, cola, honey and Prunus africana. All the projects were led by BirdLife Interna-
tional in collaboration with MINEF and later MINFOF and communities adjacent to the 
Kilum-Ijim forest. Totalling over 2.35 million US$, they were funded by the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF/UNDP), the British Department for International Develop-
ment (DFID), the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries 
through the International Nature Management Programme and WWF Netherlands. The 
first two projects, the Kilum Mountain Forest Project starting in 1987 and Ijim Moun-
tain Forest Project in 1992, later combined into the Kilum-Ijim Forest Project (KIFP) 
focused on forest conservation, using education and awareness raising. They “took over 
the forest” (Chi 1999): 8). The Bamenda Highlands Forest Project (BHFP) started in 
2000, building on the former projects with a focus on conservation and development. 
The projects, realising a need to work with the traditional authorities to have credibility, 
make impact and push through change, officialised “Fondom Agreed Wide Rules” in 
June 1998 with representatives of the three Fondoms (Birdlife International 2007). 
These rules aimed to support the attribution and management of community forests, by 
reinforcing and formalising customary forest management rules. The projects provided 
awareness raising and environmental education16, the posters of which were seen in 
shops, bars, public places and private homes in 2010. Formal regulations were imple-
mented as new institutions for community forests were set up, trained and heavily sup-
ported. Livelihoods projects concerning honey, Prunus africana and bamboo harvesting 
and processing were supported. A forest and biodiversity monitoring system was set up 
to measure the effect of activities. After project closure in 2004 a much smaller UK 
Darwin Initiative-funded project focused on capacity building of the FMIs and two um-
brella associations from 2004 to 2006. Local NGOs joined together as an umbrella con-
servation and development network, WHINCONET, in response to and with support of 
the BHFP. Post-BHFP, they were supported technically and financially by SNV from 
2004 to 2008 to conduct self-determined activities. 
The dual aims of integrating conservation and development resulted in some early 
successes (Abbot et al. 2001; Gardner 2002). By 2003 7.8% of forest area had been re-
generated and the forest boundary was marked with signs and trees, within which the 
forest remained fairly intact compared 1987 (Asanga 2002; Langley 2003; Royal 
                                                 
16  URL: http://www.birdlife.org/action/ground/bamenda/bamenda4.html. Retrieved 15 June 2009. 
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Botanic Gardens Kew 2003). The project’s presence provided a political and social mo-
tivation, a multiplier effect and sufficient direct income generation (from per diem pay-
ments for attendance at workshops, direct project employment, revenues from visiting 
researchers, students, officials and tourism and alternative livelihood activities), to ena-
ble sustainable forest governance for the project duration (Asanga 2002).  
However, little evidence of a more permanent conservation and development legacy 
indicates that many of the successes have not been sustained. The government had no 
real ownership with few capacities transferred from the projects (Global Environmental 
Facility 2009) and was only partially able to enforce rules once the projects ended. This 
capacity has been noted as important in maintaining governance (Van Tatenhove 2003; 
Ostrom 2009; Persha et al. 2011). Anthropomorphic threats have continued and in-
creaseed, with resulting forest degradation and losses to biodiversity (WHINCONET 
2005; van der Waarde et al. 2006; Nsom et al. 2007; Stewart 2007a; Mzeka 2008; 
Solefack 2009; Enchaw 2010). The over-extraction of Prunus africana and low level of 
management of the Oku Plantlife Sanctuary are examples of how institutions set up by 
the project did not continue protection and enforcement, whereas harvests continued at 
higher rates than prior to and during the BHFP’s lifetime (Stewart 2001; WHINCONET 
2005; Ingram 2007; Nsom et al. 2007; Stewart 2007). Small income-generating projects 
providing alternatives to forest-degrading activities and forest value-enhancement, mon-
itoring and raising awareness of increasing forest degradation and biodiversity loss have 
been conducted by WHINCONET members since 2004. Despite these activities to fill 
the gap left by the project (Fonjong 2006), their lower level of resources and reliance on 
grants meant that only a piecemeal focus was possible. These affected Prunus africana 
and honey chains using and enforcing formal and customary governance arrangements, 
and resulted in setting up new hybrid government arrangements, such as the collection 
and re-distribution of ecotourism revenues and geographic indication for Oku white 
honey.  
As Enchaw (2010) notes, the failure of the projects to provide long lasting solutions 
to conservation and development dilemmas in the Bamenda Highlands can be attributed 
to the incompatibility and presence of overlapping customary and formal regulations, 
combined with new and often competing governance and management structures –
notably the Community Forest Management Institutions, umbrella Community Forest 
Associations and tourism association – and decentralisation of powers to Councils. All 
of these were promoted by external project actors to govern forest and resource use, 
largely overlooking the intricacies of institutional functioning and interactions.  
 
Southwest forest projects 
A series of projects from 1988 to 2002 encompassed the montane and humid forest are-
as of the Southwest: the Limbe Botanic Garden and Rainforest Genetic Conservation 
Project (LBGRGCP) and the Mount Cameroon Project (MCP), financed by UK De-
partment for International Development (DFID) and later the German Technical Coop-
eration (GTZ). These initially strongly conservation-focused projects encouraged the 
conservation and sustainable use of forests by establishing reserves and renovating the 
Limbe Botanic Garden (Watts 1994). The final phase reconciled conservation and live-
lihood needs by including practical projects benefitting villagers around the proposed 
reserves (DFID 2000). The Programme for the Sustainable Management of Natural Re-
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sources in the Southwest Province (PSMNR-SWP)17 has run from 2003 to date. It is 
funded by the German Development Bank (KfW) (GTZ 2010) through a 7 million euro 
German bilateral grant to the government and 10 million euro direct to the programme. 
Overall, the MINFOF Provincial Delegate for the Southwest is responsible, although the 
PSMNR-SWP is managed by the German GFA Consulting Group. It is implemented by 
these two organisations together with GIZ18 staff, consultants and service providers 
through technical support, capacity building, village development and livelihoods pro-
jects, and by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the Wildlife Conservation Society 
(WCS) for conservation activities. The programme aims to implement sustainable forest 
and wildlife management with affected stakeholders in and around high conservation 
value forest ecosystems of Mount Cameroon, Korup and Takamanda-Mone Technical 
Operations Units for their benefit and to alleviate poverty.  
Many of the MCP and PSMNR-SWP’s conservation and livelihood activities con-
cerned NTFPs. NTFP-based alternative livelihood projects concerning honey, eru, snail 
farming domestication and marketing, and ecotourism were implemented (Wilson 2007) 
and a regional, strategic plan for developing NTFPs was produced in 2010. Long-term 
attention has been given to sustainable harvesting of Prunus africana, with harvester 
unions supported and a local, community-based company, the Mount Cameroon Prunus 
Management Common Initiative Group (MOCAP). Conducting inventories, developing 
standards and harvesting guidelines informally and then formally as part national man-
agement plan for Prunus Africana were also part of the activities. The PSMNR-SWP’s 
interventions had significant impact on the national management plan and changed cus-
tomary practices for many harvesters and buyers in the Southwest (see Chapter 9). 
There has been less impact on the governance and trade of other NTFPs, except for eru, 
due to the work of an NGO initiated by the MCP, the Centre for Nursery Development 
and Eru Propagation (CENDEP), which promotes Gnetum domestication (see Chapter 
7).  
The PSMNR-SWP supported and pushed for upgrading of the protected area status 
of Mt Cameroon to a 58,178 ha national park from 2006 onwards, leading to a decree in 
200919. Its final attribution in February 2010 was subject to significant conflicts20 with 
the local population and traditional rulers, concerning that the park boundaries and rules 
limiting customary and income-generating activities, particularly access to NTFPs, such 
as Prunus africana and bushmeat. The media reported the Mt Cameroon National Park 
as “the brain child of KFW with GTZ, DED, WCS and WWF” with conservation per-
ceived as more dominant than livelihood benefits21. Raising awareness and understand-
ing of conservation issues was carried out through meetings, school lectures, booklets 
and posters and tours of the Botanic Garden. The project is currently piloting a Reduc-
ing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) scheme to support 
                                                 
17  In 2008 the administrative unit of ‘Province’ to ‘Region’ was altered by ministerial decree. Names and 
boundaries of the ten units were unchanged, but some Divisional and Sub-divisional boundaries 
changed.  
18  Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), formerly the German Technical Cooperation 
(GTZ) and German Development Organisation (DED). 
19  Decree number 2009/2272/PM of 18 December 2009 concerning Mt Cameroon National Park. 
20  URL: http://www.postnewsline.com/2006/11/indigenes_resis.html and  http://the-news-from-
cameroon.com/article.php?category_id=32&article_id=1495. Retrieved September 2012. 
21  Nkeze Mbonwoh “Buea- Mount Cameroon national park launched” Cameroon Tribune 22 February 
2010 URL: http://allafrica.com/stories/201002221515.html. Retrieved June 2011. 
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conservation and community development. Time will tell if REDD payments will com-
pensate for lost NTFP incomes and provide income alternatives, or lead to further re-
source access restrictions without compensation. 
The PSMNR-SWP has impacted NTFP governance indirectly by restricting the har-
vesting of NTFPs in the national parks (Ingram et al. 2011c). Awareness raising and 
‘sensitisation’ on conservation has been criticised as undermining local usufruct rights, 
failing to compensate for losses and leading to unexpected outcomes that may not bene-
fit biodiversity conservation or local livelihoods (van Vliet 2010). Some of the park-
related activities have also been strongly debated and criticised (Brockington et al. 
2006; Curran et al. 2009; Schmidt-Soltau 2009). The project has been mistaken for a 
government institution, so strong has been its presence (Chia et al. 2004): 58). This ob-
servation continues to be valid, as the combined political, human and economic project 
capital is equivalent, and in some areas exceeds that of MINFOF’s in the region. The 
projects have reinforced MINFOF activities, particularly in remote areas where it has 
previously been largely absent. The PSMNR-SWP promoted the formalisation of forest 
governance and increased implementation and enforcement of formal laws above cus-
tomary and supported new institutions, such as village development committees and 
council forests, and hybrids of community-NGO-businesses, such as MOCAP and the 
Mount Cameroon Ecotourism Organisation. The focus on integrated landscape scale 
land-use planning to manage and sustainably allocate space has not always been accept-
ed by the local communities, leading to the need for conflict management and mitiga-
tion in all the Nationals Parks concerning land use, access and boundaries (Chia et al. 
2004; Mambo et al. 2007; Ayuk 2008).  
Although developed in collaboration with the government, the funders have had the 
major say in forming and implementing governance arrangements. Their strong pres-
ence has led them to be perceived as extensions or replacements of the state, particularly 
when they have aided the enforcement of formal regulations and participated in creating 
new regulations. One recurring result of this has been a clash between project’s conser-
vation and livelihood objectives. This is despite activities to support or compensate lo-
cal populations for lost opportunities due to changes in perceived ownership and access 
to forests and their resources. This impact is common in Cameroon and Africa (Ros-
Tonen et al. 2005a; Diaw et al. 2010; Freudenthal et al. 2011). Whilst some of the insti-
tutions set up by projects have disappeared once projects ended, some have been main-
tained or picked up by other projects and actors, often morphing into yet other institu-
tions, a process termed neo-African governance (Siloma et al. 2005). This creates more 
plural institutions and governance arrangements and is an example of institutional brico-
lage (Cleaver 2001) practised by actors to sustain their NTFP chains. This is most clear 
in the Bamenda Highlands, where a sufficiently long period post-project enables the re-
configuration of institutional and governance arrangements introduced by projects to be 
seen. 
This overview of a handful of influential projects operating in the study areas does 
not aim to critique their results or achievements, nor the implementing organisations 
and funders, but to highlight how they created changes in governance arrangements. 
Their long and sustained presence, power and significant capital injections ushered in 
new institutions strongly influencing forest governance. They, sometimes intentionally, 
created or allowed completely new institutions to rise and subjugate former institutions. 
Such use of biodiversity protection arrangements, particularly through the appropriation 
of parks and new rules for land use, has been construed as ecological-social colonialism 
138 
 
(Nguiffo 1998) and eco-imperialism (Dietz 1999). Many of the social, political, eco-
nomic and environmental impacts of setting up new institutions appear not to have been 
thoroughly considered ex-ante, and in many of the current and post-project evaluations 
have not been addressed, or if addressed, was often too late such that largely reactive 
responses to conflict situations were possible. External onlookers, from researchers to 
NGOs with different agendas, have been attentive, supportive and also highly critical of 
such projects (Curran et al. 2009; Schmidt-Soltau 2009). The existing governance ar-
rangements prior to the projects were largely customary. Some NTFPs were conse-
quently promoted as important and sustainable. Support was given for production and 
commercialisation of some NTFPs (such as Prunus africana and honey) building on 
customary rules with more formal rules all projects, whereas other products – notably 
bushmeat and bush mango – were outlawed in newly created parks. 
Discussion: An incongruent bricolage  
The analysis in this and the previous two chapters of the historical and current econom-
ic, social, political, business and institutional contexts highlights that the NTFP value 
chains operate in very dynamic, changing and complex settings. Most notable is the le-
gal pluralism, messy with overlapping and multiple layers of institutions, the configura-
tions of which have changed over time. There is also a fair share of holes in this patch-
work: where no institutions can be found governing certain practices and chains. Some 
actors, notably NGOs and project-related actors, fulfil roles normally the reserve of the 
state. In other situations and places the state performs it duties, in others not and cus-
tomary authorities or projects govern. It is this incongruence that makes it difficult to 
entangle how the bricolage impacts livelihoods and the need for specific chain analyses 
so important.  
Regulatory and institutional pluralism in NTFP chains in Cameroon mirrors experi-
ences in many other African countries. The changing and apparently increasing plural-
ism of governance arrangements concerning forests and NTFPs appears to be lesser 
known and understood. This context seems unlikely to be smoothed into a mono-
governance arrangement anytime in the near future. This is evidenced by the chequered 
history of different governance arrangements and slow rate of land and regulatory re-
forms, the still firm grasp of customary governance in some areas, the insidiousness of 
corruption and the increasing influence of new arrangements such as projects and volun-
tary schemes. Thus, for actors in NTFP value chains, it seems that they are forced to 
stay and become even more adept bricoleurs. They make the best of the arrangements in 
which they both find themselves, and creatively use capitals available, building on natu-
ral capital to construct new governance arrangements and/or remould existing ones to 
best suit to their current objectives, circumstances and livelihoods. This situation re-
flects notions of institutional bricolage: the dynamic and multiple identities of the bri-
coleurs and multi-purpose institutional arrangements (Cleaver 2002) and the crafting 
arrangements which advance livelihoods, individually and collectively. It also reflects 
productive bricolage with its focus on livelihoods as the flexible and dynamic crafting 
of livelihood options and associated impacts on landscapes (Ros-Tonen 2012).  
Examining the governance contexts in which NTFP value chains operate shows that 
before statutory rules existed, and in the continued absence of a functioning and legiti-
mate legal framework, many, but not all, NTFPs were customarily regulated. This anal-
ysis also shows that differences occur due to the social and economic contexts of the 
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areas where the chains operate. Over time this has altered as demand and business oper-
ating environments have changed. Particularly for species under strong commercial 
pressure such as Prunus africana and Irvingia spp. (see Chapters 7 to 11) statutory law 
appears an important and often necessary element and a complement to customary law. 
Dramatic changes are clearly needed on a number of fronts to develop and implement a 
governance framework for NTFPs that supports harvesters, traders and rural communi-
ties, encourages a vibrant commercial NTFP sector, and promotes sustainable and equi-
table practices.  
Despite evidence that a single, unified system does not work, it has been strongly 
promoted. External agencies (i.e. the World Bank, the High Level Commission on Le-
gal Empowerment of the Poor, the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Na-
tions (FAO) and donors) have prescribed ‘modernising’ regulatory systems, particularly 
land tenure. There has been an implicit assumption of the benefits of monism and a ho-
mogenisation of national land laws. The harmonisation of NTFP laws in Central Africa 
is an example of this (Walter et al. 2006; Bonannée et al. 2007; FAO et al. 2008; 
Ingram 2010b; Logo 2010). Whilst regulatory pluralism is only one aspect of pluralism 
in governance arrangements, it is important. Legal empowerment has been seen as fun-
damental to sustainable development and achieving the Millennium Development Goals 
(CLEP et al. 2008). Dealing with regulatory pluralism however is not easy. McAuslan 
(2004) sets out twelve precepts to make regulatory pluralism effective. Considering the 
social, economic, regulatory and political contexts of the value chains, many of these 
preconditions are not met, making pluralism, in McAuslan’s terms, not ‘do-able’. He 
stresses that pluralism and monism concerns who has political power and over whom 
that power is exercised. The ‘who’ and ‘whom’ are the individual or groups and regula-
tors (both formal and informal) in value chains, and the object is the forest and its prod-
ucts. History shows that governance arrangements are continually changing, such that 
these conditions can sometimes be met or crafted.  
The culmination of legal revisions over the past 15 years and forest, conservation and 
development politics, albeit largely under pressure from outside agencies, have resulted 
in an inconsistent and incomplete statutory framework with limited government capaci-
ty and political will. Conflicts between texts and policy objectives are compounded by 
the absence of pragmatic implementing regulations. The current regulatory framework 
thus undermines rather than enhances sustainable livelihoods. The very low level of 
awareness among harvesters, traders and government authorities, particularly local and 
regional delegations that interact with rural communities, of the laws that exist hinders 
their effectiveness. The products are not well-defined and so uncertainty dominates. 
NTFPs are taxed formally and informally, inconsistently and often heavy-handedly. The 
long-term management of species populations is not considered in quotas, nor are there 
controls or monitoring to limit overharvesting. Bureaucracy and costs eat away at prof-
its and limit the effectiveness and efficiency of actors to legally participate in the sector, 
if this was a viable option. The regulatory framework undermines the livelihoods of 
small-scale actors in favour of the politically powerful few qui mange22. With commu-
nity land and resources under ambiguous legal title, individuals, entrepreneurs and 
groups must jump enormous bureaucratic hurdles to become legal entities managing, 
harvesting and trading what they consider their own assets. Without the requisite politi-
                                                 
22  A common saying meaning ‘those who eat’: indicating those gaining economically and becoming fat 
on illicit winnings, sometimes literally, as obesity is seen as a sign of wealth. 
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cal power to acquire quotas or finances to buy waybills from quota holders, illegal 
NTFP trade is thus the norm. 
The context of property rights to forest lands and resources reflects the contested, 
overlapping and unenforced rights characterised by confusion and insecurity that are 
common in other tropical and African countries. This has been seen to undermine forest 
governance, as without secure rights forest holders have only economic incentives – and 
often lack legal status – to invest in protecting and managing their forest resources. 
While secure property rights cannot ensure sustained protection and investments, they 
are often a necessary condition (Tedder et al. 2002; White et al. 2002). De Soto (2003) 
emphasised the need to unify informal local tenure systems to aid development. How-
ever, in practice in Cameroon, unification has not been as linear and consensual as De 
Soto describes. Individual land titling has not been the ‘silver bullet’ hoped for (Larson 
et al. 2010a). So, if private property is not the foundation for sustainable governance 
and management, then what?  
Concurring with Hoekema and colleagues (2009), the answer may lie in adapting lo-
cal conditions: working with stakeholders, taking their needs seriously, respecting their 
(sustainable) ways of managing land and using simple but robust arrangements. In situa-
tions of weak customary law, well-crafted and implemented statutory law could play an 
important role in NTFP governance. Statutory law could support sustainable and equi-
table practices when commercial pressure on resources is great and traditional structures 
are undermined by this pressure. Experiences of brokering between customary and for-
mal rule systems highlight that local systems are sometimes of ambiguous functionality 
and may co-exist with continuous internal conflicts over resources. This finding is con-
trary to that implied in a recent desk study promoting formal tenure (Alden Wily 2011). 
Any adaptation and unification of formal and customary regulatory and tenure systems 
thus needs to look critically at the functionality and effectiveness of both systems. The 
collective sharing of resources de facto promotes inequity. ‘Westernisation of rules’ has 
meant replacing sometimes ambiguous collective with unambiguous private, individual 
rights, benefitting some and disadvantaging and marginalising others. This has led to 
existing rights to be defended and advocacy to enable the marginalised and those least 
able to benefit (the illiterate, poor, specific ethnic groups and minorities etc.) to access 
these ‘new’ private rights. The low level of overt conflicts may be due to the high costs 
and social capital needed to contest rights, noted also by van Dijk (2008). Collective 
customary rights of equal (and unequal) access can thus support vested local interests 
and elite capture of forest and land. Elites and traditional rulers are often unwilling to 
abandon these interests and power for public benefit. Using De Soto’s analogy, some of 
the dogs have a very large bone to lose, and so not only bark, but also bite! 
As Dia (1996) points out, the disconnect between transplanted formal institutions and 
indigenous African institutions is not necessarily a governance crisis. Traditional au-
thority in Cameroon is a crossroads (Cheka 2010), where citizens are ‘bound’ by mod-
ern law and traditional values, even if some state institutions object to certain traditional 
values and find it difficult whether and how to integrate customary regulation into for-
mal governance. The benefits of traditional authority and reason why it continues, is the 
institutional stability and certainty it offers, which elected officials and government staff 
(who come and go) do not. Traditional authorities are also often active in local devel-
opment, and closer to their subjects than a distant state. Thus customary regulations re-
main de facto institutions, but often not the only forms of governance. This has led to 
arguments that traditional institutions should be integrated into formal institutions 
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(Cheka 2010) and that plural institutions are essential and inevitable. Formal institutions 
need to adapt to the local context and build the legitimacy needed for enforceability. If 
at odds with societal behaviours, expectations and incentive systems they lack legitima-
cy. Informal and customary institutions, embedded in local culture and values tend to 
have more legitimacy, accountability and self-enforcement – being linked to peoples’ 
sense of identity. However customary discrimination on age, gender and ethnicity can 
weaken their power and competitiveness in increasingly complex, global and plural ar-
rangements. Dia (1996) recommended that such processes of synergy and convergence 
are managed. For plural or ‘bricolaged’ governance to work all chain actors would need 
to be involved and their differing needs integrated, negotiated and balanced. And that, 
given the context and nature of the chains, is not easy. 
 
  
7  
Gnetum value chain1 
This chapter presents the results of the in-depth analysis of the Gnetum spp. value chain 
originating from the Southwest and Littoral regions of Cameroon and extending to con-
sumers in Nigeria and Europe. The findings are based on interviews, observation, value 
chain analysis, resource assessments and trade data (see Chapter 3). The values provid-
ed have been verified and triangulated with literature and in workshops with stakehold-
ers and are believed to be valid for the specific chain, its geographic locations and popu-
lation sample for the time period of the data collection. The sections deal respectively 
with the second research question of how the value chain is arranged in terms of the 
species it is derived from, the products, location, actors, activities and values; the third 
question on how the chains are governed; the fourth on their importance to livelihoods 
and sustainability and the fifth on product sustainability. The conclusion focuses on how 
governance arrangements influence sustainable livelihoods. 
The Gnetum value chain  
This section addresses the second research question of how the Gnetum spp. value chain 
is configured in terms of the products, their uses, sources, actors, activities and values.  
Gnetum species, products and their uses  
The term Gnetum is used to refer to two ancient species: Gnetum africanum Welw. 
and Gnetum buchholzianum Engl. The leaves of this forest liana are known in Anglo-
phone areas of Cameroon as eru, a Bayangi term originating from an ethnic group in 
Manyu division in the Southwest region. Also in the Southwest, the Anyang ethnic 
group calls the leaves gelu, the Boki ecole and the Ovande ikokoh. In Nigeria they are 
known as afang by the Ibibio and Efik ethnic groups located in Cross River and Akwa-
Ibom States, and ukasi or okazi by the Igbo. In Francophone areas the leaves are gener-
ally known as okok, a Béti term and as koko by the Maka. The leaves are ranked as one 
of the ten most important NTFPs in the Congo Basin countries and one of the top nine-
teen most used and valued NTFPs in Cameroon (Ingram et al. 2012a).  
                                                 
1  Data for this chapter is derived from (Ingram 2010a; Ingram et al. 2011c; Ingram et al. 2012e). 
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The two Gnetum vines are very similar, both 
climbers growing to around 10 metres, but distin-
guishable by leaf shape and the male reproductive 
organs (Shiembo et al. 1996). Macro morphological 
variation has been observed in form, leaf margin, 
inflorescence type, fruit shape and colour. Although 
the leaf length, internode and spike varies between 
species, there is little significant difference (Ag-
bagwa et al. 2005). Entire and lanceolate leaves ap-
pear peculiar to Gnetum buchholzianum while the 
bead-like inflorescence distinguishes Gnetum afri-
canum. These morphological variations may be in 
response to different habitats. The leaves are well 
adapted to low light levels, resulting in strong pigmentation and leaf fibres. Weaker fi-
bres and lighter pigmented leaves are more common in disturbed primary and secondary 
habitats (Feild et al. 2007). In Nigeria the species are differentiated by colour, taste, bit-
terness and fibrousness (Isong et al. 1999). In Cameroon, 16% of harvesters distin-
guished between species by leaf size (Gnetum africanum is larger), texture (Gnetum af-
ricanum is more fibrous, especially when older) and taste (Gnetum buchholzianum is 
more bitter), confirming reports by (Nkwatoh 2005; Lingondo et al. 2006; Nguimalet et 
al. 2008). Gnetum buchholzianum was reported by harvesters to have a higher leaf yield 
per vine, and the rigid, broad, dark green large leaves were easier to pick and cut. Gne-
tum africanum has lighter green to yellow/reddish coloured, narrower, elongated leaves. 
Although Gnetum buchholzianum is most preferred by harvesters, traders and consum-
ers, both species are gathered and sold under the product names of eru or okok. 
In Cameroon Gnetum leaves are used for food, cooked and occasionally fresh. Un-
like Gnetum species in Asia, the seeds are not eaten. Consumers confirmed studies stat-
ing that it is eaten by almost all societal strata (Mialoudama 1993; Abia et al. 2007; 
Mensah et al. 2008). Contrary to Nkefor (2000) and anecdotal reports, no Gnetum-based 
distilled alcoholic drinks were found in Cameroon or Nigeria except a wine produced in 
Ebolowa sold in small quantities in Ebolowa and Yaoundé. On the western Cameroon-
Nigeria border and across southeastern and coastal Nigeria, the leaves are used raw in 
salads and cooked in soups (Burkill 1994). Okazi soup is popular among the Imo, Abia 
and Anambra ethnic groups, in parts of the Delta states and Afang soup in Cross Rivers 
and Akwa Ibom states. Gnetum is the major component in these soups (Iloh et al. 2009), 
which are sold fresh and canned. Substitutes for Gnetum include the similar tasting 
leaves of the shrub Lasianthera africana P.Beauv. The nutritional value reported by 
traders and consumers is confirmed by research. The leaves contain ashes and lipid 
(Mialoudama 1993; Mensah et al. 2008) and have a high mineral content, with Gnetum 
africanum having higher calcium and magnesium levels (Abia et al. 2007). They have a 
high calorific value (438.83 kcal/100 g) (Okafor 1995), are relatively high in carbohy-
drates and protein (Isong et al. 1999) and rich in fibre compared to other common leafy 
vegetables in Central Africa (Mensah et al. 2008).  
Gnetum dishes are traditional ceremonial delicacies across southwest Cameroon, 
eastern and southern Nigeria. Historically, the leaves were consumed as an accompani-
ment to staple starches by ethnic groups such as the Bayangi in Southwest Cameroon 
and Eastern Nigeria (Poubom Ngundam 1997; Tekwe et al. 2003) and the Bassa and 
Ewondo in the Centre region. Gnetum is sold in towns and cities such as Lagos, Abuja, 
Photo 7.1 Gnetum africanum 
leaves, Takamanda, May 2011  
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Ibadan and Makurdi in Nigeria and in 75% of the southern humid forest zone markets in 
Cameroon, constituting the largest volume NTFP traded. It is now eaten by ethnic 
groups with no tradition of consuming it and in areas where it was not previously con-
sumed, such as the Northwest. Its popularity has grown in the last forty years, trans-
forming from auto-consumption and a small, local trade into a staple and comfort food 
industry, such that it even has its own Facebook page2. Its use extends to the Central 
Africa diaspora in Europe and North America. This is demonstrated by the number of 
recipes on the internet, its inclusion in African cookbooks (Charles 2006 ; Gibbon 
2008), and the sale of fresh, dried and canned Gnetum in African supermarkets in Eu-
rope and the USA and via internet (Ingram et al. 2012e). It is competitively priced com-
pared to other leafy vegetable based dishes in Cameroon, costing around 500 FCFA 
(1.13 US$) a meal. 
The large, supple stem of the liana is sometimes used as rope and to tie bundles of 
leaves for transport. Gnetum spp. has been used in the Southwest to ease childbirth 
(Jiofack et al. 2008), to treat anaemia (Thomas et al. 1989), haemorrhoids, hangovers, 
boils and fungal infections on the fingers, as a disinfectant for wounds and an enema 
against constipation (Schippers 2004; Schippers et al. 2004). The Bulu ethnic group use 
the leaves to cure colds, increase blood production and treat spleen problems (CIFOR 
2008). In Nigeria, it is used to treat piles, high blood pressure, cholesterol, enlarged 
spleen, sore throats and as a purgative (Okafor 1983; Isong et al. 1999). Raw leaves are 
eaten as a mild laxative and to prevent constipation (Bako et al. 2002). Purgative and 
laxative effects vary with leaf age: with 6 to 12 month old leaves having a stronger laxa-
tive effect (Isong et al. 1999). Laboratory tests have shown positive effects on weight 
gain, haemoglobin and white blood cells (Iweala et al. 2009). Interviews did not cor-
roborate the extensive use reported in the literature: 10% of harvesters reported medici-
nal use and nearly 6% indicated its use to stop wounds bleeding, 5% to promote blood 
production in pregnant women and as an enema to ease child birth. The main retailers 
and traders in the major markets did not mention medicinal use as a selling point. It may 
be that traditional medicine practitioners and healers are the main buyers for medicinal 
use and were not captured by the survey. The leaves are eaten by primates, including 
endangered species such as Western and Cross River Gorillas (Gorilla g. gorilla and 
Gorilla g. diehli) (Nishihara 1995; Remis et al. 2001; Rogers et al. 2004; Doran-Sheehy 
et al. 2009).  
 
Ecoregion sources and chain locations 
Of the forty Gnetum species worldwide, only two are found in Africa, both in the 
Guineo-Congolian lowland humid forests (Chapter 4). Gnetum africanum is widely dis-
tributed across Central Africa (Schippers et al. 2004). Gnetum buchholzianum is found 
principally in Cameroon and Nigeria, extending into Gabon and the Central African Re-
public (Maheshwari et al. 1961). Blench (1994) suggests that Gnetum buchholzianum 
has been spread from its present centre of diversity in Southeast Nigeria by the eastward 
expansion of Bantu tribes. The two species are Red List classified as near threatened 
(Fraser et al. 2008; Baloch 2009). 
Both species can be found in the same location (Hutchinson et al. 1927; Chevalier 
1951), as they co-exist in the same ecological niche: the densely shaded understory of 
                                                 
2  URL: https://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=97447450602. 
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wet, primary lowland tropical and swamp gallery forests, often near slow-moving rivers 
(Clark et al. 2004). They also occur in more brightly lit and disturbed habitats such as 
understory patches of degraded primary and secondary forests, gallery forests, farm-
lands, fallows and plantations (Gockowski et al. 1999; Fondoun et al. 2000; Mathot 
2002; Clark et al. 2004;Biloso et al. 2009; Wirsiy et al. 2010; Awono et al. 2012). Gne-
tum buchholzianum has been found in savannah forest areas in CAR (Nguimalet et al. 
2008). Outside lowland rainforest, the vines originate as re-sprouts from deep-rooted, 
underground tubers, appearing to survive primary forest clearing (Clark et al. 2004). In 
the study area, harvesters reported that Gnetum spp. prefer shady sites with acid to neu-
tral, sandy and well-drained soils but will tolerate infertile and shallow soils and 
swampy areas. Gnetum buchholzianum was found mainly in primary forest, predomi-
nantly in Ndian and Korup divisions and Gnetum africanum more frequently in second-
ary forests, including fallows and oil palm plantations, mostly in Meme and Manyu di-
visions.  
Shown in Figure 7.1, major Gnetum production areas in Cameroon include the Cen-
tre Region in Lekié and Nyong et Kéllé districts around Sa’a, Esekea, Obala, Evodoula, 
Batchenga and Monatélé; Haut Nyong in the Littoral region; around Lomie in East re-
gion (Awono et al. 2002; Kanmegne et al. 2007; Clause 2010) and the Southwest region 
(Malleson 2001; Clark et al. 2004; Ingram et al. 2012e). Over a decade ago the majority 
sold was sourced from the Centre and Littoral regions (Clark et al. 1998). Interviews, 
traders and informants indicated that around Lekié and Nyong et Kéllé the production 
zones have extended considerably with a radius of around 160 km to Mbam en Kim, 
Mefou et Afamba, Nyong et Mfoumou and Haute Sanaga divisions in the last five years 
and that in the East the zone is expanding. 
From these production areas, Gnetum is sold in all market types (see Chapter 3): 
Type I (small local), Type II (medium-sized, domestic) and type III (urban) markets 
across the lowland forest zone and up to Ngoundéré in Adamaoua and Bertoua in the 
East. The largest markets are in the cities of Douala and Yaoundé, selling Gnetum for at 
least the last fifteen years (Ndoye et al. 1997/1998; Shiembo 1999). Two Type IV mar-
kets (export hubs) have operated since at least the mid-1990s: the largest is Idenau port 
in the Southwest from which Gnetum travels by boat to Nigeria. A smaller volume route 
from the Centre and East regions is by road via Ambamto in the South region to the 
border towns of Kye-Ossi and Abang-Minko’o to Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Con-
go-Brazzaville (SNV et al. 2010). A third regional channel is by head-load along the 
porous border between the Southwest and Northwest regions to Nigeria, a route existing 
since at least the late 1980s (AEERD 1993; Fuashi 1997; Malleson 2001; Clark et al. 
2004). A fourth channel is the small but increasing trade by vehicle along the improving 
road network in the Southwest from Kumba to Mamfe via Eyumojok to the border 
towns of Ekok and Ekang. A fifth export route is to European markets, mainly to speci-
ality African supermarkets in France and Belgium since at least the 1980s (Tabuna 
1998) and to the USA.  
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Figure 7.1 Map of Gnetum spp. value chain study area in Cameroon and Nigeria 
 
The channels for Gnetum from Littoral and the Southwest are shown in Figure 7.2. 
The main circuit from the harvest areas of Bachuo-Akagbe, Kembong, Eyomojock, 
Etoko, Ekenge and Ekombe, and Souza in the Southwest and Mbanga in Littoral, flows 
via two routes to local, rural, small volume (Type I) markets in Wone, Nguti, Manyem-
en, Mundemba, Mbonge and Ekondo Titi. The main Type II markets are close to the 
two largest towns in the Southwest. Higher volumes flow to the medium-sized, urban 
markets of Fiango in Kumba, Mutengene, Soppo in Buea, Tiko and Limbe (Type III). 
Kumba is a distribution point for sellers from Mungo, Manyu, Kupe Muanengouba and 
Ndian and onto the Northwest, West and Littoral regions. Gnetum from the Southwest 
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and Littoral does not supply the five markets in Douala and Yaoundé, which rely on the 
Centre and East regions, confirming other studies (Ndoye et al. 1997/1998; Bell 2004; 
Makoumsong 2004; Kanmegne et al. 2007).The export circuit extends to three Type IV 
Nigerian markets: the beachside Oron market in Akwa Ibom state is the main wholesale 
depot for buyers from other states, trading in only Gnetum from the incoming boats eve-
ry Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday night to the next morning. It is then retailed in at 
least ten other Nigerian (Type III and II) markets (in order of size): Port Harcourt, Aba, 
Oyo, Oweri, Iket, Ikot Epene, Calabar, Onitcha, Omuahi, Lagos, Ogoja, Abuja and Ka-
duna. Kaduna, in the far north, was reported as the limit of the trade. Calabar in Cross 
River state, Watt market and Calabar market (also known as Symmetry or Beach Mar-
ket) are the two other type IV markets. Watt is a large daily market with a dedicated eru 
wholesale section and retail sales. Ikom is a daily market River State. 
The current value chain, channels and types of actors mapped out in Figure 7.2, has 
changed little since the 1990s (Ndoye et al. 1997/1998; Besong et al. 2001). However 
the volumes and consumers in urban areas have grown considerably. Increasing urban 
populations, improved access to market information through mobile phones and speedi-
er, larger, more reliable boats has allowed greater volumes to be sent faster to cities, es-
pecially those in Nigeria. The trend appears uninterrupted by the introduction of permits 
from 2006 onwards. Internet sales and gradually improved transport links with Yaoundé 
and Douala have also improved access to Type III markets and aided exports to the 
USA and Europe.  
 
Figure 7.2 Gnetum value chain from the Southwest and Littoral regions 
Source: Research results  
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Gnetum chain actors  
This section introduces the main actors in the chain. Table 7.1 shows that an estimated 
2,951 people are active in the chain from the study area. Although the total number of 
actors involved in the chain is significant, this is approximately 0.2% of the total popu-
lation in the Southwest and a much lower proportion in Littoral and the states in Nige-
ria.  
 
Table 7.1 Population statistics of Gnetum chain study area 
Country Region/State Division Capital 
Surface 
area km2 Population
1
Popln. 
density 
km² 
No value chain 
actors3 % total popln. Harvester sOthers4 
Cameroon 
Southwest -Total Buea 24,571 1,316,079 34 670 1,644 0.20 
Fako Buea 2,093 466,412 222 - 1,094  
Meme Kumba 3,105 326,734 105 - 408 0.20 
Ndian Mundemba 6,626 122,579 19 35 1 0.14 
Kupe Muanengou-
ba 
Bangem 3,404 105,579 31 39 14 0.00 
Manyu Mamfe 9,565 181 039 19 596 127 0.01 
Littoral – Total Douala 20,239 2,510,2631 109 344 - 0.07 
Mungo Nkongsamba 3,723 379,241 102 344 - 0.00 
Nigeria Cross River Calabar 20,156 2,892,988 188 - 186 0.00 Akwa Ibom Uyo 7,081 3,920,051 876 - 107 0.01 
Total      1,014 1,937  
Sources: 1 Population totals for entire region. For Cameroon, population estimates for 2005 based on 1987 Census 
(National Institute of Statistics 2010); for Nigeria 2005 census (Federal Republic of Nigeria,2006). 3 Based on re-
search results. 4 Traders, retailers, processors, exporter, importers and nursery staff. 
 
The direct actors in the chain are categorised as harvesters, processors, labourers, ex-
porters, importers, traders, retailers, restaurants and consumers. Indirect actors include 
regulatory authorities, support actors such as development and conservation NGOs and 
research organisations. 
  
  Source: research results 
 
Figure 7.3 Length of time harvesting Gnetum by region  
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In the 22 villages studied, at least 1,014 harvesters gather Gnetum leaves. On average 
3,466 kg were collected annually (Southwest 3,310 kg, SD 2.4; Littoral 3,662 kg, SD 
0.9). Incomes and profits are specified in the section on governance and livelihoods. A 
typical harvester is female (79% of harvesters), middle-aged (35 years), married (64%) 
with primary school education and a household of five. Most are not active further in 
the chain, stating a lack of transport, high costs, long distances and unwillingness to 
leave farm and family. On average harvesters had been collecting for 10 years (SD 8), 
with nearly 40% starting collecting five years or less ago, and the longest 40 years ago. 
Figure 7.3 shows the regional variations, with longer experience in the Southwest. This 
confirms the history of use and trade indicated in literature. 
An estimated 221 traders, known as middlemen (although most of them are female), 
intermediaries or buy’am-sell’ams, buy, store and transport Gnetum to markets. They 
travel from 50 to 100 km over largely poor, unpaved roads to buy directly from individ-
uals or village buy’am-sell’ams. Some Nigerian traders reportedly recruit Nigerian men 
to harvest. Of the traders, 40% supply directly to retailers, exporters, importers or other 
agents, a third favouring specific retailers or purchasing upon command and 60% sup-
plying wholesalers. Payment mechanisms are buyer-seller i.e. credit or cash upon direct 
delivery using informal non-contractual arrangements, based on trust and often ethnic 
ties. Approximately 141 traders, mainly Cameroonian, are commissioned by Nigerian 
unions, buying and transporting to border markets or into Nigeria. Known as managers, 
they organise teams of young men to water or dry and pack the leaves. Around 55 trad-
ers and 28 exporters work in Idenau. The Union of Eru Workers has about 100 mem-
bers, with sub-unions for activities such as tying and watering. In Nigeria, dealers were 
all members of market-based unions, the Associations of Afang Dealers (ASOFAD) in 
Oron, Ikom and Calabar, recognised by the Ministry of Agriculture. The associations 
control trade by permitting only members to trade, providing equal access to the market 
for all members by using a quota system to control presence on market days, and 
providing credit.  
At least 542 retailers in the Southwest markets (Soppo and Muea markets in Buea, 
main and Bota markets in Limbe, Ekondo Titi, Tiko, Mutengene; and Main, Railway 
and Fiango markets in Kumba), buy leaves in kilo bundles for on average 827 FCFA 
(1.87 US$) (SD 335 FCFA, 0.67 US$). There are an estimated 45 eru retailers in 
Manyem Nguti, Wone and Mamfe markets. Gnetum is sold on average at 1,357 
FCFA/kg (3.07 US$) to households and restaurants, generally at a significant profit, 
shown in Table 7.3. The majority (85%) of retailers process and sell sliced leaves and 
15% sell both fresh whole and sliced leaves. Despite 91% of traders storing Gnetum 
specially, on average 13% of stock perishes annually. Retailers were all women, largely 
local, married with children, in their mid-thirties, educated to secondary school level, 
with on average a household of six people. They tend to specialise in Gnetum although 
31% trade in other mainly agricultural products, on average 3.5 (SD 1.3). A substantial 
proportion (42%) of retailers in Tiko, Fiango and Mutengene markets have been mem-
bers of unions for between 2 to 10 years, on average 4 years. Unions provide credit, so-
cial support and help in settling conflicts. The majority (77%) do not belong to other 
organisations, although 23% belong to other trading associations. No unions exist in 
Limbe and Muea. Over 70% of trader’s eru-based income is used for basic needs, with 
food, education, clothing and healthcare rated the most important. The 152 retailers in-
terviewed in the three Nigerian markets have comparable social profiles. The female 
retailers also have their own union and president.  
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Four small enterprises with about 20 staff were engaged in processing Gnetum leaves 
for immediate and long-term use. All started operating in the last five years. The Manyu 
Indigenous Spice Processing Ekemco Group (MISPEG) processes and sells packaged, 
dried, Gnetum in Cameroonian cities and exports to Europe and the USA. The retail 
price is 1,000 FCFA (2.27 US$) for a 250g bag, with a profit of 150 FCFA (0.34 US$) 
per kg. Taless in Yaoundé has similar operations but buys from the Centre region. The 
Limbe Botanic Garden, the Centre for Nursery Development and Eru Propagation 
(CENDEP) – which grew from the Mount Cameroon Project (MCP), and MISPEG op-
erate plant nurseries, employing approximately 12 part-time staff.  
An estimated 330 labourers work in the chains, the majority in Idenau (150 to 250 
young men) during the thrice weekly market days. Other actors include transporters 
(taxi, canoe, boat and truck drivers); knife and cutlass sharpeners; transporters (head-
load carriers, cart pushers, motorbike, truck and boat drivers); traditional authorities ex-
ercising customary control in villages; agents from the police, gendarmes, quarantine, 
customs, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife and the Programme 
to Secure Forestry Revenues carrying out regulatory and control duties; and Councils 
collecting local market taxes. 
In the markets surveyed, 25 restaurants offered Gnetum-based dishes and employed 
an estimated 63 staff. The most common dish is eru, made with waterleaf (Talinum tri-
angulare), shrimps, smoked dried fish, cow-hide, palm oil, seasoning and served with 
water-fufu (fermented cassava). A portion sells for 50 FCFA (0.11 US$), the total meal 
costing 150 FCFA (0.34 US$). All restaurants were run by women, typically married 
with two to three children, aged 30 with primary schooling and a 6 person household. 
With an average profit of 550 FCFA SD 44 FCFA (0.48 US$, SD 0.09 US$) per kg, 
their average income is 740,087 FCFA (1,676 US$) (SD 212 FCFA, 0.43 US $). This 
pays mainly for food (35%), clothing (30%), school fees (20%) and health care (15%).  
An estimated 136 exporters transport Gnetum to border towns and ports, using inter-
mediaries or travelling themselves, using 20 ton trucks and canoes with outboard mo-
tors. All exporters incurred product losses, on average 26% of stock, despite 86% using 
different storage techniques to reduce degradation. Exporters are typically married with 
just over half women (58%), with secondary level education in their mid-thirties. Start-
ing capital was obtained from Gnetum or other trade (66%) or borrowed (33%). Around 
24 large-scale exporters sell from Idenau to Oron.  
In Nigeria, around 152 importers purchase on average 51 tons of Gnetum each annu-
ally from Cameroon, although Oron importers purchase on average 140 tons each. They 
sell to small-scale Nigerian wholesalers and retailers, who as in Cameroon, process and 
sell to consumers. The Nigerian trade is entirely conducted through unions, mirroring 
the federal state system, with officially recognised, registered associations of Gnetum 
dealers in each state.  
At least eight Cameroonian exporters offer fresh and dried Gnetum through internet 
trading sites such as Alibaba and Weiku. Exporters also sell dried and fresh Gnetum to 
retailers in European cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Brussels, London, Paris, Lyon, 
Marseille, Toulouse, Bordeaux and Montpellier), Canada and the USA. In Brussels and 
Rotterdam 11 importers annually import around 24 tons of mainly fresh Gnetum, valued 
at 170,172 US$ annually. These findings echo the quantities, locations and customers 
identified over a decade ago (Tabuna 1998). The majority of fresh Gnetum continues to 
originate from Cameroon, although importers could not specify the region of origin. 
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The consumers are individuals and restaurants of Cameroonian and Congolese origin in 
Brussels and Cameroonian, Nigerian and Congolese in the Netherlands.  
 
Gnetum chain activities 
Harvesting Gnetum leaves is largely women’s activity, viewed in the cultural context 
where cooking, farming and marketing staple foods is a female task. Although available 
year round, collection is mainly in the dry season – the low season for agricultural work 
– and festive periods. A harvester typically ranges on average 5 km for on average 2.2 
hours collecting, on average twice a week. Some take their children. School children 
and students also harvest during the holiday periods. Men and whole villages may be 
active if large orders are placed by middlemen. The equipment used in harvesting and 
processing are not specialised, being commonly available household machetes and 
knives, costing on average 1,000 FCFA annually and last one to two years. These low 
costs do not present a significant entry barrier for harvesting. 
Harvesters target easy-to-reach plants, particularly larger vines with larger or tender 
leaves. Of the five methods noted, the most common (reported by 44% of harvesters) 
was to fell the trees on which the eru vine climbs to harvest the entire vine. The second 
most popular method (43%) was to pluck the leaves and stems, leaving part of the vine 
to regenerate and using young stems to tie the leaves into bundles. Fewer than 13% 
climb the support trees to harvest parts of the vine, less than 1% uproots the entire vine 
and less than 1% plucks only the leaves, leaving the main stem and using small parts to 
tie bundles of leaves weighing approximately one kilo. These methods reflect common 
practices in the Southwest (E. Wirsiy pers. comm. 2011; Shiembo 1999) and other areas 
of Cameroon (Bell 2004; Lahjou 2008). On average 44 kg (SD 22 kg) was transported 
on each trip by women in traditional rattan rucksacks or men head-portering in sacks of 
80 to 100 kg, to their village or forest-edge point of sale. The leaves are either used di-
rectly by households or packed into trucks or taxis for transport to market.  
Annually an average of 2,344 tons was harvested in the 22 surveyed villages from 
2007 to 2009. The total quantity however decreased annually by 42% over the three 
year period studied. Regional differences are apparent, shown in Figure 7.4, with the 
rate of decrease slightly higher in the Southwest (14% and 46%) than in Littoral (7% 
and 38%). Variations in production between villages, shown in Table 7.2, are attributed 
to the number and density of harvesters, abundance of Gnetum and other NTFPs, alter-
native income-generating possibilities and distances to market. Average production per 
harvester varies by region, with Southwest harvesters collecting slightly less (3,310 kg 
annually) than in the Littoral (3,662 kg) over the period. The majority (86%) of Gnetum 
harvested in the villages was sold: 80% to traders from outside the village and 20% to 
neighbours. A small proportion was consumed (11% on average, with a higher rate of 
16% in the Southwest and 5% in Littoral), 4% was given as gifts or exchanged and 5% 
perished.  
Gnetum is perishable, deteriorating within four to six days: if too moist, it rots and if 
too dry, it shrinks and desiccates, both conditions being unsellable. Young, tender 
leaves were reported by traders and transporters as being of lower quality, rotting and 
drying out more rapidly. To prevent losses on route to the market, the leaves are sprin-
kled with water or spread out to dry, depending on their state. Leaves are sold fresh and 
whole in sizes ranging from a bundle to 100 to 150 kg sack. The activities are per-
formed mainly by young men with descriptive titles such as ‘tiers’, ‘loaders’, ‘off-
loaders’, ‘counters’ and ‘waterers’. The leaves are processed by retailers at the point of 
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sale in markets by slicing finely with a knife. The sliced leaves are sold in units of small 
heaps or plastic bags of on average 250 g. Processing by small enterprises involves slic-
ing, drying in ovens followed by packaging in sealed plastic bags.  
 
 
Table 7.2 Annual Gnetum harvest per village 2007 to 2009 
Region Village Estimated 
number of 
harvesters 
Village production (tons) Harvester annual 
average (kg) 
2007-2009 
  2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 Annual average 
2007-2009 
So
ut
hw
es
t 
 
Kembong    70    200 196  113   170 2,425 
Obonyi 1 68 5 -   - 2 24 
Assam 24  10 -   - 3 138 
Nyang 117  30 -   -  10 10,000 
Mukonyong 75  15 -   - 5 5,000 
Eyomojock    40    262 233  288   181 6,527 
Nchang    42    122   97 59  79 2,200 
Okoyong    25   34   29 12  22 1,003 
Bache    30   87   91 41  64 2,430 
Takpe    20   72   62  101  56 3,923 
Bachuo-akagbe    45    504 457  168   339 8,368 
Etoko    40    326 240 88   199 5,455 
Ekenge    25   56   44 30  37 1,737 
Mungo Ndor    14  1  1  -  - 33 
Ekombe Liongo    20   67   51 36  43 2,576 
Ekombe Mofako    15   22   14 14  14 1,120 
Total  670 1,813  1,516 952 1,224 52,958 
 L
itt
or
al
 
Souza 200 672 568 514 499 2,924 
Mbonjo II    30   90 221 88  118 3,080 
Bonamateke    18   92   55 43  56 3,533 
Nkapa Camp    30    104   88 82  78 3,043 
Mbanga    50    200 180  105   156 3,703 
Mojuka    16    297 244 69   213 5,450 
Total   344   1,456 1,357   902 1,120 21,734 
Total 1,014  3,269 2,873 1,853 2,344 74,692 
Source: Research results 
 
 
Figure 7.4 Average harvest production in kg per region from 2007 to 2009 
Source: Research results 
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Gnetum markets and values 
Shown in Table 7.3 the volume of Gnetum sourced mainly from the Southwest and Lit-
toral and traded in the five Southwest type II and III markets, averaged 528 (SD 138) 
tons a year. The largest market is the export market of Idenau. The annual average mar-
ket value of Gnetum from the study areas is estimated at 1,678,015,333 FCFA 
(3,653,457 US$) in the period 2007 to 2009. The market has grown considerably since 
1996, when it was valued at 23,334,000 FCFA (46,668 US$) (Ruiz-Pérez et al. 1999). 
Around 81% of the total Gnetum traded in the Southwest and Littoral from 2007 to 
2009 was exported to Nigeria. The majority (83%) was sold through Oron market. The 
proportion of Gnetum from the Southwest and Littoral regions traded in Idenau de-
creased in the last two decades. Reports corroborate the declining harvests and harvest-
ing in increasingly remoter areas in late 1990s, due to increasing scarcity in the South-
west (Awono et al. 2002). An analysis of the CIFOR NTFP databases confirms the im-
portance of Idenau for export to Nigeria. In the period 1997 to 2004, 90% of volume of 
trade in Gnetum in Cameroon’s humid forest zone was conducted in Idenau, followed 
by 4% in Ekondo Titi, 3% in New Bell market in Douala, and less than 1% each in 
Limbe, Mfoundi market in Yaoundé, Abong Mbang on the Gabon border and Sa’a in 
the main Centre production zone. On average 220, 76 and 294 tons were exported annu-
ally through the border town of Ekok to Ikom and small ports of Bota Wharf near Lim-
be to Calabar and Ekondo Titi to Ikang respectively from 2007 to 2009. Anecdotal re-
ports that Gnetum exports have increased in the last three decades (Shiembo 1999; 
Clark et al. 2004) are supported by data shown in Table 7.4, indicating around a tenfold 
increase from 1991 to 2009.  
 
Table 7.3 Values and volumes of Gnetum in Southwest markets 2007-2009  
Annual 
average 
sales  
Market 
Muea Limbe Tiko Mutengene Fiango Idenau Total Average 
2007  kg 120,000 93,000 - 53,800 321,600     588,400  147,100 $ 415,512.97 271,585 - 157,672 321,998  1,166,768  291,692 
2008  kg 
191,500 80,900  30,800  68,700  253,400 4,290,000 4,915,300  819,217 
$ 709,273 252,705  126,446 215,362  271,384 4,594,469.46 6,169,640 1,028,273 
2009  kg 
114,600 39,500  35,400 48,700 132,700 2,639,000 3,009,900  501,650 
$   403,278 117,229  138,081 145,050  135,028     2,685,297 3,623,962 603,994 
Annual  
average 
kg    142,033   71,133 22,067 57,067 235,900    3,464,500 8,513,600 1,418,933 
$  509,355 213,840 88,176  172,695 242,803    3,639,883 3,653,457 811,125 
Source: Research results. Key: – signifies no data.  
 
 
Table 7.4 Gnetum exports 1992 to 2009 
Annual export (tons) Details Export date Source  
324 Annual average exports (3 year period) 1992-1994 Nembot 1998 
429 from Idenau 1992 AEERD 1993 
600 From Idenau 1993 Bokwe et al. 1994 
50 To Europe 1998 Tabuna 1999 
3,276 From Idenau 1999 Besong 2001 
3,741 447 tons (6 week period) from Idenau  2002 Mbolo 2002 
1,553 4,599 tons (3 year period) from Idenau 2003-2005 Asseng ze 2006 
1,078 Annual average in Idenau  1997-2004 CIFOR NTFP database 
2,964 17 to 21 tons daily, thrice a week Idenau 2007 Lingondo et al. 2008 
3,464 Annual average (2 year period) Idenau 2008-2009 Research results  
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Average prices are shown in the value chain map in Figure 7.5 and vary seasonally, 
increasing by 6% on average in the dry season. Variations are caused by demand and 
supply, with less harvested during the rainy season (including festive periods, the cocoa 
and bush mango harvest and when other vegetables are seasonally substitutable). Sup-
ply increases in the dry season when harvesting is easier and with school holidays. Pric-
es vary between markets, being on average 76% higher in Muea and 42% less in Fian-
go, due to transport costs. However, the data from the CIFOR NTFP database indicates 
that national selling price in the humid forest zone from 1997 to 2004 has been relative-
ly stable, despite increasing volumes and 3% inflation (Trading Economics 2011). 
 
 
Figure 7.5 Gnetum spp. prices and chains from Southwest and Littoral regions 
 
 
Each market has its own pricing structure. There are annual price variations of up to 
500 FCFA (1.13 US$) per kg, shown in Figure 7.6, due to variations in supply and de-
mand. There are also price variations by market type. The type II regional domestic 
markets are shown in Figure 7.5. In 2008, the same factors affecting the profits in indi-
vidual traders in each market also create price differences between markets, such as the 
number of traders, clients, quantities and costs, access costs. This results in price differ-
ences between markets of up to a buying price of 800 FCFA (1.81 US$) and a selling 
price of 1,000 FCFA (2.27 US$). The average buying price for all markets was 828 (SD 
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108) (0.24 US$, SD 1.88 US$) and the average selling price was 1,357 FCFA (SD 204 
FCFA) 0.46 US$ (3.08 US$ SD). 
 
 
Figure 7.6 Gnetum price fluctuations across markets, 2008 
 
 
Exporters in Manyu selling via Ekok to Ikom and in Meme to Ikang make lower 
profit margins per kilogram, due to higher transport costs as they often accompany 
loads due to the poor roads, longer distances and high informal ‘taxes’ paid to police, 
forestry officials, customs, council, commerce and quarantine, as none have permits: 
“There is no permit holder for eru trade here in Manyu” (Divisional Delegate MINFOF, 
pers. comm. 2009), confirmed by the 2007 to 2009 lists of Special Forestry Products 
permits. The procedure to obtain a permit is difficult and favours the large-scale export-
ers and big companies, disadvantaging small-scale exporters. Exporters from Fako ex-
porting to Calabar through Bota Wharf in Limbe incur lower transport costs as they do 
not accompany their product but use managers. Exporters at Bota Wharf legalise by 
purchasing way bills at higher than actual acquisition cost. Large-scale exporters and 
permit holders exporting via Idenau to Oron incur the lowest costs due to volumes of 
scale. No exports were made to neighbouring Equatorial Guinea or Gabon, either from 
the Southwest, Littoral or other regions (SNV et al. 2010). 
In the Nigerian markets, the average buying price per kg in 2008 was 198 FCFA and 
average selling price 418 FCFA. Due mainly to differences in transportation costs in-
volved, there are large variations of up to double the price between markets, shown in 
Figure 7.6. Larger variations in prices, for example in Ikang, were attributed by traders 
to fluctuations in demand and supply, with high levels of supply lowering prices. Ex-
porters to Ikom make the highest average profits, although this varies per exporter. Ex-
porters’ average costs include transport (23%), council and quarantine taxes (32%) and 
bribes to police and forestry services (37%). Transport costs can be up to five times 
higher for the sea route from Idenau to Calabar and Oron, around 88 km and 66 km re-
spectively, and Ikang, around 53 km. Motorised pirogues or speedboats carry smaller 
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volumes (around 1.5 to 2.5 tons) than the trucks using the Mamfe to Ikom road route, 
although these often face delays due to poor roads and corruption.  
More than 90% of Gnetum marketed in Nigeria in the study period was of Came-
roonian origin. The pockets of forest in which Gnetum is found in Nigeria (Akwa Ibom, 
Okobo, Ikot Ibassi and Ikom in Cross River state) were reportedly insufficient to meet 
consumer demand; hence there is no competition between domestic and Cameroonian 
supply. The dynamics of the Nigerian market have led to exporters having established 
networks of buyers at different depots and maintaining intensive communication to re-
spond to fluctuations in supply and demand. This dynamism affects the variability of 
the price at any point in time, with transportation costs reflected in selling prices. 
While 89% of traders reported having access to information on other markets, partic-
ularly Mutengene, Tiko and Buea, no mention was made of Nigerian markets. Traders 
generally obtained information through colleagues and 32% had experience from trad-
ing in different markets. The perceived advantages were increased sales, although a 
quarter indicated this entailed higher travel costs and paying market fees. Risk taking 
and access to market information were seen to influence profit and volume, in common 
with other agricultural and perishable product chains (Webber et al. 2009). Traders, 
NGOs (such as the Fondation Fritz Jakob (Fonjak), the Centre pour la Protection Dura-
ble de l'environnement (CEREP) and IUCN) and the media (Network of Community 
Radios of Cameroon and Radio Environment) stressed the need for more market infor-
mation during the Market Information System (MIS) pilots. In the second phase of the 
MIS focussing on the Centre, South, East and Northwest regions, Gnetum was one of 
the products about which information was most sought after. 
In conclusion, this section presented in detail why Gnetum leaves sourced from the 
humid lowland forests and of the Southwest region are valued as the most important 
cash-generating NTFP, as part of a diversified livelihood strategy, for most harvesters. 
It is also the most important NTFP for consumers due to its high nutritional and cultural 
value and for a small proportion has an additional medicinal use. The chain is suscepti-
ble to corruption, seasonal price and supply variations, and high losses due to its perish-
ability and difficult transport routes to markets. For all actors Gnetum-based incomes 
are critical to meeting basic, daily needs. For consumers, this product also has social 
value as an affordable, year-round food source providing food and nutritional security 
for numerous urban consumers in Cameroon, Nigeria and internationally, where it is a 
cultural comfort food. The Gnetum chains studied have a market value of over 3 million 
US$, and Gnetum is one of the largest volume and value NTFPs sold in Cameroon with 
fast growing regional and international exports. Although the study area is a production 
zone, it is no longer the most important harvest area, but has developed in the last forty 
of so years to be the main land and sea route to Nigerian markets. For a chain so im-
portant and a species near threatened as Gnetum the governance arrangements in place 
are weak, fragmented and poorly coordinated as will be seen in the next section. 
Governance of the Gnetum value chain 
To answer the third research question, this section presents and analyses the governance 
arrangements and trends in the Gnetum chain. This trade is regulated on paper, although 
practice is often far removed from the intention of the law. Although the NTFP sector 
and the small business context in which it is played out is notable for its regulatory and 
policy void, governance arrangements are present in the form of customary regulations 
 157 
 
which have some, albeit weak, influence on the chain and livelihoods, in contrast to the 
significant impact of market-based arrangements. 
 
Statutory regulations in theory and practice  
In 1995 Gnetum africanum was declared as an endangered species in Cameroon due to 
declining quantities and a ban was considered (but never implemented) in 1999 
(Fondoun et al. 2000). Since 2005 eru has been listed (literally) as a Special Forestry 
Product (SFP) for which annual quotas are set and permits for transportation are needed 
(see Chapter 6 and Table 7.5). The majority (85%) of permits over the period were for 
either all regions or did not specify a region, making monitoring difficult. Over the pe-
riod, 57 organisations requested permits, 10% of which have requested in more than one 
year. No Gnetum spp. population surveys were reported to have ever taken place, as re-
quired by the 1994 forestry law. Since 2005, 82% of the requested quantities of Gnetum 
were granted. Instead permits are allocated on a demand basis, rather than supply, pri-
marily to larger enterprises who often re-sell the waybills. The allocation process was 
reported as arbitrary and dogged by corruption, a fact noted by other studies (Ndoye et 
al. 2010). Gnetum is one of the most popular SFPs, accounting for half of all SFP per-
mits. Interviews also confirmed the widespread lack of permits. Comparing individual 
company permits with waybills reveals that two companies over-exceeded their permits 
in 2007 and 2008 and by four in 2009. Traders indicated that even when possessing a 
permit, corruption is common, amounting on average 25% of trader and exporter’s 
costs. Corruption costs have increased since the early 1990s, when bribery accounted 
for between 5 to 15% of transport and cross-border costs (AEERD 1993). Bribery leads 
to delays which can be ill afforded given Gnetum’s perishable nature. These reports 
contradict a 2007 independent newspaper report (Nkwain et al. 2007), stating that the 
eru trade in Idenau is legal and regulated, with official interactions between Unions, 
customs, MINFOF and immigration authorities. Despite the open and well-known in-
ternational trade, Gnetum is not listed in the government’s COMCAM database of ex-
ported forest products. Although data is patchy and inconsistent over time, Table 7.5 
shows that the estimated total quantity traded from Cameroon regularly exceeded per- 
 
Table 7.5 SFP quotas, production and trade in Gnetum spp. in tons 1992 to 2010  
Year 1992 to 
19941, 2 
19983 1997 to
20041, 4
20055 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average
SFP permits6    2,035 6,800 7,195 1,700 3,925 2,300 3,993 
Southwest & Litto-
ral production7  
     3,269 2,873 1,853  2,665 
Traded in South-
west markets 
  108   588 625 370  528 
Traded in East, 
Centre & Littoral 
markets 
  5        
Exports Idenau to 
Nigeria 
973  1,078 1,553  2,964 4,290 2,639  2,250 
Exports to Europe  50      24  37 
Total quantity pro-
duced & traded 
973 50 1,190 1,553  6,821 7,788 4,886  5,479 
2 Sources: Nembot 1998 3 Tabuna 1999 4 CIFOR NTFP database 5 Asseng Ze 2006 6 MINFOF annual Special Forest-
ry Product quotas from 2005 to 2010 7 Research results production from villages in study area. Blank areas indicate 
no data available. Key: 1 Annual average 
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mitted quantities except in 2007, when, for reasons unknown, a record number of 27 
enterprises were granted permits.  
Given that 79% of Gnetum harvested in the study area is sold and sourced from na-
tional domain forests (see Chapter 6 and following section on Sustainability), all pro-
duction that is not permitted is illegal. This problem is not restricted to Gnetum, but is a 
major flaw of the regulatory system and its application (Assembe-Mvondo 2009; Alden 
Wily 2011).The permits are also granted to traders, rather than actual harvesters, who 
harvest in a grey area of the law: as customary user rights allow harvesting but not sell-
ing. Most harvesters reported being unaware of their user rights under the 1994 Forest 
Law or that the forest belongs to the state. The majority reported believing that forests 
belong to them and can be freely exploited for commercial use. The regulatory system 
thus works contrary to its objectives, inadequately monitoring and controlling trade, in-
efficiently collecting government revenues and allowing ample opportunities for corrup-
tion. The difficult, non-transparent and inefficient permit and waybill system does not 
protect a species deemed to be near threatened. Combined with the current lack of 
knowledge about the abundance and quantity of Gnetum across Cameroon and lack of 
control at major markets and border crossings, sustainable governance is difficult, if not 
impossible under current formal governance arrangements. Despite proposals for regu-
latory and institutional reform since 2008 (Ebamane 2008) and specifically for Gnetum 
including inventory and mapping of past and current production areas and a revision of 
the demand-based permit system (Ndoye et al. 2010), changes have not occurred. Given 
the current lack of enforcement and low government presence in the study area – situa-
tions typical of remote and upland tropical forests which prove difficult to centrally 
govern (Scott 2009; Colfer et al. 2011) – any revision to the law is foreseen to have lit-
tle impact on current illegal and unsustainable practices. Better control of the quantity of 
Gnetum harvested in practice is possible only if significant political and administrative 
changes occur.  
 
Dollops of dash 
Corruption is prevalent in the chain, not all along but focussing on low-hanging fruits of 
statutory permitting procedures controlling access to the resource and access to markets 
during transport and especially to export markets, indicated by bribes comprising 37% 
of exporter’s costs. The lack of statutory regulation of this high value trade and the 
small number of channels through which it flows – particularly the large volume chan-
nelled through Idenau port, presents an easy to capture opportunity for corrupt officials 
and creates a perfect hotbed for corruption. This then further exacerbates regulatory 
failures. Corruption also aggravates the difficulties small-scale traders have in operating 
legally, promoting rather informality and illegality as the (slightly) easier business oper-
ating environment. State officials (MINFOF officers, police, customs agents and army) 
at decentralised level have no legitimacy to promote reforms and little incentive, given 
the personal revenues that can be gained from bribes that are an everyday part of the 
trade. Corruption thus becomes an insidious, predictable but incalculable governance 
arrangement. This is why alternative, but risky routes through the porous, land-based 
border through the forest to Nigeria have remained in use for decades. Corruption, 
whilst adding to costs and often creating delays, is viewed as a necessary cost to ensure 
that the fastest and lower risk sea route works. The Gnetum chain mirrors other high 
value, high volume forest products in Cameroon, such as illegal artisanally chainsawn 
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logs, which have high levels of corruption and well-established domestic and regional 
markets (Blackman et al. 2010). 
 
Customary regulations 
Customary land tenure varies across communities in the study area. In general tradition-
al authorities are custodians of forested lands outside family forests and farm areas and 
are responsible for forest management. In the study area, only men have the right to in-
herit land property, with women given land when they marry. Women in most commu-
nities interviewed indicated they had free access to village and family forest, and family 
farmlands and are free to harvest from and cultivate NTFPs on their husband’s lands. 
But if the men (husbands of those married and in-laws of those who are widows) want 
to create cocoa farms and plantations on the land, women do not have a say.  
Harvester’s access rights to Gnetum were generally open access (88%). This differs 
per region, as no harvesters in the Littoral region indicated there were areas to which 
access was restricted, whereas 25% in the Southwest indicated that there were areas to 
which access for harvesting is restricted. Tenure largely determines why access is re-
stricted, as access was restricted or not permitted in community forests, in traditional 
village forests, in privately owned areas, protected areas and national parks. Rights to 
Gnetum were asserted by 13% of harvesters, by land owners, community forests and 
village councils. This is mainly in the form of payments for harvesting by outsiders and 
‘foreigners’. Most respondents (89% in the Southwest and 96% in Littoral) indicated 
that they do not have to pay for entering the forest or for harvesting. Payment, if re-
quired, is made to a village traditional council (in the Southwest) or the forest owner (in 
the Littoral). In some villages around Takamanda, women pay a token fee to the council 
before harvesting Gnetum spp. for sale. For most ‘outsiders’ (i.e. non-residents), the tra-
ditional authority authorises harvesting for a negotiated fee. In some villages, the cost 
was 2,000 FCFA (4.53 US$) per week paid to the traditional authority and with the 
buyer obliged to buy all the eru harvested by villagers that week. In other areas, buyers 
may operate freely in village forests for a specified time period upon paying a fee of 
2,000 to 3,000 FCFA (4.53 to 6.80 US$) per month up to 20,000 FCFA (45.31 US$) to 
traditional village councils for usually an unlimited quantity of Gnetum. These ‘elite’ 
decisions were sometimes criticised by community members who do not benefit from 
these revenues. This critique was also reported by Mhadaili et al. (2002). Traders and 
exporters in Manyu division must register with the village traditional council to obtain 
supplies. At Kesham in Akwaya, traders pay a yearly fee of 10,000 FCFA (22.65 US$) 
without any ‘commission’. In other villages, traders pay 2,000 to 5,000 FCFA (4.53 to 
11.33 US$) per week for ‘booking’ plus a ‘commission’ of 10 FCFA (0.02 US$) per 
bundle and foreigners (Nigerians) pay 10,000 to 20,000 FCFA (22.65 to 45.30 US$) to 
enter village forests and harvest eru for defined periods. This fee is paid to village tradi-
tional councils and is used for village development, although some villagers suggested 
that it was not always used for this purpose. 
All respondents in the Littoral region indicated that there had been changes in forest 
access. One third indicated that local communities had not previously been aware of the 
economic importance of eru and their forests, but now that they are aware, those who 
are not members the community no longer have free access. Payments were therefore 
demanded from the ‘forest owner’. The majority (70%) indicated that forested land is 
now being bought and owned by individuals, who prohibit free access. In the Southwest 
18% of respondents indicated that there had been access changes. One third of these 
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changes related to the upgrading of protected areas and the fact that harvest from the 
National Parks in Takamanda (since 2008) and Mt Cameroon (since 2010) were prohib-
ited (see section on Project governance arrangements in Chapter 6). However, in Taka-
manda harvesting continued to take place. Two thirds of respondents who noted access 
changes indicated that with the increase in the knowledge of the value of eru, communi-
ties now restricted harvest from their own forests. Access is also gendered. The women 
of the Abos ethnic group in Mungo division of the Littoral region do not go to the forest 
to harvest eru, despite the potential and its presence in this region. During the focus 
group interviews, female producers in Mungo division indicated that they had no own-
ership rights. All the harvesters in this region were ‘foreigners’: either Nigerians or 
from the Northwest region.  
In the Southwest, privately owned and planted Gnetum was reported as vulnerable to 
theft, as it is still perceived as a wild, open access NTFP. This indicates how customary 
tenure and access rules have not adapted with the transition of Gnetum from a wild to a 
cultivated product. However, villages working with CENDEP in the Southwest reported 
that using customary rules and institutions, enhanced collective action and domestica-
tion offered a pragmatic solution to control harvesting. Combined with local quotas, 
sustainable harvest methods and ‘no-go’ or regeneration areas, these could form a multi-
pronged approach to manage Gnetum more sustainably. These findings indicate that if 
land tenure is defined and producers ‘own’ or manage land, harvesting tends to be con-
trolled. The general lack of control and ownership over lands may be a reason for the 
lack of domestication. Whilst limiting access, customary rules do not control harvest 
methods or techniques. Local traditional regulation however neither fills the voids in the 
formal system nor ensures sustainable extraction, but is an important factor influencing 
livelihoods, mainly the income derived from trade in Gnetum. 
 
Market-based governance 
Most of the eru marketed in Cameroon is traded informally, by unregistered, individual 
entrepreneurs. Although harvesters generally do not use collective action, traders do, 
with unions covering around 40% of the traders working in the markets of Tiko, Fiango 
in Kumba, Mutengene and Bota Wharf in Limbe. The unions do not bar entry to new 
traders but support traders and provide credit. In contrast, the Eru Workers Union in 
Idenau has a powerful control of the trade. It accounts for a high percentage of employ-
ment in the small town and is open to everyone of working age, in possession of a Na-
tional Identity Card and who has resided in Idenau for at least six months. Both manag-
ers and traders are members, and the majority of support workers, who are paid accord-
ing to their tasks (offloading lorries, filling bags, counting bundles and loading them 
into speedboats). The union controls the market and maintains income security by keep-
ing prices and profits high. For instance, setting quotas for quantities traded within de-
fined periods, restricting the number of traders operating at a given time, placing re-
strictions on who buys or sells, harmonising prices through the commissioned middle-
men in Idenau and Nigerian markets, setting high registration fees to limit the number 
of traders and regulating purchases by credit (zero or part payment) systems. The result 
is that excess supplies are frequent occurrences at Ikom, although not in Ekok, where 
traders are not unionised and supplies are not regulated. The trader unions aim to coun-
ter Nigerian union strength and vagaries and the frequent surpluses and losses, con-
firmed by other studies (Lingondo et al. 2006). Communication technology has aided 
merchants in Nigeria and Cameroon: over the last five years they have increasingly 
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been conducting transactions more easily by telephone and email. Over 40% of retailers 
in four of the Cameroon markets and all retailers in Nigeria were union members. 
Whilst the unions in Cameroon do not control trade, they provide a supportive enabling 
environment. In Nigeria, trader unions in the markets fulfil a similar empowering func-
tion for members and regulate trade, punish thieves, provide security guards, regulate 
who trades on which days, provide financial security by backing all transactions – even 
when losses are incurred – and resolve conflicts. Unions are voluntary in name but ob-
ligatory if traders wish to trade in the markets. The Nigerian unions affect the prices 
paid to Cameroonian importers. The retailer unions in Cameroonian markets exhibit 
similar, but far less extensive, power. 
There are no dominant enterprises setting parameters and exercising power and con-
trol along the chain. However, the activities of various groups of actors, although not 
premeditated, coincide to affect prices and the level and distribution of profit among 
actors in the chain. Current configurations of the chains mean that the intermediaries, 
particularly buy’am-sell’ams and wholesalers, are some of the most powerful actors in 
the chains. Their power is derived from their knowledge of demand and supply, alt-
hough this is incomplete, with information on long-term supply lacking. Supply is on-
command, limited more by the number of harvesters and their physical capacity to har-
vest than by demand. In the short term prices (and thus incomes) are affected by season-
al agricultural activities which divert attention from harvesting Gnetum. At transporter 
and intermediary level, power is in the hands of corrupt officials and transport compa-
nies, costing time and losses. Harvesters experience occasional conflicts over access to 
resources, but these are minor. Conflict has a minor influence on relationships in the 
chain, compared to other high value products (Tsing 2005; Exenberger et al. 2010). As 
Gnetum remains an open access common pool resource, power is fairly evenly spread 
among harvesters. However, access has become restricted as customary resource owners 
exert control as its high economic value is associated with increasing demand and scar-
city. This is illustrated in some villages near the Cameroon-Nigeria border. A know-
ledge-power relationship can be seen among harvesters, where those with better know-
ledge of the location of Gnetum can harvest greater quantities and thus benefit economi-
cally. 
 
International agreements 
Whilst Gnetum species are on the IUCN Red data list, there are no international agree-
ments or conventions in force which have specific implications for the chain.  
 
Limited project influences on governance  
Projects have had limited influence on governance arrangements in the Southwest. They 
stimulated collective action by setting up plant nurseries and providing training in the 
domestication and cultivation of Gnetum, starting with the Forestry Research Project led 
by the government’s Institute of Agricultural Research for Development (IRAD) in 
Kumba, which initiated domestication in the early 1980s, followed by the MCP in the 
late 1990s around Limbe and Mt Cameroon (Tekwe et al. 2003) and most recently by 
CENDEP since 2000 in about sixteen villages around Korup and Limbe. A result of 
these activities has been to stimulate collective control of access to markets through in-
creasing processing and sales, but these groups produce only a tiny percentage of total 
regional production which is not visible in the market. The main impact of these pro-
jects has been to send signals about the decreasing resource, livelihood value and possi-
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bilities of cultivation. These appear to be very gradually accumulating into sufficient 
political capital to influence behavioural and policy changes. For example, the work of 
the MCP resulted in the first regulations concerning Gnetum in the 1990s.  It also stimu-
lated the creation of NGOs such as CENDEP and ADIE (Association for the Develop-
ment of Environmental Initiatives) in Lekié, Centre region, on which development and 
research actors such as the FAO, ICRAF and CIFOR have built further3. These activi-
ties have provided a basis for recent government interest, leading to the Programme for 
the Support of Okok Domestication (PAPCO). This Ministry of Agriculture and Devel-
opment (MINADER) sponsored programme supported the establishment of 149 nurse-
ries for 76,296 plants located in 35 villages in 2010-2011 in five production areas in the 
Centre region (PAPCO 2010). Around 500,000 US$ per year has since been allocated to 
develop Gnetum cultivation across the country. These projects indicate that the Gnetum 
chain is slowly creeping into and up the forestry and agriculture agendas. This is justi-
fied, as the majority is still wild sourced, but creates a possibility for future supply from 
cultivated sources. Projects have highlighted corruption in the chain (Ndoye et al. 2010; 
Tieguhong et al. 2010) and pushed for government support and recognition. Changes to 
regulatory arrangements have however been slow and efforts to counter corruption non-
existent.  
 
An entwined bricolage 
The arrangements governing the trade of the leaves of this climbing liana are a mix of 
formal regulations, inconsistently applied and enforced, and topped with corruption; 
weak but changing customary arrangements controlling resource access – notably in the 
Southwest; collective action in the form of unions controlling access to markets, and 
some limited project arrangements attempting to introduce cultivation norms. Scored 
using the system introduced in the methodology in Chapter 3, and detailed in Appendix  
 
Figure 7.7 Governance arrangements in the Gnetum spp. chain in Cameroon 
                                                 
3  See for example http://blog.cifor.org/11455/taming-okok-domesticating-forest-foods-in-cameroon and 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/am803e/am803e00.pdf. 
 163 
 
13 the arrangements are illustrated in Figure 7.7. The prevalence of unions of traders 
and retailers highlights how these actors have crafted institutions attempting to secure 
livelihoods and increase profits by controlling supply and demand in the face of gov-
ernment vagaries and corruption. Attempts, albeit very small-scale, at cultivation and 
groupings of harvesters and farmers also represent a form of bricolage seeking to con-
trol production and the production environment. Equally, the growing tendency of tradi-
tional authorities and landlords to demand payment for harvesting represents a claiming 
of new ownership rights in realisation of the growing economic value of this product.  
Governance and livelihoods in the Gnetum chain 
This section addresses the fourth research question of how governance arrangements 
affect the livelihoods of actors along the chain, using the sustainable livelihoods ap-
proach. 
The ways in which the chains are organised and governed mean that Gnetum is an 
easy source of income for all involved in the chain. Unlike many NTFPs, it can be easi-
ly harvested and sold year round; is mainly gathered in open access forests with re-
strictions on access resulting costs due to forest tenure; it requires minimal processing 
prior to sale and is in high demand with well-developed and multiple market channels. 
This results in approximately 2,402 people benefitting directly from Gnetum-based in-
comes in the Southwest and Littoral regions of Cameroon and in Cross River and Akwa 
Ibon states in Nigeria. Taking into account the average household size of 5.9 people, 
around 14,098 people in total benefit from Gnetum-based incomes, for on average a 
decade.  
Harvesters generally profit from Gnetum, earning on average 562,798 FCFA (1,148 
US$) annually, equivalent to 1,541 FCFA (3.14 US$) per day, with an average profit of 
133 FCFA (0.30 US$) per kg The variations in selling price, profit and costs between 
individual harvesters, with profit margins of up to 57% of the selling price and also 
post-harvest losses, are explained by harvesters not including all or some costs for 
equipment, transport and labour. The major cost for harvesters is transport. In both re-
gions harvesters enter the forest on foot and 82% use a motorbike to bring the Gnetum 
to a sales point or village and 18% by car or bush taxi. Costs are lower in Manyu and 
Mungo divisions as traders generally tour villages. In Ndian and Kupe Muanengouba 
divisions, transport to Type I markets in Mbonge and Nguti is more expensive. 
Most harvesters have diverse income sources. Agriculture provides on average 44% 
and NTFPs, including hunting and fishing, contribute on average to 51% of annual 
household income. A third of harvester households also use these NTFPs for food. The 
large income variances between villages (Table 7.6) are related to preferences and 
availability of other revenue sources and distance to markets. For example, in Bachuo-
agagbe village, an NGO promoting cultivation and processing operates, and access to 
Mamfe is easy, whereas Mungo Ndor access is difficult due to its location 15 km from 
the main Mamfe-Kumba road and in remote Mukonyony post-harvest losses occurred in 
2007 due to high transport costs. The two main income sources were agriculture (93% 
of harvesters) and NTFPs (89% of harvesters). On average three (SD 2) NTFPs were 
harvested, with Gnetum rated the most important, comprising 62% of NTFP-based in-
comes. Thirteen NTFPs were also collected in the Southwest and nine in the Littoral, 
the most popular being bush mango (Irvingia spp.), njangsang (Ricinodendron heu- 
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Table 7.6 Gnetum harvesters’ annual average profit and profit per kg per village 
Region Division Village Access to market 
Harvester annual average 
profit (FCFA) 
(2007-2009) 
Average profit per 
kg (FCFA) 
(2007-2009) 
So
ut
hw
es
t 
Manyu Kembong E 495,453 181 
Eyomojock D 285,480 27 
Nchang D 360,311 164 
Okoyong E 167,110 185 
Bache E 605,748 305 
Tapkwe D 713,558 174 
Bachuo-
akagbe 
E 1,294,453 168 
Nyang D 472,200 10 
Obonyi 1 D 45,000 46 
Mukonyony E 100,000 202 
Assam D 150,000 77 
Kupe-
Muanengouba 
Ekenge E 411,897 242 
Mungo Ndor D 3,333 67 
Ndian Ekombe Li-
ongo 
E 596,800 238 
Ekombe 
Mofako 
D 256,000 233 
Average 471,862 179 
Li
tto
ra
l 
Mungo Souza E 484,225 168 
Mbonjo II D 476,480 155 
Bonamateke D 609,707 180 
Nkapa Camp E 509,933 170 
Mbanga E 447,898 122 
Mojuka D 505,000 93 
Average 505,541 148 
        Overall average 428,123 133 
Source: Research results Key: D = difficult access E = easy access.  
 
 
Table 7.7 Relationship between profit and group membership 
 Membership of group No Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Profit from Gnetum
in 2008 (FCFA)  
No 34  592,392 556,148 95,379 
Yes 5 321,024 158,529 70,896 
Profit in 2008 
FCFA 
Levene’s test 
for equality of 
variances 
Independent Sample Test  
t-test for equality of means 
F Sig. t df Sig.2-
tailed
Mean 
difference
Std. Error 
difference
 
95% confidence inter-
val of difference 
Lower Upper 
Equal variances 
Assumed 
1.48 0.23 1.0 37 0.29 271,367 252,803 -240,860 783,595 
Equal variances 
Not assumed 
  2.2 22 0.03 271,367 118,841 25,287 517,447 
Source: Research results 
 
 
delottii), bush pepper (Piper guineensis) and bush onion (Afrostyrax kamerunensis). Up 
to nineteen other minor income-generating activities were noted, such as petty trade, 
taxi driving, animal breeding, hunting and fishing. The majority (93%) of harvesters, 
whilst collecting companionably with others, sell individually. Some harvesters act as 
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‘assemblers’ or agents, buying from harvesters on behalf of wholesalers and bulking up. 
Income generated from Gnetum is used for basic needs with food, education, clothing, 
healthcare and house rental constituting over 90% of expenditures. A growing number 
of ‘foreign’ (mainly Nigerian) harvesters were reported around in border areas.  
Average profit margins earned by harvesters who are members of a group, compared 
to those working individually show no significant statistical difference, shown in Table 
7.8. Individual harvesters have higher average profits than those in groups, ascribed to 
increased costs of domesticating Gnetum and less time spent harvesting and existence of 
shared, group profits. 
A typical intermediary trader earns an annual average of 720,000 FCFA (1,469 US$) 
(SD 351,780 FCFA, 703 US$). Managers (traders commissioned by Nigerian unions) 
earn on average 1.44 million FCFA (2,880 US$) annually, with Gnetum being their 
primary income source. There is a wide variation in trader’s profits between markets 
(SD 351,780 FCFA or 718 US$). These profits are higher than the average net profit of 
221,000 FCFA (inflation indexed equivalent in 2007) of Gnetum traders recorded in 18 
markets in Cameroon from 1995 to 1996, indicating the increasing value of the trade. 
Shown in Figure 7.8, traders in Tiko and Mutengene have the highest profits. This is 
attributed to the many Nigerian buyers, high volumes, lower costs due to their scale of 
transactions and unionisation. Prices and profits are lower in non-unionised markets in 
Limbe and Muea markets. In Fiango market the increased competition arising from high 
volumes, proximity to production zones and harvesters selling directly leads to lower 
prices and profits. In Fiango exporters using Ekondo Titi Beach generate higher average 
profits than those in Manyu. They mostly do not have permits but trading is controlled 
by the Union, which specifies the maximum quantity that members can export. This 
avoids flooding the market and maintains higher prices. The lower profit made by trad-
ers at Bota Wharf was attributed to the majority (63%) of Gnetum sold there originating 
from secondary forests and plantations, which are subject to continuous disturbance 
from agricultural activities. The younger leaves rot faster and dry out more rapidly, 
lowering the price to 400-550 FCFA (0.82-1.12 US$) per kilogram bundle. 
 
Figure 7.8 Average Gnetum trader profit margin per market  
Source: Research results 
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Table 7.8 Gnetum retailer’s average profit per kg and profit per annum, Cameroon 
Year 
 
 
Profits per annum (FCFA) 
Muea 
(Buea) 
Limbe Tiko Mutengene Fiango 
(Kumba) 
Average 
profit per 
retailer 
Standard 
deviation
Market type1 II II I, IV II II 
2007 Total profit 473,791 536,222 - 1,920,000 1,072,000 1,000,503 669,221Profit per kg 395 403 1000 200 500 347
2008 Total profit 650,809 561,333 1,099,200 1,400,900 799,200 902,288 6345,510Profit per kg 340 486 1000 571 189 517 307
2009 Total profit 168,754 139,722 579,000 489,143 210,733 317,470 201,850Profit per kg 295 495 916 563 191 492 281
Average profit per kg 343 462 639 711 193 470 212
Average annual total
profit  
431,118 412,426 839,100 1,270,014 693,978 729,327 351,780
1 Using Ruíz Pérez et al.’s (2000) market typology, see Chapter 3. Source: Research results – signifies no data 
 
 
Table 7.9 Gnetum exporter’s total profits per annum 
Market 
 
Market 
type1 
Profit per annum (FCFA) 
2007 2008 2009 Annual average Std. deviation
Ikom III - 3,100,000 1,106,846 2,103,423 1,409,373Average profit per kg 149 346 247 139
Ikang III 33,360,000 10,800,000 930,000 9,358,400 16,623,655Average profit per kg 579 563 160 434 237
Calabar III 7,104,000 6,168,000 14,803,200 368 4,738,503Average profit per kg 370 367 367 247 2
Oron IV, III - 57,148,750 n/a n/aAverage profit per kg 263 118 30 212 118
Average annual profit  20,232,000 6,689,333 5,613,349 10,844,894 8,147,255
1 Using Ruiz Pérez et al.’s (2000) market typology, see Chapter 2. Source: Research results 
 
 
Exporters make annual average profits of 3,060,393 FCFA (SD 2,160,000) (6,121 
US$, (SD 4,409 US$) (Table 7.9). Female exporters earn on average 19% lower profits 
than men with 15% higher standard deviation. Gnetum was their major income source, 
contributing to 58% of average household incomes, with 28% having on average three 
other sources, largely agricultural products. Gnetum mainly is used for basic needs: 
food (22%) and children’s education (26%). On average a Nigerian importer earned just 
over FCFA 3 million profit annually (6123 US$$). Large differences in profits were 
found between markets and during the period 2007 to 2009, shown in Figure 7.9, with 
2007 being a high volume, profitable year. Nigerian wholesalers make higher profit 
margins at 425 FCFA/kg (0.87US$/kg) than their Cameroonian counterparts at 32 
FCFA/ kg (0.47 US$/kg). This can be explained by the lower level of collective action 
among Cameroonian exporters. Profit levels are also strongly affected by delays leading 
to product losses, corruption and taxes.  
Gnetum contributes on average up to 76% of annual household income of retailers. 
Although there is a wide variation between markets (Table 7.8) on average retailers earn 
729,327 FCFA (1,458 US$) (SD 351,780 FCFA, 703 US$) annually with average prof-
its of 470 FCFA (1.06 US$) (SD 212 FCFA, 0.42 US$) per kg.  
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Figure 7.9 Nigerian Gnetum importers’ average annual profit 2007 to 2009 
Source: Research results 
 
The analysis of the Gnetum spp. chain shows that the product becomes a major eco-
nomic asset to actors in the chain once traded. It provides one of, if not the, major 
source (67%) of cash for all actors in the chains. Whilst this finding is unsurprising giv-
en that the methodology focused on actors involved in these products, the contribution 
is higher than suggested by recent studies of forest products worldwide (Angelsen et al. 
2010) and in the study area (Ambrose-Oji et al. 2002; Mdaihli et al. 2002). It is notable 
that actors towards the consumer end of the chain have a higher dependence on the 
product, as it provides on average 76% of trader’s and 58% of exporter’s income, com-
pared to on average 47% of harvester’s income. This finding provides a challenge to 
traditional views of the high level dependence of forest-adjacent people (Das et al. 
2008; FAO 2008; IUCN 2008a; Rodriguez et al. 2009). Harvesters make the most use 
of forest products, as NTFPs contribute to nearly half of their household revenues. They 
typically rely on a greater number of income sources, but also have greater access (as 
farmers) to a wider range of subsistence products. However, wholesalers’, retailers’ and 
exporters’ livelihoods are more dependent on the one forest product, as they tend to 
have both a less diverse and smaller range of income-generating activities and thus a 
heavier reliance upon Gnetum. This has implications for policymakers and livelihood 
interventions, as harvesters are the greatest group numerically, comprising 38% of esti-
mated actors, followed by retailers (24%). Gnetum benefits forest-dwelling ethnic 
groups with good forest knowledge of its location.  
For harvesters, Gnetum is generally profitable, providing the equivalent of just over a 
2 US$ a day. Although incomes vary widely due to distance to markets, seasons and 
bargaining power, profits of up to 57% are possible. Whilst Gnetum income does not 
raise harvesters much above basic poverty levels, it fulfils a coping function. Gnetum is 
thus a flexible natural asset easily converted into financial capital, with an additional 
social dimension. Gnetum revenues are used primarily to meet basic needs (food, educa-
tion, clothing and healthcare), with all types of actors spending comparable proportions 
on these categories. Gnetum is also used for specific needs, with harvests timed to fi-
nance school fees, ceremonies and festive events. Harvesters gain lower profits and 
Gnetum-based incomes than other actors in the chain due to their lack of access to mar-
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ket information, reluctance or inability to travel to markets, lower negotiating power 
from selling individually, limited ability to increase production and high perishability of 
the product. Highest profits accrue to exporters, traders and retailers. In contrast to har-
vesters, for these estimated two thirds of actors in the chain, although little value is add-
ed through processing, Gnetum is often a highly profitable product, upon which they are 
highly dependent.  For traders and exporters, a proportion of income is invested in other 
activities, enabling diversification. These findings reflect the diverse strategies for 
which NTFPs are used in securing livelihoods in the Congo Basin (Nkem et al. 2010) 
and in general (Delacote 2009).  
Gnetum’s value is increased by the facts that, despite its perishability, if a buyer does 
not turn up, harvesters can consume or barter it. For a small proportion of harvesters and 
consumers, it also has medicinal value, unlike in other areas of the Congo Basin (Schip-
pers 2004, Schippers and Besong 2004) and in Asia (Orwa et al. 2009), highlighting 
undeveloped potential. Its high nutritional content, cultural significance, medicinal ben-
efits and economic worth combine to make this a valuable product. Gnetum thus pro-
vides multiple and important contributions to the livelihoods of actors involved in its 
chains, mirroring that of Gnetum spp. in Asia (Roshetko et al. 2000; Mertz 2007). 
Whilst only the leaves of the two Gnetum species are used in Cameroon and Nigeria, 
unlike the multiple parts and uses in Asia, a shared characteristic is its usage for food. 
The ecology of Gnetum spp. produces a product with nutritional value on a par or above 
many other leafy vegetables. For consumers, it is valued as a food and also has tradi-
tional cultural significance. Commodification has enabled it to become a comfort food 
for increasing numbers of migrants, urbanised populations both in-country and interna-
tionally for diaspora estranged from their culinary heritage, creating a growing demand 
outside traditional harvest areas and driving the trade.  
The social importance of Gnetum differs for men and women. Traditional gender 
roles affect land tenure of forest and farm land and dictate that it is women’s role to 
gather vegetal NTFPs, exemplified by Gnetum, for subsistence use. Female survival-
based strategies commonly focus on supplementing income sources and diversification 
(Ruíz Pérez et al. 2003). A phenomenon in Central and West Africa is that once a prod-
uct moves from subsistence to cash crop, men use a welfare maximisation strategy to 
appropriate the crop and capture economic power (Goheen 1996; Ruíz Pérez et al. 2003; 
Nlend V 2007), often specialising. In the Gnetum chain, the majority (73%) of all actors 
continue to be female, but there is a trend of more, particularly younger, men becoming 
involved in harvesting as the product’s value increases. Women still dominate in har-
vesting and retailing, echoing studies showing the economic clout of female retailers in 
the late 1990s (Ruíz Pérez et al. 2003). Gender thus continues to be the main basis for 
understanding who conducts which activities in the chain (Ruíz Pérez et al. 2003).  
Whilst the Southwest and Littoral regions are not the major production areas in terms 
of total national production, they contain the major markets and constitute an important 
source of employment, incomes and benefits. However this financial capital is not trans-
lated into political capital. The chain in Cameroon, despite collective action has little 
political clout, visibility and almost no say in food, agriculture, health, forestry or trade 
policies. Collective action is limited to actors towards the consumer end of the chain 
(transporters, traders and exporters). There is no collective action by harvesters or ar-
rangements to assure the quantity, quality or price of Gnetum. There is no organisation 
representing the interests of the chain as a whole. Although in Cameroon actors have 
created their own forms of collective action, in the form of tontines, to provide an ena-
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bling environment do business, these provide more of a safety net, rather than creating 
Gnetum-related political capital. This is in contrast to the highly organised unions in 
Nigeria which support member’s livelihoods by restricting access to the markets, con-
trolling corruption and theft, and positively influencing prices and profits.  
The chain is highly segmented with no actors integrating harvesting, processing, 
sales and export. This means that retailers, exporters and consumers are largely not in-
formed of or engaged in ensuring continued supply and largely unaware of the precari-
ousness of their livelihoods based on dwindling supplies. Most of the actors and activi-
ties in the chains are not vertically integrated. Some wholesalers also retail, and most 
retailers perform very simple processing. But no examples of the integrated chain activi-
ties were found. This means that for the lower earning harvesters, the arrangement of 
the chain presents few opportunities to add value and gain higher incomes, other than 
increasing harvesting production. The risk of actors being largely only connected to the 
next stage in the chain, but not chain wide, is that governance and securing a (sustaina-
ble) continued supply is not ensured. This is a drawback when the majority of the prod-
uct supply is wild sourced and thus unpredictable (Van der Kop et al. 2006; FairWild 
Foundation 2010). The lack of integration in value chains has been seen as a major rea-
son to the inability of actors, particularly harvesters and farmers, to add value 
(Vermeulen et al. 2008). Whilst the profits of intermediaries are the greatest, the activi-
ties of bulking and transporting these actors carry are essential to ensure this perishable 
product covers the long distances to diverse markets, dealing with corruption, difficult 
transport networks and poor infrastructure. The profit gained (and lost) by this numeri-
cally small group of actors is the economic reward for taking these high risk but essen-
tial activities. Hollier (1985) debunks the myth that these are bogey men profiteering at 
the expense of harvesters, but are essential actors in chains. 
Governance and sustainability in the Gnetum chain 
This section answers the fifth research question of how the governance arrangements 
impact on product sustainability. 
Currently the value chains are almost completely dependent upon wild sourced Gne-
tum. The majority (41%) of Gnetum is sourced from primary or secondary forest and 
from customarily village owned primary and secondary forest with free and open access 
for the community (21%). Smaller proportions are from private forests (17%), oil palm 
plantations (11%), protected areas (3%) and farmlands (6%). The species’ preferred 
habitat, primary Guinean Congolian humid forest, is still common in the study areas, as 
is secondary forest (see Chapter 4). However, landscape-scale threats arise from conver-
sion to plantations, protected areas and urbanisation, although these are currently on a 
small-scale. Additionally, regular weed clearing in plantations in Littoral and Southwest 
regions means that young eru is harvested with often insufficient time for the plant to 
mature. This practice may contribute to long-term species population decline, and, as 
young leaves degrade more quickly than older, tougher leaves, the quality is lower and 
increases losses (E. Wirsiy, CENDEP, pers. comm. 2009). However, some harvesters 
reported that the lianas regrowth rates in secondary forests, fallows and plantation were 
good, especially if only lateral stems were harvested. Recent research in the Centre re-
gion (Tieguhong et al. 2013) suggests forest degradation has led to 97% of Gnetum spp. 
being sourced from human-modified landscapes (fallows, cocoa farms and farmlands), 
which provide favourable habitats and are characterised by restricted control over ac-
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cess. None of the organisations involved in the chain are involved in conservation. As 
Gnetum spp. can thrive in secondary and agroforestry environments, changes in the 
ecoregion pose less of a threat than harvesting. Concerns were first expressed about in-
creasing demand, destructive and excessive harvesting in the 1990s (Mialoudama 1993; 
Bokwe et al. 1994). In the last decade similar observations have been made (Sunderland 
et al. 2003; Tekwe et al. 2003; Nlend V 2007; Nchinda et al. 2008; Tanda 2009; Ndoye 
et al. 2010). Although leaf harvesting is rated as of low vulnerability (Cunningham 
2001), the techniques used for harvesting are important given the large quantities har-
vested, the plant’s ecology and lack of any regulation or guideline for harvesting. Based 
on field observations and harvester responses, shown in Table 7.10, around 45% of the 
harvesting techniques used in the study area are judged as unsustainable, echoing 
Fondoun et al.’s (2000) findings. This suggests that harvesting techniques that take into 
account Gnetum’s initial slow growth and vulnerability are only understood by around 
half of harvesters. Whilst research is emerging on this aspect (Clause 2010; Mathot et 
al. 2011) it is not accessible to harvesters or support organisations. CENDEP’s dissemi-
nation of field experiences has been restricted by the organisations’ dependence upon 
projects, and government projects have had no discernible impact on practices in the 
study area to date. 
 
Table 7.10 Gnetum harvest technique and sustainability 
Harvest technique % harvested Assessment 
Fell the trees on which the vine climbs to harvest the entire vine 44 Unsustainable 
Uproot entire vine >1 Unsustainable 
Pluck leaves only, leave part of the stem & use part to tie bundles >1 Sustainable 
Pluck stems and leaves, leave part of vine, stem used to tie bundles 43 Sustainable 
Climb trees to harvest part of vine 13 Sustainable 
Source: Research results 
 
In the Littoral region no harvesters reported planting Gnetum. Only 16% of all har-
vesters, all in the Southwest, indicated they had planted Gnetum. Except for one woman 
farming eru since 1999, respondents indicated that vines planted since 2002 were not 
yet in production. Just over half (52%) of those cultivating Gnetum had been prompted 
by the opportunity to increase production and 47% because of a perception of increasing 
scarcity. The majority (73%) of harvesters interviewed indicated no knowledge of culti-
vation techniques. These rates correspond with data from Korup (Tanda 2009). A small 
proportion of harvesters (11%) have observed the practices from others but find it diffi-
cult and time consuming and 16% saw no need to plant since eru is (still) available in 
the forest. The proportion of cultivated Gnetum entering the value chains to date is neg-
ligible, compared to total production. CENDEP indicates that 13,350 Gnetum seedlings 
were planted in the Southwest between 2004 and 2006, 4,500 by 2008 and 1,000 were 
planned around Korup, with around a 60% survival rate (Lingondo et al. 2006; 
CENDEP 2008a; Nchinda et al. 2008) and a lead time of at least two years before har-
vest and income generation (CENDEP 2009). 
The current low level of cultivation is despite over a two decades of projects focused 
on the Southwest (Leakey 1998; Nkefor et al. 1998; Shiembo 1999; Nkefor et al. 2000; 
Nkefor et al. 2003). These started in response to the intensification of NTFP extraction 
after the economic crises of the 1980s and led to a Forestry Research Project in Kumba, 
which initiated domestication work in the early 1980s (Shiembo 1994) to take pressure 
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off wild resources. Calls to increase domestication (Tekwe et al. 2003);(Nchinda et al. 
2008; Tanda 2009) led to the projects described in the previous section and the PAPCO 
Gnetum cultivation programme. 
However, only a low level of cultivation has occurred despite promising farmer up-
take (CENDEP 2008b) and good production levels in trials (Shiembo 1994; Tekwe et 
al. 2003; CENDEP 2008b). Nkefor et al. (2000) report that one cultivated Gnetum plant 
can produce 1.9 kg leaf biomass every six months. CENDEP recommends a 2 m x 1 m 
spacing per plant to produce up to 9.5 tons a hectare and including Gnetum in mixed 
agroforestry systems. Projects have so far not resulted in major changes in harvester or 
farmer cultivation practices. Innovations such as drying and canning, which reduce 
losses and appear to be increasing in popularity, have also only started to filter through 
to farmers as a stimulus to domestication and to increase production (Awono et al. 
2009; Tabuna et al. 2009). The low level of domestication and cultivation is perplexing, 
particularly when viewed in contrast to practices in Indonesia. There, Gnetum species 
(particularly Gnetum gnemon) have been domesticated and the majority of Gnetum 
leaves and seeds have long originated from cultivated sources (Soemarwoto et al. 1985; 
Michon et al. 1994; Orwa et al. 2009). An explanation is that whilst Gnetum species are 
still available in the forest in Cameroon and not considered as a cultivated crop, wild 
harvest continues. Interviews indicated that harvesters are only motivated to plant when 
a critical level of scarcity, forage distance and collection time makes its harvesting eco-
nomically inefficient for opportunistic harvesters. A higher reliance on Gnetum for food 
and cash and/or knowledge of cultivation techniques appears to prompt planting, partic-
ularly as the majority of harvesters are also farmers and women. However, although 
women have dominated in the participation in training projects, most group leaders are 
men and only a few young women have been in the executive (Youndjie 2006). The 
ability of women to continue independently producing, processing and marketing Gne-
tum – even though it is a vegetable rather than tree crop – given the prevailing male cul-
tural dominance of cash crops, remains to be seen. The impact of wide-scale cultivation 
may alienate harvesters, particularly women, if they do not have access to sufficient 
land and for whom the open access, generally free nature of access to the resource forms 
a safety net and diversification.  
The combined impact of land-use changes, heavy and sustained extraction over the 
last two decades and unsustainable harvesting techniques is that Gnetum is becoming 
scarcer in the study areas. Most (97%) harvesters indicated that foraging distances have 
increased in the past decade and that forests have diminished. This is attributed to clear-
ance for farms (68%) and oil palm plantations (25%), and in Mungo, by logging (7%). 
Nearly a quarter (23%) of harvesters indicated that longer search times and scarcity are 
their major problems. Whilst not differentiated by consumers, Gnetum buchholzianum 
is preferred by harvesters and retailers as easier to harvest and slice. But it is less abun-
dant in the study area and most prone to habitat loss, due to its primary forest prefer-
ence. Gnetum africanum was found in higher quantities, but its quality was reported to 
diminish when forest cover is removed. Half the traders and 67% of exporters indicated 
that better quality (stronger, darker, larger) leaves are obtained from primary forests, 
and poorer quality is associated with secondary forest, plantations or farmland origin. 
For both species, these threats together with rising population density, deforestation and 
degradation (de Wasseige et al. 2009) make both species highly vulnerable. 
In conclusion, the combination of a largely wild sourced product, tendency to harvest 
using unsustainable techniques, growing threats to the integrity of the humid lowland 
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forest in the ecoregion, and signals of increasing scarcity suggest that in the long term 
the product and chain is unsustainable given current arrangements.  
Conclusions 
The analysis of the Gnetum spp. chain originating from the Southwest and Littoral re-
gions of Cameroon indicates that multiple governance arrangements exert a major influ-
ence on how Gnetum spp. products are valued, used, sourced and traded. This section 
summarises the conclusions, responding to research questions two to five, on how the 
value chain is configured in terms of products, actors, activities and values; the govern-
ance arrangements in place; how these impact the livelihoods of actors and their sus-
tainability; and how these impact chain and product sustainability. 
The main product of the two Gnetum spp. vines, known as eru or okok, has high eco-
nomic and social value. The leaves provide multiple and important economic and socio-
economic contributions to actor’s livelihoods, predominantly income and food. Alt-
hough women predominate in the chain and benefit substantially from these values, men 
are active in the stages of greatest value. In the last forty years Gnetum has changed 
from being a food source for specific ethnic groups, to an object of wealth creation. 
Commoditisation satisfies demand for a traditional food by consumers in urban areas 
and for a growing diaspora, and has created a demand amongst new, non-traditional 
consumers. 
There are multiple, plural arrangements governing the chain. Weak statutory ar-
rangements exist, lacking authority and legitimacy and arbitrarily enforced; a myriad of 
highly local customary regulations; market-based collective action in the form of local, 
market-based associations, unions and tontines – a bricolaged mechanism to mitigate 
risk, to control trade and prices, given inconsistent statutory regulations and to counter 
corruption; and some limited project-influenced rules. This may explain the paradox 
that such a high value chain is so politically invisible. Customary regulations tend to 
concentrate on access to the resource, the others generally on access to markets, illus-
trating the highly fragmented nature of how the Gnetum chains are governed, with many 
channels available to move this perishable product to consumers over long distances 
nationally and internationally. Fragmentation is caused by the multiple routes between 
the many sellers and buyers, no individual actors or enterprises dominating the chains 
(although a handful have a stranglehold on official permits), and very low level of pro-
cessing prior to consumption and high losses.  
The governance arrangements impact livelihoods focusing most on financial capital. 
They result in generally profitable commerce, with slightly above average incomes for 
those involved. But they do not assure or promote long-term, sustainable livelihoods. 
The configuration of arrangements means that power relations in the chains are a mix of 
market-based and balanced networks, with no dominant or vertically integrated actors 
with sufficient influence to affect governance arrangements all along the chain. This 
arises from the largely irregular transactions at harvester level, the many customers and 
suppliers, limited information flows between actors along the chain, low level of tech-
nical assistance, and harvest areas governed by locally, geographically-specific custom-
ary arrangements. Obligatory for exporters and retailers in Nigeria, collective action is 
voluntary in Cameroon and does not extend to harvesters. In consequence, harvesters 
are the most vulnerable group of actors in the chain, dependent upon largely wild re-
sources, receiving the lowest profits and incomes, with limited opportunities to add val-
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ue. However, in contrast to actors specialising in Gnetum trade further along the chain, 
their diversified income-generating streams leaves them less dependent upon the vine. 
The regulatory framework undervalues the contribution of eru to livelihoods to all ac-
tors. It is counter-effective in generating state revenues or meeting conservation or re-
source control aims. Its inconsistent application aggravates illegality and corruption, 
adding significant costs and reducing profit margins without denting demand. Many ac-
tors reluctantly tolerate corruption, rather than challenge it or operate formally, as per-
mits are difficult and costly to obtain and offer few advantages. Together these ar-
rangements create a highly disenabling environment for sustainable extraction, exacer-
bating the difficult business operating environment and creating a persistent culture of 
disobedience. Customary traditions dominate forest access and land tenure, largely con-
cerning access by third parties rather than rules to sustainably manage the resource.  
The impact of governance arrangements on product and chain sustainability illus-
trates trade-offs. Despite the majority of harvesters being indigenes of their harvesting 
area, customary resource stewardship is rare, focusing instead on financial gains by tra-
ditional authorities rather than species and product sustainability. Long held beliefs that 
Gnetum is being unsustainably exploited and needs to be cultivated are based on exten-
sive field experience and anecdotal evidence, but surprisingly, given the level of threat 
and protected status of the species, have never been supported by resource assessments. 
The actors framing these perspectives are indirect actors in the chains: researchers, sup-
port organisations and projects, whose positions and beliefs are only implicitly, partially 
shared by harvesters and regulators. Whilst harvesters acknowledge increasing scarcity, 
a direct relationship with harvesting techniques is generally not acknowledged. Per-
versely, increasing scarcity forms an economic incentive for more harvesters and actors 
to enter the chain as prices rise. Such plundering is largely permitted by local chiefs, 
reinforcing the product’s high value. The longevity of the trade belies its unsustainable 
nature. Whilst the methodology used allowed a retrospective view of harvesting practic-
es, the purposive selection of high production areas means that exhausted harvest zones 
have not been captured and a full picture of the temporal dynamics of harvesting and 
trade on a national level over time has only partially been given. However, the value 
chain approach used meant that the trader’s knowledge of geographical and temporal 
changes in resource availability could be gathered. Together with trade data this sup-
ports the finding of steadily increasing volumes of trade and growing markets over the 
last two decades, quantifying concerns about over-harvesting. Indicators of harvest time 
and distance, abundance, harvestable volumes and harvesting techniques all point to in-
creasing extraction, low levels of sustainability and increasing vulnerability of the spe-
cies. Given the expansion of harvest zones, an ecoregion-based approach to verify spe-
cies vulnerability merits further research, regulatory action and possibly a higher protec-
tion level, or at least geographically-based controls in the areas of high harvest pressure. 
The gradual, but still low level of cultivation highlights the long transition period need-
ed to change from a wild, forest species to an agricultural product. Forest degradation 
and clearance, particularly in the high human population density areas may positively or 
negatively impact harvesters’ livelihoods – as the availability of not just Gnetum, but 
also other forest products is increased in human-modified and managed, actively re-
source-enriched environments, or negatively as species density and suitable ecological 
habitats are reduced. The tipping point between abundance and scarcity is difficult to 
determine given the lack of data on species population and range. Responses to these 
pressures on product and chain sustainability have been lukewarm with only occasional, 
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mostly local-level engagement and discourses between conservationists, pro-
domestication researchers and NGOs, harvesters, retailers and the government about 
threats, domestication and cultivation. 
 
 
  
8  
Apiculture value chain1 
This chapter presents the results of the in-depth analysis of the apiculture value chain 
originating from the Northwest and Adamaoua regions of Cameroon and extending to 
markets nationally, in Africa and in Europe. The findings are based on interviews, lit-
erature, participatory action research, observation, value chain analysis, market surveys, 
trade data and resource assessments (see Chapter 3). The values provided have been 
verified and triangulated with literature and in workshops with stakeholders and are be-
lieved to be valid for the specific chain and its geographic locations and population 
sample for the time period of the data collection. The sections deal with the research 
questions of how the value chain is arranged in terms of the species it is derived from, 
the products, location, actors, activities and values; how the chains are governed; what 
is their importance to livelihoods and their sustainability. The conclusion focuses on 
how governance arrangements influence sustainable livelihoods. 
The apiculture value chain 
This section addresses the second research question of how the apiculture value chain is 
configured in terms of products, their uses, sources, actors, activities and values. 
 
Apiculture species, products and their uses 
Honey hunting refers to harvesting from wild bees, known as ‘going into battle’ asaséé 
bì ngour-ngou by the Gbaya in Adamaoua. In contrast, apiculture is the science and 
practice of domestication and keeping of bees. This study concerns forest apiculture, 
where man-made hives are placed in forests. As hives are generally made from local 
natural resources and forests are major sources of nectar and pollen for bees, their prod-
ucts are considered NTFPs (Bradbear 2008). This type of beekeeping has a long history 
in the Northwest Highlands and in Adamaoua. Nearly half of the beekeepers noted 
family traditions, indicating apiculture has been practised for at least 150 years. Oral 
history has it that a century ago, during a period of famine in the Northwest, honey was 
                                                 
1  Data for this chapter is derived from peer-reviewed published articles written or contributed to by the 
author (Ingram 2009a; 2011b; Ingram et al. 2011b; Schure et al. 2013, Tangkeu et al. 2013, Tsafack 
Matsop et al. 2011). 
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used for food and as a medicine. Around sixty years ago it began to be bartered in 
Nkambe and at the Nigerian border where a ‘tin2’ was exchanged for two tins of red 
palm oil or salt, the main exchange commodities prior to monetary currency. This indi-
cates the high social and economic value of honey. Literature confirms the existence of 
a centuries-long regional trade in honey and wax (Kaberry 1952; Paterson 1989), which 
was incorporated into European colonial commodity trade (Crane 1999).  
Apiculture in Cameroon produces two 
product types – bee and hive products – 
and ecological and cultural services. Bee 
products are those directly derived from 
bees, in this study the African honey bee 
(Apis mellifera adansonii) and solitary 
bees (Trigona, Meliponula, Dactylurina, 
Hypotrigona and Liotrigona spp.). Prod-
ucts include royal jelly, pollen and bee 
venom. Hive products are produced by 
bees and include honey, beeswax (Cera 
alba) – shown in Photo 8.1 – and propo-
lis. Honey is a natural sweet substance 
produced by honeybees from the nectar 
of blossoms, which honey bees collect, 
transform and combine with substances 
of their own and store in the comb to rip-
en and mature (Codex Alimentarius Commission 1989). Tests of the biochemical com-
position of Adamaoua and Highlands honey show it contains between 18 to 24% water 
and 70 to 80% sugars (Appendix 15). The high sugar content means that it has a shelf 
life of several years. Bees secrete wax to form an energy-rich, protective structure, 
formed into combs for storing bee larvae, honey and royal jelly. Wax can be melted and 
processed further and stored for years, although it is susceptible to damage by wax 
moths (Galleria mellonella). Propolis is a resinous mixture created by bees from buds, 
resins, sap and other botanical sources. It is used to fill unwanted gaps in the hive. Bee 
and hive products can be processed into a variety of hive by-products (honey beer and 
wine, candles, soaps, creams, polishes, ointments etc.).  
In both areas, all beekeepers use honey as a food. For consumers, 60% in the North-
west and 80% in urban areas use it as a high-energy food with 8% using it as part of a 
special diet. It is occasionally eaten with the comb, but mainly purchased filtered and 
eaten with bread and as a sweetener in drinks. In Ngaoundal 29% of beekeepers and 7% 
of Northwest beekeepers mix honey with water to brew a sweet, openly fermented alco-
holic drink called sha or shah in the Northwest, ntop when mixed with raffia palm wine, 
and kuri or koori in Adamaoua. This used to be the main hive product but has declined 
in popularity with the increased availability of bottled beer and adherence to religious 
codes prohibiting alcohol.  
Honey is well-known and valued for its medicinal use in Cameroon. The majority of 
beekeepers (71% in Adamaoua and 92% in the Northwest) use it to treat coughs, 
                                                 
2  Appendix 8 for all calibration measures. In the Northwest honey is sold in pots and in kilograms and 
in Adamaoua in plastic bottles and in litres. One litre of honey weighs 1.5 kilograms. 
Photo 8.1 Freshly harvested honeycomb, Oku, 
May 2007  
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wounds, skin infections, asthma, stomach ache, burns and gonorrhoea. Knowledge of 
medicinal uses varies significantly: 80% of consumers in the Northwest and 45% in Ad-
amaoua use it medicinally, compared to 5% in urban areas. Honey is a popular ingredi-
ent in medicines prepared by traditional healers, frequently mixed with herbs to treat a 
wide range of illnesses.  
Wax is used by metalworkers in Bamenda and Bali in the Northwest and Bamoun 
and Foumban in the West region in lost-wax casting for traditional artwork, cultural ob-
jects and tourist artefacts. This well-documented technique (Knopfli 1997) originated 
with the Tikar of Adamaoua, reaching a height of sophistication in the early 19th century 
(Gebauer 1979), but is now no longer practised in Adamaoua. These sources indicate 
that wax has been processed, traded and used in the study area on a small, specialised 
scale for at least two centuries. In the last five years wax has been increasingly pro-
cessed and exported for use in pharmaceuticals and cosmetics. It is also used, especially 
in the Northwest, to manufacture candles and shoe polish, in cosmetics such as body 
and hand creams and to make soap, sometimes mixed with local medicinal herbs, honey 
and propolis. Around 1% of beekeepers reported using honey for cosmetic use in Ada-
maoua.  
Propolis has medicinal value, confirmed by chemical analysis3, showing strong anti-
oxidant and antiradical activity and high levels of phenols and flavonoids for propolis 
from both regions, with Ngaoundal propolis having the highest levels. Propolis extracts 
from traditional hives were found to be more active than that collected from tree boles, 
although the reasons for this finding have not yet been established. Propolis is used in 
traditional medicines, particularly in the Northwest by 42% of beekeepers and by 7% in 
Adamaoua. It is used powdered or dissolved in alcohol in ointments, creams and soaps 
for skin complaints, rashes, fungal infections and ringworm, and chewed for stomach 
upsets, sore throats and toothache. It is perceived as most effective when used fresh. 
Paterson (1989) reported that while it was used as a gum to plug leaking vessels and in 
carpentry, it was not sold. It has been increasingly traded locally and exported in the last 
five years for its antibacterial, hydrating and emulsifying properties for use in cosmetics 
and pharmaceuticals. 
Bees provide ecosystem services, being important pollinators of flowering plants, in-
cluding NTFP species in this study: Prunus africana (Hall et al. 2000), Yushania alpina 
(Mazeyose 2011), Raphia spp. and Cola spp. (Rodger et al. 2004). Interviews con-
firmed this and indicated that in Adamaoua 25%, and in the Highlands 24% of mellifer-
ous species are also subsistence food, cash and timber crops and have medicinal uses 
(see Appendix 18). This confirms studies showing that bees are major pollinators of 
tropical forests and crops (Cane 2001; de Marco Jr. et al. 2004; Eardley et al. 2006; 
Eilers et al. 2011). Bee pollination was recognised as important by beekeepers and is 
promoted as a major benefit of apiculture by beekeeping associations. Apiforestry4 has 
been promoted in the Highlands to encourage forest conservation and afforestation, re-
duce erosion and landslides and to create and afforest water catchments. 
Bees also have cultural value as sacred animals, with swarms implicated in witch-
craft. In Oku, stylised bees are carved on the doorposts of the Fon’s palace and it is be-
lieved that a bee entering a home signifies the arrival of a visitor. The relationship be-
                                                 
3  Results presented in workshops (Ingram et al. 2010; Kosalec et al. 2010) and Appendix 1.  
4  Term coined by the North West Bee Association (NOWEBA) to describe integrating bee farming with 
afforestation or reforestation.  
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tween bees and forests is heavily symbolised, with trees being popular symbols on hon-
ey packaging from the Highlands. Bees are associated with warriors and fighting in 
Gbaya history, documented by Burnham and Christensen (1983). Honey is a highly val-
ued cultural product, also derived from its forest origins. It is mixed with camwood 
(Pterocarpus soyauxii) as a body lotion for chiefs during cultural events and ceremonies 
and given to chiefs and important visitors. These practices date back to at least the 
1920s (Chem-Langhee et al. 2011). It is also a prized gift around Ngaoundal, with 
comb-honey given to visitors a symbol of hospitality and nakia (honey cake) consumed 
during wedding ceremonies. The high social value indicated in interviews is supported 
by studies of the Gbaya (Howard 2005) and the Nso (Kaberry 1952; Mzeka 1996).  
 
Ecoregion sources and chain locations 
Tropical deciduous forests are some of the most optimum areas of the world for honey 
production (Gentry 1982). The forests in the savannah and montane ecoregions in Cam-
eroon (Chapter 4) are rich in melliferous plants. Interviews and observations led to 155 
melliferous species being noted: 58 forest plants in the Northwest, 34 forest species in 
Adamaoua and 65 crops and exotic plants in the Highlands (see Appendix 18). Both 
ecoregions have long dry seasons, allowing bee colonies to build up peak populations to 
take advantage of good nectar flows. These factors explain why the principal production 
areas in Cameroon are in Adamaoua and the Highlands, shown in Figure 8.1. In Ada-
maoua the zone covers around 14,000 km2, centring on Ngaoundal in Djerem division, 
stretching from Banyo to Meiganga and up to Ngoundéré. In the Northwest its covers 
around 9,900 km2 of the Highlands, covering Bui, Belo, Donga-Mantung and Mezam 
divisions, focusing on the towns of Oku, Kumbo, Bamenda and Fundong. Smaller scale 
production zones were found around Mifi division in the West and Fako and Kupe divi-
sions in the Southwest. In the humid forest ecoregions honey is highly prized and is 
mostly hunted with little beekeeping or trade. Interviews with beekeepers indicated that 
ecoregion factors influence honey characteristics, particularly where the hive is located, 
climate (rainfall, temperature and sunlight), altitude and soil quality, as the latter three 
determine the occurrence and abundance of melliferous species. The bi-annual flower-
ing of many of the main forage species explains the production peaks every alternate 
year, when two harvests are possible.  
The diversity and uniqueness of the flora in these ecoregions results in hive products 
with unique characteristics, especially propolis and honey (see Appendix 15). Honey 
from the savannah forest is liquid, rich in minerals and dark brown with a treacly taste. 
Honey from the montane forests of Kilum Ijim is sweet and citrusy, granulated and 
white in colour. Honey from the Highlands forest-farm interface is golden coloured and 
liquid. The colour and texture of propolis also varies according to its botanical source: 
brown and dry in Adamaoua, darker brown and waxier in the Northwest. Discussions 
with beekeepers resulted in ecoregion-linked honey profiles being developed using 
standard physical-chemical parameters (see Appendix 15). The profiles corroborate 
physical-chemical analysis which emphasise the regional and seasonal differences 
(Mbogning et al. 2011). From the production areas, the chain extends to consumers at 
different locations through six main channels, shown in Figure 8.2. 
In common with other African producing countries (McAdam 2007), the majority of 
honey is consumed within the country. The largest proportion from the Northwest flows 
from beekeepers selling filtered or comb honey to processing organisations which retail 
to consumers. A second channel flows via wholesalers and processors buying and 
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filtering comb honey to minimise adulteration and profit from the large scale. They 
predominantly sell to local Type I markets and Type II markets in nearby towns. 
Approximately 60% of Northwest honey reaches Type II markets, supermarkets and 
shops in towns such as Bamenda and Bafoussam. A third channel from Ngaoundal for 
approximately 85% of production, is by rail to markets, shops and supermarkets in Type 
III cities like Ngoundéré, Douala and Yaoundé. A fourth channel for 25% to 33% of 
production is the traditional, small-scale channel from beekeepers directly to local 
consumers. A small proportion (estimated 11%) of wax is sold from beekeepers to 
processing associations to end users. A fifth, well-established export channel for honey 
(10% of production) and wax (30%) from Adamaoua and small volumes from the 
Northwest, flows by rail, truck and bus to Ngoundéré and onto Nigeria, Central African 
Republic, Lebanon, Chad, other northern African countries and the Middle East. The 
sixth and most recent channel for honey and currently the largest for wax and propolis 
are through importers of speciality organic, ethical trade and conventional hive products 
in the Middle East, USA, Canada and the European Union.  
 
 
Figure 8.1 Map of apiculture value chain study area in Cameroon 
Market 
EQUATORIAL 
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The proportion and products sold has changed considerably since the 1940s when the 
only channels were for honey and wax from beekeepers direct to consumers, or for hon-
ey via small traders to Type I markets. Since the mid-1980s honey has increasingly been 
sold further afield, with Northwest honey sold in supermarkets and shops in Yaoundé 
(Paterson 1989) and hive products in Type II markets. By 2010 honey was sold in at 
least twenty one supermarkets, market stalls and pharmacies in Douala, Yaoundé, 
Bafoussam. Regional differences between longer chains from Adamaoua and the more 
diversified, shorter chains from the Northwest are apparent in the value chain map in 
Figure 8.2.  
 
 
Source: Research results 
 
 
Apiculture chain actors  
This section introduces the main groups of actors in the value chain. In both study areas 
the numbers of beekeepers and related organisations have been increasing in the last 
decade and constitute the largest group of actors in the chain. By 2009 there were at 
least an estimated 21,417 beekeepers in Cameroon, the majority of which of whom are 
Figure 8.2 Apiculture value chain and product channels 
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in Adamaoua (58%) and the Northwest (22%). These beekeepers represent a small pro-
portion of the total population per study area region, shown in Table 8.1. 
The way the chain is organised means that once beekeeping and processing skills are 
acquired there are few barriers to entry for conventional beekeeping. It is a low input 
activity, largely carried out during the off-season for agriculture. Apiculture produces 
multiple products with many uses, with not only an economic, but also high social val-
ue. These factors mean that a significant number of around 17,663 people) are active in 
chains from the two study regions. Men dominate all sections of the chain, and in Ada-
maoua, the Gbaya ethnic group predominates.  
 
Table 8.1 Population statistics of study area and apiculture chain actors 
Region/ 
Division Capital 
Surface 
area km2 Population
1
Pop. 
density 
km² 
No value chain actors2 % total 
populationHarvester Trad-er3 
Exporter Nursery 
workers 
Northwest  Bamenda 17,812 1,728,953 100 4,615 447 5 56 0.00 
Bui  Kumbo 2,297 321,969 32 1,216 60  16 0.00 
Boyo Fundong 1,592  124,887 31 2,241 20  20 0.02 
Mezam Bamenda 1,745 524,127 35 827 75  20 0.00 
Adamaoua  Ngoundéré 63,691 884,289 14 12,315 190 22 15 0.01 
Djerem Tibati 13,283 124,948 9 10,000 100 20 9 0.11 
Total     16,930 637 25 71  
1 2005 census population (National Institute of Statistics 2010)  2 Sources: Research results 3Includes traders, retailers 
and processors.  
 
However, changing governance arrangements, notably collective action, using differ-
ent hives and increased hive product processing (section below), have increased wom-
en’s participation and provided them with increased legitimacy and visibility in the 
chain. Cultural, religious and societal gender biases have been redefined as women per-
form more than their traditional roles of cooperative secretary and retailers. Role models 
and increases in education and literacy appear to contribute to changes. These roles are 
not unique to the apiculture chain: empowering rural women without engendering their 
capabilities has been recognised as difficult in Cameroon and across Africa (Fonjong 
2008; Shackleton et al. 2011).  
The direct actors in the chain are categorised as beekeepers, processing organisa-
tions, exporters, importers and consumers. There are also international and national reg-
ulatory authorities and support actors including development and conservation NGOs 
and research organisations. The beekeepers studied had on average 5.6 years of experi-
ence, with 58% in Adamaoua and 46% in the Northwest having up to ten years’ experi-
ence, ad 23% and 25% respectively having up to 20 years’ experience. One beekeeper 
had 40 years’ experience. The average age of a beekeeper in Adamaoua is 43 (SD 15) 
and 39 (SD 15) in the Northwest. On average 56% have primary education in the 
Northwest and 18% secondary education, with 76% and 16% respectively in Ada-
maoua. For the uninitiated, working with bees can be frightening. The majority of bee-
keepers (61%) in Adamaoua have learnt by observation and hands-on practice passed on 
by family and friends, whilst in the Northwest, 97% received training from beekeeping 
organisations, NGOs and projects. Beekeepers tend to be married (94% in the North-
west and 100% in Adamaoua) and heads of their families, which have an average size of 
8.25 (SD 4) in Adamaoua and 7 (SD 3) in the Northwest. Beekeeping is traditionally a 
male activity (Kaberry 1952) (Table 8.2), but an increasing number of women are be-
coming active. In both areas around a quarter of beekeepers are aided by women and 
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39% by their children. Although development projects have encouraged communal api-
aries, these efforts have not been very effective and most beekeepers own and manage 
their hives individually. 
 
Table 8.2 Beekeepers’ characteristics in Adamaoua and Northwest regions 
District and Region 
% households 
involved in 
beekeeping1,3 
% annual house-
hold income from 
apiculture1,3 
Ratio male/ 
female bee-
keepers 
Livelihood  
(% primary 
activity) 1,3 
Average national 
household in-
comes2 
Djerem, Adamaoua 68 48 86/14 55% 17% > 1$ day;  
50% > 2$ day Bui, Mezam, Boyo, Northwest 
55 45 80/20 34% 
Average 62 47 83/17 45%  
Sources: 1 Research results.  2 UN Human Development Report 2007/2008, United Nations World Prospects Report 
2004. 3 Averages over period 2007 to 2009. 
 
Shown in Figure 8.3, collective action varies greatly by region, with at least 8,600 
beekeepers members of 639 registered groups in 2008. Reflecting the history of cooper-
atives and collective action described in Chapter 5, twice as many beekeepers (41%) in 
the Northwest are members of associations than in Adamaoua (21%). Nationally, the 
average length of time that associations have existed is six years (SD 1), in the North-
west 9 (SD 3) years and 6 (SD 2) in Adamaoua. This suggests that collective action is 
well established. In the Northwest, the majority of groups (61%) are registered, mainly 
(94%) as CIGs and cooperatives (4%). Most operate group savings (njangi), share in-
formation and techniques and around a fifth of groups met regularly. Just under half 
were set up by NGOs as a condition to obtain support. In Djerem division a third (36%) 
were registered and 61% operate tontines (saving groups). The majority of these groups 
have been set up with support of the now defunct Modern Beekeepers of Cameroon 
(MOBEC) in 2002 and by a group of beekeepers disenchanted with the results of MO-
BEC, the Djerem Union of Natural Honey Producers (UGIPROMNAD) around 2004 
(Howard 2005; Tchana 2010) and 53 by Guiding Hope since 2006. 
 
 
Figure 8.3 Beekeepers and organisations per region, Cameroon 2008 
 
Sources: Research results and MINEPIA 2008. 
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At least fifteen processing organisations in the Northwest and three in Adamaoua are 
currently active. Table 8.3 details the oldest and largest, which have vertically integrat-
ed activities to different extents. These organisations cover over 70% of beekeepers in 
the in the Northwest and around 70% of  production, and around 12% and 2% respec-
tively in Adamaoua. Most buy honey from members or beekeepers, process and pack-
age for wholesale and retail through their own shops. Four privately-owned honey shops 
in Bamenda also purchase directly from beekeepers and sell to supermarkets, shops, 
traders and individuals in cities, largely through ethically-connected and family net-
works. Most organisations have diversified into related services: training, conservation 
and development projects, plant nurseries and selling beekeeping equipment. Processing 
is generally of low quality and artisanal, although labelled and well packaged honey has 
increasingly appeared in the last decade. By 2010, fifteen brands were sold in Yaoundé 
and Douala, up from six in 2007. This growth reflects the increase of entrants to the 
market. In the West, Southwest, Northwest and Yaoundé at least five stores and one 
market stall dedicated to apiculture products existed by 2010. Processors have intro-
duced innovations such as small honey sachets, media campaigns promoting health and 
medicinal properties of apiculture products, by-products, recipe books, and use of the 
media, fairs and exhibitions. 
 
Table 8.3 Overview of major apiculture processing organisations  
Organisation Les Meillieries 
Guiding 
Hope ANCO HONCO BERUDEP
Oku Honey 
Coop 
Oku  
Beefarmers  
Location Yaoundé Ngaoundal Bamenda Bamenda Fundong & Belo Oku Oku 
Organisation 
type  CIG CIG NGO Coop CIG Coop CIG 
Date established 2009 2006 2002 1993/2003 1997 1987 1988? 
No of staff 4 22 8 4 5 5 3 
No members 6 1,080 215 216 28 
No suppliers 50 1,400 80 80 1,550   
Average annual production 
Honey (litres)* est. 5,000 44,000 28,000 25,000 8,250 6,741 4,200 
Wax (kg)* 44,000 280 447 est. 50 264 15 
Propolis (kg) 70 3 3 est. 5 2   
Honey beer (l) 75 50 
Chain activities 
Production √ √ √ √ √ 
Agroforestry √ √ √ √   
Bulking √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Distribution √ √ √ √ √ √   
Training - √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Processing √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Packaging √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Retail √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Export Potential √ √ √       
Source: Research results. Key: *Number of years used to calculate average production varies for each organisation. 
CIG= Common initiative group Coop= Cooperative NGO= Non-governmental organisation. 
 
At its peak from the late 1990s to 2002, the North West Beefarmers Association 
(NOWEBA) had 6,000 members, 29% of whom were women. It had 250 cooperative 
groups with training, credit, collection and sales through its own shops and market stalls 
in the Northwest. In 2002, NOWEBA split into the NGO Apiculture and Nature Con-
servation Organisation (ANCO), which focuses on conservation, marketing and pro-
cessing and the Northwest Honey Cooperative (HONCO), a production and sales organ-
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isation. The non-profit Belo Rural Development Project (BERUDEP) generates reve-
nues through volunteers, grants, tourism and apiculture from its own and members’ 
products, financing beekeeping training, farming, conservation and development activi-
ties. The Oku Honey Cooperative Society (Oku Coop) and Oku Beefarmers Coopera-
tive both collect, process and market honey, wax, propolis and beer and provide train-
ing, equipment and credit to members. Both self-initiated, the Oku Coop has secured 
several projects and support from the Bamenda Highlands Forest Project (BHFP). A 
member-manager coordinates its activities, gradually increasing production by building 
up credit to purchase honey. With BHFP support, low key forays to market honey out-
side of the production area were made. Annual average turnover ranges from 74,515 to 
207,000 FCFA (152 to 422 US$) per organisation for the period 2003 to 2007 (in Figure 
8.4). 
 
 
Figure 8.4 Annual revenue of apiculture processing organisations 2003 to 2007 
Source: Research results 
 
 
In Ngaoundal most beekeepers work individually, supported by families during har-
vest and in constructing hives. Beekeeping groups generally have a social function, and 
group sales are not common, although increasingly encouraged by NGOs since the mid-
2000s and recently by international buyers. The strongly individualistic culture of the 
Gbaya ethnic group, large distances between villages, poor infrastructure, established 
traders and negative experiences with NGOs have combined to make collective action 
less common in Adamaoua. In Ngaoundal, Guiding Hope and a support organisation 
Programme d’Appui aux Initiatives Locales à L’Auto-Emploi (PAELLA-E) have been 
working with beekeepers since 2006. They have legalised, certified, worked with and 
trained 53 village-based groups to adapt traditional methods to produce organic, ethical 
trade apiculture products, obtaining Soil Association- certified organic status in 2008 
and ethical trade certification in 2010. Wax and honey are sold nationally and exported 
worldwide. Guiding Hope also has links with ApiTrade Africa, a regional trade organi-
sation. Les Meillieries buys from individual beekeepers and traders around Meiganga 
and Tibati and sells in Douala and Yaoundé. It is in the process of registering to export 
to Europe. 
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Despite collective action, 50% of beekeepers mentioned a lack of coordination and 
collaboration and the saturation of local markets as problems. This is corroborated by 
support organisations (WHINCONET 2006; Ade 2009). In response, regional and na-
tional associations and unions have been established, with encouragement from donors. 
The Federation of Beekeepers’ Associations of Cameroon was set up in 1995 led by 
NOWEBA, joining four beekeepers’ associations from three provinces. However within 
a year the Federation failed due to internal conflicts and unrealised funding. Since 2007, 
apiculture groups, backed by SNV and the FAO, have supported a new association 
growing from the Southwest and Northwest regions with a strong collective, networking 
history (Ingram et al. 2007). In parallel, Guiding Hope, Les Meillieries and other traders 
have been collaborating since 2009 with the Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries and Ani-
mal Production (MINEPIA) to create an Apiculture Interprofession, a network joining 
chain actors and regional beekeepers associations. In August 2010, the Interprofession 
was legalised and is slowly developing national apiculture policies and honey quality 
standards. Learning from past lessons, the associations are concentrating on low level 
advocacy for quality standards, export regulations and raising consumer awareness. 
Guiding Hope and Les Meillieries also formed the Union of Apiculture Exporters in 
2007 to represent exporters to the European market. In 2008 this Union set up a Council 
for National Apiculture Security to secure Cameroon’s application to the European Un-
ion for a Honey Monitoring Residue Scheme (HMRS) for EU exports (see Box 8.1).  In 
2009 MINEPIA set up the 50 million FCFA (96,000 US$) ‘Projet d’Appui au Dévelop-
pement de la Filière Apicole’ (PADFA). This focuses on providing training, equipment 
and setting up beekeeping groups, with 3,200 beekeepers and 310 groups registered to 
date. Market information systems have also been piloted to fill information needs, re-
sulting in higher local market sales and prices (van der Goes et al. 2009; SNV 2010b). 
In the Northwest, plant nurseries have been integrated into the activities of pro-
cessing organisations. At least fifteen NGOs and enterprises have nurseries of multipur-
pose and non-native trees and plants, provide plant cultivation and beekeeping training 
and conduct beekeeping and agroforestry projects. Thirty small-scale planting schemes, 
some project funded, and forest enrichment by farmers, community forests and councils 
using native and exotic melliferous species were observed. Almost half of these had 
multiple objectives to secure water catchment protection, provide NTFPs for fuelwood, 
food and medicinal use, timber for carving, bee forage and demarcate forests and lands 
using live fences). These were largely supported by grants, the World Agroforestry Cen-
tre (ICRAF) and the government-funded Rural Forestry and Agroforestry Project 
(PAFRA). PAFRA reported that over 2 million trees, 60% of which are melliferous, 
were planted on private land, communal, community and council forests from 2005 to 
2009. Small nurseries for indigenous and exotic fruit trees, bamboo and raffia were 
started in 2010 around Ngaoundal, set up by Guiding Hope and MINADER Community 
Education and Action Centre in Wassande, near Meiganga. 
In Adamaoua about 15 Nigerian, Cameroonian and Lebanese intermediaries (known 
as wholesalers, transporters and ‘buy’am-sell’ams’) run informal, well-organised opera-
tions. They tour villages in Adamaoua and occasionally the Northwest during the har-
vest season to buy honey and wax. Most also trade in other products and two are also 
government officials. They often collaborate for large orders and work on command, 
processing honey for all market types. Some Cameroonian intermediaries work on a 
trust-based system, paying advance credit system to regular, larger scale beekeepers.  
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Retailers sell to individual consumers, restaurants, artisans, pharmacies, market trad-
ers and supermarkets. The estimated 447 traders in Kumbo and Bamenda markets in the 
Northwest are predominantly female (66%). Typically they are between 36 to 45 years 
of age, married (75%), with 35% having attained secondary level education. They buy 
honey from wholesalers or direct from beekeepers in quantities of about 20 to 100 litres 
and retail it to consumers. An estimated 150 mostly young male hawkers sell low grade 
honey in Bamenda, Bafoussam, Yaoundé and Douala markets. In Adamaoua around 50 
honey retailers with similar profiles operate in Ngaoundal, Meiganga, Tibati and 
Ngoundéré. At six of the stations along the Yaoundé to Ngoundéré train route, an esti-
mated 10 to 15 women and children and a few male hawkers of all ages, announce their 
wares as the once-daily train briefly stops with cries of “miel, miel, miel”. They sell re-
cycled 1.5 litre plastic bottles of low quality, crudely filtered honey. Honey beer ven-
dors were not surveyed, but observations and informants indicated that they are often 
middle-aged women who own and operate small, informal bars and stalls in market 
towns or sell from their houses in remoter, large villages. For many brewers and ven-
dors, honey beer is an additional source of income. Although this activity is not sup-
ported by law, it is usually tolerated by local municipalities because of its long history 
and tradition. 
At least 25 projects5 have been implemented in the last three decades, focussing 
mainly on the beekeeper, production end of the chain. Apiculture and especially forest-
based apiculture has been heavily promoted as a way to attain conservation and devel-
opment win-wins (Abbot et al. 2001; Timmer et al. 2005; Mazur et al. 2008). This has 
been encouraged by development and beekeeping circles (Bradbear 2004; DiN 2009; 
Lietaer 2009) and picked up by local conservation and beekeeping NGOs (API-CAM 
1998; Abott et al. 2001; Fombad et al. 2006; Oyono et al. 2012). Evaluations of wheth-
er the dual aims have been met are not positive and the evidence presented is general 
and does not enable conservation ‘successes’ to be attributed directly, or only, to apicul-
ture (Brown 2001; Purcell et al. 2005). Technical support and information has also been 
provided by API Trade Africa, the Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooper-
ation (CTA) and CIFOR. SNV has been taking a value chain approach in the last six 
years. They have supported BERUDEP, the Oku Honey Cooperative and worked with 
Guiding Hope to develop standards, regional and national platforms. SNV and Guiding 
Hope are also working with the Kilum Ijim White Honey Association (KIWHA). Since 
2010 the African Office for Intellectual Property (OAPI) and French International Agri-
cultural Research Centre (CIRAD) have supported them to develop and implement a 
Geographical Indication certificate for montane white honey, financed by the French 
Development Agency (AFD). Final approval is expected in late 2012. Fluctuations in 
interest by donors appear related to preferences rather than sector performance.  
There are distinct differences between women and men’s roles in the chain and bene-
fits derived. Men dominate production and wholesale and women retail, determined by 
the physical work of carrying and climbing trees for hive installation and harvest, as 
women are traditionally barred from climbing trees. This is in contrast to Ethiopia and 
Zambia, where women are main beekeepers (Husselman et al. 2009). Project-promoted 
                                                 
5  From WWF, Birdlife International, DFID, IUCN, FAO, SNV, GTZ, INADES, Bees for Development, 
HIPIC, Heifer International, Bees Abroad, VSO, Peace Corps, Oxfam, religious charities, monasteries 
and the RIGC project. See list of acronyms for meanings. 
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technologies and practices, such as using Kenyan Top Bar (KTB) hives6 and placing 
hives close to family compounds and on stilts, avoids climbing and lifting and have en-
couraged women’s participation. Increased processing has also favoured women. Or-
ganisations such as ANCO have actively targeted women, with a third of the 6,000 bee-
keepers trained being female. Promoting collective action and pooling finances have 
further resulted in their increased participation either in mixed groups and at least seven 
female beekeeper groups in Adamaoua and 22 in the Northwest. Women however indi-
cated that as their trading activities are largely informal, they are invisible to policy-
makers, project and government support with little recognition for their multiple roles. 
Dynamic leading women in BERUDEP, HONCO, Guiding Hope, Paradise on Earth and 
large-scale traders (such as Jane Lailam, also head of the Kumbo Business Women’s 
Cooperative Women), serve as role models.  
Local consumers are of all ages and social status. Consumers belonging to ethnic 
groups from the major production areas are more knowledgeable about honey and have 
higher consumption rates: on average 10 litres annually in the Northwest, compared to 
two litres (SD 19) in Adamaoua. Nearly half (45%) of consumers did not know that 
honey is produced by bees from plants. In Adamaoua the 25 to 50 litres annually con-
sumed per household was attributed to the prevalence of Islam, as the prophet Moham-
med reportedly said honey is a remedy for every illness. Consumption is influenced by 
quality, price, visual attractiveness, colour and taste. The majority (60%) of urban con-
sumers valued origin and quality (40%). In the Northwest 42% of consumers are influ-
enced by packaging, associated with hygiene and quality. Many urban consumers were 
unfamiliar and sceptical about the source of different coloured honeys, concerned about 
adulteration and contamination. Tests, labelling and promotional material are seen as 
indicators of quality. Honey’s multiple uses and benefits are most known in the North-
west and less in urban locations. Most consumers believe that honey is healthy, natural 
and a good replacement for sugar. Price sensitivity ranges from 500 FCFA (1.13 US$) a 
litre with no regard for packaging, quality or origin, to half of Northwest consumers 
paying above 1,000 FCFA (2.27 US$) a litre and 20% indicating they would pay 2,500 
FCFA (5.68 US$) or more per litre. 
 
Chain activities  
The activities conducted in the chain are strongly influenced by the seasons and climate 
of the ecoregions, and are shown in Figure 8.5.  
 
Figure 8.5 Apiculture calendar 
Activity  Jan Feb Mar April May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
Hive construction             
Install hives§              
Move hives to forest*             
Maintenance             
1st harvest (biennially)             
2nd harvest (annually)  #     #      
Honey processing             
Wax processing              
Season dry rainy dry 
§ Northwest and Adamaoua * Kilum Ijim area only # Adamaoua only 
                                                 
6  Hives with sloping sides and bars of wood across the top to which the bees attach the comb.  
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 Hive construction differs per region due to traditional styles, materials and skills (de-
tailed in Appendix 15). In Adamaoua traditional, tapered cylindrical hives are made by 
99% of beekeepers, 78% of Northwest beekeepers build cylindrical hives and the re-
mainder purchase or make KTB hives. Hollow log, bark hives and clay pots are no 
longer used in either area. Hive type does not influence honey characteristics but affects 
the ease of harvest and management and therefore production, and the volume of propo-
lis harvested. In the Northwest, higher annual average honey volumes were found from 
KTB hives (112 litres compared to 77 litres from traditional hives), attributed to the 
ease of harvesting (Tsafack Matsop et al. 2011). In Kilum Ijim, hives are initially placed 
on farms and once colonised, are head-portered and installed in the forest on supports or 
in trees around 1.5 to 2.5 m height. A small but growing trend of keeping hives around 
the home and farm was noted. In Adamaoua hives are installed directly high up (2 to 3 
m) into trees in the forest. This minimises damage from bush fires and predation by 
honey-loving animals (ants, snakes, termites, honey badgers (Mellivora capensis) and 
African palm civets (Nandinia binotata), which were noted as the major production 
problem by 42% of Adamaoua beekeepers. Beekeepers indicated that maintenance re-
sults in higher colonisation rates, lower absconding rates and higher production. In the 
Northwest, this involves periodically checking hives for damage by pests, predators, 
storms, fallen trees, fires or strong winds, performing repairs and lightly clearing under-
growth around the hive. In Adamaoua, hives may be visually inspected once or twice a 
year.  
 In the harvest season, combs are harvested in the early evening in Adamaoua and 
during the day in the Northwest, as night harvesting7 is increasingly taboo due to the 
higher bush fire risk. Most beekeepers do not use modern protective clothing or tradi-
tional raffia and grass ‘suits’ but do use smokers8. Smoke has a soporific, calming effect 
on bees but imparts an odour to honey. Most Adamaoua beekeepers harvest all comb 
from the hive. In the Northwest, 50% of beekeepers follow ‘best practice’ using metal 
smokers, leaving unripe combs and harvesting only two-thirds of ripe combs. Propolis 
is picked off hives in the Northwest and is mainly taken from wild colonies in Ada-
maoua, where it occurs in larger quantities. The call of the greater honeyguide (Indica-
tor indicator) bird may be used to find wild colonies. A few (9%) beekeepers maintain 
records of hives and quantities harvested. Combs and propolis are then head-portered in 
buckets to the village.  
The first stage of processing is to separate the honey from the wax. The honeycombs 
are gently crushed and filtered. Most individual beekeepers process at home: those be-
longing to processing groups send combs to collection centres for bulk filtering, usually 
within a day of harvest to avoid solidification, ensuring quality and allowing both honey 
and wax to be obtained. Filtering removes debris but results in losses of up to 30%. All 
use basic equipment (raffia or plastic sieves, buckets, raffia, stainless steel or fabric fil-
ters, recycled plastic food oil containers for storage). Around 33% of Northwest bee-
keepers package honey in recycled plastic containers, with and without labels. The pro-
cessing organisations now use dedicated plastic pots for retailing. Four processing or-
ganisations have specialised equipment obtained through grants or gifts. After filtering 
                                                 
7  Bees are poikilothermic and less likely to sting at night. 
8  A device that generates smoke from smouldering selected leaves and grasses to calm bees. Tradition-
ally a verbena and euphorbia leave and grasses ‘torch’, an imported or locally made metal smoker and 
bellow.  
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the combs may be washed and the resulting honeyed-water may be made into honey 
beer. In the Northwest villages around 50 to 75% of honey is brewed. Two processing 
organisations make wine using the closed fermentation process, with a shelf-life of over 
a year. 
Crushed, washed combs are melted to consolidate the wax. In the Northwest, a 
small-scale au-bain-marie method is used to produce a high quality, yellow wax. In Ad-
amaoua, three methods are used. Combs are melted over charcoal and the wax collected 
in moulds, producing a low quality, dark brown, smoky-smelling black coloured wax. 
In the second method, honey is separated from combs using solar energy, the wax is 
then boiled in water in a metal drum over an open fire. The liquid wax is scooped into 
nylon sacks and wrung into moulds. This produces a slightly smoky, lighter brown col-
oured wax. While effective on a small scale, both techniques are labour, time, water and 
fuelwood intensive and produce low quality wax. Guiding Hope has experimented with 
large-scale solar and electric melting to produce a high quality yellow, smoke-free wax 
using fewer resources, at lower costs, and with less environmental and health impacts. 
Propolis is used fresh, stored in plastic or dissolved in alcohol, and then used in tinc-
tures, soaps and creams. 
 
Apiculture product values 
A small proportion of the honey harvest – shown in Figure 8.7 below – is consumed by 
beekeepers and a smaller proportion is given as gifts. The majority, on average 88% of 
production, is sold. Most (62%) of beekeepers in the Northwest sell processed honey, 
the rest sell honey unprocessed. Other hive products are generally thrown away, with 
28% of beekeepers extracting wax, although 100% harvest propolis. In Ngaoundal the 
majority (91%) of beekeepers sell unprocessed honey and 8% filtered. Only a small 
proportion (2%) also process wax and (7%) collect propolis. Average annual honey 
yield per hive per year in the Northwest was between 10 to 15 litres in 2009 and in Ad-
amaoua in 2007 on average 7 to 10 litres per hive. This provides a net income per hive 
(if all by-products are collected) of 26,250 FCFA (54 US$) annually in the Northwest 
and 19,999 FCFA (41 US$) in Adamaoua9. More details about incomes are given in the 
section on livelihoods.  
Honey prices vary per market and seasonally, shown in Figure 8.6. Product prices re-
flect classical demand and supply theory, with lower prices in the Adamaoua production 
zone due to high supply and low demand, and the inverse in the Northwest, where the 
higher population density and use creates higher demand. Seasonal variations in price 
occur in both regions, with price increases of up to 52% in Ngaoundal in the non-
harvest season and 10% in the Northwest. In Type III urban markets, no seasonal retail 
price variations were noted. Value is affected by labour, hive and processing equipment, 
taxes, transport, storage and packaging costs. Labour constitutes the highest proportion 
of total costs for beekeepers at 50% in Ngaoundal and 80% in Oku. Most beekeepers 
however do not see their input or hives as costs when locally available ‘free’ natural 
materials are used. This negation of human and natural capital costs is common for for-
est products (Beauchamp et al. 2011; Tsafack Matsop et al. 2011). It is also attributed to 
                                                 
9  The figure is based on average honey production of 12.5 litres in the Northwest and in 8.3 in Ada-
maoua and a retail price of 1,500 FCFA per litre to earn 18,750 FCFA; 2 kg of wax worth 5,000 
FCFA and 0.5 kg of propolis worth 2,500 FCFA. 
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the low opportunity costs: as apiculture activities commonly occur in the agricultural 
low season and at night.  
 
 
 
Source: Research results 
 
Around Kilum Ijim, the distribution of average profit margins gained by producers 
(29%), wholesalers/distributors (46%) and retailers (25%) per litre of white honey. 
Those with dedicated managers have increased scale and professionalization to obtain 
higher profit margins through upscaling and accessing more Type II and III markets 
outside the production areas and vertical integration. However, issues of trust, ethnic 
ties and cultural relationships have sometimes made the appointing of capable and ac-
countable managers difficult. In the Northwest, the propensity to work in groups has 
helped reduce individual transaction costs by linking buyers to groups. In Adamaoua, 
the groups selling to Guiding Hope also benefit from higher prices and long-term con-
tracts. Profit margins in Adamaoua are slightly higher, with beekeepers earning 17% 
profit, processors 31% and wholesalers 15%. This is due to the larger economies of 
scale. Associations have reduced costs by cutting out intermediaries, giving producers a 
competitive advantage. The costs and risks that associations and wholesalers take, par-
ticularly in the regional and export channels by bulking volumes, travelling long dis-
tances, storing, packaging and exporting are seen as exploitative by some beekeepers 
and development organisations, due to the fact that on average in the Northwest a 
wholesaler/processor sells for 100% higher price than a beekeeper and a retailer (15%). 
Profits are also increased by marketing and packaging. For example, Guiding Hope uses 
leaflets stating laboratory results by the University of Yaoundé to promote quality and 
selling in pharmacies at 10 to 15% higher than street-vendor prices. ANCO, Guiding 
Hope and Rural Development through Apiculture (RUDA), a Southwest-based proces-
ser, all sell small 25 g sachets, popular due to their affordable price, while generating 
higher profits and turnover. 
The geography of key production sites in relation to consumer markets, transport 
hubs and support services has implications for the value of apiculture products. Both 
production areas are isolated: on average 70 km from regional capitals, largely on par-
Figure 8.6  Average honey selling prices in Cameroonian markets 2006 to 2009 
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tially and unpaved roads and over 400 km from the main cities. The benefits of isolation 
include sufficient forest forage which is naturally organic. However remoteness also 
brings disadvantages in increasing costs, difficulty in physically accessing markets, in-
formation, equipment and support. Collective action has lowered costs to overcome 
some barriers. For example, three organisations have retail outlets in regional capitals 
from where products are marketed to the major cities and sold up to 110% above the 
production area selling price (US$ 3.3 per kg in mid-2010). Many associations use their 
strong social networks via ethnic and cultural societies to distribute and sell honey via 
friends and family. Trust-based credit systems are common, although anecdotes of loss-
es and theft were encountered. To counter this, Guiding Hope has been experimenting 
with advance purchase and marketing incentives. 
With increased commodification the economic value of apiculture products has also 
risen over time, with (inflation adjusted) prices in Bamenda increasing by 220% from 
the 1989 average price of 500 FCFA per kg (0.81 US$) (Paterson 1989). The economic 
and cultural value of honey is reflected in its selling price and differs by region. Figure 
8.7 shows that the price of honey from Adamaoua is lower than from the Northwest in 
all market types. This difference is attributed to lower costs (Ingram 2011a; Tsafack 
Matsop et al. 2011), increased economies of scale, greater supply and lower local de-
mand. The much smaller production quantities and higher cultural and multiple use val-
ues of honey from the Northwest and especially Oku, increase the price, especially of 
white but also golden honey. This means that the price of white honey in type II and II 
Box 8.1  Import requirements for honey and wax 
Water content, hydroxymethylfurfuraldehyde (HMF) and diastase are used by importers to 
measure honey purity. This is despite strong criticism (White 1994), as diastase varies largely 
depending on botanical origin and high water content (up to 25%) and high HMF (over 100 
mg/kg) which is common in tropical honey (Sanford 1996). It is even a sign of non-
adulteration. Testing is expensive at around 25 US$ per sample. Cameroonian exporters see 
this as an unfair trade barrier as it translates into an unequal market requirement for tropical 
honey. They have had high HMF honey rejected as only saleable as lower quality (lower 
priced) ‘bakers honey’. In response, Guiding Hope is trialling different logistics, storage meth-
ods and refrigerated containers to reduce transport time and avoid the high temperatures 
which create high HMF levels. The European Union Honey Monitoring Residue scheme 
(HMRS) (European Council 2002) regulates pesticide and chemical levels in honey imports to 
the EU, responding to adulterated honey from large-scale exporters such as China and Ar-
gentina. It applies to all imports, regardless of Cameroonian production being dominated by 
organic, forest-based beekeeping with no evidence found of chemicals used in beekeeping. 
The Cameroonian HMRS was recognised by the government and approved by the EU prior to 
any exports being made. Guiding Hope proposed and led the challenging 18 month process 
with MINEPIA. The HMRS was approved in 2009 (see Ingram and Njikeu 2011). Individual 
exporters have to register in Cameroon and be approved by the EU. A similar process is re-
quired for wax. To date only Guiding Hope has maintained its annual registration since 2009. 
Annual testing of honey samples is required before honey is accepted for export. Tests can 
only be conducted in EU-certified labs (which do not yet exist in Cameroon, adding further 
costs). To date the HMRS costs Guiding Hope around 2,000 US$ annually. Other industry 
standards requirements add to the considerable barriers small companies face in export 
(Ingram et al. 2011b). For example, South Africa requires imported honey to be irradiated and 
in certain types of containers. The USA and Canada have different phyto-sanitary require-
ments. Organic certification does not allow irradiation and the containers specified are not 
accepted by other exporters, creating further barriers to enter different import markets.  
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markets is comparable to average honey prices in European and USA consumer markets 
(CBI 2006). High transaction costs, complicated logistics, small-scale bulking and 
meeting stringent export standards (shown in Box 8.1) combine to make exported Cam-
eroonian honey expensive compared to honey from major exporting nations such as 
China and Argentina. This situation mirrors other developing country experiences (Bees 
for Development 2006; van Loon et al. 2006). It means that only high value, niche ex-
port markets, such as organic, ethical and fair trade certified, create sufficiently high 
margins to be economically viable. 
Honey is the highest volume and value apiculture product traded in the chains, 
shown in Table 8.4. Domestic and regional markets for table honey were reported by 
traders and exporters to have increased in the last three decades. In the Northwest, an 
estimated 112 tons was produced in 1988 (Paterson 1989) and in 2008 at least 158 tons. 
Almost 95% of beekeepers reported increasing production in the last three decades and 
93% in the last five years. In Adamaoua, production also increased in the last 30 years 
according to 78% of beekeepers and 85% in the last five years. Honey production and 
value per region are shown in Table 8.4. Adamaoua is the largest zone producing 
around 93% of national production followed by the Northwest and West regions. Export 
data is difficult to verify, with official statistics focusing on the Port of Douala and not 
capturing the porous road borders. Annually an estimated 30,000 to 50,000 litres is ex-
ported to Congo, the CAR and Gabon and 50,000 to 150,000 litres to Nigeria and Chad. 
Corruption was not as a major cost on road transport routes; however during its exports 
from Douala and rail it was reported to be increasing.  
 
Table 8.4 Annual average apiculture production and value per region 2003-2009 
Region 
Honey pro-
duction  
(litres) 
Honey value  
(FCFA) 
Wax 
production 
(kg) 
Wax value  
(FCFA) 
Hive prod-
uct value  
(FCFA) 
Total value 
apiproducts 
(FCFA) 
Adamaoua  3,101,700 1,723,400,000 225,000 519,126,090 342,000  2,242,868,090 
Centre  15,026  22,499,104 - - - 22,499,104 
East 347  51,470,000 20 - - 51,470,000 
Northwest 104,006  51,802,475 1,861  1,595,012 1,155,500 54,552,987 
South  1,068 1,598,416 40 - -  1,598,416 
Southwest 39,689  43,638,000 106 7,200 - 43,645,200 
West 48,900  66,825,000 106 - - 66,825,000 
North & Ex. N 28,434  42,575,503 20 - - 42,575,503 
Total   3,339,170 2,003,808,497 454,200 520,728,302 1,497,500  2,526,034,300 
Value US$   4,483,802     1,016   3,351   5,652,355   
Source: Research results Key: - No data available 
 
Shown in Table 8.5, a smaller volume and value of wax is traded annually, primarily 
exported. Wax production is influenced by hive type, as KTBs are easier to harvest, 
with on average 7.18 kg obtained from KTBs compared to 5.5 kg from traditional hives, 
although the differences are not statistically significant (Tsafack Matsop et al. 2011). 
Wax production varies widely between regions and villages, attributed to beekeepers’ 
skills and knowledge in wax processing and if they have links to buyers. If there are no 
links, beekeepers generally do not process wax and often throw it away as a by-product 
of honey processing. From Adamaoua, an estimated 157 tons of black wax is sold annu-
ally to type IV markets in Nigeria and the Central African Republic. The international 
type IV wax export market has been growing in the last five years with demand out-
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stripping supply, to around 66 to 120 tons annually. This market is further price and 
quality differentiated, as shown in Figure 8.7. The low relative profit margins have been 
increasing as prices and demand have consistently risen for Cameroonian wax, particu-
larly certified organic, in the last five years. This has occurred as wax production 
worldwide has declined (Grünewald 2010) as a result of climatic changes, pests such as 
varroa, and increasing monoculture agriculture lowering yields (UNEP 2011).  
 
Figure 8.7 Apiculture value chain and prices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Research results Key: regions: A = Adamaoua NW = Northwest, C = Centre, L = Littoral 
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Conventional wax producers however find it difficult to meet pharmaceutical and 
cosmetic use requirements for yellow wax and the stringent EU quality standards for 
pesticide and chemical-free wax (see Box 8.1). Despite growing demand, production 
increases have been slow and upscaling difficult, reflecting other African experiences 
(CBI 2006). The volume of wax entering type II markets for craft and metal working is 
estimated at around 500 to 1,200 kg in Bamenda and 800 kg in Foumban. The odour 
makes no difference to craft workers but smoky, overheated wax works less effectively 
and thus lowers the price. High quality wax is sold up to 50% above the average selling 
price shown in Figure 8.7. Sales of hive by-products, occurring mainly from the North-
west, were also reported to have grown in the last decade to a value of at least 2,359 
US$ annually in the study period. Around Ngaoundal, annual honey beer production is 
estimated at 9,360 litres, worth 2,808 million FCFA (5,732 US$) and in the Northwest, 
the estimated 6,864 litres of beer is valued at 2,059 million FCFA (4,203 million US$). 
Propolis is the most valuable hive product by weight. It is hardly traded in Adamaoua 
but in the Northwest is in high demand and usually only available in small quantities. 
Guiding Hope has been buying from both study areas and exporting 10 to 60 kg annual-
ly to South African, European and American pharmaceutical, cosmetic and health com-
panies since 2008. 
Governance of the apiculture chain 
To answer the third research question, this section presents and analyses the governance 
arrangements and trends in the apiculture chains. Although the apiculture sector and 
small business context in which it is played out is notable for its regulatory and policy 
void, governance arrangements are present in the form of beekeeper and association-led 
market standards and recent voluntary initiatives. The last two decades and especially 
the last five years, have seen major changes in chain organisation and governance. 
 
Absent statutory regulations 
There is currently, and appear never to have been statutory regulation concerning bee-
keeping or apiculture products. National quality standards and definitions have been 
discussed since 2008, mainly by major processing associations as a way of differentiat-
ing their products and quality. No formal regulations have yet emerged and the pushing 
has not been too forceful, due to fears of government interference, excessive formalisa-
tion and higher costs that formalisation may bring, particularly fears of corruption. This 
uneven playing field however benefits organised groups more than individuals, allowing 
innovators to set their own ‘rules of the game’. The only regulation is recent and con-
cerns the requirement by MINEPIA for production and collection centres for the collec-
tion and marketing of all animal products (including honey) to be accredited. Most pro-
cessor organisations and local MINEPIA agents outside of Bamenda and Ngaoundal are 
unaware of the regulation and it is generally not enforced. Only Guiding Hope and Oku 
Honey Cooperative were accredited by 2011. For exports, although the EU HMRS (Box 
8.1) has been implemented, no other measures have been introduced for exports to other 
countries. The HMRS was pushed into place by Guiding Hope to their competitive ad-
vantage. For exports to other countries, no rules exist and no regulation was reported as 
being exercised by any government department. Whilst forest and wildlife regulations 
(see Chapter 6) are important for the maintenance of forest-based bee forage, they do 
not specifically mention beekeeping or honey hunting.  
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Government actors have been only sporadically active in regulating the chain and 
their interplay has been confused, with at least four entities10 promoting beekeeping 
over the last 20 years. Their objectives have varied widely from stimulating beekeeping 
as an agricultural or livestock practice, for forest conservation and for rural develop-
ment. These have changed largely on a project-by-project basis or related to the person-
al skills and interests of staff. In 2008 MINEPIA claimed the apiculture sector and allo-
cated resources to develop and regulate it through the PADFA. This was partly due to 
pressure from apiculture trading enterprises and interest by development organisations 
such as SNV and FAO. This void of formal governance echoes the lack of many of the 
design principles seen as important for governance (Ostrom et al. 1994; Vollan and 
Ostrom. 2010). 
 
Sticky dash 
Many of the large trader-intermediaries and enterprises such as Guiding Hope maintain 
relations with government agents to minimise bureaucracy, manage corruption and se-
cure access to government training and support through projects such as PADFA. Some 
of these relations are nuanced when officials are also large-scale traders. Corruption 
levels are not however generally perceived as high in the chain and do not strongly in-
fluence either access to resources or markets. There are fears that this may change with 
formalisation, noted by many in the Northwest as a reason not to formalise or become 
‘visible’. Whilst exporters and larger traders indicated that they are often checked and 
pay bribes at border crossing and roadblocks, these were seen as everyday occurrences 
and not specifically related to the product. A warning signal was raised by Guiding 
Hope of the problems negotiating exports of honey and wax from the Port of Douala, 
despite having all the required permits indicates that large volumes of this at the time 
unfamiliar product attract unwanted calls for dash, negatively affecting honey quality 
and costs whilst negotiations ensued to speed its exit from the port. 
 
Customary regulations 
Although customary rules governing beekeeping have existed for at least fifty years, it 
is not strongly regulated in Adamaoua, where no customary rules relating to beekeeping 
were found. In the Northwest however, in common with other areas of the Bamenda 
highlands, traditional authorities around Kilum Ijim have decreed ‘country Sundays’ 
which determine when farm and forest work should cease. Traditional rules prohibiting 
killing bees exist in the three Fondoms covering the Kilum Ijim Forest. There are no 
rules granting rights or setting boundaries specifically for beekeeping or honey hunting, 
which works on a first come basis. Some beekeepers however try to secure their rights 
with annual gifts of honey to the palace. Many of the processing organisations also 
maintain relations with customary authorities. 
The governance of forests as sources of bee forage and hive materials also differs be-
tween regions. In Adamaoua, customary regulation of forage sources currently does not 
appear to exist nor has it in the past. The forest is open access and only specific, valua-
ble resources, such as fertile riverine gallery forests popular for farming are traditionally 
controlled. Beekeepers’ access to relatively scarce bamboo (Oxytenanthera abyssinica) 
groves for hive construction is permitted by the village ‘owning’ the resource. Other 
                                                 
10  MINADER, MINFOF, the Northwest Rural Development Agency (MIDENO) and MINEPIA. 
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apiculture activities impacting the use of hive materials and forage sources are not cus-
tomarily controlled, monitored or enforced. For example, there is no control of access to 
multiple use species such as kofia (Lophria lanceolata), the main melliferous species 
and favoured fuelwood species (including for wax production), source of edible cater-
pillars, cattle forage and medicinal oil seeds (also used in soap making). Bush burning, 
practised by semi-nomadic herders, is not controlled and was reported as the main rea-
son for installing hives high in trees. Beekeepers noted only very occasional conflicts 
with grazers and with other collectors of hive materials. These were mainly resolved 
through traditional authorities. In the Northwest, as explained in Chapter 6, the High-
lands forests were strongly customarily regulated, creating a favourable environment for 
bee forage and beekeeping and strong cultural symbolism relating to honey and bees. 
But increasing pluralism and decreasing traditional authority’s power and ability to con-
trol and enforce customary regulations, combined with increasing pressures in popula-
tion and use, have led to significant deforestation and degradation (elaborated in Chap-
ter 4).  
 
Buzzing voluntary governance  
The high level of voluntary collective action among beekeepers in the Northwest and its 
gradual emergence in Adamaoua has influenced how the chains are governed. The pop-
ularity and success of cooperatives and associations in the Northwest stems from the 
historical cultural, political and trade context in the region (Chapter 4), making collec-
tive action more common than in Adamaoua. Beekeepers’ groups and the integrated 
chain activities of processing organisations have created voluntary rules about how, 
where and when collection, processing and marketing take place. This has supported 
economies of scale, increased the bargaining power of producers and their ability to 
compete in the market and sometimes enhancing communication but also creating mis-
trust and miscommunication as product values and roles change.  
Alternative organisational forms, such as NGOs which act as enterprises, have been 
adopted to avoid some of the problems associated with cooperatives, upon that premise 
that avoid formalisation minimises corruption and costly government interference. 
However, collective action has not always been successful. Internal corruption, inexpe-
rienced management and marketing have led to the failure of several collective ar-
rangements. Many organisations engaging in collective purchasing have struggled to 
balance cash flows and pay beekeepers a good price direct on delivery. Despite this, 
there have been repeated attempts to organise beekeepers to benefit from collective ac-
tion, mainly stimulated by donor organisations, NGOs and the government. Collective 
action and formalisation has often been a prerequisite for accessing grants, capital and 
ethical and organic niche markets.  
Another recent voluntary arrangement is the organic and fair trade certification (see 
Chapter 6) by Guiding Hope of its honey, wax and propolis operations in 53 villages in 
Adamaoua. It is extending collective action and certification across Adamaoua and 
gradually to other areas in Cameroon. In 2006, the GIC spotted a market opportunity in 
the large quantities of good quality, naturally organic products, high production poten-
tial and growing demand from international clients (Ingram et al. 2011b). As the first 
and only certified apiculture organisation in Cameroon and Central Africa, this involved 
a steep learning curve and significant investment funded by the founding members, 
costing approximately 4,000 US$ in start-up costs and 3,200 US$ annually. The annual 
costs of maintaining certification and traceability systems mean that selling honey, wax 
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and propolis as certified organic at a higher price than conventional products is essential 
to cover costs. Considerable human and physical capital was also required to achieve 
and adhere to the standards. Only Guiding Hope is certified, although BERUDEP and 
Oku Honey Cooperative are interested, but deterred by the costs. The high retail prices 
in the Northwest, strong demand and lack of regulation mean that the costs of certifica-
tion are not perceived to outweigh benefits in terms of higher selling prices and access 
to new markets. Similar experiences have occurred in Ethiopia and Zambia (pers. 
comm. M. Husselman, CIFOR; (Mickels-Kokwe 2006; Husselman et al. 2009). The 
chain of custody for organic honey requires a system of documentation, traceability and 
quality control which was difficult to set up given the largely illiterate beekeeping popu-
lation and undocumented and informal trade systems. The benefits were professionali-
zation, increased scale, process and product innovations and the connection of actors 
along the value chain (see Ingram and Njikeu 2011 for details). Organic certification 
allowed Guiding Hope to apply for the ethical trade certification and qualify to export 
under the preferential terms of community trade status to the international cosmetic 
company The Body Shop. Guiding Hope exports to Tropical Forest Products which 
sells organic apiculture products in Europe. These trading relationships have been built 
slowly, based on trust, mutual learning, capacity building and long-term orders. The risk 
is however dependence upon international clients and sometimes lower prices than the 
prevailing market prices, as demand has been increasing significantly for both organic 
products and conventional wax. The Body Shop and Tropical Forest Products also have 
Zambian and Ethiopian honey producer associations as clients. This creates a competi-
tive dimension between suppliers from the three countries but also opportunities for 
cross-country learning, including through trade associations such as ApiTrade Africa. 
 
International agreements  
Involuntary regulations such as the European Union’s HMRS (see Box 8.1 and above) 
have had a moderate influence. Whilst the Cameroonian HRMS was voluntarily set up, 
it was in response to the EU requirements that effectively control access to the European 
market and set quality standards for products (albeit that this is irrelevant for the pro-
duction methods used in Cameroon). Whilst rights are clearly stated in the regulations, 
Cameroonian actors have no control over rule-making, monitoring, sanctions.  This has 
had significant consequences for the practices and production methods for organisations 
that sought to supply European-based buyers and has deterred some organisations from 
entering this market.  
 
Project governance  
In the Northwest, new governance mechanisms were first driven by the BHFP (see 
Chapter 6). The 17 community forests introduced under the BHFP in the early 2000s 
cover the main honey production areas and created new rights, responsibilities and insti-
tutions impacting the apiculture chain. Realising the then importance of customary 
regulation and lack of formal regulations about sustainable forest management and bee-
keeping specifically, the BHFP sought to officialise customary governance and project-
developed guidelines in what was known as Fondom Agreed Wide Rules in 1999 
(Asanga 2002). This resulted in rules that all community forests should have at least one 
area where all use was forbidden except beekeeping, allowing only smokers to be used 
for harvesting and prohibiting the felling of melliferous species such as Podocarpus 
spp., Carapa grandiflora, Prunus africana and Scheffleria spp. The BHFP encouraged 
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beekeeping, seeing it as conservation positive: “the Oku beekeepers are in no way harm-
ful to local ecosystem” (Paterson 1989: 6). Recognising the long tradition of beekeeping 
in the Kilum Ijim forest, the project tried to enshrine this right in forest management 
plans, including it as a permitted activity in most community forests areas. Individual 
and collective action was promoted and supported through two associations, the Oku 
Honey Cooperative and NOWEBA (Paterson 1989).These conservation-focussed strat-
egies attempted to increase the forest’s livelihood value by commoditising forest prod-
uct, epitomised by Birdlife International (2000): 
“Technicians with skills in natural resource management and specific technologies such as beekeep-
ing, will provide training and advice in areas that will help to enhance livelihood opportunities derived 
from the forest in a sustainable manner (…) provid[ing] training, advice and support for activities 
which enhance the value of forests to communities (e.g. beekeeping).”  
Enforcing compliance with new rules through monitoring and on-the ground presence 
was successful while the project was well-funded, but with diminished funds after 2004, 
locally-initiated projects and NGOs filled this gap. Whilst building on the BHFP’s lega-
cy, skills and networks, they did have not had the same level of assets, but were often 
more integrated into the local communities. They also aimed to halt and reverse forest 
degradation, but often more pragmatically with the focus first on livelihoods and sec-
ondly on conservation. 
A Geographic Indication (GI) (see Chapter 6) Oku White Honey project funded by 
the Organisation for Intellectual Property in Africa (OAPI) was started in 2010. The 
idea originated with the French Development Agency (AFD) and Centre for Agricultur-
al Research (CIRAD). They selected the product and recruited local actors to implement 
the GI: Guiding Hope and SNV Cameroon, which helped set up a legally registered 
multi-stakeholder Kilum-Ijim Oku White Honey Association (KIWHA). The associa-
tion aims to improve the production and quality of Oku White Honey and other bee 
products, protect the natural environment of the GI through forest management institu-
tions, to judiciously manage the Kilum Ijim forest to meet producer’s interests and to 
work with Government and OAPI partners on the GI product. This process is expected 
to culminate in the award of a GI in 2013, valorising the white honey and local culture, 
and promoting development. It is a new concept for the African apiculture sector and 
for agriculture and forest products in general. The project has been strongly process-
orientated in obtaining the GI. Initially the GI was strongly externally influenced, how-
ever now that GI attribution is almost finalised hybrid forms of governance are appear-
ing as local ownership and implementation occurs. In 2012 KIWHA started to focus 
more attention on maintaining and securing sufficient bee forage and marketing, but 
without external funding. It is too early to determine the effects of the GI on apiculture 
product values, livelihoods and sustainability. 
The BHFP, the GI Oku White Honey project and the many geographically specific, 
small-scale conservation and beekeeping development projects in the Northwest have 
largely focussed at the start of the chain, on beekeeping. Most donor-led initiatives have 
also focused only on beekeepers. This is despite beekeepers and organisations repeated-
ly stating that their main problems are running enterprises, up-scaling and marketing. 
An outcome of projects has been the gradual evolution of sustainable and production-
enhancing ‘good practice’. These include rules about leaving unripe combs in the hive 
and harvesting only two-thirds of ripe combs – to maintain brood, reduce fermentation 
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and moisture content, leave food for the colony and promote post-harvest re-colo-
nisation; using smokers and daytime harvesting – to reduce the risk of bushfire11; light 
clearing of vegetation and no felling around hives and not using bark or hollow trees as 
hives – as conservation measures. Many of the grasses and plants used for hive thatch-
ing and in smokers are now cultivated around beekeepers’ homes and farms, as are mul-
ti-purpose melliferous plants. These practices have been documented (API-CAM 1998; 
Bonu 2001; CTA 2007) and have gradually disseminated into other beekeeping areas in 
the Northwest, Southwest and nationally by the local NGOs and processing organisa-
tions providing training and running projects, such as HONCO, ANCO, BERUDEP, the 
Riba Agroforestry Resource Centre (RARC) and the Oku Honey Cooperative.  
Other impacts created by the projects are the incongruences that new institutions, 
such as community forest management institutions, have caused. Producer organisations 
and beekeepers have been confronted with donor and support organisation’s models for 
upscaling and collective action. ‘Modern’ beekeeping has been favoured by projects as 
providing immediate, tangible outputs. For example, the RIGC project gave KTB hives 
to beekeeping groups around Kilum Ijim but up to 20% were unused and a low rate 
(18%) colonised in the first year in 2010, ascribed to poor management (Ministry of 
Forestry and Wildlife 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). At least three other projects in the North-
west and one in Adamaoua (MOBEC), have promoted ‘modern’ beekeeping techniques, 
despite the ineffectiveness of this type of intervention being well documented in other 
developing countries (Howard 2005; Tchana 2010; Wright et al. 2010a). Responses 
have ranged from acceptance to rejection, to tailoring and creating hybrid practices and 
arrangements with different outcomes at individual, group and community level. The 
differing efficiency of management and harvesting techniques associated with different 
hive types and feelings of ownership and engagement resulting from ‘gifts’ of hives 
have left beekeepers divided about the efficacy of project interventions, particularly 
when the focus has been on production but not on commercialising apiculture products, 
and projects have resulted in changes in power relationships in their communities. Pro-
jects and NGOs have had sufficient presence and resources to change activities and 
norms, but not always enforcement. This has depended upon the local presence and fol-
low up contact with beekeepers, particularly over more than one harvesting season, as 
well as the ability and resources to enforce compliance with new governance arrange-
ments.  
 
Sticky bricolage 
The chain is characterised by a situation of multiple arrangements and institutional bri-
colage (Cleaver 2002). In the Northwest the lack of formal arrangements concerning 
beekeeping and ineffective forest management regulations, combined with once strong 
customary arrangements, project-based rules and new, hybrid forest management ar-
rangements such as community forests have led beekeepers and their organisations to 
create their own institutions to enable and regulate chain activities. This dynamic situa-
tion has emerged to claim assets, in response to struggles, and to avoid conflicts be-
tween multiple forest users. Many actors, particularly processing organisations, have 
played all available options by joining or engaging in different degrees, with CF institu-
tions, maintaining links with traditional authorities, collaborating with projects, donors 
                                                 
11  Night-time use of grass smokers in Kilum Ijim forest caused bushfires covering 5,000 ha in 2003 and 
2000 ha in 2008 and the deaths of two beekeepers in the period 2000 to 2010.  
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and development organisations and collaborating with government officials. In Ada-
maoua, where formal and traditional regulations have been little felt, the effect of pro-
jects has been more minimal and conflicts fewer due to its lower population density. 
Market-led institutions such as the certification schemes and chain platforms developed 
by Guiding Hope have blended local practices with the requirements of new markets. 
This has supported up-scaling, professionalising, adapting and improving local technol-
ogies and engendered ownership by beekeepers, countering past negative experiences of 
external, project-led arrangements. Seeing that the lack of formal rules and unauthorised 
exports to Europe could jeopardise exports, Guiding Hope and Les Meillieries have 
pushed regulatory systems – such as the Cameroonian HMRS – into place, institutional-
ising and formalising new rules on quality and processing. The major processing organ-
isations, the Interprofession and regional Associations have also been toying with intro-
ducing regulatory honey quality standards, aiding competitive advantage and maintain-
ing market control as lead organisations. Scored using the system introduced in the 
methodology in Chapter 3 and detailed in Appendix 18, the arrangements are illustrated 
in Figure 8.8.  
 
Figure 8.8 Governance arrangements in the apiculture chain in Cameroon 
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Governance and livelihoods in the apiculture chain 
This section addresses the fourth research question of how governance arrangements 
affect the livelihoods of actors along the chain, using the sustainable livelihoods ap-
proach. Table 8.5 shows that in both areas beekeeping contributes to nearly half of an-
nual household income. In the Northwest a third of respondents (SD 40) indicated that 
beekeeping is their primary income-generating activity. They have up to six (SD 2) oth-
er activities and all practise farming. Just over 30% indicated they are primarily farmers, 
12% were wood workers, 10% were civil servants, 12% collect other NTFPs including 
hunting, 12% in trading and 1% were traditional healers. The majority (45%) have at 
least one and up to four other income sources such as commerce, medical practices, 
crafts, livestock and labouring. 
 
Table 8.5 Average income range of beekeepers from apiculture  
Region Northwest Adamaoua Average 
Average annual income apicul-
ture3 
207,000 FCFA  
587 US$ 
281,000 FCFA 
433 US$ 
244,000 FCFA 
510 US$ 
Difference from average incomes1 -30% -1% -38% 
Annual average income range 
FCFA 
% of beekeepers 
Mezam Boyo & Bui Djerem Average 
10.000 - 100,000 44 18 87 50 
100,000 - 500,000 50 25 11 29 
500,000 - 1,000,000 3 19 2 8 
1,000,000 -2,000,000 3 31 0 11 
>2,000,000 0 7 0 2 
Sources Research results and 1National Institute of Statistics 2002. 
 
Average annual incomes are shown in Table 8.5. These are lower than the Came-
roonian average incomes detailed in Chapter 4. Variables influencing production and 
incomes are the number of hives per beekeeper, the average of which varies widely by 
and between regions. The national average is 11 hives, varying from 68 in Adamaoua 
(with 5% owning up to 400 hives), 16 in the Northwest to three in the Southwest and 
West. Investing in large numbers of hives counters low occupation rates, with between 
30 to 85% of hives colonised in Ngaoundal and 18 to 56% in the Northwest depending 
on season, location, pests, management and experience. Skills also determine the activi-
ties conducted and extent of processing hive and by-products. For most intermediaries 
in Kumbo and Bamenda markets trading provides 80% of household incomes, farming 
5% and other activities 15%. Their average annual income was 1,083,867 FCFA 
(250,000 FCFA, SD 510 US$) (2,007 US$, SD US$) in the period 2007 to 2009. Aver-
age incomes of traders in Adamaoua were lower, at 900,000 FCFA (SD 445,000 FCFA) 
(1,666 US$, SD 908 US$). 
Taking into account average household sizes in each region, an estimated 130,678 
people benefit from apiculture incomes. For an estimated 16,930 beekeepers in the 
Northwest and Adamaoua, beekeeping contributes on average to just under of their half 
of annual household cash income. However, many continue to struggle and few emerg-
ing above a 2 US$ a day poverty level. Beekeepers therefore generally use a range of 
income-generating and subsistence activities. Some of these paradoxically contribute to 
degrade or diminish the source of bee forage, such as livestock grazing, live fuelwood 
collection, and unsustainable Prunus africana harvesting collection (see Chapter 9), 
hunting and, in Adamaoua, shifting cultivation. Much higher incomes and profits are 
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possible when beekeepers professionalise, join together, increase scale and diversify 
production to include other hive and bee products. Although less people work further 
along the chain in processing organisations (96), as intermediaries and wholesalers (20), 
retailers and hawkers (737) and exporters (40) – specialisation in these value adding ac-
tivities results in higher than average incomes for these actors, fewer income-generating 
activities and higher levels of dependence on apiculture.  
The mix of collective action with voluntary market-based governance arrangements 
reflects attempts, particularly by processing organisations, to increase the value of api-
culture and the economic and political power of beekeepers and their organisations. 
New arrangements have been productively bricolaged (Batterburry 2001; Ros-Tonen 
2012) to diversify apiculture income sources by producing more hive and associated 
products, such as seedlings. Building economies of scale and extending to regional, na-
tional and international markets outside the saturated local type I markets has resulted in 
increases in volumes sold, prices and profits, illustrated by Guiding Hope12. These dis-
tant markets are also less vulnerable to price fluctuations linked to supply peaks, mak-
ing incomes and livelihoods more stable. Collective action has enhanced the ability of 
organisations to gather and use market information and improved their bargaining pow-
er, particularly in type III urban and type IV export markets, mirroring other NTFP and 
smallholder experiences (Komarudin et al. 2006; Markelova et al. 2009; Awono et al. 
2010a). It has enabled scale and specialisation, leading to innovative marketing and 
product profiling, helping diversify income sources.  
Further livelihood improvements have faced challenges which institutional arrange-
ments have tried to overcome, with mixed success. The multi-tiered associations enable 
several thousand members to be connected. However they have struggled to access suf-
ficient economic, human and physical capital to upscale, maintain information flows 
and enter new markets with different standards and products. Although increasing scale 
and professionalization reduce transaction costs, compensating for market weaknesses 
(Markelova et al. 2009), increasing size amplifies transaction costs which has under-
mined performance. This delicate balance is highlighted by the collapse of the largest 
associations. Producer associations’ fluctuating levels of service provision, ability to 
purchase bee and hive products in season and invest in equipment and infrastructure are 
dependent on the availability of capital from internal sources and external (donor, finan-
cial or support) institutions, as traditional credit sources (tontines and social networks) 
are generally insufficient and micro-finance institutions absent and wary of coopera-
tives, given their mixed track record in Cameroon. Although two of the groups have 
bank loans, they are difficult to obtain due to a lack of collateral and trust. Guiding 
Hope is an exception having leveraged significant capital: its business model as a for-
malised, ethical enterprise is attractive to investors. Many cooperatives have raised 
funds by initially rapidly increasing membership, but became overwhelmed providing 
services and support to the remote, dispersed members. Without sufficient capital, man-
aging cash flow becomes difficult and seasonal price fluctuations continue as beekeep-
ers cash in their products directly post-harvest to generate income, despite their long 
shelf life. As most beekeepers prefer profits to be paid immediately in the form of high-
er buying prices, the operating profit margins of processing organisations can support 
only a minimal level of services. This cash crunch has driven organisations to acquire 
                                                 
12  For example, Guiding Hope won the Best New Small, Medium and Micro Enterprise in Africa Award 
in 2011. http://www.africagrowth.com/Press_Release_SMME_Award_Winners.pdf. 
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skills (e.g. project writing) and orientate themselves to external actors’ requirements, 
such as certification which also requires major economic and social capital investments. 
The rises and falls of groups such as NOWEBA, HONCO, MOBEC and UGIPROM-
NAD and the continuing low average apiculture incomes indicate that collective action 
has had only marginal impact on livelihoods for the majority of actors in the chain. 
Corresponding to Bernard et al.’s (2008) findings, the performance and range of ser-
vices provided by collective processing organisations are also constrained by low pro-
fessional management capacity. Whilst new skill sets have been acquired and human 
capital increased, an increase in empowerment (i.e. social capital) to a level enabling 
beekeepers, their associations and intermediaries to shape niche markets and increase 
their bargaining power with large, international buyers has not yet occurred. Guiding 
Hope’s difficulties in setting-up the Body Shop’s community trade scheme, achieving 
ethical and organic certification and entering the EU market illustrate this (Ingram et al. 
2011b). However, collective action attracted support, provided a voice and legitimacy to 
interact and develop formal governance arrangements with donors and the government, 
illustrated by the emerging Interprofession. The success and failures of regional federa-
tions shows however that whilst many actors recognise the benefits of collective action, 
several attempts and configurations are needed before appropriate institutions have de-
veloped and benefits can then be returned to beekeepers in the form of timely hive 
product purchase and higher buying prices.  
New markets have driven new chain configurations, relationships and institutions 
and vice versa. These have increased profits, by adding value and by marketing hive 
products previously thrown away or little harvested, such as wax and propolis. Choices 
of whether to develop new markets with higher profit margins and risks, or invest in the 
burgeoning local and regional market, both have implications for the sustainability of 
livelihoods and require security of supply. A balance of power in the new relationships 
is apparent. Benefitting from the experience of partners and support organisations to 
enter speciality export markets with high entry and maintenance barriers carries a risk of 
dependence. This has been balanced against generating sufficient, immediate profits to 
convince beekeepers of the initial additional costs of new production methods and insti-
tutions. 
The range of arrangements, strategies and channels used by different organisations 
reflect Thomas et al.’s (2003) suggestion that forest-based enterprises should focus on 
either quality or quantity and Macqueen and colleagues’ (2006) recommendation that 
standards increases the likelihood of accessing niche markets with better prices. Ad-
dressing quality, quantity and regularity of supply has enhanced access to type III and 
IV markets and improved livelihoods. Formalisation and scale are constraining factors 
in the transition from local to international markets, explained in Chapter 5. This is a 
common complaint from small-scale rural entrepreneurs (Vermeulen et al. 2008). Net-
working and using support partners has partially helped to overcome this, enabling ac-
cumulations of political and human capital, echoing studies showing the importance of 
these capitals to livelihoods (van den Berg et al. 2007; Devaux et al. 2009). 
The void of formal governance arrangements has created a space in which many 
people use apiculture to enhance and diversify livelihoods based largely on subsistence 
agriculture. Collective action, projects and voluntary market led schemes have been to 
increase the value, particularly economic worth of apiculture products and craft higher 
than average livelihoods, while allowing social values to be extended to more people in 
the chain. Those specialising in apiculture have introduced institutions to recognise and 
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guard environmental, social and economic origins and values of apiculture products to 
create and maintain market niches and further add value to their products. As a last re-
sort, formal regulation has been selectively fashioned as a tool to support these new in-
stitutions and market positions.  
Governance and sustainability in the apiculture chain 
This section answers the fifth research question of how governance arrangements im-
pact product sustainability.  
The governance arrangements described result in activities in the apiculture chain be-
ing conducted fairly sustainably with a generally neutral to positive impact. The majori-
ty of apiculture products continue to originate from domesticated bees foraging and 
hives predominantly located in forests. Some of the most unsustainable practices in the 
Northwest notably honey hunting; bark hives and night harvesting are no longer prac-
tised. These have been discouraged by customary, project-based and voluntary regula-
tions which have evolved into best practices. However, some unsustainable practices 
remain as beekeepers engage, often unknowingly, in activities that in the long term neg-
atively affect forest bee forage. In the Northwest, traditional smokers are used and a mi-
nority of beekeepers engage in hunting, livestock grazing and collecting medicinal 
plants. In Adamaoua, practices occur such as honey hunting and collecting propolis 
from wild colonies, harvesting unripe combs, over-harvesting scarce hive materials, us-
ing torch-smokers and the wood of melliferous species as fuel for wax processing. Pro-
cessing innovations introduced by Guiding Hope, planting and protection of bamboo 
and raffia are early signs of changes to increase sustainability. 
Focus group discussions highlighted that anthropogenic and climatic fluctuations are 
negatively affecting forest resources and apiculture, echoing the changes described in 
Chapter 4. Just over a third of beekeepers indicated increasing variations in the length of 
the dry season, variability in the onset of seasons and increases in the number of bush 
fires and extreme rain events. These were perceived to negatively affect apiculture by 
changing the vegetation and causing new and increased pests and diseases. A concern 
voiced by beekeepers around Kilum Ijim was that forest fragmentation, deforestation 
and degradation is decreasing the availability of forage sources creating Oku white hon-
ey, noting a decrease in melliferous species such as Prunus africana. In the Northwest, 
the changing forest governance arrangements described in Chapter 6 have been unable 
to sufficiently maintain the forests as sources of bee forage, hive materials and fuelwood 
for product processing and specific agriculture chain arrangements have also been inad-
equate. In Adamaoua, nearly half of the beekeepers indicated increased climatic chang-
es. Increases in cattle grazing, bush burning and encroachment for agriculture were also 
noted, but not reported as affecting apiculture. Increasing numbers of beekeepers re-
quire scarce bamboo and raffia for hive building – affecting the NTFP chains described 
in Chapter 10 – pest outbreaks are more frequent and the demand for fuelwood, includ-
ing for wax production, has augmented. Beekeepers noted a decrease in the melliferous 
species Lophira lanceolata and Terminalia macroptera. Such increasing degradation 
and deforestation threatens the sustainability of the apiculture chain in the long term. 
However this hazard is perceived only by the larger processing organisations and char-
 205 
 
ismatic ‘ambassadors’13 – individuals with years of experience. On a beekeeper level, 
the generally small-scale production and growing numbers have enabled supply increas-
es to keep pace with demand, despite the diminishing forest forage supply, meaning that 
only beekeepers with long-term experience noted changes, as those with less experience 
are confounded by the natural bi-annual production fluctuations. This leads most bee-
keepers to not see forage sources as the limiting factor, but access to type III and IV 
markets.  
Some project-based and voluntary governance arrangements to enhance sustainabil-
ity have been ‘bricolaged’ in response to deforestation and degradation, the decline in 
traditional authority and the absence and/or ineffectiveness of formal forest governance 
arrangement. Many bricolaged arrangements aim to tackle the problem by planting 
trees. The integration of nurseries and tree planting into apiculture projects and pro-
cessing organisations has become institutionalised. This is most evident in the North-
west where forest loss is greatest. In Djerem, bamboo and raffia nurseries and planting 
out around three villages commenced in 2010. Exchange visits from Adamaoua to the 
Northwest led to ideas being mooted, but not yet put into action, to designate village 
‘beekeeping forest areas’ and create community forests. However the process of obtain-
ing a community forest and costs were seen as too high, with an uncertain outcome and 
long timescale. Donors and the ambassadors have driven this change by setting an ex-
ample, providing training and raising awareness. A result is that an estimated 15% of 
beekeepers plant multi-purpose melliferous species on farm, confirmed by Nkamleu and 
Manyong (2009) and Asaah et al. (2011). Only where tenure is secure, such as in com-
munity forests, or forests with still strong customary tenure, such as sacred forests and 
in parts of Oku, Bihkov and Mbiame, has forest enrichment or regeneration taken place. 
Few beekeepers reported actively protecting or conserving forests to support beekeep-
ing. Thus most beekeepers and their organisations are not conservationists per se, but 
pragmatic interventionists, managing forage sources, planting melliferous and hive ma-
terial-producing species. Some organisations combine enterprise and conservation as a 
way to maintain sustainable livelihoods. For example BERUDEP and ANCO have used 
customary rules and created community forests, such as Mbiame.  
However the opportunity costs of other forest uses (for agriculture, hunting, grazing, 
fuelwood and Prunus africana bark harvesting) are too high for apiculture chain actors 
to compete with. Beekeepers, alone or collectively, do not have sufficient economic or 
social power or tenure rights to maintain sufficient forest cover to maintain or increase 
production, despite the support of projects such as the BHFP and the SNV value chain 
capacity building project which aimed to add value to the forest and apiculture. The 
hailed ‘successes’ of collective action securing forest conservation (Asanga 2002) in 
hindsight did not wait to assess a sufficient time period to evaluate the impact of the in-
troduction, embedding and then hybridisation of the new governance arrangements. 
This resonances with the contention of Carter et al. (2007) that sustainable forest man-
agement is linked to greater local people’s involvement in decision-making through for-
est-based enterprises. The Cameroonian apiculture chain is not unusual in this respect, 
as the success of collective action in securing forest management depends on diverse 
                                                 
13  Notably Paul Mzeka, ANCO director (see footnote 1) and George Kangong, Riba Agroforestry Re-
source Centre director and 2010 Equator Prize winner. 
http://www.equatorinitiative.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=597%3Aribaagrof
orestryresourcecentre&catid=175&Itemid=689. Retrieved 21 January 2012). 
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variables, all of which need to be mastered to ensure sustainable livelihoods and re-
sources (Bradbear 2004; Donovan et al. 2006; Ostrom 2007).  
With increasing demand for apiculture products, beekeepers and especially pro-
cessing organisations have become more aware of the fragility of the resource base. 
This implies they are more aware of the positive indirect impact on ecosystem services 
(Holvoet et al. 2004), such as the pollination of a wide variety of subsistence and cash 
crops. Voluntary market-based arrangements such as organic certification and GI are 
founded upon forest-based apiculture and thus depend on a sustainable, continued sup-
ply of forest forage. The characteristics and organic nature of white honey are a unique 
selling point, evidenced by the forest images used on packaging and stress on this aspect 
in funding applications by processing organisations. Marketing strategies such as the 
Geographic Indication branding of ‘Oku White Honey’ and organic certification for 
‘Miel Royal de Savanne’ help consumers differentiate between honey profiles and in-
ternalise ecosystem and biodiversity values. In Adamaoua, the majority of hives are for-
est based, on average 3 to 20 km from villages. The results of HMRS tests and annual 
organic certification audits confirm beekeepers’ reports that the environment and bee-
keeping practices are organic. Guiding Hope however had to introduce rules to prove 
and check this, such as storing products in separate, registered collection centres to 
avoid a reoccurrence of contamination from chemicals and banning the traditional prac-
tice of smearing cow dung on hives, a transmission vector of chemicals used in live-
stock to apiculture products. In the Northwest, despite a belief that honey is organic, the 
practice of hive transhumance means that bees also forage on crops, particularly coffee 
(confirmed by beekeepers, observation and pollen analysis, see Appendix 15 for de-
tails). Observations, discussions with coffee cooperatives and literature (Nchare 2007) 
indicate that chemical use on coffee is widespread and not well controlled. This affects 
bee health, honey quality and poses problems for potential organic certification of Oku 
white honey, although governance arrangements to control this have not yet been enact-
ed.  
New practices and systems of governance have enabled new actors to enter the chain 
which may cause further changes in aspects of sustainability. For instance, as it is now 
easier and acceptable for women to keep bees, the home and farm become the main for-
age source, rather than the forest, although depending on distances, forests may still be 
foraged. With this development, product characteristics are likely to change, with the 
most highly valued characteristics such as the whiteness of Oku honey, being lost. The 
SNV and FAO support for chain-integrated activities contributed to an awareness of the 
benefits and failures of past production-focused and ‘modern’ technology orientated in-
terventions (Macqueen 2006; Simukoko 2008; Vabi 2010). As development rhetoric has 
moved to a pro-poor, sustainable chain and consumer-orientated focus, consciousness of 
the link between the sustainability of forest resources and livelihoods has grown, build-
ing on project-led arrangements such as the BHFP where forest benefits were stressed, 
and market-led arrangements such as organic certification and geographic indication 
which also emphasise the importance of sustainable resource use.  
The mix of arrangements constructed and employed by direct actors emphasise how 
natural capital has produced economic assets, aided by inputs of social capital. Alt-
hough there are some trade-offs with natural capital, such as the hive materials and re-
sources used in processing and practising activities which damage forest forage, these 
are now generally of limited scale. The apiculture chain has not been the major driver 
degrading forest resources. The chain is however threatened by anthropogenic forest use 
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and climatic changes. In the Northwest tree planting and the geographic indication 
scheme aim to secure access and tenure and reverse forest losses. However, community 
forests have failed to meet many institutional design principles and are largely ineffec-
tive. The quasi-tenure and changed institutional landscape created by community for-
ests, protected areas and decreasing traditional authority have meant that neither com-
munity forests, government, traditional authorities nor beekeeping organisations have 
been able to counter the scale of anthropogenic forest degradation. In Adamaoua, only 
recently have governance arrangements been introduced to tackle problems of scarcer 
forest resources. Once aware of the threats to the sustainability of their livelihoods, bee-
keepers and organisations have become bricoleurs, responding by planting forage on 
secure land and creating voluntary, market-based systems to internalise the environmen-
tal costs and benefits of apiculture. However, the tendency to use multipurpose and non-
native trees means that the ecosystems which create the prized white honey in Kilum 
Ijim are not being replaced. In Adamaoua, only selected species are being regenerated. 
The Highlands chain thus appears sustainable only as long as the rapidly diminishing 
forest resources continue to exist. In Adamaoua, recent actions may be sufficient to 
maintain production and continue to increase livelihood benefits. Although the forest 
resource is substantially larger, the lack of comprehensive, strong governance arrange-
ments encompassing the majority of actors represents a mounting risk to the livelihoods 
of those engaged in the chain as well as product sustainability, which ultimately affects 
the viability of the entire chain. 
Conclusions 
The analysis of the apiculture chains originating from Adamaoua and the Northwest of 
Cameroon indicates that governance arrangements have significantly influenced how 
apiculture products are sourced, harvested and traded. This section summarises the con-
clusions, responding to research questions two to five, on how the value chain is con-
figured in terms of products, actors, activities and values; the governance arrangements 
in place; how these impact the livelihoods of actors; and how these impact chain and 
product sustainability. 
Apiculture products are highly valued. These products are an important source of 
cash income and providing food, medicines and culturally important symbols, as well as 
ensuring pollination, a valuable ecosystem service. Alongside honey, the economic val-
ue and quantity sold of products such as wax, propolis and by-products has been in-
creasing. The significant economic and social values of apiculture products have be-
come more visible as their chains have extended further than the traditional local and 
regional markets. However the apiculture product chains been largely invisible for poli-
cy makers, similar to many other NTFP chains in the Congo Basin (Ingram et al. 
2012a). Only recently has recognition grown of their value by policymakers and state 
actors.  
However, the dispersed and remote nature of the chains and trade has meant that 
governance arrangements in the chain have been characterised by voids in formal gov-
ernance. This gap has allowed new voluntary, market-led and statutory arrangements to 
be relatively easily bricolaged by direct actors in the chain, often building upon tradi-
tional customs, and pushed largely by local enterprises, when perceived to contribute to 
livelihoods. Customary arrangements are more prominent and intense in the Highlands 
than the savannah forest ecoregion, in part due to factors such as high population densi-
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ty and pressure on forests and their products. In the Highlands, customarily control has 
now given way to pluralistic hybrids of customary, project and voluntary arrangements, 
such as geographic indication and best practices. Although apiculture products are de-
rived mainly from domesticated bees, the sources of forage and hive materials in Ada-
maoua, the main production area, are loosely customarily controlled or open access. 
This context has allowed actors to create and influence arrangements. Stringent volun-
tary and formal regulations in some importing countries have influenced the chain and 
stimulated a plural array of bricolaged, voluntary arrangements that allow actors to gain 
access to high value nice markets. This has affected a small but growing proportion of 
beekeepers and actors in the chain to date. The trade has not yet generated such reve-
nues that informal regulation through corruption is significant or large scale. There are 
signs however that this is changing as formalisation increases visibility.  
Trade in generally sustainably produced products apiculture products has a centuries-
long history and in the last decade has generated positive livelihood impacts for a sig-
nificant number of people. The product characteristics: seasonal but with a long shelf 
life and a high value-to-volume ratio, are advantageous to creating wealth. For the ma-
jority of small-scale actors, apiculture has not constituted a path out of poverty, despite 
contributing nearly half of average household income. Major changes in governance 
arrangements and markets in the last five years are however providing new opportuni-
ties for beekeepers, processers and exporters to professionalise and to scale up. As the 
value of products increases, the benefits they generate for actors in the chain has risen, 
increasing access to new markets for some actors, mainly members of groups.  
The main impact of governance arrangements on apiculture products and chain sus-
tainability has been to increase control over access to resources. Recent voluntary and 
market arrangements have focussed on access to markets as an explicit way of increas-
ing and demonstrating the sustainability of the chain: coupling access to assets with ac-
cess to markets. However if these tentative arrangements are sufficient to ensure prod-
uct sustainability is highly debateable. Faced with weak forest governance generally, 
and strong anthropogenic and climatic pressures, the Highlands chain is threatened by 
swiftly increasing forest degradation and deforestation. In Adamaoua, the small scale of 
voluntary and market actions to date may be sufficient to maintain production levels if 
other threats to the ecoregion do not endanger either bees or forage sources. Significant 
scaling up of production may pose a mounting risk to resources, but also act as a trigger 
to introduce arrangements that safeguard the availability of bee forage and species used 
in apiculture, securing and possibly improving the livelihoods of the largest group of 
most marginalised and low income actors involved in the chain. 
 
  
9  
Prunus africana value chain1 
This chapter presents the results of the in-depth analysis of the Prunus africana chain 
originating from the Northwest, Southwest and Adamaoua regions and extending to 
markets in Cameroon, Europe and the USA. The findings are based on interviews, liter-
ature, observation, resource assessments, value chain analysis, market surveys and trade 
data (see Chapter 3). The values provided have been verified and triangulated with liter-
ature and in workshops with stakeholders and are believed to be valid for the specific 
chain, its geographic locations and population sample for the time period of the data 
collection. The sections deal respectively with the second research question of how the 
value chain is arranged in terms of the species it is derived from, the products, location, 
actors, activities and values; the third question on how the chains are governed; the 
fourth on their importance to livelihoods and sustainability and the fifth on product and 
chain sustainability. The conclusion focuses on how governance arrangements influence 
sustainable livelihoods. 
The Prunus africana value chain  
This section addresses the second research question of how the Prunus africana chain is 
configured in terms of the products, their uses, sources, actors, activities and values. 
These components of the value chain are analysed in the following sections.  
 
Prunus africana species, products and their uses  
This section introduces the species and the main products created from its bark and tim-
ber: medicines and equipment. Prunus africana (Hook. f.) Kalkman is known in Came-
roon as pygeum2 or kanda stick. In local dialects it is called kirah, elouo and mowom, 
eblaa, bi’beh’kemb’oh’, dalehi and wotangu or wotango3. Shown in Photo 9.1, the ev-
ergreen hardwood tree has dark-brown, longitudinal fissured bark and thick, leathery, 
oval leaves with pointed ends and reddish stalks. It grows up to 40 m tall and under 
                                                 
1  Data derived from peer-reviewed published articles written or contributed to by the author (Ingram 
and Nsawir 2007; Pfund et al. 2009), a peer-reviewed national policy guidance document (Ingram et 
al. 2009) and two peer-reviewed, published reports (Foaham et al. 2009; Nkeng et al. 2009). 
2  The pidgin name and botanical nomenclature (Pygeum africanum) until reclassification in 1965. 
3  Respective languages of Lamnso, Kom, Oku, Fulfulde (Northwest) and Bakweri (Southwest). 
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good conditions can grow to 14 m high and 37 cm diameter at breast height (dbh) in 18 
years, with annual growth rates of 1 to 1.9 cm (Hall et al. 2000). Size increments de-
crease after it reaches 30 cm dbh, such that very large trees of 80 to 200 cm dbh may be 
hundreds of years old. There is a high variation in the diameter and height of equal aged 
trees in the same locality (Ingram et al. 2009), corroborating Cunningham et al. (2002). 
A minimum harvestable age for bark has been proposed as 13 years old (Franzel et al. 
2009) or when the tree is 40 cm dbh (Ingram et al. 2009). 
The tree is a light-demanding species, although the 
seeds require shade, with disturbance and fruit dispersal 
into canopy gaps or forest margins being important deter-
minants of its population biology and accounting for its 
scattered distribution (Tonye et al. 2000). Its creamy white 
flowers have a short flowering time which can occur 
throughout the year, but is often from March to June, with 
many different pollinators visiting, including bees (Were 
et al. 2011). Beekeepers indicate it is a melliferous tree 
producing white honey (see Chapter 8). Fruit production 
commences at around 15 years old and increases with tree 
age, with alternating high and low production years 
(Stewart 2001). The black, fleshy almond-odour fruits are 
consumed and dispersed by many animals, including en-
demic and endangered bird, frugivore and primate species 
(Fossey 1983; Maisels et al. 1999; Stewart 2003). The seeds are semi-recalcitrant and 
germinate between 50 days and four months old, losing viability quickly if not stored in 
a moist atmosphere, such that few seeds older than six months old are viable (Mbuya 
1994). The tree is generally single stemmed, developing multi-stems when saplings are 
browsed or cut, with large trees having weak re-sprouting capability. Trees may coppice 
if surface roots are damaged and occasionally after felling (Cunningham 2002, Ingram 
2007). Wubet et al. (2003) noted arbuscular mycorrhizae among the roots, aiding the 
uptake of minerals and growth, which has implications for cultivation. 
The versatile, multi-use tree is used to generate cash and for subsistence uses. Chem-
ical analysis of its fungicidal and termicidal properties (Mburu et al. 2007) supports its 
reputation as a hard, insect-resistant timber preferred for carving, axe, tool and hoe han-
dles, used as such by 10% of harvesters. The Nso clan uses its timber for ceremonial 
spear shafts. Poles are used in house construction, fencing and for bridges, confirming 
Stewart (2003). It is planted to protect and indicate water catchment areas and to demar-
cate boundaries. It was a favoured fuelwood for heating and cooking (Stewart 2003; 
Ingram and Nsawir 2007) but is now used by only 13% of harvesters in the Northwest 
for fuel for subsistence, and not trade. Fuelwood collection is generally from dead trees, 
due to the traditional ban on collecting live wood for fuel, enshrined in the 1998 Fon-
wide rules for forest management. Observations in 2010 and 2011 indicated that in-
creasing numbers of trees in the forest were felled for timber and fuelwood, but no fresh 
Prunus africana were seen felled. Market observations confirmed that all fuelwood sold 
in Bamenda and Kumbo was eucalyptus. Traditional carvers in Oku do not use Prunus 
africana for stools or carving, confirming Knopfli (1998).  
The bark was reported as having been used since pre-colonial times as a medicine in 
the Northwest and Southwest, confirming reports by Mbai (1998). In both regions 35% 
of harvesters indicated its use for stomach problems, diarrhoea, fevers and madness. 
Traditional healers reported that it is one of their most important plant species (Ingram 
Photo 9.1 Prunus africana, 
Fundong, September 2009 
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and Nsawir 2007). The bark is usually dried, chewed raw, boiled into a tea (often with 
other herbs), or ground into a paste and mixed with honey and herbs. These findings 
parallel the human medicinal uses, but not the veterinary uses, recorded for the bark, 
leaves, berries and roots (Cunningham et al. 1993; Nfi et al. 2001; Cunningham et al. 
2002; Stewart 2003; Cunningham 2006b; Nfi et al. 2008).  
Medicinal use internationally began in the 1700s (Simons et al. 1998) and was scien-
tifically documented in 1962 (Watt et al. 1962; Altavahealth 2001). The bark, leaves, 
seeds and roots contain active chemical extracts (Cristoni et al. 2000; Anon. 2002). 
Studies have confirmed the bark’s efficacy to reduce benign prostatic hyperplasia 
(BPH) symptoms, chronic prostatitis, sexual and reproductive dysfunctions and obstruc-
tion-induced contractile dysfunction  (Cunningham et al. 1993; Hall et al. 2000; Anon. 
2002). The bark extract has been approved for use in prescription pharmaceuticals since 
the mid-1960s in Germany, France and Italy. Although there are many other alternative 
plant-based drugs to treat prostate problems, no synthetic chemical alternative exists. 
The high social and medicinal value of Prunus africana is emphasised by it being the 
active ingredient of BPH treatments for over 30 years and continued demand expected 
with ageing populations from the estimated 85,000 prostate patients in 2000 (Pomatto 
2001; CITES 2008). Data on prescription pharmaceuticals based on Prunus africana 
extract focus on the efficacy of the active ingredients and are aimed at doctors prescrib-
ing the drug – not the end consumer. The health product chain targets consumers using 
images of a natural, botanic remedy, some drawing on traditional use in South Africa 
(Simons et al. 1998), but none on medicinal or other uses in Cameroon. Certification 
has been advocated to develop a chain of custody and enhance producer benefits (Peka 
2003; Chupezi et al. 2004; Medicinal Plants Specialist Group 2007), but is difficult giv-
en that the route to consumers is as a prescription drug. 
 
Ecoregion sources and chain locations 
There is substantial indigenous knowledge of the locations and ecology in which 
Prunus africana is found. This is typically held by medicine practitioners, forest users 
such as hunters and beekeepers, community forest managers and patrollers, and com-
mercial exploiters. Based on observations, literature and surveys, six major afromontane 
ecoregion landscapes were identified as the main Prunus africana production areas, 
shown in Figure 9.1. In Adamaoua, where it is not used locally and harvesting takes 
place by agents exogenous to the region, locations were hardly known. In the Southwest 
region, on Mt Cameroon the species is found in sub-montane and montane forest in the 
highest densities between 900 to 2,500 m, on farms and in plantations; in the Bakossi 
Mountains, Bamboutous Mountains around Lebialem, Mt Kupe, Mt Muanengouba and 
Takamanda, it was found planted around farms and wild in gallery forests between 
1,600 to 2,400 m. In the Northwest region, it was found between 2,400 to 3,000 m in 
Kilum-Ijim forest in the highest densities, and in forest-savannah transition zones (but 
not scrub where bush fires are common, indicating its limited fire resistance), secondary 
forests, forest remnants, and on farms and small plantations across the region. In Ada-
maoua, it was found in the wild in the Mbabo Mountains on the Mayo-Baléo-Nigerian 
border and Tchabal Gang Daba mountain gallery forests between 1,300 m to 1,800 m. 
Similar to other African countries (Hall, O’Brien et al. 2000); it is most abundant in 
high altitude sub-alpine, upper and lower afromontane mixed forests. This distribution 
pattern matches ONADEF data (MINEF et al. 2000; Belinga 2001).  
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Figure 9.1 Map of Prunus africana value chain study area in Cameroon 
 
From these production areas, the chain has two main channels, shown in Figure 9.2. 
One channel concerns local trade and has existed for at least forty years, pre-dating in-
ternational exports from the 1970s (Cunningham et al. 2002) with four sub-channels. In 
the local medicinal channel, small, dried bark pieces are sold to the general public 
through medicinal plant traders in type I local markets and type II urban markets in 
Bamenda, Kumbo, Bafoussam and Dschang. On average five kg of dried bark was sold 
every six months by traditional herb and spice vendors in each market, with two to five 
vendors having permanent stalls in each market. If known, the main sources were 
named as Oku and Mt Cameroon.  
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In the second channel, bark is processed into medicines and sold direct to consumers 
by traditional medicine men from their homes in the Northwest, particularly in Oku, Be-
lo, Fundong and Kumbo, and in the Southwest in centres of traditional medicine 
(Wonya Mavio, Fontem, Buea, Tombel and Bangem). They source locally, from their 
own trees, in villages or on the forest edge. This supports reports that for 80% of 
Southwest herbalists Prunus africana is one of the most important medicinal plants (Nfi 
et al. 2008). A third channel concerns timber for hoes and tools. A fourth channel is lo-
cal, small-scale veterinary use (Nfi et al. 2001; Stewart 2003). The second and major 
chain is international: from the Northwest, Mt Cameroon and Adamaoua, bark is har-
vested and either dried locally or transported to drying sheds in Douala and Bafoussam. 
Here it is cut into pieces or powdered, prior to exporting to specialised chemical and 
pharmaceutical companies in Europe. Pygeum powder and extract is re-exported to oth-
er European countries, the USA, India and China.  
 
Prunus africana chain actors  
This section introduces the main actors in the chain. Table 9.1 shows that an estimated 
3,233 people are active in the chain from the study areas. Although the total number of 
those involved is significant, this is a very small proportion (less than 0.1%) of the total 
population in the Northwest, Southwest and Adamaoua. The direct actors in the chain 
are categorised as harvesters, farmers and planters, traders, exporters, importers and 
consumers. There are also international and national regulatory authorities and support 
actors including development and conservation NGOs and research organisations. 
 
Table 9.1 Population statistics of Prunus africana study area 
Region/ 
Division Capital 
Surface 
area km2 Popln
1 
Popln. 
density 
km² 
 No value chain actors % 
total 
popln.
Harvester Farm-
ers2 
Trader Exporter Nursery 
workers 
Northwest  Bamenda 17,812 1,728,953 100 245 800 6 11 79 0.05 
D.M. Ndu 4,279 269,931 33 20 5 1 3 0.01 
Bui  Kumbo 2,297 321,969 32 150 455 3 1 15 0.19 
Boyo Fundong 1,592 124,887 31 75 120 25 0.18 
Mezam Bamenda 1,745 524,127 35 220 2 10 36 0.05 
Adamaoua  Ngoundéré 63,691 884,289 14 0  0.00 
Djerem Tibati 13,283 124,948 9  0.00 
Southwest Buea 24,571 1,316,079 34 205 49 1 31 0.02 
Fako Buea 2,093 466,412 222 200 23 1 25 0.05 
K.M. Bangem 3,404 105,579 31 10 26 6 0.05 
West Bafoussam 13,892 1,760,276 38 3 5 7 0.00 
Littoral Douala 20,239 2,510,2631 124 15  0.00 
Centre Yaoundé 68,953 3,098,044 45 25  0.00 
Total   450 825 57 1451 450 
Sources: Research results and 1 2005 population (National Institute of Statistics 2010). 2 Includes plantation owners. 
Key: DM= Donga Mantung KM= Kupe Muanengouba 
 
In the Southwest, all the harvesters were male, 73% were less than 31 years old, with 
an average household size of seven people with a high proportion (92%) having primary 
education. The largest group of 200 harvesters inhabit 14 Bakweri villages in Fako divi-
sion circling Mt Cameroon with a total population of around 10,000 (Stanley 2009). The 
harvesters worked on rotation under the supervision of the Mount Cameroon Prunus 
Management Common Initiative Group (MOCAP-CIG). MOCAP-CIG was created in 
August 2000 to control the harvest and sale of Prunus africana in nine villages. It grew 
from the Mapanja and Bokwango Harvesters’ Unions established in 1994 to supply 
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Plantecam Ltd. The German development agency GTZ supported MOCAP-CIG 
through the Sustainable Management of Natural Resources in the Southwest Province 
project (see Chapter 6), paying set-up costs of over 1 million FCFA (2,041 US$), help-
ing overcome administrative hurdles and for them to eventually obtain a harvest permit 
in 2007. In the same year, a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) grant 
supported the purchase of a small processing machine. But the trade suspension in 2007 
(discussed in the section on national regulations) discouraged the group (Joseph Ekati, 
MOCAP-CIG, pers. comm. 2010). Around 10 harvesters from Nyasososo, a village of 
around 1,500 people, have harvested occasionally on Mt Kupe and an estimated 15 har-
vesters inhabit villages around Bangem, near Mt Muanengouba. 
In the Northwest, all harvesters were married men, 50% from the Kom, Nso and Oku 
ethnic groups, associated with 21 community forests, 18 of which are located in the Ki-
lum-Ijim Forest (see Chapter 4 and 6). They mainly inhabit 11 forest-adjacent villages 
in Bui division with a population of 29,000, 13 villages in Boyo division with around 
30,000 people, and Njila village of 2,500 inhabitants in Donga Mantung4. A few har-
vesters (8%) were members of a Prunus harvesting association and 47% were members 
of forest management committees governing the community forests. The other 50% of 
harvesters were also from the Northwest, being individuals or employed ad-hoc by in-
termediaries. Northwest harvesters were on average 47 years old, educated to primary 
school level, heading a household of 9.8 people on average.  
Large-scale harvesting has usually taken place in groups of 10 to 400 people from 
the community and community forests, with harvesters working individually or in pairs. 
The majority (72%) of the Northwest community forests were less than a decade old in 
2009 and had commenced harvesting in the last four years or less. Individual harvesters 
had on average 16 years’ experience, with a maximum of 40. Many (80%) collect other 
NTFPs, with on average 11 years’ experience harvesting honey, bamboo, firewood and 
medicinal plants, and were knowledgeable about the forest. Some 2% of harvesters were 
also traditional medicine practitioners. Harvesting was rated by 50% as one of their five 
main income sources and nurseries by 25%. In the Northwest, other major income 
sources included subsistence farming and cash crops (coffee, market gardening, cola, 
potatoes, palm-wine, maize and beekeeping), livestock, petty trading and labouring. 
Less than 2% had salaried incomes. All had diversified incomes with up to seven differ-
ent activities and an average of three.  
In the Southwest, 75% of harvesters had at least two other supplementary activities, 
mainly subsistence agriculture and cash crops, the value of which was less than Prunus 
africana in 2008. The vast majority of bark harvested was sold, 5% was given as gifts 
and 5% degraded, usually from mould. A small proportion, on average 1.1 kg of bark 
was kept by 15% of harvesters for family medicinal use. Timber was occasionally har-
vested. At least 22 plant nurseries in the Northwest region, eight in the Southwest and 
two in the West sell Prunus africana seeds and seedlings, among a range of multi-
purpose plants, melliferous and native trees. Many started with support and/or training 
from conservation projects such as the Mt Kupe Forest, Kilum-Ijim Forest, Bamenda 
Highlands Forest, Mount Cameroon and government-supported projects such as the 
support programme for rural forestry and agroforestry (PAFRA) and the capacity build-
ing for community-managed forest and fauna resources initiatives (RIGC) (see Chapter 
6). They employ on average three to four staff each, mainly male. Seeds tend to be col-
                                                 
4  Population data reported in community forest simple management plans.  
216 
 
lected from nearby forests and cultivated. Many of the nurseries are side-enterprises of 
NGOs, farming groups and community forests and around a quarter are solely occupied 
by the nursery business. Three councils have started nurseries, the largest of which is 
Kumbo Urban Council, supplying municipal re-planting and erosion control schemes in 
watersheds and as a commercial enterprise.  
At least 4,821 individuals and 78 Common Initiative Groups (CIGs), farmers and 20 
community forests have planted and ‘own’ Prunus africana trees. There are at least 18 
large-scale plantations in the Northwest, 13 in the Southwest and three in the West. 
They are owned by individuals, schools, an agricultural enterprise, a water company, 
NGOs and the state Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC).  
Seven medicinal plant vendors in markets in Oku, Bamenda, Bafoussam and 
Dschang sold small pieces of Prunus africana bark at 200 to 500 FCFA (0.40 to 1.02 
US$) a piece. Their stock ranged from one to ten kilos with a low turnover. They were 
supplied by specialist harvesters or harvested themselves with permission from tradi-
tional rulers or from tree owners. Their clients either asked specifically for the bark for 
home medicinal use or were advised by the vendors once specific complaints were indi-
cated. Prunus africana was not found in markets in Yaoundé or Douala. Two itinerant 
Prunus africana hoe handle vendors harvested in Kilum-Ijim Forest and had a stock of 
around 40 handles. They travel to Country Sunday markets in large villages such as 
Oku, Belo, and in Mezam and Bui divisions.  
Around 28 agents, intermediaries and buyers have been active in the international 
bark trade. The majority employ men (80%), aged 38 years on average with a household 
of five people, working on average 5.8 years in the sector, with the longest 15 years. 
Their staff size ranges from three to hundreds, with the largest being Afrimed, a consor-
tium that includes one of the largest Cameroonian financial institutions. They obtain 
special forest product (SFP) permits or buy weigh bills from permit holders. Some of 
the larger enterprises have informal teams of occasional harvesters and/or hire villagers 
on an ad-hoc basis paying per kilo of fresh bark. Most have warehousing capacity and 
re-sell to the exporting companies. Eight companies have regularly exported Prunus 
africana from Cameroon since 2003. Most also trade in other forest products: eucalyp-
tus poles for the domestic market, yohimbe bark (Pausinystalia johimbe) and gum ara-
bic (Acacia spp.) for export.  
Since 1972 at least 11 exporting enterprises have conducted primary and secondary 
processing. Fresh bark is cut into 10-20 cm chips, sun or air-dried to a moisture content 
of less than 30% and packed for shipping. The only companies processing from 2007 to 
2009 were the Compagnie Commerciale pour l’Exportation des Produits Forestiers 
(CEXPRO), Africaphyto and Agrodenree in Douala and Afrimed based in Bafoussam, 
Yaoundé and Douala. As some importers require verification of the species – due to 
substitutions made in the past – quality control along the chain now usually takes place 
in the easiest way by purchasing bark instead of powder. MOCAP-CIG has a small-
scale shredding machine, but has never used this commercially. Only two companies 
process into a powder of less than 10% moisture content: CEXPRO and Afrimed. Alt-
hough Africaphyto has the capacity, since 2007 it has only exported bark. Plantecam 
Medicam5 operated a Prunus africana bark-processing factory in Mutengene near Buea 
from 1972 to 2000 when its license expired and factory operating costs became uneco-
                                                 
5  Plantecam Ltd. was a subsidiary of Laboratoires Debat, owned by the Fournier Pharma group, and 
now by the French company Solvay Chemicals. 
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nomic. Since 2000 no extract-processing facilities have operated in Cameroon. Since 
2000, 50 companies had obtained licenses, with three dominating the market. Afrimed 
annually exported on average 1,382 tons, having on average 57% of market share annu-
ally, CEXPRO 208 tons, SGP 190 tons and others 40 tons. On average, from 2005 to 
2009, five companies annually have been granted permits. In 2006 a Spanish importer 
was interested to set up operations but was dissuaded by the permitting system and in-
security of supply. Four exporters are members of associations. The Syndicat des Ex-
ploitants Transformateurs Industriels Exportateurs des Produits Spéciaux (STIEPFS) is 
a vocal lobby group for special forest product and forest-product traders and the Nation-
al Organization of Non-Timber Forest Product Operators of Cameroon (ONPECAM) 
conducts capacity building and lobbying. Although exporters did not respond to the en-
tire questionnaire, sufficient trust was built up such that many shared information 
piecemeal. This reflects their frustration with the sector, initial mistrust and research 
fatigue. 
At least ten pharmaceutical companies have imported Cameroonian bark and extract 
the active chemical from the bark. Solvay Chemicals is an international chemical com-
pany which has produced the Prunus extract-based drug Tadenan for the last 30 years 
and has the longest history of importing from Cameroon. Their product is on average 
used by 1,300 persons daily. The drug has been a long-term ‘cash cow’ for the compa-
ny: exceeding the anticipated 15 year lifetime, with an additional two to ten years pre-
dicted, depending on the availability of Prunus africana. Due to 2007 CITES trade sus-
pension, Solvay indicated its plan to be more active in sustainable extraction to its value 
chain suppliers by providing financial and moral commitment for vertical integration 
using plantations or forestation to secure supply, as difficulties obtaining the raw mate-
rial could make the product no longer commercially viable. Synkem is a Solvay subsid-
iary producing extracts (of which Prunus is the only botanic extract) and was active in 
Cameroon as Plantecam Ltd. It now operates from France and imported barks from 
Cameroon, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Uganda and Tanzania. The EU trade suspensions 
in 2007 reduced its supplies by 80% (see section on Governance), posing a major sup-
ply threat as it keeps around six months’ worth of stock. Starlight and Herbs Interna-
tional are French companies processing and selling in Europe and the USA. The Span-
ish pharmaceutical company Euromed produces both the extract and pharmaceuticals. 
The Italian company Indena produces the extract using a different process, which it ex-
ports to the USA health and diet supplements market. Madagascar-based Innovax 
makes an extract sold mainly to France. The European companies also supply American 
and Chinese manufacturers of health and diet supplements. Many of these also manu-
facture products from other barks and natural resources.  
The chain structure and actors have changed significantly during the forty-year histo-
ry of international trade, but little since 2000 (Pomatto 2001), indicating a stable market 
since then. The actors changed when Cameroon became a party to the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) in 2005, 
with the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife (MINFOF) designated as the CITES man-
agement authority and the National Forestry Development Agency (ONADEF)6 as the 
national CITES scientific authority. Since the CITES trade suspension in 2007, the two 
authorities have been most active. Development organisations such as GTZ, SNV, Bird-
life International, WWF and particularly the Mount Cameroon Project, Sustainable 
                                                 
6  ONADEF became ANAFOR in 2006, see Chapter 6. 
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Management of Natural Resources in the Southwest Project and Kilum-Ijim Forest pro-
jects have been prominent actors over the last 15 years. Local development and conser-
vation NGOs such the Western Highlands Nature Conservation Network (WHINCON-
ET) have been increasingly active since the mid-2000s, often with donor aid (see Chap-
ter 4). They have supported conservation-focussed inventories, monitoring and yield 
studies. Together with international and national research organisations, they have stud-
ied the sector and disseminated information in Cameroon, influencing CITES and the 
European Commission. Since 2000 their focus has increasingly been on institutional, 
organisational and technical capacity building of harvesters in the Southwest and 
Northwest and collective action. Actors from all regions and along the chain met to-
gether for the first time in 2006. A Prunus Platform was facilitated as part of the FAO-
CIFOR-SNV NTFP Project to provide guidance on a national management plan and 
allow exchanges on techniques, problems and markets. 
 
Prunus africana chain activities 
Activities are generally conducted irrespective of seasons and climate, although slightly 
more harvesting was reported during the low agricultural season (June to August). The 
two channels use different harvest and processing methods. 
For international trade, only the bark is harvested. Men dominate harvesting: walking 
3 to 12 km to find trees, climbing them, using a machete and knife to incise and then 
peel the bark into approximately 30 by 50 cm to 100 cm strips, taking on average two 
hours for 10 kg, tie it and head-load the 30 to 75 kg (average 50 kg) bundles to their 
homes or village drop-off points. The vast majority of bark is sold in fresh strips. Bark 
from mature trees is generally twice the weight of dried bark i.e. 1,000 kg of wet bark 
produces 500 kg of dry bark at 50% humidity.  
In some Northwest community forests, preliminary cleaning and drying was con-
ducted, using ASSOFOMI and ASSOKOFOMI offices as stores. Only 9% of individual 
harvesters dry barks using their own houses or sheds and 2% clean barks. The bark is 
sold to processers in Cameroon or to international pharmaceutical companies, who pul-
verise it into a powder of up to 10% moisture content. This is then dissolved in a solvent 
base to produce an extract. A second processing produces a fine white crystalline extract 
of 5% to 0.05% weight of the initial dry powder, which is the active ingredient for 
pharmaceutical preparations. In 2001 in France, Switzerland, Austria, Spain and Italy at 
least 19 products and in the USA, eight contained Prunus africana extract (Pomatto 
2001). By 2009 over 25 medications and 20 products contained Prunus africana extract, 
marketed by American, French and Chinese companies and in 2010, at least 40 brand-
name products were sold on different internet sites.  
Initially Plantecam Ltd. felled trees, changing to the two quarters technique where 
bark is peeled and stripped from opposing quarters of the tree trunk (see Box 9.1) in 
1989 in response to the 1986 law. The company trained its workers on this technique 
between 1972 and 1987, and then harvesters in the Northwest in 1985 and harvesters 
from 12 villages around Mt Cameroon in 1994. The Mount Cameroon Project (Hall et 
al. 2000) further popularised this technique. In the Southwest, all MOCAP-CIG har-
vesters reported being trained and using the technique. In the Northwest 45% use the 
technique, 13% strip the whole tree of bark and 40% harvest a small patch or poles for 
own use or local sale. MOCAP-CIG limits harvesters to one 33 kg bundle a day, for 
health reasons and to control harvesting, rotating harvesters so that all can earn. 
Plantecam Ltd. restricted workers to five and half days harvesting per month. In the 
Northwest, harvesting was reported as an occasional, temporary activity, commonly un-
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dertaken in response to a trader’s order. On average, individual harvesters reported hav-
ing harvested three times and community forests twice. Bark is also stripped from felled 
trees, particularly in the Southwest (Cunningham and Mbenkum 1993; Meuer 2007), 
but less in the Northwest (Stewart 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When harvested for own use and local trade, different activities and tree parts are 
used. Traditional bark harvesting by medicine men in Kilum-Ijim Forest involves cut-
ting a small piece of bark, around 10 wide by 10 or 20 cm long, with a machete or knife 
from the lower bole of a mature, healthy tree of 30 to 100 cm dbh. Harvesting occurs 
approximately once every six months to two years. Pieces of dry bark, sold in widely 
varying sizes weighing between 50g to 400g, remains useable for years. The practition-
ers indicated that it was common to repeatedly harvest the same tree, with no visible 
health impacts to tree health or mortality. The efficacy of barks from different trees is 
not checked and patients do not usually provide feedback. As Prunus africana is used 
alongside other components, practitioners could not indicate if there were differences in 
efficacy between trees. Harvesting was conducted mostly from trees located on the har-
vester’s compound or farm and occasionally from neighbour’s trees or the nearest 
community forest. Branches used for poles, hoe and tool handles are harvested from se-
lected branches, not usually by felling the tree and are sold per unit rather than by 
weight.  
 
Prunus africana values 
Over the past 40 years the chain has grown from a subsistence and low-volume, low 
commercial value medicinal bark, timber and fuelwood trade, to a high-value bark trade 
driven by the international pharmaceutical and botanical health-product sector. Availa-
ble data indicates that annual production (including illegal7 harvests), from the major 
production zones has varied significantly, shown in Table 9.2 and Table 9.3.  
 
 
                                                 
7  Harvesting is illegal if unauthorised by a community forest, if contrary to the forest management plan, 
if the plan was unapproved or if sold to a person not possessing a special forestry product permit. 
Box 9.1  Two quarters bark harvesting technique 
 Bark removed from the trunk in strips from 1.30 m above ground level to the first branch. 
 Only trees with diameter at breast height (dbh) >30 cm can be debarked.  
 Trees with dbh <50 cm should be debarked with two strips in opposite sides, each no wid-
er than 1/4 of the tree circumference.  
 Trees with a dbh >50 cm should be debarked in four strips, regularly distributed around 
the circumference, each no wider than one eighth of the circumference.  
 Lateral roots with a minimum diameter of 20 cm on trees >dbh 50 cm can be debarked.  
 Debarking is prior to clearing the root rhizosphere and should not exceed one quarter of 
the root's circumference. 
 After debarking, the root should be covered with soil to avoid desiccation and enable rapid 
reconstitution.  
 Trees with debarked roots and trunks should be marked. 
 Each debarked tree should completely recover before subsequent debarking. 
 
Sources: (Ministry of Agriculture 1986; Ndibi et al. 1997; Ondigui 2001). 
220 
 
Table 9.2 Prunus africana harvests in the Northwest and Adamaoua 2001 to 2007 
Region Division Year Average quantity (kg) 
Average selling price in 
village  (FCFA) 
Total income 
(FCFA) 
Northwest 
Bui 2007 2,575 64 164,800 2006 385 45 17,325 
Donga Mantung 
2007 1,360    66.5 90,440 
2006 530 54 28,620 
2005 250 75 18,750 
Boyo 2005 3,860    32.5 125,450 
Adamaoua Mayo-Banyo 2001 to 2007 494,600 - - Faro et Déo 2001 to 2007 8,800 - - 
Sources: Research results interviews traders, MINFOF Northwest, MINFOF Adamaoua. 
 
 
Table 9.3 Prunus africana harvests in Northwest community forests 2003 to 2007 
Community forest Year Quantity (kg) 
Average selling price 
(FCFA per kg) 
Total income 
(FCFA) 
Illegally harvested 
quantity (kg) 
Afua & Juambum 2006 12,000 65 780,000 
Adjicofomi 2007 20,000 90 1,800,000 
Abuh 2003 2,700 74 199,800 
Anyajua  2007 20 90 1,800 6,000 
Ajyng 2000 8,000 50 400,000 50,000 
Baba II 2004 5,000 50 250,000 50,000 
Bihkov  2004 122,000 90 10,980,000 2005 95,000 30 2,850,000 
Anyafua  2005 1,000 60 60,000 
Bihkov  2003 150,000 80 12,000,000 
Njilah 2006 85,000 40 3,400,000 
Kilum 2006 900,000 85 76,500,000 
Ijim 
2005 250,000 90 22,500,000 
2003 42000 80 3,360,000 
2006 80,000 90 7,200,000 
Kedjem Mawes 2006 106,000 100 10600,000 
Laikom 
2003 6,000 75 450,000 
2004 20,000 75 15,00,000 5,000 
2005 40,000 135 54,00,000 6,630 
2006 410 94 38,540 
Muteff 2004 29000 75 21,75,000 
Vehkovi 2004 20,000 80 16,00,000 
Yatimofco 2003 3,500 50 175,000 
Average 86,853 76 6,842,506 23,526 
Total  1,985,630 163,440,140 117,630 
Sources: Research results with harvesters and community forests, ASSOFOMI and ASSOKOFOMI. 
 
To overcome illegal harvesting and prevent bushfires, community forests such as 
Ndu, Ijim and Kedjem Mawes set up patrols. Success depended upon their ability to pay 
patrollers (on average 500 to 1000 FCFA – 1.02 to 2.04 US$ – a person daily). This in 
turn rested upon the income gained from community forest harvesting, the scale of ille-
gal harvests and implication of FMIs, local authorities and community members in en-
forcement and punitive actions. Increased demand led to a “free for all situation” (Peter 
Bah, Ijim CF, pers. comm. 2009). Many community forests gave up patrolling and har-
vested illegally, with high volumes harvested in 2006 and 2007. Mt Cameroon has also 
suffered from illegal harvesting (Meuer 2007). Figure 9.3 shows regional production, 
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highlighting that the origin of half (57%) of the bark from 2003 to 2011 was unknown: 
the source being only occasionally indicated on weigh bills. There is no distinction 
made in official figures between legal and illegal bark. These figures emphasise the im-
portance of Mt Cameroon and the Northwest as major production zones and with no 
distinction made between wild and cultivated bark. 
 
Figure 9.3  Annual Prunus africana production (tons and percentage) 2003 to 2011 
 
Sources: MINFOF SFP permits, Research results from ASSOFOMI, ASSOKOFOMI and MOCAP-CIG.  
 
Shown in Table 9.4, harvester selling prices varied substantially from 1980 to 2011, 
with a national average over this period of 180 FCFA (0.31 US$) per kg. Prices also 
varied widely by location: 30 to 50 FCFA (00.5 to 0.09 US$) outside of community for-
ests; 76 FCFA (0.16 US$) from community forests and 160 FCFA (0.28 US$) to 260 
FCFA (0.45 US$) from MOCAP-CIG. Although many harvesters indicated their un-
happiness with prices, Prunus income was seen as more valuable than small-scale farm-
ing or plantation crops, confirming earlier studies (Yaron 2001). Higher selling prices in 
the Southwest are attributed to MOCAP-CIG eliminating intermediaries, negotiating 
directly with exporters and regularly selling larger quantities. The export market value 
is shown in Table 9.4, averaging 1,332,601 US$ annually. The retail market in consum-
er countries in 1999 was estimated at 200 million US$ (CARPE 2001). In 2009, the av-
erage internet selling price of branded pygeum capsules (76 capsules weighing 91 g, 
containing 50 to 100 mg of bark extract) was 16 US$. This is equivalent to 991 US$ per 
kg of active ingredient (GAIA/GRAIN 2000). The values of bark sold along the interna-
tional channel are summarised in the chain map in Figure 9.5 below. 
Cameroon has consistently been the world’s largest Prunus africana exporter, aver-
aging 38% of global market share from 1995 to 2004. Since 2000 Cameroonian Prunus 
africana has been imported predominantly by France (53% of imports), Spain (31%) 
and Madagascar (11%), with India, USA, Belgium and China all importing around 1% 
each. Cameroon’s share increased to 48% of global production after 2004 as other ex-
porting countries, such as Madagascar and Kenya, decreased production. Worldwide 
trade trebled from 2003 to 2005, the majority from Cameroon. CITES export re-
strictions led to world production decreasing to 641 tons in 2008, sourced from the 
DRC, Cameroon, Kenya. Only 54 tons was exported worldwide in 2009, all from  
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Table 9.4 Harvester and export value of Prunus africana 1995 to 2010 
Sources: 1 CITES 2011, 2 CARPE 2001, 3 Research results,  Chupzei and Ndoye 2004, Ewusi 1998, Ndam and Tonye 
2004, 5 Henri Ackagou, MINFOF pers. comm. 2011. - signifies no data 
 
 
Figure 9.4 Prunus africana exports from Cameroon 1976 to 2011 
Sources: COMCAM 2003-2009, H. Ackagou, MINFOF pers. comm. 2011, CITES 2011, Cunningham 2006, 
Bellewang 2005 (averaged for 6 years). 
 
Year Exports tons1 
Average harvest-
er price kg3 
Market value 
Cameroon 
(FCFA) 
Average ex-
porter price kg
Export value 
(FCFA) 
Export 
value 
(US$) 
1980 - 40     
1995 310.00 70 21,700,000 750 232,500,000 465,420 
1996 - 60 - 750 -  
1997 115.00 185 21,275,000 750 86,250,000 147,887 
1998 - 180 - 750 -  
19992 - 215 - 750 - 700,000 
2001 115.00 215 - 750 86,250 117,572 
2002 199.99 200 23,000,000 750 149,989 213,907 
2003 386.00 200 39,997,000 750 289,500,000 500,992 
2004 547.20 180 69,480,000 750 410,401,500 776,939 
2005 1,452.00 160 87,552,320 1,050 1,524,602,100 2,890,315 
2006 1,863.73 160 232,320,320 1,000 1,863,726,000 3,565,532 
2007 1,540.50 260 484,568,760 1,000 1,540,500,000 3,213,342 
2008 700.50 260 400,530,000 1,050 735,525,000 1,641,097 
2009 505.69 180 126,090,000 1,050 735,525,000 1,125,603 
20105 150.00 - - - -  
20115 350.00 - - - -  
Average  703.17 180 145,219,400 835 636,480,959 1,332,601 
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Uganda. Annual exports from Cameroon are shown in Figure 9.4. Despite data incon-
sistencies8 a growing volume is apparent until the trade suspension in 2007 and subse-
quent gradual resumption. COMCAM recorded exports in 2008 are difficult to explain, 
given that in 2009 only suspended stock harvested in 2007 was permitted by CITES. 
Benefits from Prunus africana revenues have extended to local communities in the 
Southwest, stimulated by the Mt Cameroon project and access and benefit-sharing prin-
ciples of the CBD. The benefit-sharing system of Mapanja Prunus Harvesters Union 
contributed 1,580,000 FCFA (2,260 US$) to the village development fund in 1998, sup-
porting water and electrification projects (Ndam et al. 2004). Revenues to local com-
munities over a nine month period in 2004 amounted to 35,700 US$, of which 2,260 
US$ (7%) went to a village development fund and 1,530 (4%) to pay for group func-
tioning costs. The multiplier effects of average incomes reported in the livelihood sec-
tion included increased house construction, a surge in formal marriages and a greater 
proportion of children attending school (Ndam et al. 2004). MOCAP-CIG continued a 
benefit-sharing scheme, allocating 5% of the per kilo selling price to nine Village De-
velopment Funds, 65% to individual harvesters, 8% to MOCAP-CIG management and 
monitoring activities and 4% for government taxes. Out of the 15% allocated to the 
community, 90% is shared equally among member villages, 7.5% among the natural 
resource custodians (chiefs) and the remaining 2.5% is paid to the host village 
(Tieguhong et al. 2008). In 2005, 3,700,000 FCFA (7,104 US$) was paid into village 
development funds, for water and electrification, building markets and community halls 
(Tieguhong et al. 2008a).  
In the Northwest, the Kilum-Ijim Forest Project also encouraged community forests 
to develop and implement benefit-sharing mechanisms. Generally 50% of community 
forest revenues were allocated to village development projects, 35% to forest regenera-
tion and 15% for the community forest management institution (WHINCONET 2005). 
Harvesters received on average 67% of the total forest edge price. Of the total price re-
ceived for the bark, individual harvesters are paid on average 30 FCFA (0.61 US$) per 
kg brought to collection point and 40 FCFA (0.81 US$) per kg was kept by the commu-
nity forest. The money is usually kept in a credit union account, subject to distribution 
according to agreed rules, with 35% set aside for the running of the community forest 
management bodies, 50% for community development and 15% for regeneration and 
training on forest conservation (Samuel Mbuh, Emfveh-Mii CF FMI, pers. comm. 
2004). For example, ten villages benefitted from the 3.3 million FCFA (6,736 US$) 
Prunus africana revenues by Emfveh-Mii community forest in 2003, with between 
40,000 and 225,000 FCFA (81 to 459 US$) per village allocated for development pur-
poses such as a water supply, primary school roofing, a bridge and repairs to Oku Rural 
Radio, and 250,000 FCFA (510 US$) to traditional authorities. Although the communi-
ty forest associations (Bihkov, ASSOFOMI and ASSOKOFOMI) have benefit-sharing 
mechanisms, none of the community forests harvesting Prunus africana in the period 
2004 to 2008 paid dues to the Associations. Only Bihkov produced a report and ac-
counts with details of benefit sharing. Three community forests had major internal con-
flicts in the period 2004 to 2008 due to mismanagement of funds, and five failed to pro-
duce annual reports in this period. A small proportion of harvesters (10%) indicated 
                                                 
8  Cameroon CITES authorities provide data for the CITES database. Differences may be due to how 
dried bark, powder and extract were recorded and time lags between authorisations, exports and pub-
lished data. 
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conflicts due to boundary disputes and Plantecam Ltd. agents not paying. Community 
members indicated concerns that benefit-sharing mechanisms had not fully been im-
plemented and communities had not sufficiently benefited. Due to the lack of permits 
and harvesting outside of their management plans, income was illegal for many of the 
community forests (WHINCONET 2005; Nsom et al. 2007; Stewart 2007b). 
Values and volumes of Prunus-based medicinal products sold by traditional medici-
nal practitioners were not investigated. The average values of hoe handles and bark 
pieces sold for medicinal use in local and national markets are shown in Figure 9.5.  
 
Source: Research results 
Governance of the Prunus africana value chain  
To answer the third research question, this section presents and analyses the governance 
arrangements and trends in the Prunus africana chain. The trade in this tree’s bark is 
one of most highly regulated among forest products in Cameroon and Africa, both for-
mally by national laws and international conventions, customarily and by project- based 
arrangements.  
 
Figure 9.5 Prunus africana value chains and prices 
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A plethora of national regulations 
Regulation of commercial harvesting of Prunus africana started in 19749, when permits 
were granted for a private company (formerly SODEXMEDI) to harvest. Plantecam 
Ltd. received a permit in 1976, following three failed requests, subsequently obtaining 
permits annually for at least 500 tons a year from 1976 to 1983, and five-year permits 
for 1,300 tons annually from 1986 to 1996. Two or three permits were issued to other 
Cameroonian companies in this period. After over-extraction in 1985, rules for harvest-
ing medicinal plants, including Prunus africana, were prescribed in 1986 and 1992 
(Ministry of Agriculture 1986; Ndibi et al. 1997; Ondigui 2001). In 1986 a requirement 
to plant three hectares of Prunus africana annually from 1986 and five hectares annual-
ly from 1992 was enacted. In 1981 the Minister of Agriculture enacted a law10 follow-
ing concerns about harvests in the Southwest. The 1994 Forest Law refined this proce-
dure, requiring regional forestry chiefs to specify harvesting methods and quantities ex-
ploited. Interviews indicated this requirement has never been provided as part of the 
permit of special forest product process since 2004 (Joesph Ntsengue Levodo, MIN-
FOF, pers. comm. 2010). A quarter of harvesters interviewed did not know about any 
rules. The two quarters technique was promoted by projects and apparently in the 1981 
law, although long practiced, is of unproven efficacy. Monitoring and inventories high-
light that if and when the two quarters technique was applied, high levels of subsequent 
debarking of the remaining quarters or total debarking occurred. The bark regeneration 
study (see Nkeng et al. 2009 in Appendix 1) and participatory meetings in 2009 to de-
velop the national management plan provided new insights upon which to base a har-
vesting standard. Actors in the chain were convinced that a combination of a new gov-
ernance regime including sole exploitation rights, certified harvesters, a well-publicised 
harvest standard and a conservative quota would ensure that a revised harvest technique 
based would work. A harvest standard with a minimum 40 cm and maximum 80 cm ex-
ploitable dbh, eight year rotation period taking into account tree health, tracing and tag-
ging system, harvester training and certification and specification of harvesting seasons 
was incorporated into the guidance for a national management plan (Ingram et al. 
2009). Supported by GTZ, the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife then finalised a nation-
al harvest norm in 2010 (Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife 2010). This awaits imple-
mentation in the 2013 forestry law revisions. 
Prunus africana has been regulated as a special forestry product since 1994, through 
the system of annual, tonnage-based quotas and permits for bark harvested nationwide 
and/or from specific regions. Felling without special permission is illegal. Permits are 
granted by an Inter-Ministerial Committee, based on technical reports from regional 
forestry chiefs that should provide a ‘reasoned recommendation’ of quantities, exploita-
tion areas and harvesting modalities. In practice species and quantities have been indi-
cated on the annual special forest product list and exploitation areas have only occa-
sionally been specified. The lack of coordination at regional Ministry of Forestry and 
Wildlife level has made it difficult to trace bark to its source and there are no controls of 
harvesters or harvesting techniques. Although a 2007 Circular11 introduced a new Ca-
hier de Charge (technical specification), this was not implemented due to the 2007 trade 
suspension. 
                                                 
9  Decree No. 74/357 of 17 April 1974. 
10  Law No. 81/13 of 27 November 1981. 
11  MINFOF Circular letter n° 0958 of 15 November  2007. 
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The Special Forest Product permit costs approximately 1,000,000 CFA (2,041 US$) 
plus a payment of 2% of the quota value, and a 10 FCFA (0.02 US$) per kg regenera-
tion tax payable by permit holders in three or two instalments, one of which is in ad-
vance. None of the government regeneration projects appear to have been funded from 
this tax, having other funding sources, and no specific government regeneration projects 
have been set up for Prunus africana. The regeneration tax is paid on all NTFPs, gener-
ating 556,000 US$ for the Treasury in 2003 (Chupezi et al. 2004). Prunus africana 
government revenues are estimated at 12,101 US$ annually and 29,970 US$ in the peak 
year of 2005. Permit holders should notify the regional Ministry of Forestry and Wild-
life delegation and leave a copy of the permit when seeking to exploit. This often does 
not often happen or only in retrospect. Harvesting in community forests requires a per-
mit, although again in practice this did not occur. Prunus africana seized after illegal 
harvesting is auctioned at a public sale, with the buying price usually below the current 
market price. The buyer does not need a permit but pays an additional 12% of the buy-
ing price to the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife delegation making the seizure. This 
practice was criticised by traders and community forests as a white-washing: selling il-
legally harvested Prunus africana cheaply and collusively to the benefit of the local 
Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife delegation. A Certificate of Origin should be issued 
by the ministry prior to exportation; however those seen in the Port of Douala office on-
ly state Cameroon as the origin and its planted or wild origin. 
Granting permits to many organisations for the same area creates unsustainable ex-
ploitation by creating a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ situation, which encourages over-har-
vesting. The Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife has had difficulty monitoring multiple 
exploiters, attributing destructive harvests and exceeded permit quotas. The short-term 
time scale of permits and unspecified locality means there is no ownership of specific 
sites, thus no incentive to use the two quarters technique or long-term resource man-
agement. The procedure is not transparent, with exploiters in the field often not corre-
sponding with weigh bill holders. The expensive, complex bureaucratic permit proce-
dure is difficult for small-scale organisations and community forests to access, taking 
over two years for some, with the quota received less than requested, making business 
planning very difficult. International pharmaceutical companies also reported that the 
short-term permits discourage long-term investment in processing in Cameroon. There 
have been no sanctions for exceeding permits or destructive harvesting.  
Bans have been regularly enacted due to perceived unsustainable extraction. A na-
tional prohibition on harvesting was enacted from 1991 to 1992; a 1983 Prefectural Or-
der was applied to Kilum Forest and in 1997 in Ijim Forest, prohibiting farming and 
grazing in the forest, but permitting NTFP collection. Enforcement was minimal and 
deforestation rates remained (Abbot et al. 2001). In 1998 harvesting was suspended on 
Mt Cameroon. In November 1999 an Arrête specified the control systems and the gov-
ernor of the Southwest region imposed a harvest ban. In May 2005 the Divisional Dele-
gate of Bui suspended harvesting from Oku Forest12 and in December 2005, the divi-
sional delegate of Fundong, collaborating with the ASSOKOFOMI delegate, seized 5 
tons of illegally collected Prunus africana and banned further harvesting. In May 2006 
the Sub-Divisional Delegate suspended harvesting in Oku Sub-Division13. In October 
2007, harvesting and exports were suspended in relation to the CITES convention. 
                                                 
12  E26/PS/126 Prefectural Order No 17/2005. 
13  E26.03/GSB/19/S.1/288 Sub-Prefectural Decision No 3. 
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A national management plan for Prunus africana (Ingram et al. 2009; Akoa et al. 
2010) is currently being implemented. Lessons learnt from the trade suspension appear 
to have generated a more cautious resource management and consultation and consen-
sus-making approach, with the Ministry being more aware of its image nationally and 
internationally and of contentious governance issues. There is now an “impression that 
things are going better now in terms of good governance” (H. Ackagou, MINFOF, 
pers., comm. Nov. 2011). The new arrangements have created Prunus allocation units in 
the six major production zones. A Prunus Allocation Unit is a wide geographical area in 
which Prunus africana can be exploited with a long-term permit based on an inventory 
and management plan agreed by the government and granted on competitive tender ba-
sis. Local organisations were to have priority, but in practice, have had to team up with 
companies. Pharmafric and Afrimed have been granted the Northwest Prunus Alloca-
tion Unit (Phillipe Evoe, MINFOF, pers. comm. 2011) as well as Afrimed Mt Came-
roon (Mambo Okenye, GTZ and Pierre Kebou MINFOF, pers. comm. 2011). Local 
community members, via MOCAP-CIG may harvest Prunus africana according the Na-
tional Park management plan. Harvesting in a National Park is a legal anomaly, as nor-
mally no commercial exploitation is possible in protected areas. This was supported by 
GTZ as part of the Sustainable Management of Natural Resources in the Southwest 
Province project (see Chapter 6) and approved by the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife 
and the Cameroon CITES authority. MOCAP-CIG will continue to represent and coor-
dinate community harvesting, having made a memorandum of understanding with 
Afrimed, which addresses benefit-sharing mechanisms for revenues (Mambo Okenye, 
GTZ, pers. comm. 2011; Jean Pierre Kebou, MINFOF Southwest, pers. comm. 2012). 
These new institutions allowed exports from Cameroon to recommence in 2011.  
Until 2010 the regulatory framework was not founded upon a national-scale assess-
ment of resource or threats to ecosystems and tree populations. However many invento-
ries and surveys had been conducted in the Adamaoua plateau, the Bamenda Highlands 
community forests and Mt Cameroon (see Ingram et al. 2009 in Appendix 1). These 
varied in methodology, with only one (Foaham et al. 2009) using the same methodology 
for multiple locations. The 2006 CITES Significant Trade Review (STR) required a na-
tional management plan based upon an inventory, reflecting the view that inventories 
are key to sustainable wild harvesting (ETFRN 2000; Wong 2003a; FairWild Found-
ation 2010). The adaptive cluster sampling method has been proposed as appropriate for 
unevenly distributed wild tree species such as Prunus africana (Roesch 1993; 
Thompson et al. 1996 ; Acharya et al. 2000). There was however no consensus nation-
ally, in academic circles or from CITES on an appropriate inventory method. Invento-
ries on Mt Cameroon (Acworth et al. 1998; Underwood et al. 2000) and Bioko Island, 
Equatorial Guinea (Sunderland et al. 1999a; Navarro-Cerrillo et al. 2008b), used adap-
tive cluster sampling and led to recommendations for an inventory standard (Hall et al. 
2000; Belinga 2001; Betti 2008; Ndam et al. 2008). Inventories in 2007 and 2009 
(Nsom et al. 2007; Foaham et al. 2009) further confirmed the transect-based adaptive 
cluster sampling approach and need to incorporate tree health and prior harvesting in the 
method. A review of all methodologies by the Prunus Platform in 2008 further empha-
sised balancing scientific rigour with costs, time and local capacity to conduct invento-
ries. Based on this review, an inventory norm was drafted (Ministere des Forets et de la 
Faune 2009) and legalised in 2011 after testing in the community forests in the North-
west (Akoa et al. 2010) and on Mt Cameroon. It has been accepted by CITES and the 
EU as the basis for the national management plan. 
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Most inventories have been financed by conservation, development and research pro-
jects. Responsibilities for financing inventories are currently unclear, with costs running 
into tens of thousands of euros, dependent upon the area surveyed. Community forests 
and small exporters and agents complained of the high financial and political capital 
needed to conduct an inventory and Prunus Allocation Unit permit. Although more ex-
pertise now exists in Cameroon to conduct inventories, it is mostly among civil serv-
ants, creating potential for corruption. The Bihkov community forest inventory (Tah 
2009) highlights how a participatory inventory can use local knowledge, increase 
awareness and ownership by local people, with the pros and cons thereof (Gregersen et 
al. 2010; Lawrence 2010). Inventorying cultivated Prunus africana requires a different 
method than for trees in natural forests. The guidance management plan proposed regis-
tration of cultivated stocks by owners, including details on tree age and harvest status. 
Cultivated Prunus africana started to be registered by the Ministry of Forestry and 
Wildlife in 2010; however difficulties have been experienced confirming ownership and 
the low level of awareness by tree owners, farmers and plantation owners. Some traders, 
such as Kumbo-based Cameroon Medical Plants (CAMEP) enterprise, have inventoried 
planted stocks to secure resources and raise owner awareness. There remains a wide-
spread lack of knowledge about registration, creating a false impression of stocks. An 
elaborate regulatory framework concerning Prunus africana has been developed in the 
last thirty years. However it has been only partially implemented and not been able to 
control and monitor illegal practices. Despite its strengths in offering a statement of in-
tent and an open competitive nature, it has major weaknesses. 
 
Dash 
Corruption feeds off and thwarts the statutory permitting procedures controlling access 
to the resource, monitoring and sanctioning. The high level of regulation of this high 
value trade and the small number of harvest areas, channels and actors through which 
the trade flows – provides a lucrative opportunity for corrupt officials. This then further 
exacerbates regulatory and customary failures. Corruption aggravates the challenges 
actors have to operate legally, promoting rather informality and illegality as a (slightly) 
easier and apparently profitable way of doing business. Corruption thus became an in-
sidious, predictable but incalculable governance arrangement and may continue to do so 
under the revised Management Plan, as unprecedented power is channelled via govern-
ment officials controlling inventories rather than participative inventories. 
Customary regulations  
Of the harvesters interviewed in the Northwest, 66% indicated access restrictions to cer-
tain forest areas: protected areas and traditional sacred areas (66%) and private or fami-
ly areas of forests and plantations (33%). Access to the open forest was free. Less than 
1% indicated changes, due to a part of Kilum-Ijim Forest becoming the Oku Plantlife 
Sanctuary protected area in 2005. In the Northwest 82% of harvesting was conducted in 
community forests and the remainder from family farms and other forested areas. 
The Kilum-Ijim Forest Project formalised a number of customary rules into the ‘Fon-
wide agreed rules’ in 1998. This process was legitimised by the presence of the Ministry 
of Forestry and Wildlife. The Fon-wide rules created a hybrid institution incorporating 
new rules, such as tree planting, patrols and fire-tracing. Prunus africana was specifi-
cally mentioned as a collective activity, from which the whole community should bene-
fit and was one of four ‘protected’ species from which only mature trees could be har-
vested for bark and only branches or dry (dead) trees for hoe handles. Traditional rulers 
 229 
 
in Kom, Bihkov, Nso and Oku subsequently upheld some of these rules. For example, 
when Prunus africana was harvested in the Laikom sacred forest in 2006, the Fon of 
Kom commanded the culprit to be found and exploited barks confiscated as punishment. 
In 2010 these were still held in the palace as a warning to others. In Bakingili, Chief 
Ephraim Inoni (Prime Minister from 2004 to 2009) also strove to enforce customary 
rules. 
However, in mid-2005 harvesting took place in the Oku Plantlife Sanctuary and the 
Oku sacred forest, with the implication of Fon Ngum III of Oku (WHINCONET 2005). 
This was a major about-turn as initially the Fon had been one of the major proponents 
supporting the Fon-wide rules and community forests during the Bamenda Highlands 
Forest Project. He was known as a conservationist, winning a prize and grants for his 
work. Interviews indicated that the Fon’s action was economically motivated, with pro-
ceeds spent on a new car. The sudden death of Fon Ngum III in October 2007 was seen 
by some as witchcraft and retribution for breaking the rules: the car was never used and 
reportedly has never since worked. The act signalled the end of both customary and hy-
brid regulations and encouraged others to flout customary and statutory rules, such that 
by 2007 the largest scale and most destructive harvesting had taken place, encouraged 
by the government and exporters, signalling the commodification of previously com-
mon property resources. This is exemplified by the Fon of Nso who “claimed that peo-
ple stopped thinking of the forest as a community asset and started to think about it as a 
resource to be exploited for personal gain” (Cunningham et al. 2000:321) illustrating 
the gradual degradation and ignorance of customary rights described in Chapter 6 and 
by Enchaw (2010) and Chi (2004). Many of the community forests reported that they 
were strongly rebuked for their actions by the traditional councils. The traditional au-
thorities were unable to mitigate conflicts between communities and permit holders in 
the community forests, or mediate with the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife. The cur-
rent Fon of Oku, Fon Sentieh II, aims to reverse this situation, having taken measures to 
control access revenues (such as the tourist fee to enter the forest, in collaboration with 
the local council), working with the community forests and with the small remaining 
Bamenda Highlands Forest Project and project interventions such as those by SNV and 
the African Intellectual Property Organisation (OAPI). Thus in the Northwest, commu-
nity-managed and customary controls over Prunus africana have generally not been 
more sustainable than open access areas where the private sector has had a free reign. 
Traditional authorities have either not been able to stop destructive harvesting practices 
or have actively participated in illegal and unsustainable harvesting. 
In the Southwest around Mt Cameroon, harvester interviews indicated there were no 
restrictions on access to the forest or to Prunus africana. Although farms are normally 
seen as private property, planted Prunus africana was reported as vulnerable to theft, 
perceived as either wild or simply as valuable and easy to steal. However, most harvest-
ing is conducted in open-access forest, seen as common property of the village, with 
chiefs and village councils as guardians and the clan as the legitimate landowners of Mt 
Cameroon. There was thus common affront when Plantecam Ltd. contracted non-
Bakweri to harvest Prunus africana bark. This added the perception of a gradual ero-
sion of forest resource rights, starting with colonial appropriation (Schröder, 2000) and 
the 1981 and 1994 forest laws. Together with further tensions concerning land and for-
est management and a disregard by some Bakweris for traditional leadership this led to 
over-harvesting (Ndam et al. 2004).  
In Adamaoua near the main harvesting region population density is very low and 
with few communities within approximately 25 km of the resource, only some semi-
230 
 
nomadic Fulbe/Fulani pastoralists. They did not claim rights to access or control the 
montane forest and did not know the species or its uses. Reports from traders and their 
agents reiterated similar experiences and indicated that due to the lack of local 
knowledge and use, they preferred to use their own teams of non-resident harvesters 
who could identify the tree and had no fears of working in the remote, steep forests for 
periods of days to weeks.  
Customary regulation has played a major role in both creating and resolving con-
flicts. Traditional institutions were instrumental in the adoption of harvesting tech-
niques, but when confronted with the large economic gains to be made and weakened 
by new institutions such as community forests, were unable to enforce sustainable har-
vesting techniques, control volumes harvested or restrict access. Customary access rules 
have yet to adapt to the transition from a wild to a privately owned, cultivated species, 
but a number of rules have been incorporated into new collective governance arrange-
ments (see next section). 
 
Assisted voluntary, collective action 
The collective action assisted by projects (community forests in the Northwest and har-
vesting unions and MOCAP-CIG in the Southwest) has had a clear impact on govern-
ance arrangements, although their monitoring, sanctioning and conflict resolution pow-
er, location of decision making authority and legitimacy has been highly variable.  
The 1980s and 2000s scramble for Prunus africana led to frequent conflicts within 
and between villages and the forestry service in the Southwest. By November 1996 the 
conflicts caused the Mount Cameroon Project and Plantecam Ltd. to mediate and set up 
partnerships between local communities, traditional authorities, government and busi-
ness to sustainably harvest bark and increase the benefits to local communities (Ewusi 
1998). Many illegal harvesters formed harvesters unions, collaborating with village el-
ders and traditional councils to represent villages in negotiations with outside stake-
holders. The Mount Cameroon Project brokered an agreement between the Mapanja and 
Bokwango Harvester’s Unions and Plantecam Ltd., allowing villagers to harvest legally 
under Plantecam’s license (Acworth and Ewusi 1999). The chiefs realised that the 
scramble for bark and frequent conflicts within and between villages, the forestry ser-
vice, the Mount Cameroon Project, Plantecam Ltd. and its harvesters and villagers, 
posed a problem requiring intervention. The harvesters elected an executive and created 
union rules and regulations. Representatives from the harvesters’ unions and community 
elders, including women, helped reduce conflicts and introduced local governance rules 
(Tieguhong et al. 2008a). By 2004 the union was seen as a force of social cohesion and 
of employment (Bellewang 2005). Thus traditional institutions were incorporated into 
new collective governance arrangements and new institutions formed. 
The Mount Cameroon Project continued to encourage planting and agroforestry, 
monitoring and evaluating benefit-sharing mechanisms and conflict resolution. When 
Plantecam Ltd. closed, the change created new governance possibilities. In response to 
this opportunity, MOCAP-CIG was formed, grouping the 13 villages involved in 
Prunus africana harvests to integrate activities in the value chain by becoming harvest-
er, buyer and trader and maintaining a strong community basis. Although MOCAP-CIG 
has claimed Mt Cameroon as its domain, permits with national coverage and specifical-
ly for the Southwest have allowed up to nine other enterprises to operate in the last five 
years. MOCAP-CIG has not been able to counter unsustainable or illegal harvest for 
other non-permit holders on the mountain. Despite the inventories and management 
plan established for Mt Cameroon, by 2006, three of the five blocks were almost totally 
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depleted of exploitable Prunus. Meuer (2007) points out that in MOCAP-CIG-
controlled zones there were also infringements. Most areas affected now fall within Mt 
Cameroon National Park. Even though traditional rulers have had some clout in restrict-
ing access to Prunus africana, unsustainable harvesting practices have not been coun-
tered by collective action. Local communities and traditional leaders disagreed with 
some of the Sustainable Management of Natural Resources in the Southwest Province 
project activities, particularly the upgrading of Mt Cameroon to national park status, 
partly due to belief in their customary right to harvest and trade Prunus africana. These 
conflicts prolonged the creation of the park for over four years (see the section on the 
Southwest project governance arrangements in Chapter 6), and further complicating 
governance arrangements by adding a layer of formal rules.  
In response to the possibility created by the 1994 Forest Law which permits devolved 
management authority in the form of community forests, twenty one community forests 
and their associations (ASSOKOFOMI, ASSOFOMI and Bihkov) were set up in the 
Northwest under the umbrella of the Bamenda Highlands Forest Project, which contin-
ued long-term support for them (see Chapter 6 for details). This form of state legitimat-
ed collective action developed new rules governing Prunus africana harvest. These all 
focus on Prunus africana as their main source of cash revenue (ASSOFOMI and AS-
SOKOFOMI delegates, pers. comm. 2007). Harvest zones and periods were defined in 
simple management plans (SMPs) and protection patrols and regeneration plans includ-
ed planting Prunus africana. None included inventories or annual quotas. Although the 
attribution process was long and difficult, most of the local population and community 
forest committee members considered the community forests as ‘theirs’. All the com-
munity forests had started protection and conservation and also developed new income-
generation activities (such as ‘modern’ beekeeping and bamboo paper making), howev-
er many were not fully established and for some the attribution process was not finished 
as demand for the bark grew. In response, harvesting occurred in half of the community 
forests. Four community forests exploited Prunus illegally (see Table 9.3) (i.e. not ac-
cording to their SMP).This was purportedly following a signal from the regional Minis-
try of Forestry and Wildlife delegation that Prunus was ‘needed’ in collaboration with 
buyers. Six community forests failed to renew their simple management plans upon ex-
piration in 2006 and 2007 but also continued harvesting. Despite these infringements of 
their own rules and the SMPs agreed with the governments, these community forests 
were not subjected to sanctions for harvesting bark, but for some the finalisation of their 
attribution files was delayed and in two cases, lost and had to be resubmitted. Whether 
this is connected is not known, as an awkward and difficult attribution process is com-
mon in Cameroon (Beauchamp et al. 2011). The community forests paid dues to Fons 
to secure their commitment to these new institutions, which in effect decreased the 
powers of traditional authorities over the forests (Enchaw 2010). The community forest 
associations ASSOKOFOMI and ASSOFOMI aimed to provide a common voice for the 
community forests and created an additional hybrid institution, channelling information 
and power. The community forests and their associations created new local institutions 
with forest access and management rights, relocating rights away from traditional con-
trol, but without granting corresponding monitoring or sanctioning powers and respon-
sibilities, or economic capital to enable this. Thus when the traditional authorities failed 
to receive the promised economic and political capital under the community forest bene-
fit-sharing mechanism, their motivation to collaborate was low. The scale and destruc-
tive harvest technique used raised alarm among local conservation organisations and in 
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the community forests, many of which had not yet harvested by the end of 2005 
(WHINCONET 2005). 
Community forests are currently being established in the Southwest around Mt Cam-
eroon National Park with support of the Sustainable Management of Natural Resources 
in the Southwest Province project. 
 
International conventions 
Cameroon became a party to CITES in 2005, acquiring its history of regulating the spe-
cies. Prunus africana was listed as a CITES Appendix II species in 1995, meaning it is 
not threatened by extinction, but may be so if trade is not regulated. Producer parties, 
such as Cameroon, have to declare exports, to set a ‘scientific non-detriment findings’ 
for the growing annual quotas (see trends in ) and report these to CITES.  
 
Figure 9.6 Prunus africana quotas and exports from Cameroon 1995 to 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources:CITEs 2011, SFP lists 2005-2010, COMCAM reports 2003-2009 
 
Concerns about the sustainability of international trade and wild harvest were voiced 
in the mid-1990s (Cunningham et al. 1993), culminating in a CITES Significant Trade 
Review in 2006 (CITES 2006; Cunningham 2006a). The Significant Trade Review pro-
cess identifies problems and solutions in implementing the Convention and acts as a 
safety net to prevent species decline due to international trade. An alternative is to trans-
fer the species to Appendix I where no trade is permitted. The Significant Trade Review 
recommendations included maintaining Appendix II status and supporting and monitor-
ing cultivation with wild harvest as a short-term measure in the transition to cultivation. 
A Working Group established to guide the implementation of recommendations offered 
a survey and management plan of Bioko as a model (Clemente Muñoz et al. 2006), 
classifying Cameroonian Prunus africana as of ‘urgent concern’. Cameroon was also 
required to review the current export quota and establish a conservative, reduced quota 
for export within three months; carry out an inventory of standing stock, establish esti-
mates of sustainable harvest; develop a scientifically based system to monitor harvested 
and un-harvested populations by July 2007; collaborate with Nigeria on trade monitor-
ing; and establish a long-term management plan for sustainable use within two years. 
Using the EU’s legally binding CITES Regulation14 on its member states, in July 2004 
                                                 
14  Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 9 December 1996 on the protection of species of wild fauna and 
flora by regulating trade therein. 
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the EU Scientific Review Group requested information from Cameroon and other coun-
tries on their management of the species. Failure to provide this would lead to trade 
suspension with the EU. In March 2005 imports from Cameroon were provisionally al-
lowed, but in June 2005 further data was requested on how the annual export quota was 
calculated.  
Despite support from the Working Group, the government found the ‘reasoned rec-
ommendation’ and ‘scientific non-detriment finding’ difficult to establish and was una-
ble to meet the requirements. News of the destructive and large harvests in 2005 and 
2006 reached conservation organisations, CITES and the EU, stoking fears, at the time 
unsubstantiated by evidence, of unsustainable trade. In October 2007 the EU Scientific 
Review Group subsequently suspended Prunus africana imports to EU member states15, 
the main importing countries. The Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife responded with two 
Ministerial Circulars16 in November 2007 outlining management measures, procedures 
for gathering statistics and administrative requirements. A CITES Working Group 
workshop in Naivasha in September 2008 aimed to support CITES Management and 
Scientific Authorities of seven priority countries, including Cameroon. In January 2009 
trade was also suspended from Tanzania, Equatorial Guinea and the DRC17, dramatical-
ly decreasing the global availability of Prunus africana. As the Lima 2006 recommen-
dations were not met, Cameroonian exports to the EU remained suspended for most of 
2008. Eventually the origins of bark 646.5 tons held in stock from the 2007 harvest 
were traced, leading to CITES granting a quota for 1,000 tons of powdered bark in April 
2008, exported in 2009 to France and Spain. This was critical as stocks held by Europe-
an importing companies were reportedly almost depleted. It also maintained the faith of 
Cameroonian actors in the chain. Cameroon declared a zero quota for 2009, buying time 
to respond to the recommendations.  
Actors joining the Prunus Platform indicated a wish to continue exporting bark, and 
so, with support from the Ministry of Forestry and ,Wildlife the National Forestry De-
velopment Agency, the FAO-CIFOR-SNV NTFP project and GTZ, an action plan was 
developed in September 2008 to meet CITES recommendations, followed by a guidance 
document in 2009 (Ingram et al. 2009). The Cameroon CITES authorities used this to 
develop a National Management Plan – defining Prunus Allocation Units, an inventory 
norm and a harvest standard. At the end of 2010 this plan (Akoa et al. 2010) was sub-
mitted to CITES, belatedly supporting the Northwest inventory and a 150 ton quota re-
quest granted in December 2010 and March 2011(Andre Nna, MINFOF, pers. comm. 
2011). Further inventories in the Southwest led to a resumption of trade in 2012 with a 
quota of 658 tons. This reinstated Cameroon as the world’s leading exporter, with small 
amounts permitted from the DRC (72 tons) and Uganda (176 tons)18 in 2012. 
                                                 
15  Lettre ENV.E.2/HE/DO/sb D(2007)14094 23 Oct. 2007 Mise en œuvre de la convention CITES dans 
l’Union européenne consultation concernant l’importation de Prunus africana dans l’Union euro-
péenne. 
16  Lettré No2050/L/MINFOF/SG/DF/SDAFF/SN 22 Novembre. 2007 Gestion de Prunus africana and 
Lettre Circulaire No0958/LC/MINFOF/SG/DF/SDAFF/SN 15 Novembre 2007 relative à la délivrance 
des documents pour le suivi de la gestion de Prunus africana au Cameroun. 
17  CITES No 2009/003 3 February 2009 “Implementation of Resolution Conf. 12.8 (Rev. CoP13) on 
Review of Significant Trade in specimens of Appendix-II species”. 
18  CITES national export quotas for 2012 
http://www.cites.org/common/quotas/2012/ExportQuotas2012.pdf retrieved 12 February 2012. 
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The impact of CITES has been wide-reaching. Actions to meet the Lima 2006 com-
mitments were insufficient, despite the threat of penalties. Only with the trade suspen-
sion were the repercussions clear. Until then the government saw Prunus africana 
(along with NTFPs in general) as of minor importance, providing a meagre contribution 
to state revenues (Joesph Ntsengue Levodo, MINFOF, pers. comm. 2008). The suspen-
sion, subsequent meetings, lobbying and support from CITES Scientific Review Group 
and stakeholders flagged up the environmental, social and economic importance of the 
bark exports and placed it on the forest, development and conservation agendas.  
Prunus africana is a favoured subject of the access and benefit sharing (ABS) com-
ponent of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (United Nations Environment 
Programme 1998; Chupezi et al. 2004; Ekpere 2007; Laird et al. 2008; Secretariat of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity and Central African Forests Commission 2009; 
Samndong 2010; Union for Ethical Biotrade 2010). A common theme of these studies 
has been its high value, declining stocks, high contribution to harvester’s livelihoods – 
and presence of the scheme on Mt Cameroon to share benefits. However benefits to 
others in the chain and in other areas are not discussed. Samndong (2010a) highlights a 
gap between definitions of genetic and biological resources in the CBD and implica-
tions for negotiations on national and international levels. Also that Prunus africana 
exports are not a direct use of genetic resources as defined in the CBD, but an indirect 
use, since only components of the bark extract are prospected, not the gene directly. 
Unduly emphasising and restricting its trade may affect communities dependent upon 
the tree for their livelihoods. The studies all reiterate problems of ineffective institution-
al structures and need for capacity building to address access and benefit sharing.  
Exporters and importers revealed a lack of awareness of access and benefit sharing 
discourses and their low level of impact on livelihoods except in Mt Cameroon. Access 
and benefit sharing schemes neither prevented large-scale uncontrolled harvesting lead-
ing to the trade suspension or subsequent negative effects on livelihoods, nor increased 
harvester’s rights nationwide. A lobbying report (GAIA/GRAIN 2000) argued for the 
negative impacts of commodification on local livelihoods and the intrinsic value of bio-
diversity. This however does not reflect feelings in the Northwest and Southwest ex-
pressed from 2007 to 2009 whilst developing the national management plan. The main 
priority of harvesters, traders and exporters were their livelihoods (financial capital). 
Local trade, ecological and cultural value were stressed only by support actors: local 
and international NGOs, development organisations, researchers and occasionally the 
government. Equitable benefits were a concern for harvesters and their associations, due 
to their realisation of the large profits gained by the pharmaceutical industry and that 
they were unable to add more value to the product in Cameroon. The unique situation of 
Cameroon being the main exporter globally was seen to give harvesters a better bargain-
ing position. In contrast to the GAIA lobby not to privatise, many actors indicated a 
wish for community organisations and individuals to obtain ownership and tenure 
rights, privatising the resource and ensuring better management.  
Other international agreements have also affected the chain. In 1998 Prunus africana 
was classified as a vulnerable species (IUCN 2006). Renowned botanists have argued 
that the species was not remotely in danger of extinction, being very common in its 
range, as long as montane forest survives, proposing a rating of ‘least concern’ or ‘near 
threatened’ in Kilum-Ijim Forest (Cheek et al. 2000) and ‘lower risk, near threatened’ 
on Mt Cameroon (1998d). The classification has been contested as inappropriate as the 
species is locally common, although threatened by low densities, in shrinking and in-
creasingly degraded montane ecosystems and high levels of harvesting. This led to a 
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comment that “further consultation with all parties concerned is required” (IUCN 2009). 
The classification remains unchanged to date. Developments since 1998 across all the 
range countries indicate that the Red Data listing drastically requires updating, as it is an 
important influence on decisions made by CITES, conservation and development pro-
grammes. The majority (94%) of harvesters interviewed had no knowledge that Prunus 
africana is a protected species, classed as vulnerable, or that it is endemic. 
 
Project governance 
The Mount Cameroon, Kilum-Ijim Forest and Bamenda Highlands Forest projects (see 
Chapter 6 for details) all used community participation in the management and protec-
tion of forests, based on a philosophy that this allows dual objectives of income genera-
tion and biodiversity conservation to be met. To date however, community management 
has not been evidenced by an improved track record concerning Prunus africana com-
pared to non-project or protected areas. In the Southwest and Northwest examples 
abound of unsustainable impacts (Nurse et al. 1995; Ewane 2001, Tieguhong, 2008; 
Ewusi et al. 2001; Gabriel 2003; Gardner et al. 2001; Sumelong undated). The GTZ 
monitoring study (Meuer 2007) indicated that MOCAP-CIG was unable to control un-
sustainable harvest by others (or its own members).  
Community forestry was one of the main approaches used by projects (see Chapter 6 
and above section on Assisted, voluntary collective action). The Mount Cameroon, Sus-
tainable Management of Natural Resources in the Southwest Province and FAO-
CIFOR-SNV NTFP projects were highly instrumental in creating an inventory and har-
vesting standard, conducting training and building awareness of the two quarters harvest 
standard (Hall et al. 2000) around Mt Cameroon in the late 1990s and the Northwest in 
2007. Actors with little incentive to harvest sustainably (buyers and non-indigenes on 
Mt Cameroon (MOCAP-CIG 2007) and in other areas) were not targeted by projects, 
creating gaps in skills and understanding nationally. The Mount Cameroon and Ba-
menda Highlands Forest projects were also enforcers, financers and initiated and im-
plemented management, monitoring and evaluation (Acworth and Ewusi, 1999; Ewusi, 
1998). For example, if harvesters exceeded their allotted bark quota, penalty compensa-
tory payments to a Village Development Fund were required. Continued over-extraction 
led to fines or a cessation of harvesting for some days. The Mount Cameroon project 
held capacity-building workshops with harvester unions to increase participation, moti-
vation and trust among members (Ewusi 1998). GTZ has continued assisting MOCAP-
CIG to date, including securing the right to harvest in Mt Cameroon National Park. Pro-
jects by the IUCN and WWF Wildlife Trade Monitoring Programme (TRAFFIC), GTZ, 
FAO and CIFOR were also influential in clarifying and developing a harvesting norm 
and pushing this to become a legal instrument. CITES and ITTO projects (ITTO-CITES 
2010) built staff and institutional capacity of the Cameroonian management and scien-
tific authorities, aiding them to build the national standards and to meet CITES re-
quirements. 
 
Strong, plural bricolage  
The differences between Cameroon and other Prunus africana-producing countries 
(CITES 2008; Navarro-Cerrillo et al. 2008a) indicate that the governance arrangements 
are a major factor impacting livelihoods and sustainability. The Prunus africana chain 
is characterised by strong, multiple arrangements and institutional bricolage. The ar-
rangements governing the international bark chain have been gradually crafted over the 
last forty years to make this one of most regulated forest product chains and products in 
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the country and in Central Africa. Formal regulation has grown since the 1980s, influ-
enced strongly by international conventions and standards. Enforcement however has 
been arbitrary and ineffective, regularly resulting in illegal harvesting and dubious 
transactions. Customary regulations (non-existent in Adamaoua, but present in the 
Southwest and Northwest) have been added, and sometimes overrun by projects. Com-
munity-based companies and community forests created hybrids with difficult existenc-
es: sometimes adding on to, collaborating with or dependent upon, occasionally subju-
gated to and often challenging traditional and regulatory authority. This has led to fur-
ther alienation and disabling of the power of customary institutions to control increased 
commodification. The local chain for bark and wood is entirely governed by strong cus-
tomary and weak market-based systems. Scored using the system introduced in the 
methodology in Chapter 3 and detailed in Appendix 18, the arrangements are illustrated 
in Figure 9.7. 
 
Figure 9.7 Governance arrangements in the Prunus africana chain in Cameroon 
Governance and livelihoods in Prunus africana chain 
This section addresses the fourth research question of how governance arrangements 
affect the livelihoods of actors along the chain, using the sustainable livelihoods ap-
proach. 
The governance arrangements of the international chain for medicinal use of the 
tree’s bark have gradually increased and multiplied with international fears of over-
exploitation and increases in the level of threat to the species and its increasing value 
since 2000. In contrast, although Prunus bark and timber are valued for subsistence use, 
with a fifth of harvesters interviewed engaging in local trade and exchange, traditional 
use of the bark and wood is largely unregulated. Despite the low level of processing and 
value adding of the bark destined for international trade in Cameroon since 2000, the 
simplicity of activities taking place in the chain in Cameroon, year round harvesting, 
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long shelf life with low losses and high demand mean that a significant number of peo-
ple have profited from the international chain. Approximately 1,464 people benefitted 
directly from exported Prunus africana incomes in the study period.  
Given the average household size, approximately 13,375 people benefit in total in the 
Northwest and Southwest regions. There are also indirect, non-cash benefits from reve-
nue benefit-sharing schemes for an estimated 71,500 people in communities around the 
Mt Cameroon and Kilum-Ijim Forests. Thus around 86,339 people benefit from the in-
ternational chain in Cameroon, including 21 community forests and a community-based 
enterprise, over 829 smallholder tree owners, around 455 harvesters, up to 11 traders, 
five exporting enterprises and an estimated eleven importing and processing companies 
internationally.  
In the peak years of harvest Prunus africana contributed up to 80% of household in-
comes for harvesters in the Southwest and was one of the main income sources for half 
of harvesters in the Northwest. It has been a source of income for on average 16 years 
and for 68% of harvesters for more than 20 years. For retailers, traders and exporters, it 
has been one of their main income sources alongside other medicinal plants for on aver-
age a decade. Regular Prunus africana revenues have been used to meet basic house-
hold needs in the Southwest and in the Northwest, the occasional harvests have contrib-
uted to major investments such as housing and marriages. For harvesters, Prunus afri-
cana is generally very profitable, equivalent to 3,100 FCFA (7.03 US$) per day, well 
over a 2 US$ a day poverty line. In the Northwest, the average income generated per 
harvest and harvester was 160,197 CFA (SD 90,257) (363 US$ SD 204), with 46% 
earning over 150,000 FCFA (339 US$) from harvests over the last decade. Higher in-
comes in the Southwest are due to Prunus africana harvesting being a regular activity 
since the 1970s, whereas in the Northwest it is largely undertaken only occasionally. 
Revenues paid for food (30%), school fees (17%), household needs (16%), healthcare 
(15%), clothing (8%) and weddings (2%). Profits vary depending upon transport costs 
from forest to pick up points and upon bargaining power, with members of unions and 
community forests obtaining higher prices. Its increasing value in the long term has 
meant that nurseries selling Prunus africana seeds and seedlings have provided regular 
incomes in the last decade. For importers and pharmaceutical companies, the bark ex-
tract has been the source of a lucrative trade for over forty years. For many consumers, 
it is an effective and relatively low cost treatment for common medical conditions.  
Average net daily income from Prunus harvesting in the Southwest is shown in Ta-
ble 9.5. Most harvesters think in terms of gross revenues, rather than net profit. In 2004, 
the 60 Mapanja Prunus Harvesters Union members earned around 532 US$ each (Ndam 
and Tonye, 2004). Union members had 74% higher revenues than non-members in the 
area (Ndam and Tonye, 2004): affiliated harvesters earn on average 50 FCFA (0.9US$) 
per kg more than non-organised harvesters. Hence collective action makes a difference.  
The formal regulation of the trade from 1985 to 1994 allowed many permit holders 
to operate, creating completion for Prunus africana, enabling owners, farmers and har-
vesters to negotiate higher prices. The open access to the resource created a classical 
tragedy of the commons scenario, where it was in the interests of each permit holder to 
fell or harvest trees because if they didn’t, someone else would. The monopoly of 
Plantecam Ltd. till 2000 provided regular and stable incomes, and institutional arrange-
ments with harvesters, particularly in the Southwest, led to regular, high incomes. The 
combination of granting permits to more companies from 1994, laxly and unenforced 
formal controls with increasing global demand and reduced supply from other African  
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Table 9.5 Average daily Prunus africana harvest revenues, Southwest 
Activities Duration (hours) Costs (FCFA) Income (FCFA) 
Income (260 FCFA per kg * 30 kg) 8  7,800 
Travel on foot to forest 1.5 225  
Finding suitable trees  0.5 75  
Measuring tree girth and cleaning  0.5 75  
Meals  0.5 675  
Climbing tree  0.5 75  
Debarking and bundling  2.5 375  
Transport bark to village  2 300  
Equipment   500  
Gross total  8 2,300 7,800 
Contribution MOCAP benefit sharing scheme (80
FCFA*30 kg)  2,400 
 
Net total   4,600  
Profit   3,200 
Source: Research results 
 
countries, presented increasingly lucrative opportunities for uncontrolled harvesting 
across the country, allowing more actors to easily and profitably join the chain. Projects 
supporting community forestry quickly added both rules and new actors interested to 
benefit from the ‘green gold’ (Page 2003). A tragedy for livelihoods occurred in 2007 
with the EU CITES trade suspension abruptly ending exports and leading to a two-year 
period of uncertainty with little to no income for any actors in the chain. This forced 
actors to work together to bricolage new governance arrangements, dictated by interna-
tional conventions and based on revised formal regulations, customary best practices 
and projects. The resulting arrangements appear a framework for more sustainable live-
lihoods in the long term. 
Governance and sustainability in the Prunus africana chain 
This section answers the fifth research question of how the governance arrangements 
impact on product sustainability. The sustainability of harvesting Prunus africana de-
pends on interrelated variables: the quantity and health of wild and cultivated trees, sus-
tainable bark yields i.e. the quantity of bark which can be harvested and the rate at 
which a tree can be repeatedly harvested and remain healthy and productive, and main-
tain tree populations. 
Quantifying the resource and its health: inventories  
Despite the studies summarised in Ingram et al. 2009, a national overview of the quanti-
ty of Prunus africana in the major production zones did not exist when this research 
commenced. Thus two surveys19 were conducted within the framework of this study, 
experimenting with and testing methodologies. 
Stewart (2009) and the surveys quantified and confirmed the legacy of repeated har-
vesting in the Northwest: between a third to 60% of trees of harvestable size had been 
exploited, mostly unsustainably (from 62% in Ijim community forest to 98% in Emfveh 
Mii community forest). Tree health varied from nearly all (98%) being in good condi-
tion in Ijim to less than half (47%) in Emfveh Mii and 13% mortality. Very little regen-
                                                 
19  Supported by the FAO-CIFOR-SNV NTFP Project and reported in Chapter 3 on the methodology and 
in Nsom et al. 2007 and Foaham et al. 2009 in Appendix 1.  
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eration and fruiting were found in either community forest. The 2008 Kilum-Ijim inven-
tory (Foaham et al. 2009) indicated a much lower availability (11 tons annually over the 
next ten years if sustainably harvested) than previously harvested. In the Southwest, 
surveys (Tasse 2006; Meuer 2007) also indicated the detrimental impact of harvesting 
on tree health. The 2007-2008 inventory (Foaham et al. 2009) indicated a higher density 
than previous studies, attributed to the larger sample and location of transects, with an 
estimated 272 tons of bark from wild sources annually over 10 years if sustainably har-
vested and 5 tons annually from plantations. Mts Kupe and Muanengouba had lower 
density and healthier stocks, with 22 tons annually estimated as available over the next 
decade.  
The negative impact of unsustainable harvest techniques upon tree health and mortal-
ity health was confirmed, with significant reductions in crown size after harvest (see 
Nkeng et al. 2009 and Foaham et al. 2009 for details in Appendix 1). Despite training 
and the best practice standards and decree, the majority (61%) of trees in all the main 
harvest zones surveyed were debarked unsustainably. This was predominantly in for-
ests, especially those with easy access. Only 9% were harvested according to the Two 
Quarters technique, mainly in privately-owned plantations and some areas of Mt. Came-
roon controlled by MOCAP-CIG. Less than a third (29%) of trees were under-exploited, 
mostly in difficult access areas in Adamaoua and the Northwest. In the community for-
ests in the Northwest, higher levels of unsustainable debarking were found: 98% of 
trees in Emfveh Mii community forest, 62% in Ijim community forest. In Bihkov com-
munity forest, 30% of trees over 60 cm dbh died when poorly or over-exploited com-
pared with 17% when the sustainable technique was used. An increase in unsustainable 
harvesting is also apparent over time: in Adamaoua in 1999 11% of trees had been un-
sustainably exploited (MINEF et al. 2000) and on Mt Cameroon in 1999 36% of trees 
were unsustainably debarked (Underwood et al. 2000), increasing to 43% in 2007 
(Meuer 2007).  
This data suggests that younger, smaller trees can withstand over-extraction and larger 
trees are most vulnerable, resulting in poor health or death. Mortality occurred between 
two and seven years after harvest, confirming Navarro Cerrilo (2008b) and Stewart 
(2001). The mortality rates found in this and other surveys are all higher than in natural 
populations (Stewart 2001), indicating a positive correlation with unsustainable harvest-
ing, shown in Figure 9.8. As Stewart (2009) notes, the death of large trees has implica-
tions for population regeneration, as they produce most seeds. However, older trees do 
exist. This finding sheds new light on the data presented in the 2006 Significant Trade 
Review. The majority of normally exploited trees were in perfect condition and had not 
died. This supports Cunningham and Mbenkum’s (1993) observations and the Mount 
Cameroon Project that Prunus africana can withstand repeated limited bark removal 
after a period of years. 
The surveys and comparisons with previous studies demonstrate the wide variations 
in density, tree size, stocking levels, phrenology, post-harvest regeneration and mortali-
ty rates for the main production areas. Density and distribution appear to be correlated 
with previous extraction. The inventories confirm the typical clumped and patchy dis-
tribution of Prunus africana, which may be exacerbated by harvesting. They also con-
firm the wide variations in density found across Africa (Hall et al. 2000). However, the 
lack of a national baseline and different study locations do not provide accurate, longi-
tudinal evidence of a declining resource nationally. The surveys do however strongly 
suggest locally declining natural populations on Mt Cameroon and Kilum-Ijim, with  
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Figure 9.8 Relation between tree mortality and harvest technique 
Source: Research results 
 
abnormally low tree density, poor health and high mortality rates and evidence that this 
is due to repeated harvesting. The differences between populations and harvesting activ-
ities per production area make it impossible to nationally assess the national status of 
Prunus africana populations or to extrapolate from one site to another. However, this is 
exactly what happened: alarms raised concerning Mt Cameroon were inferred to the to-
tal population of Prunus africana in Cameroon. The surveys also highlight how anthro-
pogenic activities upon the ecoregion impact on the quantity of Prunus africana. Bush-
fires, livestock grazing and forest degradation by agriculture inhibit natural regeneration 
by decreasing numbers of seeds and of seed dispersers, such as primates – many of 
which have recently become extinct (Ingram et al. 2008), birds (Fotso et al. 1991), fru-
givores (Gautier-Hion et al. 1985; Maisels et al. 2001; Wang et al. 2007; Farwig et al. 
2006) and possibly bees – important Prunus africana pollinators (Tangkeu 2011). 
In natural forests the inability of customary authorities to control access in the 
Northwest and their open access nature on Mt Cameroon and Adamaoua, combined 
with a regulatory system that allowed multiple permit holders open access to an quanti-
fied resource, stimulated competition. With no responsibility to maintain resources, no 
or low levels of enforcement and with opportunistic corrupt officials, this created an 
operating environment emphasising short-term economic wins through unsustainable 
extraction. The new regulatory framework aims to counter these problems.  
 
Quantifying the resource: cultivation  
Tree domestication is the process where species are adapted for cultivation from their 
natural state. As shown in Appendix 1, inventories up to 2009 had focused on wild 
Prunus africana. The 2006 CITES Significant Trade Review reported that in Cameroon 
“all bark entering the international market is from wild harvest” (CITES 2006: 5). This 
was despite many commentators noting domestication and cultivation activities in the 
last four decades (Cunningham et al. 1993; Cheek et al. 2000; Hall et al. 2000). Inter-
views indicated that Prunus africana has been cultivated in the main zones since the 
early 1970s. Nearly one-third (29%) of harvesters in the Northwest indicated they had 
planted trees. Of those who had not, 61% said that this was because they did not know 
how; 15% because it is time consuming and difficult; 20% because it is still available in 
the forest “so there is no need” and 4% due to a lack of land. On average farmers in Bui 
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and Donga Mantung Divisions had 250 trees each, ranging from one to 600 with 75% 
owning up to 25 trees. In the Southwest, the majority of harvesters (95%) had not plant-
ed, quoting the same reasons. The 2009 survey indicated that 34 plantations contained 
trees on average 14 years old, 41% (115,490 trees) of which were over this median age. 
Approximately 70% had never been harvested. Some 25% were located in pure strands, 
the rest were mixed with other agroforestry species. Given an average survival rate of 
32%, it is estimated that around 515,200 trees currently exist in plantations, equivalent 
to approximately 86 tons annually on a 10 year rotation. Interviews also indicated that a 
further 4,821 individuals, 78 CIGs and 20 community forests had planted at least 
1,698,481 Prunus africana trees (Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife 2008, Foaham et al. 
2009). Most have been planted by individuals on farms and family compounds support-
ed by government projects (Forestry Funds, the former Office National de Développe-
ment des Forêts (ONADEF), the Capacity building for community-managed forest and 
fauna resources initiatives (KIFP) and the Support Programme for Rural Forestry and 
Agroforestry (PAFRA). At least 15 projects (such as the Mount Cameroon, Kilum-Ijim 
and Bamenda Highlands Forest projects, and shorter term projects by ICRAF, HEL-
VETAS and local NGOs which facilitated planting by individuals, in community forests 
and communal spaces such as schools and watersheds. Initially required by law, gov-
ernment projects enabled planting in natural forests and on government-owned planta-
tions.  
Based on this data and reports (Nkembi et al. 2008; Franzel et al. 2009), five types of 
cultivation can be characterised: plantations by small companies and the Cameroon De-
velopment Corporation, around 3% of cultivators; pioneer owner-farmers from the early 
1970s onwards, with varying motives (firewood, traditional medicinal and/or commer-
cial use); high-income, progressive owner-farmers, including traditional ‘notables’ (6% 
of cultivators) who purchase seed, often from nurseries or individual collectors in Buea, 
Fundong, Kumbo or Oku, 19% of whom had over 100 trees, on average 993 up to 
8,000; small-scale ‘opportunistic’ owner-farmers – the majority of owners – with 81% 
having less than 100 trees, on average 15 trees each; and community groups, councils 
such as Kumbo Council with 52,000 trees, and organisations such as the Banso Baptist 
Hospital and water catchments such as Kiko Roh Vitangtaa.  
An overview of cultivation over time, by location and type of planter is given in In-
gram et al. 2009 (see Appendix 14). An estimated total of at least 1,616,815 cultivated 
trees exist, representing around 63% of total stocks known in Cameroon and an im-
portant genetic source. This has enhanced access for farmers and planters to diverse tree 
germplasm and provides a critical stock for regeneration and long-term maintenance of 
the population in Cameroon. These facts demonstrate the previously unrecognised 
large-scale of domestication, reinforced by the number of plant nurseries, especially in 
the Northwest. Figure 9.9 summarises the trends in planting of Prunus africana trees 
annually and Figure 9.10 the number of new plantations. The peaks correlate with high 
bark harvests from 1995 to 1996 and 2000 to 2007. The private sector has become more 
interested as the impact of the 2007 trade suspension has been felt, with international 
pharmaceutical companies discussing options to support cultivation with their Came-
roonian buyers, such as Afrimed. The Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife commenced 
inventories in 2010 to implement the national management plan; however farmer and 
owner awareness of the need to register Prunus africana remains low, in part due to un-
certain land tenure. Cultivation has been stimulated by the species’ economic and cul-
tural value and by governance arrangements. Early laws and a series of conservation, 
research and development projects promoted institutions supporting cultivation. This 
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long history and wide scale of domestication and cultivation activities is strongly in 
contrast with CITES’ impression that “cultivation is taking place on a small scale in 
Cameroon” (CITES 2006: 5). 
 
 
Figure 9.9 Prunus africana seedlings and trees planted 1988 to 2008 
Source: Research results 
 
 
Figure 9.10 Number of new Prunus africana plantations 1988 to 2008 
Source: Research results 
 
 
This finding questions two of the assumptions upon which international trade gov-
ernance arrangements are based: CITES and the species Red data listing. It suggests that 
the threats to the national species population are less than supposed, corroborating Ca-
ble & Cheek (1998) and Cheek et al. (2000). Domestication and subsequent cultivation 
have provided an alternative supply source from wild Prunus africana, challenging the 
supposition that the trade is of a ‘wild’ and endangered species as the basis upon which 
international trade is governed. This finding indicates that trade may have been more 
sustainable than supposed by the numerous trade bans, and that there is potential for 
cultivated sources to enable continued, sustainable trade.  
 243 
 
Sustainable bark yields  
Regulatory control since the 1980s has concentrated on repeated harvesting of live trees. 
However evidence to support the sustainability of this practice, based upon the premise 
of bark regeneration, is lacking (Ndam et al. 2004) and depended upon anecdotal evi-
dence from Plantecam harvesters (Ndam et al. 2008). Bark regeneration depends upon 
tree health pre and post-harvest, the rate of bark growth post-harvest and the time period 
between harvests (i.e. the rotation). The regulatory framework has ignored these factors 
and outlawed felling to harvest bark. Thus the use of multiple tree parts, as occurred in 
Kenya and Madagascar and promoted as economically attractive particularly for culti-
vated trees (Franzel et al. 2009), is barred.  
The bark regeneration study20 evaluated bark recovery and potential yields post-
extraction in the three main harvesting regions. The results indicate that over 60% of 
harvested trees were over-exploited (i.e. more than two quarters had been harvested) 
and 9% sustainably harvested. Bark recovery rates differed significantly by ecoregion 
location, with a thickness of 0.12 m (SD.05) in Adamaoua, 0.1 m (SD 0.03) in the 
Northwest and 0.06 m (SD 0.02) in the Southwest annually. Recovery reached 15% of 
original bark thickness in the first and second years after harvest and progressively 
dropped to an inflection point (7%) between the seventh and eighth year. This indicates 
that at least a seven year rotation period is the most sustainable period for repeat har-
vesting, adjusted to take into account the aforementioned ecoregion differences. Har-
vests from trees of 30 cm dbh appear most sustainable because of higher recovery rates 
(8% annually) and higher average bark thickness (1.3 cm) up to the first branch. Tree 
growth rate was faster (14 SD 0.5 m compared to 9 SD 0.2 m tall) in altitudes less than 
800 m, however insect attacks (in 94% of trees surveyed) are severer below 1,000 m, 
indicating that trees at lower altitudes may require a longer harvest period to reduce 
mortality risks. Generally there was an abundance of seedlings and small trees in open 
forest, canopy gaps and forest edges, however few seedlings over 5 cm tall were found 
near living trees and seldom found in closed forest canopies. This confirms Ewusi et al. 
(1992), Ndam (1998) and Hall et al.’s (2000) observations of the light-loving nature of 
seedlings. 
The national regulatory framework until 2010 was demand based, not upon availabil-
ity, even when inventory data was available and sustainable yield for a given area could 
have been calculated. As part of the guidance for a national management plan (Ingram 
et al. 2009), an annual sustainable yield equation was developed, building upon past 
work (Acworth 1997; Underwood et al. 2000), the 2009 and 2010 inventories and the 
bark regeneration study. This was calculated based on the population density of exploit-
able trees, area of forest containing Prunus africana, average sustainable bark yield per 
tree and the time taken for bark regeneration. Regular re-measurement of sample trees 
over time is recommended to determine the long-term impacts of harvesting on tree re-
covery and bark regeneration.  
Long-term rates of mortality, recruitment and growth must be known or estimated to 
determine the sustainability of the harvesting cycle. Tree growth rates were calculated 
by size class distribution (the diameter size over a range of tree ages) in a Prunus Allo-
cation Unit and taking into account previous harvesting. If a larger amount of the small-
est two size classes and a large number of the oldest classes are present, this can assure 
                                                 
20  Supported by the FAO-CIFOR-SNV NTFP Project. See Chapter 3 on the methodology and Nkeng et 
al. 2009 in Appendix 1 for details. 
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regeneration. Given mortality rates averaging 17% in Cameroon (Ingram et al. 2009), a 
verification of tree health and recovery rates of harvested trees is necessary to determine 
mortality after first and second harvest (i.e. when the entire circumference of the tree 
has been stripped). These can be verified using a mortality, recruitment and growth 
equation (see Appendix 8) that incorporates the number of trees standing at the begin-
ning and end of an harvesting cycle, the number of tree mortalities and tree recruitments 
during the harvesting cycle and the average yield of bark per tree (kg fresh weight/ 
trees/harvest) by size class. These calculations led to the sustainable yield formula being 
incorporated into a national inventory norm (Ministere des Forets et de la Faune 2009).  
Harvest techniques used for local chains for medicinal bark and wood for hoes ap-
pear sustainable, given the preference from cultivated sources, small-scale of harvesting 
and no reports or observations of poor tree health or of mortality. Whilst governance 
arrangements such as the 1986 law on harvesting techniques and the subsequent com-
pany and project-led two quarter standard specified how to harvest, they did not define 
the sustainable yield of bark from individual trees. Projects such as the Mount Came-
roon project researched yields but this did not emerge as a governance tool and aided 
the introduction of rules limiting the frequency and quantity harvesters associated with 
unions could carry in the Southwest. These rules were known only by some harvesters 
in some regions and largely unenforced, with offenses resulting largely in blanket, 
short-term bans on harvesting, a few penalties for individuals and none for companies 
or community-based organisations. Thus none of the governance arrangements have 
sought to regulate sustainable harvesting either on an individual tree or on a population, 
ecoregion or landscape level. Hence no regulations exist regarding the quantity of bark 
that can be harvested and the rate at which a tree can be repeatedly harvested and re-
main healthy and productive nor the quantity that can be harvested from wild and culti-
vated populations whilst maintaining that population. However, the EU trade suspen-
sion sent shockwaves and forced reflection of and ultimately adherence to the institu-
tions set out in international conventions. This research was a key factor in helping to 
address how to define sustainable yields on a production zone level and reconfigure the 
formal and informal mix of actors and institutions to enable this.  
Conclusions 
The analysis of the Prunus africana chain originating from Adamaoua, the Northwest 
and Southwest regions of Cameroon indicates that governance arrangements have 
strongly influenced how the chains are configured in terms of values. Also how the 
products are sourced, harvested and traded. This section draws conclusions, responding 
to research questions two to five on the governance arrangements in place; how these 
impact the livelihoods of actors; and how these impact chain and product sustainability. 
Prunus africana products are characterised by high values, providing an important 
economic contribution to actors’ livelihoods. In the last forty years the multi-purpose 
uses of this tree have changed from local uses by the montane ecoregion communities to 
create substantial wealth for these and other actors in Cameroon, and companies inter-
nationally. It scores highly on socio-economic value, used by thousands of prostate suf-
ferers internationally, consumers with medical problems and for everyday tools. The 
species has a high environmental value as a key afromontane endemic species.  
The multiple governance arrangements covering the international chain make this 
one of most regulated forest product chains and products in Cameroon and Central Afri-
ca. Formal regulation has grown, strongly influenced by international conventions and 
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standards. Enforcement has been arbitrary and ineffective. Working collectively har-
vesters have had some impact on the distribution of power in the chain, creating oppor-
tunities to add limited value and legally control supply in the last decade. The interna-
tional chain has crept into multiple policy agendas (development, forestry and agricul-
ture). The 2007 European trade suspension precipitated a crisis and participative review 
of governance arrangements in the form of a national management plan that blends stat-
utory, customary and project-based institutions. Customary regulations are non-existent 
in Adamaoua but strong in the Anglophone montane areas and preceded the regulatory 
framework, but have been frequently overrun by projects. Community-based companies 
and community forests have alternatively used, adapted, collaborated with, occasionally 
subjugated and often challenged traditional and regulatory authority. This has further 
alienated and disabled customary institutions as commodification has increased. Gov-
ernance of the local use chains, in contrast, has remained largely unchanged: with light-
ly customarily regulated, informal and highly fragmented with no individual actors or 
enterprises dominating.  
The impact of these governance arrangements on livelihoods has been considerable. 
A handful of processing, exporting and importing companies have benefited enormous-
ly for decades, gaining global competitive strategic advantage. Liberalisation to a mar-
ket-based network had dramatic impacts: increasing prices and competition, retaining 
low flows of information between buyers and sellers. The state treasury has benefitted 
from Prunus africana exports. Some state officials have gained from corruption. Con-
servation-minded projects and NGOs promoting alternative and decentralised govern-
ance arrangements seeking to improve harvesters and/or the species’ environmental sta-
tus prompted large-scale resource ‘mining’. However the government’s under-estima-
tion and/or ignorance of the impact of the international conventions and agreements 
contributed to the EU CITES suspension. This had an immediate and direct negative 
economic impact. This was a ‘lose’ for the livelihoods of all actors involved. The new 
rules may have negative implications for equity of access to resources and markets, as 
the smaller, weaker and, until recently, unorganised actors struggle to make their voice 
heard against the larger, dominant traders and exporters. Collective action allowed 
community-based, collective action, often project supported, to gain or maintain a share 
of the economic value, increasing selling prices by 50 to 600%. However, attempts at 
value adding have been hindered by the low level of vertical integration. Now that An-
glophone harvesters are in contact and govern access to the Prunus Allocation Units, 
they expect their power to increase. A sobering note is that collective arrangements also 
contributed to over-extraction and ultimately the trade suspension.  
The impact of the multiple governance arrangements on the sustainability of Prunus 
africana-based products, and ultimately the chain, has been mixed but generally nega-
tive. Whilst sustainable harvests are possible, regulatory frameworks that take account 
of the species’ ecological characteristics still await implementation. The government 
repeatedly ignored is own rules requiring inventories and harvest standards, and even 
when conducted, did not use them for permitting. This promoted short-term economic 
wins above a sustainable, long-term product and chain. Statutory arrangements have 
been ineffective in countering pressures to harvest unsustainably, culminating in a trade 
suspension. Natural capital ‘won’ – receiving a respite from harvesting for nearly three 
years and prompting a profound rethink of governance arrangements. In contrast, pro-
ject-stimulated collective action has supported planting, leading to a hitherto unrecog-
nised amount of Prunus africana being cultivated. However, because they are unquanti-
fied, cultivated trees have remained invisible to national and international policymakers, 
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with no distinction made between the product’s wild and farmed origins. Regulations, 
conventions and project-based arrangements however have been based upon a presump-
tion of wild sourcing and the species’ threatened status. Thus perceptions of sustainabil-
ity by the CITES and IUCN red data listings have played a dominant, but mistaken, role 
in its governance and consequent sustainability. The bark’s high value encouraged ac-
tors to negate customary rules, illustrated by unsustainable harvests by traditional au-
thorities. Community collective action, promoted by statutory and project-based ar-
rangements, has been directly responsible for illegal and unsustainable harvests and has 
largely failed to control access or over-extraction. Community-based institutions defied 
institutional design principles. They were insufficiently powerful to exclude others. 
Powerlessness was exacerbated by statutory systems allowing multiple resource users in 
one geographical space, with no sanctions, monitoring or conflict resolution arenas,. 
However actors’ collaborations with vocal support organisations (research, development 
and conservation NGOs) have led to policies and institutions that have shifted the focus 
on product and livelihood sustainability. 
The current global market for Prunus africana is hovering on the brink between bust 
and continuation, with Cameroon one of the few suppliers in large volumes. Facing 
competition from natural and synthetic substitutes makes the chain sensitive to supply 
disruptions and positive livelihood impacts precarious. Whilst feeble attempts were 
made by Plantecam Ltd to control supply through plantations, only since the 2007 trade 
suspension have actors seriously considered vertical integration with traders stimulating 
cultivation. This tardiness illustrates a classic tragedy of the commons. It is surprising as 
several importers trade in barks and natural products sourced largely from cultivated 
sources. In contrast to the international chain, the local chain using customary bark and 
branch harvesting methods appears largely sustainable. These traditions have been ig-
nored by national and international regulations and actors. Reconciling livelihoods with 
longer term sustainability has proved difficult. Short-term economic benefits have been 
gained at the cost of the sustainability of the natural capital they are based on. 
 
  
10  
Cola, Irvingia, Raphia,  
bamboo and Acacia value chains1 
Introduction 
This chapter summarises the analysis of five additional NTFP chains in Cameroon: Cola 
nuts (Cola spp.), bush mango (Irvingia spp.), raffia products (Raphia spp.), bamboo 
(Yushania alpina and Oxytenanthera abyssinica) and gum arabic (Acacia spp.). The 
findings are based on interviews, literature, observation, resource assessments, value 
chain analysis, market surveys and trade data (see Chapter 3). The values provided have 
been verified and triangulated with literature and in workshops with stakeholders and 
are believed to be valid for the specific chain, its geographic locations and population 
sample for the time period of the data collection. These products and chains originate 
from the same three ecoregion study areas. They provide both complementary and con-
trasting views to the three previous chapters of how NTFP chains are configured (the 
products, location, actors, activities and values), their governance arrangements and sus-
tainable livelihood outcomes. Compared to the extremes of governance arrangements, 
plurality and voids illustrated in the eru (Gnetum spp.), apiculture and pygeum (Prunus 
africana) chains, these five chains provide a broader view of products and chains in 
Cameroon. They reflect the wide range of non-timber forest products shown in Chapter 
4.  
Cola chain 
C(k)ola (Cola acuminata, C. nitida and C. anomala) trees produce red, pink and white 
coloured nuts in mast years, which are high in caffeine, chewed as a stimulant and hun-
ger suppressant. The bark is occasionally used as a remedy for ring worm. The nuts are 
a symbol of hospitality across Western and Central Africa and used in traditional cere-
monies particularly in the montane ecoregions of the West, Northwest and Southwest. 
The rituals surrounding cola are elaborate and deeply ingrained in most aspects and lev-
                                                 
1  Included data published in peer-reviewed articles written or contributed to by the author (Awono et al. 
2013; Wiersum et al. 2013), Ingram et al. 2010 (Colfer), Ingram and Tieguhong 2012, and peer re-
viewed reports in Annex 1.  
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els of society, and include planting trees at a first son’s birth. All species are found in 
the wild, but most trees harvested are cultivated, located near homesteads and in man-
aged forests, with tree size and interviews indicating some planted specimens of around 
200 years old, confirmed by studies (Kaberry 1952; Goormans et al. 1955; Chilver 
1961). Cameroonian cola was traded through Hausa trade caravans to the Nigerian cali-
phates and entered into the intra-African trade, which dates back to at least the 7th Cen-
tury. Cola nitida was introduced from the Gold Coast and exported since around 1910 
from colonial plantations in Cameroon to the main centres in Western Africa, and to the 
UK and US in the mid-19th century (Morgan 1959; Lovejoy 1980). In 1886 the Ameri-
can druggist John S. Pemberton invented Coca-Cola, combining coca and cola extracts 
as a headache and hangover cure (Kiple et al. 2001), sourced from West and Central 
African cola. Although shrouded in secrecy, it is highly likely that only synthetic ex-
tracts are now used (D’Amato et al. 2011). Cola nitida is preferred in Northern Came-
roon, the subject of long distance and export trade. Cola acuminata is the preferred spe-
cies in the West and Northwest. Cola anomala (known as Bamenda cola, ehbe in Oku 
and ebii in Kom) is the least traded, and found wild in Kilum-Ijim Forest. An estimated 
90% of harvest in the Northwest and West originated from cultivated trees, found near 
households, on customarily owned farms and fallows, in managed forest and coffee and 
raffia agroforests. Around 10% originates from secondary forested areas, gallery forests 
and community forests.  
The trade is reportedly not as lucrative or large as 30 years ago. A result is that old 
cola trees are not being replaced, continuing a trend identified in the West region in the 
early 1980s (Nguifo 1982), despite the then higher demand than supply. However, the 
product is still valuable: the Northwest and West chains are estimated to be worth 1.8 
million US$ annually, with around 1,000 people, mainly men and children participating 
in harvesting during the season. Trade in the 1000 nut, 20 kg baskets extends to North 
Africa and the diaspora in Europe, with cola found in African shops in the Netherlands, 
Belgium and UK. This is confirmed by other studies (Duru 2005; Kendo et al. 2007).  
Harvesting techniques are largely sustainable, 
as ripe nuts are gathered once fallen or by chil-
dren climbing and shaking the tree, or hooked 
using a bamboo pole. The nuts are then extracted 
from the pods using a sharp knife, and transported 
to the harvester’s home, where the white meso-
carp is removed, often by family members of the 
harvester. Nuts are then graded by size and quali-
ty and stored in plantation leaves, sand or using 
pesticide, allowing storage for around three 
months. Perishability is a problem, with up to 5% 
loss reported by harvesters and higher for whole-
salers. Cola harvests are seasonal and so often 
form only a supplementary source of income for 
harvesters, with 85% of harvest sold, providing 
on average 81,000 FCFA, (SD 62,000) (171 US$, SD 131), around 25% of household 
income. Alongside cola harvesting, on average five other income sources were noted. 
Cola harvesting for trade is generally long established, the average harvester has been 
active for nine years. Traders tend to specialise in cola and earn more, on average 
153,000 FCFA (SD 42,000) (324 US$, SD 88 US$) annually, frequently specialising in 
it and complementary crops (such as coffee and potatoes) and condiments with similar 
Photo 10.1 Cola acuminata tree and 
owner, Bamenda, March 2010 
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trade routes. These follow the ancient trade routes in cotton, cloth, palm oil and salt. 
Nuts are commonly retailed by women (85%) in markets and by male youths roving 
along roadsides and toll gates. Sold individually, the nuts cost from 5 to 50 FCFA (0.01 
to 0.10 US$). The majority of consumers were men and women of all ages, and around 
10% in the Northwest were semi-nomadic herdsmen. 
Illustrated in Figure 10.1, customary arrangements govern the chain, arising from the 
product’s long history of high economic and cultural value. In the Highlands, tradition-
ally male clan lineage heads owned all tree crops and controlled the trade (Goheen 
1996, Chilver 1961). This system of access to resources continues in largely in the same 
way today, supporting a system of male wealth and power, which ultimately, in combi-
nation with surpluses from women’s farm labour and material capital, is transferred to 
‘symbolic power’. Trees on private land are male owned and passed down patrilineally 
and may only be harvested with express permission of the owner. Traditional chiefs in 
the Northwest control access to wild or actively managed trees, normally receiving nuts 
and gifts in exchange for permission for large-scale harvesting. Rules to guard against 
unsustainable practices include prohibitions on climbing trees and plucking unripe fruit 
but allowing open access for community members to fallen fruits. Well-known man-
agement techniques may also be instigated if cola nut trees are not producing enough. 
Reported practices include marking the tree with ropes to avoid damage, fertilsing with 
wood ash and slightly incising the bark to induce fruiting. Whilst there are no statutory 
regulations, at roadbloacks and border crossings along the common regional trade 
routes trade is subject to corruption. No instances of collective action were found, how-
ever strong ethnic ties link traders from the Northwest and Extreme North. Informal, 
 
Figure 10.1  Intensity of governance arrangements in the Cola spp. chain 
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trust-based market-based arrangements dominate between traders, and sometime har-
vesters, enabling long distance, trans-national economic exchanges, dispute settlement, 
financial support and information sharing. 
Bush mango chain 
Bush mango is the term for two tree species producing oil-rich seed kernels. Originating 
in the humid forest ecoregion, Irvingia gabonensis is a tree bearing fruits with fragrant, 
juicy flesh, sweet juice. Irvingia wombulu (‘dry season mango’) has smaller, bitter fruit. 
Both are found wild (Leakey et al., 2004). Irvingia gabonensis is semi-cultivated in 
some areas, left and or nurtured in farm fallows, small plantations in Akwaya, and re-
generates spontaneously among well-used forest to farm routes (Ingram et al. 2011). In 
the Southwest, Irvingia wombulu is also widely found in farm fallows. The ground ker-
nels, extracted from the hard fruit using a machete, are used as a condiment and sauce 
thickener. Cooking oil is extracted from the seed, the juice is used in cooking and wine, 
the pulp as a dye, the bark and kernels have multiple medicinal uses and the timber is 
used for construction. The kernels are increasingly processed in the USA and Europe as 
the main ingredient in weight-loss aids, health supplements and cosmetics. 
 
 
Over 6,387 tons valued at 8 million US$ were harvested on average annually from 
five major harvest areas in the Centre, South, Southwest, Littoral and Eastern regions in 
the study period, with around 3,800 people active. An estimated 4,220 tons were ex-
ported annually to Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. Between to 31% to 58% of 
harvest is consumed by the harvester’s household, between 11% to 27% of harvest is 
exchanged and 31% to 58% is sold. Bush mango contributes on average 28% to 44% of 
household incomes. Average annual household income from bush mango in Cameroon 
was 145,960 CFA (SD 59,756) (324 US$) (132 SD), varying form 98,950 (219 US$) in 
the Southwest to 213,206 CFA (473 US$) in the Centre, South and Littoral and 125,723 
CFA (279 US$) in the East. The price varies from 0.9 to 1.8 US$ per kg (producer) to 
2.5 to 4.6 US$ (consumer). Near borders the price is strongly influenced by demand and 
supply. Ebolowa and Mblamayo markets respectively control 71% and 19% of the 
Cameroonian trade. In the Southwest, five main markets are the focus of a flourishing 
trade to Nigeria, where Nigerian agents work seasonally to store, distribute and set buy-
ing prices. Harvesters receive between 30 to 50% of the consumer buying price, with 
value increasing with transformation into cake and powder. Price-setting buyers cartels 
were opened up with the ’Market Information System’ in 2008 which enabled new en-
Photo10.2  Irvingia gabonensis flowers, fruits and dried kernels, Yaoundé, March 2009 
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trants and higher selling prices, especially at remote locations. Consistently slightly 
higher margins were earned by individual dealers, although average production per per-
son is higher in groups. Over 90% of actors belong to marketing and processing associa-
tions. NGOs and research organisations are been supporting domestication trials of Ir-
vingia wombulu.  
Exploitation is generally regarded by harvesters as sustainable, as only fallen fruits 
are harvested and as bush mango is usually left or actively managed in fallows. Howev-
er increasing forest clearance may pose a risk to ecoregion level populations. Fruiting is 
highly variable from year to year and demand is generally higher than supply. Losses of 
5 to 8% have led to 11 different storage methods being used (including pesticides) with 
different levels of effectiveness. On average 41% is harvested from farm-fallows in all 
the regions, varying from 37% in the East where it is not domesticated but left in fal-
lows, to 65% in the Southwest where harvesters have planted or maintain it in agrofor-
estry, fallow systems.  
Shown in Figure 10.2, customary tenure and ownership rules dominate governance 
arrangements. Irvingia trees within forests are not owned by individuals or families and 
access is generally on a first-come, first-served basis. About 99 % of harvesters indicat-
ed they did not require prior authorisation from any authority before harvesting. How-
ever, families tend to harvest in the same area each year, constructing ‘bush houses’ for 
the harvest season, indicating tacit acknowledgements of ‘ownership’ within most 
communities. Trees planted or maintained on farmland are owned by the landowner, 
with access restricted without permission. As Irvingia spp. has increased in value, some 
people have begun to clear land around these trees in the forest. This extension of tenure 
through clearance usually relates to farmland, but resources from retained trees are also  
 
Figure 10.2  Intensity of governance arrangements in Irvingia spp. chain 
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considered to be owned by the family that cleared the land. ‘Outsiders’ and large scale 
buyers are required to register before purchasing from community members, with fee 
payable to traditional authorities. Rates differ from US $7 for indigenes to US $4.7 plus 
an unspecified amount of palm wine in Mbilishi to US $11 for the whole season in Kaji-
fu. These fees have increased since 2001 (Sunderland et al., 2002) by up to 50%. En-
croachment of customary forest areas by Nigerian communities is a considerable cause 
of conflict, for example in Obonyi I, Basho, Matene and Mobilise villages. Because of 
such conflicts, Mbilishe people began planting both Irvingia species. Other traditional 
controls include prohibitions on felling individual Irvingia spp. trees under any circum-
stances, climbing trees and harvesting unripe fruit. The fruit may be harvested only after 
it is ripe and has fallen to the ground. 
Bush mango is not classed as a Special Forestry Product but has been the subject of 
mutual agreements (gré à gré) with a quota for 100 tons from the Centre granted to one 
permit holder in 2009. The majority of traders interviewed did not have permits but op-
erated illegally or purchased way bills. Despite having a way bill, corruption at check-
points and border crossings by police officers, forestry officials, customs, council, trade 
and quarantine officers is prevalent, amounting to 24% of costs. Market-based arrange-
ments are most common, with conditions for its exchange and trade negotiated on the 
basis of market prices, and little exchange of information, learning from others during 
transactions and no consideration of resource sustainability. The Technical Operations 
Units set up for Takamanda landscape (see Chapter 6) to decentralise decision-making 
established partnerships with local populations through rural forestry or village commit-
tees. However financial and administrative power and authority have not been trans-
ferred in practice. Projects, such as PSMNR-SWP set up development committees in the 
Technical Operations Unit to provide an interface between the population and other nat-
ural resource users and guardians. The village management committees and community 
forests (adjoining the park) introduced new co-management arrangements, aiming to 
strengthen governance arrangements and devolve power and authority, but also increas-
ing complexity, causing coordination problems and creating new opportunities for 
(mis)appropriation of power, authority and resources, both financial and forest assets. In 
the study period emerging rules aroused harvesters’ fears that they would be prohibited 
from harvesting bush mango in the newly-gazetted Takamanda National Park, which 
would negatively impact their livelihoods.  
Raffia chain 
Raffia palms (Raphia farinifera, vinifera and hookeri) have long been domesticated in 
the Northwest region in the montane forest ecoregion. Most palms are located in river-
ine, gallery forest patches and some in swampier semi-flooded plans. Six parts of the 
palm are used to create over 30 products of Raphia spp. palms Stems are sold individu-
ally as poles, at the roadside in or domestic timber markets, used by beekeepers to make 
beehives and transformed by artisanal craftspersons into over 20 items such as mats, 
baskets, furniture and artefacts. These items are sold in stalls, markets and crafts shops, 
by the roadside and from the craftsperson’s home. The sap is fermented into mimbo 
(wine) and aforfor (liquor) by local tappers and sold in specialised palm wine markets, 
in food markets, by the roadside, directly to bars by individual tappers and from tap-
per’s homes. The cooked bitter yellow fruits are sold in markets and by children at cul-
tural events. Seeds are sold to craftsmen for transformation into rattles and curtains and 
sold in craft markets. Leaves are woven into decorations, mats and baskets. The stem is 
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used to create archways during funerals, traditional ceremonies and religious events, 
harvested directly by users. The fronds are used as roofing material. Items such as bas-
kets and mats are traditionally not sold, but exchanged between families and craftsper-
sons. Raphia spp. items such as wine and spears are traditional gifts, used to pay chiefs 
and customary authorities.  
Many of these products have strong cultural significance, being used to decorate pal-
aces, signify cultural events and in traditional musical instruments. The rituals associat-
ed with serving palm wine are core social and communal acts associated with hospitali-
ty, traditions captured by storytellers such as Chinua Achebe. Whilst most are also trad-
ed on a small scale (Box 4.1), palm wine, the fermenting sap tapped from the stems, al-
so known as mimbo or raffia (from R. farinifera) or mbu (from R. hookeri and R. vinif-
era), is the most commercially valuable product from the species. The estimated market 
value of palm wine from the study area is 6,762,475 US$ annually. On average, 72% of 
production is sold, 12% consumed, and 8% exchanged or given as gifts. This low-cost 
popular drink, averaging 65 FCFA (0.13 US$) for mimbo and 75 FCFA (0.15 US$) per 
litre at the farm gate, is used in traditional ceremonies, often with cola nuts. It was the 
main alcoholic beverage prior to beer (400 to 500 FCFA (0.81 to 1.02 US$) becoming 
increasingly widely and cheaply available over the last fifty years. Palm wine is pro-
duced year round, although production is higher in the rainy season, and holidays and 
festivities increase demand for the 20 litre recycled oil containers of wine which are the 
common unit of sale. After around two days the openly fermented wine turns to vinegar. 
This short shelf life restricts the distances it is marketed. An increase of 20% a litre up-
on farm-gate prices was found in village markets, rising to 67% in village bars, 100% in 
town markets and 167% in town bars. Palm wine contributes on average 36% of aver-
age annual household income (190,444 FCFA, 388 US$) of ‘tappers’ (harvesters), sup-
porting on average their household of seven. Tappers have up to seven other sources of 
income including five other NTFPs. Palm wine was rated by 52% of harvesters as their 
primary source of income. Men dominate harvesting (99%) due to cultural norms, the 
heavy work and distances involved. They walk or cycle once or twice daily (travelling 
on average 10 km), tending the palms, tapping the stem to obtain the sap and bringing 
the wine to the market mostly individually. Men dominate bulk sales in markets (95%) 
and women (95%) running bars. Average wholesaler and retailer income is 143,208 
FCFA (292 US$) annually. Palm wine is con-
sumed by all ages and both sexes. It has cultural 
significance, offered as a gift to chiefs and used in 
traditional ceremonies. In the main production ar-
eas around Bamenda, Tuba, Ndop, Babessi, 
Mbengwi and Batibo in the Northwest, an estimat-
ed 1,347 people are involved in the trade. 
An estimated 95% of raffia-based products 
originate from once wild, riverine gallery forests 
that have been cultivated for many years, often at 
least a century. Most raffia (70%) was harvested 
from customarily owned family land and 10% 
from land granted to men following traditions of 
tenure and use dictated by traditional authorities, 
with 20% on privately owned land. These palm 
groves are actively managed, with customary best 
practice norms relating to grove management and 
Photo 10.3 Wine tapping (Raphia fa-
rinifera), Bafut, July 2010  
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vegetation clearance, water management and harvesting periods and techniques for the 
different products that aim to ensure the long-term, sustainable flow of different prod-
ucts on a year round basis. Whilst access to raffia is governed by customary arrange-
ments, access to markets is not officially regulated and subject to market rules. 
 
Figure 10.3  Intensity of governance arrangements in the Raphia spp. chain 
 
Bamboo chain 
An estimated 1,200 to 5,400 actors are active in the bamboo chain originating from the 
montane and humid forests ecoregions of Cameroon, catering for local rural and urban 
markets. This is largely based on colonially introduced ‘Chinese bamboo’ (Bambusa 
vulgaris) now semi-cultivated. African indigenous bamboo species in the Northwest 
include the alpine Yushania alpina (known locally as intomtom (Oku), ebtotom (Kom), 
tomtom (Lamnso) and kehweh (Fulfulde) and Indian bamboo) and Oxytenanthera abys-
sinica (mentomtom in Oku and mbasetutuy in Kom), and in the savannah Oxytenanthera 
abyssinica, known as Kok-ko (Gbaya). The stems are short lived, but rhizome clumps 
can survive for at least forty years (Indada and Hall 2008). Both species are mainly 
gathered from the wild with low levels of cultivation found near homesteads, and are 
extensively used in their localities. The chain consists of individual, micro and small 
enterprises of owners, collectors and harvesters; craftspersons, traders and retailers. On-
ly 13% belonged to a bamboo-related association. Regulatory, support and control ac-
tors, such as local and central government ministries and development or support organ-
isations are absent, although some traditional councils and chiefs regulate use locally.  
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Bamboo is harvested for own use by 77% of harvesters, typ-
ically middle-aged, married family men from the collection ar-
ea. A few high volume, professional harvesters collect up to 
6,000 stems a year (earning around 4,000 US$) but most are 
small scale, collecting around 500 stems annually, earning on 
average 364 US$. The market is estimated annually at 
2,367,673 US$. Access and control differs across regions, with 
the Northwest and West regions more traditionally regulated. 
Most bamboo, however, is freely available with open access: 
one-third is either owned or permission is needed for harvest, 
and in 33% of these cases, payment is required to traditional 
or village authorities. The majority (57%) harvested is natu-
rally regenerating; 6% has been planted and 37% is a combi-
nation of natural generation and planting. Resource availabil-
ity and sustainability were not seen as issues except in Adamaoua where decreasing re-
sources were indicated. Craftspersons are typically married, middle-aged men, a third of 
who classified bamboo crafting as their major occupation. Prices reflect demand, quan-
tity of raw material used and product quality. Their average annual revenue was 
236,208 CFA (524 US$) (SD 467,712 CFA, 1,039 US$). Bamboo is consumed raw and 
after a series of basic primary and secondary processing, resulting in 14 major product 
types with over 43 different products, with 50% of the products used for construction , 
30% as furniture, 22% in agriculture  and the remainder as tools and utensils and as fuel 
. Afromontane bamboo (Yushania alpina), is used to create over 45 products, classified 
into 13 product groupings, all using the stem: furniture, fencing and hedges, construc-
tion material, utensils, baskets and containers, hunting implements, agricultural sup-
ports, water pipes, musical instruments, ornamental planting, fuelwood and paper. 
These different products are sold in different markets and to different consumers. Some, 
such as poles, are often exchanged. The leaves are used as fodder for animals and the 
flowers provide bee forage. The products are perceived by consumers as an affordable 
‘local’ material producing a high quality product. 
Illustrated in Figure 10.4, there is no specific statutory regulation addressing bam-
boo. It is not listed as a Special Forestry Product nor has it ever been included in the an-
nual lists. It has been subject to a 1993 prefectural order in Oku division forbidding, 
among other activities, the ‘cutting of young alpine bamboo’. Customary practices gov-
erning Yushania alpina in Kilum Ijim include a prohibition on grazing in the forest. 
Rule number 16 of the Fondom-Agreed Wide Rules introduced by the Bamenda High-
lands Forest Project (see Chapter 6) stipulates that only mature or dry Indian bamboo 
should be cut. In cases where fresh young bamboos are needed, the community must be 
consulted. Enforcement has generally been via traditional councils. Around Bafut, 
where ‘wild’ and planted bamboo exists, strict control and regulations for harvesting are 
enforced by the Fon. In most cases, these result in monetary fines and payments for 
rights to harvest. Around Ngaoundal in Adamaoua, there are no customary rules for 
small-scale harvesting and most bamboo is located in ‘open access’ forests. In only one 
village, where there are no beekeepers but several large clumps of bamboo, have bee-
keepers from neighbouring Wendoka made arrangements with the village chief to har-
vest and collect cuttings for transplant to riverine areas nearer their village, to ensure 
security of their resource. Apiculture organisations indicate that the declining quantity 
of bamboo and increasing distances to harvest it have encouraged protection of bamboo 
groves by beekeepers (Michael Tchana and Paul Mboui, Guiding Hope, pers. comm. 
Photo 10.4  Yushania 
alpina bamboo beaker, 
Oku, November 2009 
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2007). This has led to assisted regeneration since 2010 in four villages around Nga-
oundal, with bamboo and raffia palms planted and protected by order of the local chief – 
with agreement of villagers – on land demarcated as community regeneration zones. 
 
Figure 10.4  Intensity of governance arrangements in the bamboo chain 
Gum arabic chain 
Gum arabic is resin collected from Acacia senegal (producing a high quality resin), 
Acacia seyal and Acacia polyacantha trees in the savannah ecoregion. Acacia senegal 
plantations were first established Cameroon in 1985. The latter two species are found 
wild around Waza National Park and around Maroua and Mokolo, producing a lower 
quality and quantity of gum. Around 96% originates from open access savannah forest 
and the national park and 4% from enriched forest plantations by state development pro-
jects between 1990 and 2006, now no longer actively managed. Acacia trees have mul-
tiple uses. The resin is used locally to manufacture ink and as a fabric stiffener and in-
ternationally in the food sector (known as E414), in pharmaceuticals, textiles and paints; 
the leaves provide forage and flowers bee forage; its timber provides firewood and 
poles; the tree is used to counter soil erosion, improve fertility and the bark is used me-
dicinally.  
Around 1,900 people are active in the chain including 1,250 seasonal, mainly un-
schooled, women and child gum pickers in wild stands; middle-aged, wealthy male 
plantation owners; 60 plant nursery labourers; 550 growers; 125 wholesaler intermedi-
aries; state, private and cooperative plantations; and one processer and exporter, CEX-
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PRO. Collective action is low with around 3% of harvesters belonging to a group. In 
2006, SNV supported the creation of a chain-wide interprofession to address problems 
in the chain. All the export companies are members of the Syndicate for Special Forest-
ry Products (STIEPFS). Permits and official exports in the last six years have been dom-
inated by four companies. Limited support to improve production and processing is 
provided by three local and three international NGOs, one chain platform and two gov-
ernment agencies (IRAD and ANAFOR). Gum contributes on average 162 US$ or 37% 
of a harvester’s household income, alongside farming, livestock, commerce and wood-
fuel. Around 80 to 90% is sold; the remainder is auto-consumed, exchanged or perishes. 
Harvesters earn on average 210,000 FCFA (SD 66,468) (424 US$ SD 140 US$). Planta-
tion owners earn higher values for the better quality Senegal gum on average 283,000 
FCFA (SD 115966) (598 US$ SD 245US$). Cameroonian and Nigerian traders buy at 
between 175 to 200 FCFA (0.37-0.43 US$) per kg and export at 455 FCFA (0.92 US$) 
on average. An estimated 2,050 to 3,050 tons is harvested annually; 50 tons of A. sene-
gal, 500 tons of A. polyacantha and 1,500 to 2,500 tons of A. seyal. Permit data indi-
cates that on average 200 tons were exported annually by CEXPRO (see Appendix 10), 
mainly to the EU and USA. Trade data for gum arabic is not listed in COMCAM, mak-
ing actual quantities officially exported uncertain. An estimated 400 to 2,800 tons annu-
ally is exported illegally via Kousséri to Chad and Nigeria. The total market value is 
estimated as at between 716,816 and 1,990,733 US$ annually. The SFP taxes, permits 
and high levels of corruption (between 1 to 10% of selling price) make illegal exports 
more competitive, leading to decreased sales and abandoned plantations. Threats report-
ed to the trade include the destructive harvesting techniques, low productivity of wild 
stands, harvesting of the trees for fuelwood, the degradation of wild stands due to graz-
ing and burning for pasture and increasing desertification threatening its existence in 
this ecoregion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The chain is not highly governed, shown in Figure 10.5. Although gum arabic is 
listed as special forestry product, harvesters wishing to trade and traders complain that 
the process to obtain a permit or grè á grè is difficult and costly and that conditions are 
unfavourable for business, with four larger companies dominating the market. The legal 
situation regarding the status of the now unmanaged, degraded plantations is ambigu-
ous. Many exporters thus work illegally and cross the border to Nigeria and Chad unre-
corded and informally for processing and further export. As collecting in the national 
Photo 10.5   Gum arabic (Acacia senegal and Acacia seyal), Maroua, January 2006 
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park is illegal, an agreement with MINFOF to make this customary activity legal and to 
create a community forest adjacent to the park have been sought, supported by SNV. 
These had not been implemented to date. Guidelines for harvest and management of 
wild strands have been proposed, given the high levels of unsustainable harvesting and 
lack of customary norms, but have not been adopted as legal instruments (Ofaken 
2008). 
 
Figure 10.5  Intensity of governance arrangements in the Acacia spp. chain 
 
Conclusions  
The analysis of the cola nut, bush mango, raffia, bamboo and gum arabic chains origi-
nating from the montane, savannah and humid forest ecoregions of Cameroon indicates 
that multiple configurations of governance arrangements exist, influencing how the 
chains are configured in terms of values. Alongside product characteristics, these ar-
rangements also influence how the products are sourced, harvested and traded. This sec-
tion draws conclusions, responding to research questions two to five on the governance 
arrangements in place; how these impact the livelihoods of actors and their sustainabil-
ity; and how these impact chain and product sustainability. 
These products have high economic, socio-economic and cultural values. Mirroring 
exactly the top ten uses of NTFPs in Cameroon presented in Chapter 4, the multiple 
products from these species are used as medicine, food, tools, construction, cultural, 
wood, fuel, condiments, oil and forage. They have subsistence use and their trade satis-
fies highly diverse rural and urban consumers in local, national, regional and interna-
tional markets. 
 259 
 
The governance arrangements of the five chains provide a stark contrast to the con-
figurations found in the Gnetum, apiculture and Prunus africana chains. Not only are 
the arrangements governing all five chains of a less intense nature, but they are also all 
less plural, reflecting more the reality of governance arrangements for most NTFPs in 
Cameroon. Customary arrangements predominate, the de-facto system for most prod-
ucts, with highly local institutions and arrangements controlling mainly access to natu-
ral resources. These are strongest and most well developed for species producing prod-
ucts of high cultural value species, such as cola and raffia, and for high economic value 
products, such as bush mango. They are weaker for products with more everyday uses 
and lower economic and social values, such as bamboo. The gum arabic chain, with 
three species – indigenous and imported – creating products of differing values, illus-
trates how this characteristic has resulted in plural arrangements, which have been con-
tradictory and temporal. These arrangements have been mildly tempered and altered by 
the gum arabic and bamboo chains by some limited interventions by projects. Market-
based arrangements, typically the result of collective action by unions and associations 
of traders, affect access to markets. Statutory regulations are of limited intensity, mainly 
due to the high levels of illegality as enforcement is arbitrary or weak and permits sys-
tems are easily side-lined or avoided. Corruption casts form a persistent shadow over 
high-value products with longer distance, international chains.  
The different impacts of these governance arrangements on livelihoods can be been 
seen. Customary rules regarding tenure and access to the resources, which enshrine 
long-established management and harvesting techniques, such as in the cola and raffia 
chains, enable long-term sustainable livelihoods. Rights and responsibilities are well 
defined and create clear, well-enforced boundaries to manage these resources. For raffia 
this is more exclusionary and akin to a private property regime, and for Cola a common 
pool regime. The analyses show that this works when the product is valuable. When 
products are of lower value, such as bamboo in Adamaoua until recently, the effort re-
quired to create and enforce such governance results in a void of arrangements. Howev-
er, when livelihoods are negatively affected by resource scarcity or degradation, often 
combined with increasing product value, governance arrangements are crafted. Market-
led and collective actions – often drawing on customary authority – are used to maintain 
or enhance livelihood resilience. These chains provide good examples of how critical 
the time scale is between which actors become conscious of threats to livelihoods, act to 
introduce changes and arrangements, and the time before these bear fruit (sometimes 
literally). The different ratios of cultivation as a reaction to livelihoods demonstrate the 
alternative strategies used by actors in the chains (and sometimes indirect actors, such as 
governments, research, conservation and development actors): where tenure and access 
to resources is difficult, such as the inability to own Acacia spp. trees in protected areas 
and on former state plantations, efforts have been directed to access to markets (collec-
tive action – the interprofession and illegal exports). The inconsistency and complexity 
of statutory arrangements has encouraged corruption, to the detriment of livelihoods as 
costs increase. 
The impacts of governance arrangements on product and chain sustainability have 
been manifold. Strong customary arrangements have created systems to restrict access 
to selected actors, generally men indigenous to the ruling authority, and to enable spe-
cies to be managed in order to repeatedly generate products over long periods of time. 
Statutory arrangements, despite also promoting cultivation, have had no such impact. 
By focusing on access to markets and the generation of state revenues and ignoring ac-
cess to the resource and the specific characteristics of the species and local communi-
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ties, they not provided systems that encourage sustainability, but instead extraction, as 
illustrated by the gum arabic chain. Market-based, collective action has not had an ex-
plicit focus on product sustainability, although the interprofession of gum arabic actors 
and bush mango-processing and marketing associations show that they are interested in 
chain sustainability.  
 
  
 
 
Part IV: Conclusions 
 
This section presents the conclusions, comparison and synthesis. It summarises the key 
findings on how governance arrangements have shaped the eight value chains based on 
the research and development experiences. The dramatic differences in governance ar-
rangements and livelihood impacts between the eight chains were not apparent at the 
time of selection of research design and cases and strongly justify the number of value 
chain cases as providing a balanced view. The chapter summarises responses to each 
research question: the contexts in which the NTFP value chains are embedded and ob-
servable trends, how the value chains are configured in terms of products (uses and 
sources), actors, activities and values; the arrangements used to govern the NTFP 
chains; livelihood sustainability and product sustainability. The chapter ends with re-
flections and recommendations for policy and regulatory changes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Bannerman’s Turaco – a bird of high cultural value and endemic to the Cameroon High-
lands forests, feeding upon Prunus africana leaves and seeds. Card printed on paper made 
from Yushania alpina bamboo and grass by the Kilum Forest Craft Paper Cooperative, Oku, 
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How governance arrangements  
shape NTFP value chains1 
Introduction 
This chapter summarises the empirical findings about how governance arrangements 
influence NTFP chains originating in the Congo Basin and affect sustainable liveli-
hoods, helping explain why some chains are subject to overexploitation and others are 
not. The main research question asked was how governance arrangements in forest 
product chains originating in Cameroon influence sustainable livelihoods? To respond 
to this, first the following sub-questions are answered in turn:  
 
1. In which contexts are the NTFP value chains embedded and what trends can be ob-
served? 
2. How are NTFP value chains originating in Cameroon configured in terms of prod-
ucts (uses and sources), actors, activities and values? 
3. What arrangements are used to govern NTFP chains? 
4. How do these governance arrangements affect the livelihoods of actors along the 
chain and their sustainability? 
5. How do these governance arrangements impact product and chain sustainability? 
Shaping contexts and trends 
This study shows how the ecological, socio-economic and governance contexts in 
which the NTFP value chains are located have strongly influenced how the chains have 
emerged, evolved and are currently configured. The ecoregions are all characterised by 
                                                 
1  Includes data published in peer-reviewed articles written or contributed to by the author (Awono et al. 
2013; Ingram 2012b, Ingram et al. 2014a; Ingram et al. 2014b; Wiersum et al. 2013).  
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increasingly rapid reductions in the forest area and degrading quality in the last sixty or 
so years, mainly human-induced. Changes have been most severe in the Afromontane 
Cameroon Highlands and around urban areas. Deforestation results in a reduction in the 
number of species which provide products and/or their seed dispersers and pollinators 
and reduces the resilience of ecosystems. Although a much larger number of species 
were found used as NTFPs than previously recorded, this is due not to increased NTFP 
use, but to the methods and sources used to gather data. Instead, it appears that the
availability of species used for NTFPs from natural forests has declined and that re-
source availability in natural forests has declined. Only a very small proportion of 
NTFPs in the ecoregions were classified as vulnerable. However four of the eight NTFP 
species studied were classified by international systems as vulnerable in some way – 
with Gnetum spp., Irvingia gabonensis, Raphia regalis and Prunus africana on the 
IUCN Red List and the latter also listen on CITES Appendix II (Chapter 6). All the 
plant-based species studied are perennials, with the majority of their parts harvested rat-
ed as having a medium to high level of impact – indicating they are inherently vulnera-
ble at individual and possibly population level, depending upon harvesting techniques 
and management practices that mitigate negative impacts and/or promote positive im-
pacts, such as sufficient reproduction or regeneration. These findings suggest that vul-
nerability is associated with high product value. 
However, harvesters and new entrants to the chains (farmers, agro-foresters and dif-
ferent community, public and private sector organisations) have found ways to counter 
scarcity in the wild and vulnerability, with all the NTFPs studied being cultivated in 
varying degrees. Cultivation rates have been maintained or increased over time. Cola 
spp., Raphia spp. and Apis mellifera adansonii have all been cultivated between at least 
the last 50 to 100 years, such that the majority of products now originate from cultivated 
sources. Beekeeping has replaced wild honey hunting in the Northwest and also largely 
in Adamaoua in the last twenty years. Products such as Prunus africana have been cul-
tivated more recently as demand and their values increase, and wild sources diminish. 
Irvingia spp. has been semi-cultivated in the last forty years, and bamboos, Acacia spp. 
and Gnetum in the last twenty five years. This suggests a general trend, depicted in Fig-
ure 11.1, of increasing cultivation as demand rises and availability in natural forests de-
creases, mirroring global trends of declining forest quality through deforestation and 
degradation with expanding small and large-scale tree planting in tropical countries 
(FAO 2011). From a SLA perspective, cultivation adds natural capital and, depending 
upon the rate of extraction, compensates for the conversion of natural to financial capi-
tal from wild resources.  
The livelihoods context has shaped how the products are valued, used and traded. 
One of the most defining socio-economic contexts, prevailing over time, is poverty. The 
majority of the most numerous groups of actors in the chains, harvesters and retailers, 
live on or under the poverty level. This situation has hardly changed in the study period 
(National Institute of 2010), despite economic growth with poverty levels worsening in 
rural areas and for households whose head is not formally employed, with only slight 
improvements in urban areas since household data was first collected in 1996 up to 
2010. A typical harvester in all of the chains studied has all the characteristics of en-
trenched poverty recognised in Cameroon (Republic of Cameroon 2009): living in rural 
areas – often with poor infrastructure – and in the poorest regions in Cameroon, having 
a large household size, low education levels, and with many being females. Given this  
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Source: Research results 
 
 
context, the majority have engaged in NTFP harvesting, seeking to diversify and add 
sources of cash household income to meet their most basic needs for food, schooling, 
healthcare and housing. For the species with multiple, largely food, medicinal and fuel 
uses, these products also contribute to livelihoods, although with lesser importance than 
their cash contribution. The fairly long periods of time over which harvesters have en-
gaged in trade, around eight years, suggest both a continued reliance on NTFPs but also 
entrapment in poverty, particularly for those chains where incomes are lower than the 
national average: apiculture in Adamaoua, Prunus africana, Cola spp., Irvingia spp., 
Raphia spp. and bamboo. 
In all three forest-rich ecoregions, forest resources have been used to create products. 
Many of these species have been used for centuries, intricately embedded in the liveli-
hoods of people living in and around the forests that they originate in. Whilst some spe-
cies and products have remained in subsistence use, overall a rising pattern of commod-
ification is apparent, with different sub-trends. One growing trend is for ‘mainstreamed 
NTFPs’. These are products such as eru (Gnetum spp.), bush mango (Irvingia spp.) and 
honey which have changed from products with particular uses by geographically-
specific ethnic groups, to popular products used by a wide range of mainly urban-based 
consumers across Cameroon and further afield by African diasporas. A second trend 
concerns ‘global niche NTFPs’: these highly profitable products have specific uses and 
increasingly global chains. Derived from traditional uses, commercialisation of these 
new products is driven by growing demand for ‘natural products’. Examples are Prunus 
africana and Irvingia gabonensis based remedies and organic honey, beeswax and 
propolis for food and for the latter, multiple industrial uses. This trend reflects an in-
creasing trade in forest products (European Forest Institute 2010) and steady growth in 
agricultural and forestry exports since the 1990s (Afdb et al. 2012), and slightly easier 
trading conditions in Cameroon (World Bank 2007). This increase is despite (or perhaps 
Figure 11.1 Relationships between forest quality, NTFP supply and demand 
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because of) the general dip in exports from Cameroon and consistently pervasive cor-
ruption in the study period.  
In contrast, a decreasing trend in the use of ‘traditional NTFPs’ is apparent. Cola nuts 
(Cola spp.), palm wine (Raphia spp.), raffia and bamboo furniture and tools and the tra-
ditional medicinal uses of Prunus africana and Gnetum spp. are being replaced by al-
ternatives such as, respectively, cigarettes, bottled beer, plastic and Western medicines. 
Similarly, activities in chains, including harvesting, storage and particularly processing, 
have been transformed by labour-saving technologies and knowledge. This occurs as 
the availability and affordability of alternatives increases, traditional cultural prestige 
attached to these products and their production processes diminishes, and as synthetic 
alternatives for products are created, such as for Prunus africana and Cola spp. Taking 
such a historicising approach shows that such waxing and waning of products markets is 
nothing new and emphasises the dynamism of products and chains over time. This find-
ing confirms Geschiere’s (2007) contention that products and prices are shaped by vari-
able historical contexts, not just economic supply and demand, with co-existing, multi-
ple scales of values, built upon and combined by economic actors. 
The governance context is characterised by a shift from largely separate customary 
and formal systems since colonial times, governing respectively access to resources and 
access to markets, to an increasing comprehensive – but not always well integrated –
regulatory framework. On paper regulations set out rights to access NTFP species and 
regulate their trade. However in practice regulations have been largely ineffective, with 
enforcement highly sporadic and geographically specific, and non-adherence due to ig-
norance and/or a perceived lack of legitimacy, especially regarding tenure. As a result, 
many high value products – particularly honey – remain formally unregulated and oth-
ers – notably Gnetum spp. and Prunus africana – are subject to considerable parallel 
‘governance’ by corruption. In contrast, customary regulations have generally weakened 
in application and enforcement, threatened by formal regulation and by non-adherence, 
related to factors such as increasingly heterogeneous communities. Customary regula-
tions are still clung onto for ‘traditional’ products such as Cola spp. and Raphia spp., as 
long as their values do not change. Changing product values have been both a stimulus 
and cause of changes in governance arrangements. Projects have played a critical role in 
devising, sometimes participatorily, new governance arrangements in the last three dec-
ades – at times crafted from local traditions. Hybrid arrangements have emerged, creat-
ed by combinations of harvesters, processers and traders, which craft legal, customary 
and sometimes market-based systems together – such as geographic indication for hon-
ey. An increase in collective action and its formalisation, and in market-based arrange-
ments are evident in recent decades, whereby actors have sought to control and manage 
access to NTFP species and markets, particularly in the face of scarcity and/or increas-
ing values, mainly economic.  
Value chain configurations  
The second research question seeks to understand how NTFP chains originating in 
Cameroon are configured in terms of products and uses, actors, activities and values. 
 
Product ecoregion sources and uses 
The main uses of the species studied – Gnetum spp., Prunus africana, Apis mellifera 
adansonii, Cola spp., Irvingia spp., Raphia spp., Yushania alpina and Oxytenanthera 
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abyssinica and Acacia spp. – are for medicine, food, materials, construction, cultural, 
timber, fuel and condiment use. This closely mirrors the uses of NTFPs in Cameroon. 
These products rank among the top 5% of ‘priority’ NTFPs due to their exceptional 
economic, social and environmental value, and are exceptional in that they all have mul-
tiple uses, and that they have more multiple uses (on average 4.3) than most NTFPs in 
Cameroon, which have on average 1.6 uses. However, they are generally representative 
of NTFPs from Cameroon, displaying similar diversity in life forms, parts used and 
phytogeographic origin. This is partly derived from the fact that multiple parts are used 
(on average 3.6, compared to an average of 2.6 for all NTFPs). The products studied 
reflect the one third of NTFPs used both for subsistence and for trade are both used by 
harvesters, being traded, locally, nationally and internationally. 
The NTFPs studied originate from all ecoregions and from different ecological nich-
es in the regions, from primary to degraded forest to cultivated lands. Characteristics of 
the ecoregions have shaped the chains. Shown in Table 11.1, humid forests provide, as a 
proportion of the number of known species, the most products. The montane forests, 
covering just 1.1% of national land are a haven for biodiversity and endemism, harbour-
ing an even larger number of known species. A smaller proportion of these montane 
species than in the lowland forests are however used as NTFPs, despite the generally 
higher population density (shown in Table 7.1). The savannah ecoregion is less species 
rich, but an equivalent proportion of these species are used as NTFPs (5% of plants and 
1% of animals). This suggests possible links between species with high local abundance 
and multiple uses, in areas of high population density, characteristics which enhance the 
benefits of trade and cultivating species, as they ease the process of commercialisation. 
The result is short, local value chains, such as for traditional raffia, bamboo, cola nut 
and pygeum products, where actors exercise control over access to the resource and to 
their markets. This can be explained by the variety of reasons indicated in Chapter 4: 
gaps and biases in the literature and data, a shorter overall period of human habitation in 
the montane ecoregion, higher levels of over-extraction and subsequent disappearance 
of useful species (creating an empty forest syndrome (WWF International 2011/2012)), 
and higher rates of forest conversion to other land uses – leading to higher dependence 
on alternative sources of natural resources, such as farming. A major limitation of the 
conjecture about these causes is that species and products data is woefully incomplete.  
 
Table 11.1 NTFPs per ecoregion 
Ecoregion 
Proportion na-
tional land cover 
type 
Total number of 
species 
Number of NTFP species 
(% NTFPs of total plant 
and animal species) 
Proportion of 
total species 
  Plant Animal Plant % of total Animal 
% of 
total Plant Animal
Afromontane#   1% 2,435   920 118 20 86 71   5   9 
Lowland humid 35% 1,100 1,964 351 58 86 71 32   4 
Savannah∆ 12%    965    417   57 10 47 39   6 11 
Forest-crop mosaics 10% n/a n/a   26   4   6   4 n/a n/a 
Source: Research results Notes: * 2% of plants and 36% of animal species occur in all ecoregions. # 4% of plants 
occur in montane and humid ecoregions ∆ 1% of plants occur in savannah and humid ecoregions. n/a = not available.  
 
The number of uses of a species by harvesters and consumers is shown in Table 11.2. 
The differences provide an alternative perspective of dependence on a product by dif-
ferent actors and highlight in particular its subsistence use value. Harvesters tend to use 
more parts of a species and to utilise these parts for a larger number of uses, creating 
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higher natural capital from valuable multipurpose species. But in only a few cases is this 
natural capital translated into financial capital. Most of the species studied have only 
one part that becomes a traded product. Individual or industrial consumers tend to use 
these specific parts as products for one specific use. The exceptions concern wax – used 
by industrial buyers for cosmetics and pharmaceuticals, honey for food and medicinal 
use, and Raphia spp. products woven from the palm stem which have multiple uses. 
Comparing the value and use scores of the selected NTFPs, summarised in Table 11.2, 
differences between the chains are obvious, although all score as high value, due partly 
to the selection methodology. Harvesters create more uses for a species than end con-
sumers or buyers, due to the larger variety of uses than for subsistence plus trade use. 
This is related to the number of parts used with, unsurprisingly, the higher the number 
of parts used associated with higher number of uses. Once traded, products tend to have 
just one use. An inverse relationship is apparent between the value score, number of us-
es by harvesters and number of parts used (see Chapter 4). This is attributed to the 
product characteristics as higher values derive from the combination of both subsistence 
consumption and local, national and international trade. 
 
Table 11.2 Uses and values of NTFPs studied  
NTFP Value score Number of parts 
used 
Number of uses by 
harvester 
Number of uses 
by consumer/buyer 
Gnetum spp. 5 2 3 1 
Apiculture  4 3 4 2 
Prunus africana 5 4 5 1 
Irvingia spp. 4 4 6 1 
Cola spp. 4 2 1 1 
Raphia spp.  4 4 6 2 
Bamboo  3 4 4 1 
Acacia spp.  4 6 6 1 
Average    4.1   3.6   4.4    1.3 
 Source: Research results 
 
Actors 
People in the chains studied generally work as self-employed individuals, with on aver-
age 24% partaking in collective action, shown in Table 11.3. Many harvesters engage 
collectively through traditional tontines or njangi groups. These provide access to credit 
and social exchanges, but generally do not represent individuals in business or policy 
arenas. Enterprises, the vast majority small and medium enterprises, are found mainly in 
the processing, wholesale and export stages of the chains. This means that actors are 
largely ‘silent’ and the NTFP sector is largely invisible. Their voice is little heard in 
policymaking or business circles and ability to significantly influence business bottle-
necks, such as access to formal credit and banking institutions, weak. This finding is 
similar to forest product chains in other countries (Macqueen et al. 2006). However, 
modest changes can be seen resulting from participatory action research, development 
projects and collective action, enabling actors to have more voice and visibility in the 
apiculture chain, where actors worked together to develop new policy on honey exports 
and standards for the sector, and the Prunus africana chain, where actors joined to 
counter the 2007 trade suspension. In the Gnetum spp. and Irvingia spp. chains, collec-
tive action bolsters the negotiating position of harvesters and traders.  
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Table 11.3 Percentages of actors per chain and stage engaging in collective action 
NTFP Harvester Processor Trader Exporter Retailer Average 
Gnetum spp. 7 0 45 55 42 30 
Apiculture  18 24 0 0 21 13 
Prunus africana 69 0 50 0 - 30 
Cola spp. 0 - - - - 0 
Irvingia spp. 39 0 75 - - 38 
Raphia spp.  1 - - - - 1 
Bamboo  13 32 -  - 23 
Acacia spp.  38 - - 0 - 19 
Average  23 11 43 14 32 25 
Source: Research results.- signifies no data. Averages calculated only where data available. 
 
The data presented in Chapters 7 to 10 highlights that actor’s profiles generally 
change according to the activities they conduct in a chain. Extrapolating from the sam-
ple of actors interviewed to obtain the estimated number of actors per chain – shown in  
Figure 5.1 – indicates that most actors (71%) harvest in rural areas (farms, fallows and 
forests), followed by retailing (16%) and wholesaling (6%), occurring generally in peri-
urban and urban areas. Table 11.4 and Chapter 5 show that the majority of actors (60%) 
are male. However their participation varies significantly per chain and stage. Women 
tend to be most engaged in retailing, wholesaling and export, and harvesting in the Gne-
tum spp., Cola spp., Irvingia spp. and Acacia spp. chains.  
 
Table 11.4 Average number of sources of income per chain and actor type 
NTFP Harvester Processor Trader Exporter Retailer Average 
Gnetum spp. 5 2 - 1 4 3.0 
Apiculture  5   2 2 1 - 2.5 
Prunus africana 8 - 3 2 - 4.3 
Irvingia spp. 6 - 5 2 2 3.8 
Acacia spp. 3 5 - 3 6 4.3 
Bamboo  8 5 - - - 6.5 
Cola spp. 3 5 - 2 - 3.3 
Raffia spp. 7 - - - - 7.0 
Average  5.6 3.8 3.3   1.8   4.0 4.3 
Source: Research results.(- signifies no data. Averages calculated only where data available. 
 
Specialisation creates dependence. In comparison to harvesters, actors further along 
the chain have less access to other income sources and subsistence livelihood activities. 
Harvesters tend to have more diverse livelihood strategies, with a slight majority relying 
mostly on farming (44%) and 39% relying primarily on forest–based revenue to gener-
ate cash income, shown in Table 11.4. Harvesting households had on average six 
sources of income. Although most harvesters use the specific NTFP for subsistence use, 
the main incentive for its harvest is trade: on average in the eight chains 80% is harvest-
ed for trade. This figure is clearly affected by the methodology, as being traded was a 
selection criterion. Hence the proportion of harvest that is used, traded, perishes, given 
as gifts or exchanged, is not archetypal for all NTFPs. However, this figure appears rep-
resentative for the 21% of the plant-based NTFPs noted as traded in Cameroon (see 
Chapter 4). Diversification by harvesters provides a safety net and way to spread risks. 
It is also inevitable, given the seasonal nature of most farmed and forest products. In 
contrast, processers, wholesalers and exporters tend to specialise, benefiting from econ-
omies of scale and market knowledge to increase revenues, and manage the often high 
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risks inherent in transport, bulking, storage and export. Retailers generally specialise 
less, but more than harvesters. Household dependence upon income from specific 
NTFPs thus generally increases as the chain extends further from the forest. 
Actor profiles and livelihood impacts change with the stage they operate in the chain, 
and are also determined by the location where the activity takes place. This parallels the 
findings of studies in the Amazon (Stoian 2005) and in Asia (Ruíz Pérez et al. 2004). 
Harvesters tend to be lower educated than other actors in the chain, attributed to lower 
levels of access to schooling than for actors situated in generally peri-urban and urban 
areas and tend to have slightly higher levels of dependents. Actors – both in rural and 
urban areas – which are female have lower educational levels and larger households are 
particularly susceptible to poverty, mirroring national trends (United Nations Population 
Fund 1999).  Shown in Chapters 5 and 7 to 9, most harvesters belong to the dominant 
ethnic group of the area where they harvest in. In the bush mango (Irvingia spp.) chain 
in the East region, both the main Bulu ethnic group and the minority Baka’a pygmy par-
ticipate. However in the Highlands, it is uncommon for the minority Fulani group to 
engage in apiculture, Raphia spp., Cola spp. and Prunus africana products. This finding 
indicates that harvesting is mainly conducted by ethnic groups with cultural ties with 
and traditions of forest use. As the chain extends towards consumers, actors tend to be 
more ethnically diverse. This social-cultural characteristic explains why perceptions of 
value and the number and types of product uses differ strongly between actor groups, 
and why different arrangements govern access to production and to markers (Wiersum 
et al. 2013). Generally harvesters from the predominant ethnic group are bound by local 
customs. As a chain extends to urban areas, different arrangements increasingly apply. 
In most chains, customary institutions governing medium to large markets (types II, III, 
IV and V) have been watered down by the melting pot of ethnic groups in peri-urban 
and urban areas. This allows new hybrid cultures, market-based and statutory arrange-
ments to influence actors’ behaviours, activities and values, including institutions en-
forced by local governments in physical markets. Ethnicity is also a major reason why a 
forest product continues to be consumed in urban areas far from its source of origin. 
The strong cultural identity of specific ethnic groups with certain products can mutate 
over time, illustrated by eru/okok (Gnetum spp.) and cola nuts (Cola spp.), which are 
now perceived as national ‘Cameroonian’ products. 
 
Activities 
Activities in the value chains are generally highly gendered, varying with product char-
acteristics and stage in the chain. This is strongly determined by customary governance 
arrangements and shaped by project and market-based governance arrangements. High-
value products, such as pygeum, gum arabic, palm wine and bamboo are primarily 
male-harvested, due to strong customary rules governing tenure and access. Products 
such as eru and bush mango are largely female-harvested. Where both men and women 
participate in harvesting in a chain, women generally use more of their harvest for home 
consumption, while men sell a greater proportion. Men tend to capture value more ef-
fectively by larger scale activities, by engaging in processing, wholesale and export 
where higher profits (but also highest risks) are possible. Whilst these findings generally 
mirror other studies (Ruíz Pérez et al. 2003; Awono et al. 2010a), indicating that gen-
dered patterns in retailing have changed little, some new trends are visible. Interventions 
by external agencies have positively influenced the benefits gained by women in NTFP 
chains, allowing access to resources and creating value-adding opportunities. This oc-
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curs for example by disseminating new harvest and cultivation techniques, opening ac-
cess to new and existing markets through novel and cost, and labour-saving processing 
activities.  
Most activities carried out in the chains studied have characteristics in common. 
There is generally a low level of value adding in Cameroon and activities are highly 
segregated with little vertical integration. Actors generally engage in only one or two 
chain activities, except in the bamboo and apiculture chain, not conducting the full 
range possible. This is starkly illustrated by the Prunus africana chain which has re-
turned to a classic ‘low added-value’ model since processing to a finished pharmaceuti-
cal product stopped in Cameroon. The consequence is that actors tend to have limited 
means to upgrade or add value, relying instead on increasing harvested quantity to gen-
erate increased revenues, mainly from wild harvested sources. For apiculture, cola, raf-
fia and on a small scale for bamboo, Acacia spp., Gnetum spp. and Irvingia spp. cultiva-
tion has allowed control of quantity and, partially, quality. As upgrading and adding 
value is a key mechanism by which actors can strengthen their economic, social and or-
ganisational capacities – leading to increased control and power in chains (Grieg-Gran 
et al. 2005; van den Berg et al. 2007; Will 2008; Webber et al. 2009), the lack of value-
adding leads to entrenched positions in a chain, less ability to compete or appropriate 
greater shares of profits (Kaplinsky and Morris 2000). 
 
Values 
That benefits gained by different actors in the chains differ is not surprising: it is a cen-
tral element of the value chain concept that values change and augment along a chain 
(Kaplinsky and Morris 2000). The NTFP chains studied, shown in Table 11.5, reflect 
this. The further the chain extends from the harvest zone, the higher the average house-
hold income per actor type with an increase up to 60%. Exporters and wholesalers gen-
erally have highest income. The highest revenues were obtained in international and 
niche markets. Looking at the average proportion the selected NTFPs contribute to 
household cash revenues, it is intriguing that the further the chain extends from the for-
est, the higher the importance to household cash income revenues. Whereas 38% of 
harvesters rank the specific product as their main source of household income, 42% of 
exporters and 52% of retailers do. This finding is in contrast to the common view pre-
sented in NTFP literature (Stoian 2005), which ignores the higher level of dependence 
by actors in peri-urban and urban areas. Factors explaining this dependence are these  
 
Table 11.5 NTFP annual average household income (US$) per chain and actor  
NTFP Annual average household income from NTFP (US$) Average annual 
market value Harvester Processor Wholesaler Exporter Retailer Average 
Gnetum spp. 1,276     0 818 8,741 1654 2,498 6,211,688 
Apiculture 469 377 0 8,953 2458 3,064 5,390,999 
Prunus africana 374 213 0 11,563 0 4,050 1,332,601 
Cola spp. 184     0 347 0 0 265 1,859,053 
Irvingia spp. 331     0 10,437 0 620 3,796 8,049,410 
Raffia spp. 432     0 325 0 0 378 6,762,475 
Bamboo 536    1,010 0 0 1608 1,051 2,367,673 
Acacia spp. 167     0 0 97,959 0 49,063 714,852 
Average 471 533 2982 31,804 1585 7,475 4,086,094 
% average   38    23            37 42 52 38  
 Source: Research results 
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actors’ physical proximity to markets, higher levels of education and collective action. 
These appear to contribute to greater social capital and increased access to markets and 
information. This allows specialisation, economies of scale, innovation and more profit-
able trade. 
Governance arrangements 
This section responds to the third research question by summarising the arrangements 
used to govern NTFP chains. The context and analysis in Chapters 6 and 7 to 10 make 
clear that governance is messy. All the chains have overlapping and multiple layers of 
institutions and arrangements, illustrated in Figure 11.2. The three chains illustrate ex-
tremes of pluralism and voids where no institutions govern access to resources and mar-
kets. Such pluralism and intensity of governance arrangements is also found in some 
other high value and special forestry products (see Chapter 4 and 6). This justifies the 
use of five other chains to illustrate the less extreme and intense arrangements that are 
typical for most NTFPs in Cameroon. The configurations are highly dynamic, with 
some changing dramatically over the last forty years. Some actors, notably NGOs, pro-
ject-related and market-based actors fulfil roles normally the reserve of the state. In oth-
ers, the state performs some of its duties, in others not. Customary authorities, projects, 
civil society and market-based collectives dominate. Customary arrangements have 
been largely imposed by traditional authorities. Statutory laws, standards and interna-
tional agreements are also largely involuntarily placed on actors, but have also been en-
couraged to further direct actor’s competitive advantage. Project rules and corruption 
illustrate both bricolage and involuntarily foisting upon actors.  
 
 
Figure 11.2 Plural governance arrangements in NTFP chains in Cameroon 
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All these arrangements seem unlikely to be smoothed into a mono-governance ar-
rangement anytime in the near future. This is evidenced by the chequered history of the 
governance arrangements, slow land and regulatory reforms and business environment 
changes, increasingly tenuous grasp of customary governance in some areas, the insidi-
ousness of corruption, and increasing influence of new economic, cognitive and social 
institutions. Thus, actors in chains are forced to stay, and become even more adept bri-
coleurs: making the best of the arrangements in which they find themselves and crea-
tively using capitals available to change these. They build on natural capital to construct 
new institutions and/or remould existing ones to advance their livelihoods, individually 
and collectively, to meet their current objectives, circumstances and livelihoods. This 
reflects both productive bricolage (Ros-Tonen 2012) with its focus on livelihoods as the 
flexible and dynamic crafting of livelihood options and associated impacts on land-
scapes, and institutional bricolage (Cleaver 2002, Cerney 2010), with its emphasis on 
experimentation with institutions by private and public sector actors frustrated by insti-
tutional weaknesses, barriers and their impacts on livelihoods. 
The scoring mechanism (elaborated in Chapter 3) allows the governance arrange-
ments and their intensity to be made explicit. Figure 11.3 illustrates the ‘fine mess’1 of 
governance arrangements in the chains and Figure 11.4 shows the wide variances in in-
tensity between arrangements in chains and between chains, whereby the following pat-
terns are discernible: 
 All the NTFP chains have multiple, plural governance arrangements, combining 
customary, voluntary or market-based standards and corruption.  
 The intensity of governance arrangements varies. The Prunus africana, apiculture 
and Gnetum spp. chains respectively are the most intensely governed chains (indi-
cated by their combined governance scores in Figure 11.3). Whilst there are no ab-
solute voids of governance, there are voids of certain types of arrangements; for ex-
ample, formal regulations do not exist in three of the chains (bamboo, raffia and co-
la). These extremes and differences were not apparent at the time of selection of the 
eight chains and justify the number of cases. Intensity and pluralism reflects the 
specific ecoregion and socioeconomic context, combined with product value and 
characteristics.  
 Voluntary and market-based arrangements have the most pervasive influence in all 
the chains, affecting prices, activities, types and timing of transactions, and quality. 
When summed they are rated as moderate. Customary regulation, generally location 
and culturally specific, also occurs in all chains, but to a lesser extent, being mainly 
concerned with the beginning of the chain, rated as mediocre. They tend to be 
strong in the montane forests (Chapter 6) but have generally become weaker with 
 improved access to markets, immigration, decreased dependence on forests and in-
creasing pressure (and conflicts) over natural resources and upcoming hybrid ar-
rangements (Chapter 4). Statutory regulation, often shadowed by corruption and 
weakly enforced, is overall rated as weak as it exists only in some chains, notably 
Gnetum spp., Irvingia spp. and Acacia spp. 
 
                                                 
1  Silent, silver screen actors Stan Laurel and Oliver Hardy coined the catchphrase “This is another fine 
mess you’ve gotten us into”. Similarly actors in NTFPs chains often have little or no voice in formal 
governance arrangements and act to create their own ‘messy’ arrangements that work well for them. 
‘Fine’ in Cameroonian pidgin means good or well. 
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Figure 11.3 Intensity of governance arrangements in eight NTFP chains 
 
Figure 11.4 Overview of intensity of NTFP chain governance arrangements 
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 Arrangements governing access to production (the resource base) and access to 
markets are usually separated (Wiersum et al. 2013). Some arrangements nominally 
focus on resource access; statutory regulations generally have a wider geographic 
and social scope and tend to influence access to markets mainly. Few systems – 
such as recent regulations in the Prunus africana chain and organic certification in 
the apiculture chain – govern both spheres of chain activity.  
 Hybrid governance arrangements such as community forests and certification 
schemes have developed as regulatory, project and market-based systems have 
sought legitimation and embeddedness in pre-existing customary arrangements. 
These bricolaged arrangements originated in response to contextual changes and 
changes in product value with a view to securing market access.  
 Regulatory arrangements have generally weak influence on the chains, with the ex-
ception of Prunus africana recently.  
 Corruption influences all chains, its influence varying dramatically by chain. In the 
high volume, high value and particularly highly statutorily regulated chains such as 
Prunus africana and Gnetum spp., opportunities for corruption flourish as parallel, 
‘shadow’ arrangements to formal laws. Corruption also occurs in chains where no 
statutory framework operates, such as the Cola spp. chain, due to its systemic na-
ture in Cameroon and in neighbouring countries to which the chain flows.  
 Market-based, voluntary and collective arrangements tend to focus on access to 
markets, using mechanisms to enhance access or control by specific actor groups 
and/or enhance their power, whilst limiting or excluding access for others.  
 Involuntary standards such as conventions affect the governance of four chains. In 
the Prunus africana and apiculture chains this worked by enhancing and legitimat-
ing the existence of statutory and project-based governance arrangements. Overall, 
however, they tend to be poorly disseminated in the chain.  
 Project rules, due to the highly geographically and specific activities of projects, are 
only recognised by a few, many mistaking them for statutory regulations. They tend 
to be strong in the Prunus africana, apiculture and gum arabic chain.  
 
This plurality is despite the common environmental and socio-cultural context for prod-
ucts originating from the same eco-region, and the common economic and regulatory 
context in Cameroon. Geographical location explains some of the differences in govern-
ance arrangements – particularly in customary arrangements. Product values and char-
acteristics and chain history have a far greater impact and better explain power differ-
ences in arrangements. Value, mainly economic, but to a limited extent socio-cultural, 
exerts a strong influence on the number and type of governance arrangements in place. 
Generally the economically higher-value chains tend to have more arrangements active-
ly and greater intensity of institutions and arrangements governing access to resources 
and to markets.  
How governance arrangements shape sustainable livelihoods 
The fourth research question asks how these governance arrangements impact the live-
lihoods of actors along the chain and their sustainability. Drawing on Chambers and 
Conway’s (1999) definition, a livelihood is deemed sustainable when it can cope with 
risks and recover from stresses, shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and as-
sets (capital), both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural capital re-
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source base. The main capitals assessed in this study are financial, social-cultural and 
natural. Whilst it is difficult to predict future sustainability, an indication of the future 
can be given by looking back at the historical trends of the products, chains and liveli-
hoods. This section draws two main conclusions on how governance shapes livelihoods, 
focussing on the positive and negative impacts of plural and overlapping arrangements 
and the effect of where power and control in the chains is located. These are derived 
from the concepts introduced in Chapter 2. 
The extent to which arrangements impact livelihoods and sustainable resource man-
agement depends in part upon their legitimacy for actors in the chains, and thus adher-
ence. This finding mirrors literature on governance (van Kersbergen et al. 2004; Cotula 
et al. 2007; Peach Brown et al. 2010). Legitimacy is indicated by three governance cri-
teria: acknowledgement of the existence of a governance arrangement, belief in its mor-
al grounding and compliance, illustrated in Figure 11.5.  
 
Figure 11.5 Legitimacy of governance arrangements 
 
For all chains, customary governance arrangements have the highest levels of legiti-
macy. These are most prevalent in rural, forest areas and have the effect of excluding 
access to resources on the basis of social-cultural capital and personal characteristics: 
sex, age, familial and societal status, allowing actors meeting their conditions to benefit. 
The same customary traditions are less legitimate in urban areas, and for migrant and 
‘outsider’ harvesters. Collective action, such as unions and associations, has the second 
highest level of legitimacy. This can be explained as collective arrangements are most 
controlled by direct actors in chains and as their legitimacy increases as more actors ad-
here, illustrated in the Gnetum chain. Collective action operates by restricting access to 
markets on the basis of membership, using economic and social capital, benefitting 
those who have access with higher and often more stable prices. Statutory regulations 
have the next highest level of legitimacy, albeit much weaker. The legitimacy of statuto-
ry rights holders is diminished by corruption and exclusion due to the lack of know-
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ledge about their rights, for example, concerning subsistence harvest and permits re-
quired to commercialise special forestry products and to obtain a community forest. Ac-
tors using their social and political capital can benefit from their knowledge of rights 
and procedures to generate higher incomes and avoid corruption. 
 
Plural, overlapping and segmented governance arrangements  
Governance arrangements generally focus on only some chain activities – access to 
NTFP resources (shown in Table 11.6) and access to markets (shown in Table 11.7). 
This characteristic is a double edged sword, having both positive and negative impacts 
for the livelihoods of actors along the chain and for their sustainability.  
Well defined, well-known, enforced and functioning arrangements and institutions 
provides a clear framework allowing actors to operate with security and to manage risks 
inherent in the natural resource base (i.e. irregular seasonality and fluctuating harvest 
volumes). Examples are the customary arrangements governing access to the cola and 
raffia, and clear market-based arrangements in the eru and bush mango chains. Howev-
er, when the intensity of arrangements is weak, this is counterproductive to sustainabil-
ity. For example the inconsistency and arbitrariness with which formal regulations are 
implemented and enforced does not set a clear playing field to access and trade NTFPs. 
Similarly, project arrangements well known on a local level, but not well nested and 
with a short and contested duration, have created uncertainty and added to costs as ac-
tors comply and invest in project-based institutions, only to see them decline or morph 
once the project closes.  
 
Table 11.6 Governance of access to NTFP resources  
NTFP production 
system 
Governance 
arrangements 1 
Approach to ex-
traction 
Dominant tenure 
type NTFP 
Gathering wild from 
natural forests 
Voids, customary
Statutory 
Uncontrolled 
and controlled 
extraction  
State forests, with 
customary rights, 
Community forests 
Prunus africana, 
bamboo, Cola, 
apiculture, Gne-
tum, Acacia 
Extraction from re-
source enriched 2 and 
managed forests 
Customary (lim-
iting access to 
specific places, 
periods or spe-
cies) 
Uncontrolled 
and controlled 
extraction 
State and communi-
ty forests, custom-
ary with individual 
claims to specific 
species 
Irvingia, Cola, 
Raphia 
Production in mixed 
arboriculture and 
agriculture systems 
(farms and fallows) 
Customary, 
Statutory 
 
Purposeful re-
generation, cul-
tivation 
Private property of 
land and NTFP 
species 
Prunus africana, 
Irvingia, Cola, 
Bamboo, Gnetum 
Production in planta-
tion systems 
Statutory, mar-
ket 
Purposeful re-
generation, do-
mestication and 
cultivation 
Land and NTFP 
species as private 
property 
Prunus africana, 
Gnetum, Acacia 
1 All governance regimes may be subject to collective or market-based governance regimes, e.g. if NTFPs traded in 
international markets to meet certain minimum standards or voluntary standards. 2 Deliberately or unconsciously by 
anthropogenic actions and naturally regenerated wild trees. Source: adapted from Wiersum et al 2013. 
 
Corruption, which shadows and overlaps statutory governance arrangements, impos-
es considerable costs and unpredictability for direct actors, over which they have only 
limited control. Whilst the location of power in corrupt practices is known (the govern-
ment and ruling authorities), its moral grounding is perversely double edged. Most di-
rect actors in NTFP chains indicated that corruption applied to their commerce is moral-
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ly unjust.  Some corrupt government officials have no choice but to participate in insti-
tutionalised chains of ‘dash’. Collective action is used to counter corruption, legitima-
tise and enhance the power of actors to negotiate with corrupt state authorities.  
 
Table 11.7 Governance of access to NTFP markets 
Market type 
Governance 
arrangements
Degree of 
formalisation Access to markets NTFP 
Type 0: Physical forest-edge, farm-
gate and village based transactions, 
proximity to supply zone, direct 
transactions producer & buyer 
Customary Informal 
 
Open, free, easy, low 
transaction and lo-
gistic costs, low lev-
els competition with 
producers from out-
side immediate pro-
duction area 
Apiculture 
Raphia 
Bamboo 
Prunus 
Irvingia 
Cola, 
Bamboo 
Apiculture 
Gnetum 
Acacia 
Type I: Physical small, local markets, 
high self-sufficiency, proximity to 
supply zone, high local supply & 
exchange, supplies regional & na-
tional markets, direct producer-
consumer transactions 
Type II: Physical, medium sized, 
regional importance, medium level 
of self-sufficiency, secondary nodes 
for type I and intermediate markets, 
bulking points for type III, interme-
diaries often involved  
Customary 
Collective 
Market-led 
Informal Open, easy, low en-
try barriers 
Prunus 
Irvingia 
Cola 
Gnetum 
Apiculture 
Type III: Physical, large urban mar-
kets, national projection, large range 
of products, weak self-sufficiency, 
reliance on close and far supply are-
as, hubs for type I & II, intermediar-
ies involved 
Collective 
Market-led 
Regulated 
Informal 
Formal 
Closed, entry barriers 
(F, P), compete with 
other production 
zones 
Irvingia 
Cola 
Gnetum 
Bamboo 
Type IV: Physical, frontier markets, 
small & high value transactions, high 
supply dependence on other areas, 
specialisation in high volume prod-
ucts, chain of intermediaries  
Regulated 
Collective 
Market-led 
Informal 
Formal 
Illegal 
Open & closed, high 
entry barriers (R, Fi, 
F, P, C) 
Gnetum 
Irvingia 
Cola 
 
Type V: Physical, export, high trans-
action values, dependence upon dis-
tant supply zones, specialisation in 
large volumes, long chain of inter-
mediaries & transactions  
Regulated 
Voluntary 
Market led 
Formal 
Informal 
Illegal 
Open & closed, sig-
nificant entry barriers 
(R, Fi, F, T, Q, L, C) 
Apiculture 
Prunus 
Gnetum 
Irvingia 
Type VI: Non-physical transaction 
channels (e.g. internet), mainly ex-
port/international, low to high trans-
action values, dependence upon dis-
tant supply zones, specialisation  
Market-led 
Unregulated 
Formal 
Informal 
Illegal 
Open, moderate en-
try barriers (F, T, Q, 
L, C) 
Apiculture 
Prunus 
Acacia 
Source: Inspired by Ruiz Pérez et al. (2000) and Wiersum et al. (2013). Key: R= regulatory P= procedural Fi-=fiscal 
F= financial, T=technical, Q= quality, L= logistical, C= competitive 
 
Overlapping arrangements incur additional costs for direct actors to participate in and 
comply with multiple arrangements. Many chain actors can ill-afford such costs, given 
the high incidence of poverty. However, the overlaps and voids in governance arrange-
ments, and tendency to cover only part of chain activities, shown in Figure 11.6, also 
create benefits. Direct actors can grab control, particularly when engaging in multiple 
chain activities, well-illustrated by the apiculture chain. Voids also result in entry to the 
chains generally being easy, enabling actors to generate income and to bricole their own 
responses to improve livelihoods. Overlaps mean that actors can ‘shop’, participate and 
279 
 
comply with arrangements that best suit their own mix of capitals and situation, exem-
plified by harvesters and exporters in the Prunus africana chain. Where no suitable ar-
rangements exist, or are of low intensity, such as early in the apiculture chain, actors 
have also used voids to create new arrangements.  
The chain cases show that unless there are governance arrangements to ensure that 
the natural capital resource base is not undermined, an impact is that long-term sustain-
able livelihoods and chains are difficult to obtain. This leads to livelihood shocks and 
stresses, due to chain booms and busts as NTFP resources are exploited, deteriorate in 
abundance, become less exploited and then recuperate over time. The international 
Prunus africana chain well illustrates the negative impacts of booms and busts, mirror-
ing NTFPs such as rubber and ivory (see Chapter 5). In the apiculture, Cola spp. and 
Raphia spp. chains in contrast, busts have been avoided and long-term, secure liveli-
hoods and sustainable chains have been maintained. This has been achieved through 
long-established customary arrangements, involving highly managed customary produc-
tion systems, restricted tenure and resource access, and cultivation. 
Voluntary market-based systems such as geographic indication and organic certifica-
tion have a similar impact. They have explicitly linked demand with supply, controlling 
access and harvesting methods, creating non-tangible product characteristics and value, 
using sustainable sourcing as a unique selling point. However, as voluntary, market-
based arrangements have only recently been adopted, an assessment of how enduring 
and sustainable these arrangements are over time is not possible. Whilst shorter term, 
profitable livelihoods are possible, such as in the Gnetum spp. and Prunus africana cas-
es, the increasing scarcity and vulnerability of these resources in the wild indicates that 
these chains are not sustainable in the longer term.  
The segmented nature of how NTFP chains are governed and negative implications 
for sustainable livelihoods indicates that vertical nesting of governance institutions for a 
chain maybe as important as horizontal nesting. This reflects the institutional design 
principles (Ostrom 1990; Scott 2001; Agrawal et al. 2006; Cox et al. 2010, see Box 
2.5). The voluntary, market-based arrangements in the apiculture chain allow better ver-
tical integration and nesting, and seek to balance demand and supply, creating more sus-
tainable livelihoods. This reflects the concept that chain of custody certification sup-
ports sustainable trade (Shanley et al. 2008). To add this element to the institutional de-
sign principles, more testing is required.  
 
Figure 11.6 Plural governance arrangements covering chain activities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Access to resources  
       Harvesting        Processing                  Wholesale          Retail          Consumption 
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Projects
Collective/voluntary
 Corruption
Access to markets 
                                         Statutory
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Power and control of access to capital 
The second major conclusion concerns how governance arrangements influence the 
power and control of direct and indirect actors in the chains, and thus sustainable liveli-
hoods. The chain cases show that the nature of the governance arrangements affects ac-
tor’s ability to maintain and enhance their capabilities and capital, shaping their rights 
and responsibilities towards natural capital and impacting the level and type of values 
and benefits derived from the NTFPs. Governance arrangements are critical in influenc-
ing who controls what along a value chain, determining power between actors and insti-
tutions. Their configurations have had significant effects on the mechanisms actors use 
and create to gain and control and access to NTFP resources and markets, affecting 
costs and benefits. 
Drawing on the conceptual framework (Chapter 2), particularly Boelen’s echelons of 
rights concept (2009), Schlager et al. (1992) and Larson et al. on tenure (2010a) and 
Fortmann (1985) on bundles of rights, the study shows that plural governance arrange-
ments result in multiple bundles of rights and responsibilities. These are summarised in 
Table 11.8. 
  
Table 11.8 NTFP resource access rights and responsibilities 
Rights & responsibilities  Statutory regulations
Voluntary/
market Corruption
Customary 
regulation Projects
Involuntary 
standards 
R
ig
ht
s t
o 
N
TF
P 
sp
ec
ie
s &
 p
ro
du
ct
s 
 
Inheritance    X   
Management  X   X  
Access for harvest X X  X X  
Own use/consumption X   X   
Trade  X X X  X X 
Ownership X   X   
Revenues  X X    
Exclusion X X  X   
Withdrawal access X X  X   
Alienation X   X   
Transfer/ sell rights    X   
Cultivation    X   
Intellectual property  X     X 
Maintain/protect tra-
ditional knowledge 
   X  X 
Organise (re resource) X X   X  
R
es
po
ns
ib
ili
tie
s f
or
 
N
TF
P 
sp
ec
ie
s &
 p
ro
d-
uc
ts
 
 
Inventory X     X 
Management X      
Revenue distribution   X X  X X 
Rule setting X X  X X X 
Monitoring X X    X 
Enforcement X X X    
Conflict resolution  X X  X X X 
Sanction setting X   X X X 
Devise institutions X    X  
Source: Research results Key: X = Explicit rights and responsibilities.  
 
Whilst some governance arrangements complement each other, others have created 
competing rights and responsibilities and differing access to resources and markets. One 
result is that female harvesters, traditionally forest gatherers and family rearers, are 
gradually profiting more from the increasingly fluid socio-economic context and oppor-
tunities provided by changing arrangements, to generate cash income. This is alongside 
subsistence products, used as diversification, safety-net strategy. However this strategy 
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generally does not lift harvesters significantly above the average poverty level of the 
regions they inhabit or the national level. In contrast, male harvesters tend to join the 
chains when commercial product values increase, illustrated by the Irvingia, Gnetum 
and Acacia spp. chains. They pursue different strategies from women, with elite males 
blending customary and statutory rights to appropriate land and forest resources, and 
young males opportunistically ignoring customary and regulatory systems, to earn sig-
nificantly higher than average incomes, as in the Gnetum chain. The highest profits, but 
also highest risks, are generally carried by traders, wholesalers and exporters. This nu-
merically small group of actors, both male and female, play along with regulatory sys-
tems, and use parallel strategies of market-based, collective action, ethnic ties and cor-
ruption to limit the often high losses resulting when product sale are delayed by corrup-
tion, bureaucracy and poor infrastructure. Retailers generally earn higher incomes than 
harvesters, but not significantly higher than national averages. Collective action is used 
to control prices, quantity and product quality. Whereas harvesters use products as one 
of many income sources, urban-based actors have fewer income-generating opportuni-
ties and seek to control mainly though collective and market-based systems.  
Most of the chains are segmented, with very few actors engaging or controlling the 
whole chain from access to resources to access to markets. Higher levels of multiple and 
competing rights were more common in the high economic value chains (Prunus afri-
cana, Gnetum, apiculture and Irvingia spp.). The extent to which this diminishes sus-
tainable resource management depends strongly on the composition of bundles of 
rights. Whilst customary rights cover inheritance and ownership, management, use, ex-
clusion, withdrawal and alienation, they have not addressed intellectual property or 
rights to organise.  
As Kooiman and Bavinck (2005) emphasise, it is the interactions between the sys-
tem-to-be governed (the NTFP chains) and the governance arrangements, that affect the 
natural capital (the NTFP species and their environment). This interaction also deter-
mines the resource users’ sustainable livelihoods. The study shows that livelihood im-
pacts for those in the value chains are as varied as the species and products. Chapter 4 
makes clear that the characteristics of the species – their lifecycle and form, seasonality 
and abundance – affect ease of harvest, tolerance and vulnerability to harvesting, prod-
uct perishability, possibilities for use as (multiple) products – and ultimately value. Val-
ue in turn impacts livelihoods, determining economic, environmental and social out-
comes. The most significant relationships are between species and product characteris-
tics, and value (calculations detailed in Appendix 18). Higher levels of cultivation are 
linked to importance for subsistence use, whereas lower abundance, high seasonality 
and more difficult harvesting is associated with higher market value. This finding mir-
rors Agrawal and Chhatre (2006), who found that in ecologically and socio-culturally 
variable contexts, the biophysical factors of resources strongly influence socio-cultural 
conditions and the impact of resource governance.  
Using Gereffi et al.’s (2005) governance type continuum (Chapter 2), power rela-
tions in the chains are shown for three chains studied in-depth in Figure 11.7. It is nota-
ble that all of the eight chains studied have market-based governance channels, with ac-
tors dealing with other at arms-length exchange transactions, many customers and sup-
pliers, some repeat product transactions, limited information flows and no or little tech-
nical assistance. Some balanced networks are formed with harvesters and producers col-
laborating in the bamboo and cola chains, with often repeat transactions between pro- 
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ducers and processers. In the international Prunus africana, gum arabic and honey 
channels, the export market is characterised by hierarchy, dominated by a major lead 
firm who drives the chain, reacts to quality specification from its international buyers, 
and provides some financial and technical assistance to producers, and has greater ac-
cess to information on international prices, processing and demands. Few of the govern-
ance institutions affect wholesalers. Exporters in these chains benefit from greater pow-
Figure 11.7 Actor power and control in NTFP value chains 
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er and have correspondingly higher profit margins. Powerful leaders can provide posi-
tive externalities to groups in the form of norms. However, greater power inequality 
tends to lead to higher levels unsustainable harvest, as larger firms and elites dominate a 
chain and dictate terms, prices and quantities, even when unsustainable, echoing Pérez-
Cirera et al. (2006). Some of the channels in the apiculture and bamboo chains are also 
characterised by hierarchy, with vertically integrated enterprises. These more tightly 
governed chains can reduce production costs, increase quality and production and coor-
dinate information. Because they are organised as cooperatives and associations, the 
power inequalities and price margins along these chains are lower than assumed. Mar-
ket-based, collective action has been shown in these cases as a mechanism by which 
direct actors seek to increase their power and control for various ends: to ensure product 
quality, reassure consumers, enable partnerships, access finance and technical support, 
and control trade – with the ultimate goal being to secure their livelihoods. Collective 
action is enabled and strengthened by shared geographic location, kinship and ethnic 
ties. 
Development-focussed debates about value chains have concentrated on the lack of 
equity between actors and issues of inclusion and exclusion of what are perceived the 
most vulnerable actors, such as rural harvesters (Meyer-Stamer et al. 2007; Laven 
2009). In contrast, this study, due to its focus on NTFP harvesters rather than farmers, 
(albeit that both are active in global chains) finds that exclusion is not an issue: the poor  
and forest-adjacent, marginal ethnic groups are not excluded at all and participate fully 
in these chains. Most of the projects intervening in the chains studied have however tak-
en an exclusionary approach – a pro-poor emphasis on harvesters, excluding any exam-
ination of the level of poverty of other actors in the chain. Projects have used a simplis-
tic analysis of market prices and the proportion of the end-price gained by harvesters to 
justify focusing on harvesters. The empirical evidence from this thesis indicates that 
where actors in Cameroon have 
little control (when they are en-
gaging in high-value, export-
orientated chains), there is a 
higher chance that they obtain a 
lower proportion of profits and 
run risks, and that there is a more 
likelihood that long-term product 
and chain sustainability are low-
er. This finding is in common 
with the observations of Berde-
gué et al. (2005) and Laven 
(2010) that risks arise with the 
inclusion of poor, rural actors in 
global chains. It is also clear that 
governance outcomes can be 
‘bad’ and ‘good’ for certain 
groups in society, indicating that 
a differentiating outcomes for 
different actors is important. 
 
 
Photo 11.1   Harnessing apiculture marketing and product 
knowledge, Guiding Hope, Yaoundé, November 2008  
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Impact of governance arrangements on product and chain sustainability  
The fifth research question asks how governance arrangements impact product and 
chain sustainability. To answer this, the two aspects are separated and clarified.  
 
Product sustainability 
As highlighted in Box 2.1, an NTFP is economically sustainable if the value increases 
or remains constant. It is ecologically sustainable when the species from which a prod-
uct is derived can be extracted with no long-term deleterious effect on the reproduction 
and regeneration of harvested populations. Also if there is no discernible adverse effect 
on other species in the community or on ecosystem structure and function. These effects 
can be determined by comparing harvested to un-harvested systems (Hall et al. 1993). 
Product sustainability also implies no negative environmental, social and economic im-
pact through a product’s lifecycle or value chain. The cases show that sustainability de-
pends on:  
1. The abundance of the species from which a product originates – both in the wild and 
cultivated – the interplay of which has generally been overlooked;  
2. Threats and vulnerabilities to species populations, both anthropogenic (i.e. forest 
degradation and deforestation and climate change) and natural;  
3. Inherent species vulnerability which depends on the part(s) harvested; and  
4. A species’ low tolerance to harvesting and unsustainable harvesting techniques – 
illustrated by the natural Gnetum and Prunus africana populations – can lead to con-
tinuing species population decline, even though persistent demand keeps market 
value constant.  
 
In the absence of inventories for any of the products except pygeum, perception-based 
indicators highlight the negative effects of trade on the sustainability of natural capital. 
Across all chains, 97% of harvesters indicated longer forage distances in the last five 
years. Nearly a quarter indicated the NTFP was becoming scarcer and 23% reported in-
creased forage time. Threats include increasing numbers of new harvesters and over half 
of the harvest techniques being unsustainable. Deforestation for farm clearance was a 
threat for Gnetum spp., Irvingia spp., Raphia spp. and Cola spp. Forest degradation due 
to multiple pressures (such as fuelwood harvesting and livestock grazing) prevented re-
generation of pygeum and bamboo and is problematic for apiculture. Gnetum and 
Prunus africana were the most unsustainably harvested products, due both to the above 
factors and their inherent vulnerability due to the part harvested and, especially for 
Prunus africana, low tolerance to the harvest techniques commonly used. As NTFP 
species populations become depleted and products scarcer, economic returns can in-
crease even when demand remains constant. Scarcity can however have an adverse im-
pact, increasing extraction costs, driving prices upward and reducing demand. Ultimate-
ly, with complete resource depletion, there is no sustainability, only local extinctions of 
populations, and eventually extinction of the species. This has not occurred in the cases 
examined, but is known from historical examples of wild rubber and ivory in Central 
Africa. The evidence collected suggests that governance arrangements which do not 
balance economic and ecological interplays result in unsustainable products and chains. 
The cases show that where arrangements institutionalise harvest techniques for spe-
cies vulnerable to harvesting, product sustainability is higher. Norms for tapping gum 
arabic and raffia palm sap have been built up over centuries and are embodied in cus-
tomary arrangements, enabling production to be maximised whilst maintaining the via-
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bility of repeated harvests from the same population. Similarly, long practised beekeep-
ing harvesting techniques have, ceteris paribus, resulted in little reported impact on bee 
populations. Although severe over-exploitation results in almost immediate mortality, 
detection of the ecological effects of unsustainable extraction of natural populations can 
take years and species population declines decades, especially for long-lived trees such 
as Prunus africana, Irvingia spp., Cola spp., Acacia spp. and bamboo. Product and, 
therefore chain sustainability, are thus strongly time-bound.  
Using the language of the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach, timescales to convert 
natural capital to financial capital are often much shorter than the time it takes to un-
dermine the natural capital resource base. Detection depends on harvesters not only be-
ing aware of the impacts of harvesting, which the interviews confirm occurs, but also 
aware of population dynamics over a long term. However, generally harvesters have not 
been active in the chains long enough to be aware of long-term species dynamics, are 
active on a limited geographic scale and due to the fragmented and geographically dis-
persed nature of most chains, have few opportunities to exchange with other actors in 
the chain on the state and sustainability of the product. Alternative sources of know-
ledge about resource abundance, such as inventories and assessments, have not oc-
curred, except in the Prunus africana chain, and then only recently and still with limited 
geographic scope. Thus knowledge about abundance, scarcity and vulnerability may 
only become visible and acknowledged by all actors along the chain when critical levels 
of wild populations are reached.  
A mitigating factor in product sustainability is the level of cultivation of a species. 
Cultivation makes products more sustainable by seeking to control production and re-
generate the micro, farm level population harvested. This enables direct actors to craft 
more secure livelihood strategies as they can better predict and control quantities pro-
duced and ensure access, by moving from open access to common property and private 
property regimes. For harvesters, reasons to engage in cultivation have been a realisa-
tion of locally diminishing resources and an expectation that marginal costs of cultiva-
tion will be less than forage costs. This implies that not all costs are explicitly taken into 
account. Calculating the opportunity costs in economic terms is difficult, particularly 
when NTFPs are opportunistically harvested as part of diversified, individual livelihood 
strategies, when several NTFPs are harvested at the same time, or when conducted dur-
ing farm and fallow cultivation.  
Reinforcing the relationships illustrated in Figure 11.1, a continuum of strategies 
ranging from wild sourcing to full cultivation is apparent in all ecoregions (see Table 
11.6). An estimated 95% of plant species are wild harvested in Cameroon (see Table 
4.10). For the chains studied, around 48% originate from some form of cultivated pro-
duction system; varying from 5% to 95% in the eight chains (see Figure 11.8). Chains 
with higher levels of cultivation (apiculture, Prunus africana, Cola, Raphia and Acacia 
spp.) originating from montane forest ecoregion highlight how cultivation and manage-
ment of wild products has enabled high demand to be met and deflect higher levels of 
pressure on wild resources, becoming the norm to obtain products. Table 11.6 and Fig-
ure 11.8 also show that cultivation and domestication has occurred for species with 
longer histories of high social and cultural values, such as cola nuts, honey, raffia palms 
and to some extent, Prunus africana. For Gnetum spp., large-scale trade has only result-
ed in increasing scarcity being signalled in the two decades, during which cultivation 
has slowly commenced. Timescale is thus a critical element in realising unsustainability 
and reacting to it with cultivation. 
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Table 11.9 NTFP cultivation strategies 
Strategy NTFP species Features  Ownership regime 
Domestication Apis mellifera  High value hive and by prod-
ucts, low cost, domestication 
skills passed down through 
generations 
Individual harvester, unregulated or 
customary, private property on open 
access or CPR regimes 
Small-scale 
cultivation   
Gnetum  spp.  Cultivated since 1990s, small 
projects and research, initially 
difficult to cultivate. 
Household, trade regulated, private 
property   
Active plant-
ing 
Acacia spp. High economic value, planta-
tions  
Community, government, trade regu-
lated, customary rules, private prop-
erty 
Cola spp. High economic and cultural 
value,  traditionally planted  
Household, customary regulation, 
private property 
Prunus afri-
cana 
High economic value, multi-
ple uses, international and 
local trade 
Community, household private prop-
erty, customary, national and interna-
tional regulations,  
Active man-
agement   
O. abyssinica  Wild sources appropriated and 
managed 
Individual harvester, household and 
open access, customary regulation, 
common property 
Raphia spp.  
Cola spp. 
Wild sources ‘owned’ and 
managed, high cultural value  
Individual harvester, customary 
regulation, Common property 
Preserved  Irvingia spp. Left during field clearance and 
in fallows  
Household,  
customary regulation 
Cola spp. Left during field clearance, in 
fallows, cocoa & coffee farms 
Spontaneous   Irvingia spp. Grows along forest to village 
paths, left during field clear-
ance and in fallows  
Open access 
Y. alpina Locally widespread on Mt Oku Open access 
Wild har-
vest 
Acacia spp. High value export trade  
Open access, trade regulated, cus-
tomary harvest rules 
 
 
Gnetum spp. Own use and cash crop, de-pending on ethic group 
Apis mellifera  Limited  wild harvested in Adamaoua 
Source: Research results 
 
Governance arrangements which incorporate institutions supporting planting and 
domestication, such as Gnetum and Prunus africana, have had a positive impact on 
product sustainability and continued trade. These can take decades, shown by the api-
culture chain, and centuries to perfect, implement and pay dividends, as illustrated by 
the Cola spp. and Raphia spp. chains. In ecoregions subject to high rates of deforesta-
tion and degradation, such as the Northwest highlands, the largely customary and mar-
ket-based arrangements are critical in maintaining viable species populations. 
Statutory governance arrangements have not distinguished the resulting continuum of 
different sources, treating all forest products as wild harvested, despite tacit government 
acknowledgement that cultivation does occur, due to it having supported. In practice, it 
is almost impossible to distinguish the provenance of products, blurring the line be-
tween forestry and agricultural policy and regimes (Wiersum et al. 2013). However cus-
tomary arrangements do distinguish, having more intricate land and species tenure and 
ownership rules. Involuntary arrangements have also struggled with how to deal with 
and acknowledge species cultivation and the absence of data indicating its scale, illus-
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trated by the perpetuation of the Red listing and vulnerable status attributed to Prunus 
africana.  
 
Figure 11.8 Average annual market value and cultivation levels in NTFP chains 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chain sustainability 
A chain is sustainable not only when the product is sustainable, but when the govern-
ance arrangements acknowledge and deal with economic and social aspects and show an 
understanding of the links between species ecology, life form and harvesting. Custom-
ary and voluntary market-based arrangements enshrining such practices have created 
sustainable chains. When combined with strong commercial pressure, or market ar-
rangements that are short-term, customary laws have proven incapable of counteracting 
unsustainable harvesting techniques and over-extraction, particularly by outsiders, but 
also by local communities. Most statutory regulations have not addressed the ecology-
life form-harvesting relationship for species inherently vulnerable to harvesting. This 
absence has led to diminishing natural populations and a crash in trade when Prunus 
africana exports were prohibited – the ultimate sign of chain unsustainability. Corrup-
tion does not address chain sustainability at all. It aggravates the difficulties small-scale 
traders have in operating legally, promoting informality and illegality as the (slightly) 
easier business operating environment. Thus a persistent ‘culture of disobedience’ 
(Roitman 2005) is created that undermines the rule of law and reinforces ‘dash’. Pro-
ject-based and involuntary standards have sought largely to create sustainable products, 
rather than chains. Some projects have introduced harvesting guidelines, such as for 
honey and Prunus africana, their status and legitimacy making them enforceable, and 
sometimes monitoring their impact, these practices have not always persisted upon the 
closure of a project. Thus only some forms of governance arrangements, for specific 
products in specific contexts, promote both economic and environmental sustainability. 
Interactions occur between chains – such as those between the apiculture and Prunus 
africana chains, and apiculture, bamboo and raffia chains, where demand for one prod-
uct affects demand and use of other species and products  – also demonstrates that cu-
mulative impacts on the environment occur, which can be positive or negative. Such 
knock-on effects can occur within very different timeframes, making interactions diffi-
cult to disentangle. They are also affected by the ability of actors to bricolage solutions 
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to changes in the availability of some resources, for example by finding alternatives (i.e. 
wooden eucalyptus hives to replace traditional grass hives). Environmental sustainabil-
ity is however decisive in determining long-term economic sustainability. 
Conceptual implications and contribution to knowledge 
Some of the implications of this research that advance concepts and add to existing 
knowledge have been stated in Part III. This section briefly revisits the conceptual 
framework to enhance understanding of NTFP governance, value chains and sustainable 
livelihoods and how win-wins can be created. Figure 11.9 illustrates how this thesis had 
contributed to and refined the conceptual scheme presented in Chapter 2.   
 
Empirical data on NTFP value chains: making the invisible visible  
This study aimed to present empirical data on NTFP value chains and their values from 
an economic, environmental and social perspective. The main contribution this study 
has made is by developing indicators of value to address these three perspectives (Ap-
pendix 17), using mixed methods (literature, stakeholder interviews, situational analy-
sis, value chain analysis, trade data, resource assessments, PAR and local knowledge) to 
source and triangulate data. The result is a more extensive database than any previous 
studies of the NTFPs used and traded in Cameroon. By refining the definition of priority 
NTFPs (Box 3.1) and developing a scoring mechanism to summarise their values (Table 
4.1), NTFPs were prioritised and their economic, social and environmental value made 
explicit, many for the first time. This thesis provides an alternative valuation methodol-
ogy. Using this method revealed the extent of NTFP trade and indicated the much high-
er economic, social and environmental values of NTFPs in Cameroon than had previ-
ously been recognised. It provides a foundation for policy decisions about trade-offs 
that occur, and can be affected, by the sets of governance arrangements for each chain 
and the sector. This empirical data allowed the eight chains studied to be placed in con-
text. The results bust some common (and partly already debunked) myths: that NTFPs 
are a panacea for poverty reduction; that harvesters have low incomes; that most har-
vesters are women; that NTFPs are only wild sourced; and that NTFP harvesting is en-
vironmentally benign and per se sustainable. 
 
Typologies of cultivation strategies and access to resources and markets  
Empirical evidence helped develop a new continuum of access to resources. This builds 
on work by Wiersum (1997), Ros-Tonen (2012), Ingram (2012) and Wiersum et al. 
(2013). The continuum refines the characteristics of access to NTFP markets, adding to 
Ruíz Pérez et al.’s (2000) work and elaborating NTFP cultivation and tenure strategies. 
The study also demonstrates that entitlements, rights and institutions governing access 
to resources and markets change with the type(s) of governance arrangements and their 
intensity; it also has showed how different actors combine and create different bundles 
of access rights and entitlements.  
 
Participatory action research 
PAR has been shown to be a valuable tool in understanding value chains and pro-poor, 
sustainable livelihoods, albeit one that is tricky and requires regular surveillance to 
counters its limitations of depended, partiality and bias. The experiences gained in this  
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Figure 11.9 Conceptual implications  
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study indicate that a long-term commitment to both implementation and monitoring is 
essential to determine if impacts have their intended consequences. 
 
A methodology for forest product value chain analysis incorporating sustainability 
This study aimed to provide a tested methodology for the holistic valuation of NTFP 
chains. It sought to incorporate livelihood outcomes and sustainability outcomes further 
into the value chain concept. It showed the strong, time bound, interdependent links be-
tween these outcomes depending on the chain activities, governance arrangements and 
livelihood strategies chosen by different actors at different stages of the chains. The 
main innovation introduced is that the methodology used for forest product value chain 
analysis (VCA) has included an assessment of both NTFP and chain sustainability. De-
finitive VCA guidelines and conceptual frameworks to date have not addressed sustain-
ability (Porter 1985; Kaplinsky & Morris 2000), with only a handful of publications 
considering the sustainability or environmental aspects of natural or wild-based product 
chains (Bolwig et al. 2008, Seuring and Miller 2008). Nang’ole et al.’s (2011) review of 
guidelines and manuals for value chain analysis for agricultural and forest products con-
firms this, with just a handful addressing sustainability (Lecup 2006; Bolwig et al. 
2008; Will 2008). The need is great, because as Wiersum et al. (2013) point out, being 
based on natural, often wild resources, product sustainability is key to chain sustainabil-
ity and to sustainable livelihoods. This thesis has shown how chain sustainability de-
pends to a large part upon how sustainable the product is, which in turn depends on fac-
tors such as (1) the abundance of the species from which a product originates, (2) threats 
and vulnerabilities to species populations, both anthropogenic (such as forest degrada-
tion and deforestation) and natural (such as climate change), (3) inherent species vul-
nerability which depends on the part(s) harvested, and (4) a species’ tolerance to har-
vesting. The second aspect is that the methodology has shown that how chains are gov-
erned. The arrangements regulating access to species and the forest in which they origi-
nate, and access to markets, are also key to determining their sustainability. In contrast 
to harvest for subsistence use, there are generally negative associations between com-
mercialisation and species sustainability and conservation unless institutions effectively 
avoid, control and, if necessary, mitigate unsustainable exploitation. These two aspects 
of sustainability and governance of forest product chains have not been explicitly ad-
dressed together in literature to date. A third aspect is that the methodology links com-
mercialisation and poverty, due to the high levels of spatial coincidence between Came-
roon’s forests and both the rural and urban poor depending on forest products for their 
livelihoods and the estimated millions worldwide benefitting from these products.  
 
Governance intensity 
This work builds on concepts of (regulatory and legal) pluralism and multilevel govern-
ance, providing empirical evidence of six types of governance arrangements and hybrids 
thereof. It shows that governance arrangements are not all present all of the time and in 
equal measure and that are dynamic, affecting chain activities, values and consequently 
livelihood strategies and actions and livelihood and sustainability outcomes. The meth-
od to measure of the intensity of governance arrangements introduced in this thesis is 
novel. There are no existing measures of the strength or intensity of different govern-
ance arrangements and the scoring mechanism allows configurations of (plural) govern-
ance arrangements to be made explicit. The closest equivalent is the World Bank’s an-
nual Doing Business report, which uses indicators of the strength of regulatory envi-
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ronment and their influence on the ease of doing business in national economies. Build-
ing on work on institutions and their design, originally, the scoring system was designed 
to define the existence of governance arrangements, as it was clear from the outset of 
the research that at least customary and formal arrangements shaped the chains. The re-
sults of this study indicate however that the picture is more complex, with more systems 
shaping chain activities, actors, introducing and influencing institutions, and shaping 
values and norms. Why is this measure significant? Because it illustrates the nature of 
competing claims over access to NTFP resources and access to markets and provides a 
qualitative and quantitative way of measuring these. This is important, because, as Ribot 
et al. (2006: 1878) state, multiple, competing and conflicting claims over forests re-
sources eviscerate the ability of any authority to protect them. This raises the questing 
on of which and whose claims constitute rights and their legitimacy, and if there are in-
stitutions (such as the state, or alternative alliances or partnerships (Ros-Tonen et al. 
2007), which mediate to resolve competing claims. The method needs to be tested fur-
ther in practice. It could be further improved by getting actors to rate intensity directly, 
rather than implicitly drawing on interviews and explicitly from expert consultation. 
The language and terms used need to be accessible to local actors – rather than the aca-
demic and development parlance used here. 
Recommendations for policy and practice for forest governance  
and sustainable livelihoods based on NTFPs 
Reiterating Elinor Ostrom’s often repeated tenet1, this research shows that there are no 
silver bullets: no one institutional design or governance arrangement that leads to wins-
wins. This finding indicates a need to be pragmatic about the role of forest products in 
poverty alleviation, their contribution to biological diversity, and to ecosystem services, 
as key aspects in reconciling global environmental values with local livelihood needs 
(Ros-Tonen et al. 2005c). But, as Dietz (2011) states, there is a silver lining. Revisions 
to the Cameroonian regulatory framework so far have been insufficient to produce win-
wins, but the current (2013) revisions to which this study contributed offer hope that 
formal regulations can take account of other arrangements and produce a more comple-
mentary mix reflecting the reality of trade from the forest to urban areas nationally, re-
gionally in Central Africa and globally. Drawn from this study are some – perhaps am-
bitious – recommendations for policy and regulatory changes2:  
 
1. Local-level (land) administration and registration in rural and urban areas, where 
customary boundaries are known, and customary and statutory alternative dispute 
resolution processes can be used to secure tenure and promote NTFP cultivation.  
2. Regulatory systems should be coherent with national goals, and legal rules adapted 
to meet constitutional (and international) conventions, norms and standards relating 
to gender equality, administrative justice, access and benefit sharing regarding local 
                                                 
1  Opening speech IASC Conference 2011 and key note speech World Forestry Conference 2010. 
2  See FAO (2008, 2009, 2010) and Laird et al. (2010) for more details. This research also fed into rec-
ommendations made to MINFOF as part of the GIZ Support Programme to the Forest Environment 
Sector Programme re the revision of the 1994 Law and recommendations for implementing texts in 
2013. 
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knowledge of uses and processing, and the protection of private and communal 
property rights. 
3. Linking top-down planning to participatory customary, community-based and in-
formal and formal market institutions, with officials playing a more advisory role, 
taking into account citizen wishes. This reflects Bavinck et al.’s (2005) contention 
about interactive governance, that challenges can be addressed only if actors work 
and learn together. The powers and duties of public officials should be delineated, 
regulated and exercised transparently and accountably with clear rules for actions 
and transactions, and mechanisms for enforcement. 
4. The range of values NTFPs hold for communities and chain actors – economic, en-
vironmental, cultural and social – which this thesis makes visible should be 
acknowledged in laws and policy on forests, agriculture and business. The subsist-
ence use of NTFPs should be recognised as central to rural and urban livelihoods 
and cultures, and exempted from taxation and direct government oversight and in-
tervention, as is small-scale local NTFP trade. Trade in priority NTFPs (see Chapter 
4): those traded in national markets, high volumes and exported and species that are 
vulnerable to harvest or that originate from vulnerable ecosystems, should be regu-
lated, aligning with existing parallel governance arrangements. These designated 
priority NTFPs (replacing the 2006 special forestry products) should be selected on 
the basis of economic, social and environmental criteria. However it is important to 
acknowledge the risks of increased visibility and formalisation, if the political and 
business environmental does not change. It can be counterproductive, it inducing 
unwanted corruption, bureaucracy and a dis-enabling environment. 
5. Management and governance of priority NTFP species is impossible without know-
ledge of resource availability and the sustainable post-harvest regeneration period. 
This implies that resource assessment and harvesting guidelines are developed with 
harvesters using local and scientific knowledge. Participatorily developed manage-
ment plans involving all actors in the chain can respond to pressures to create sus-
tainable NTFP-based commerce and reconcile conflicting pressures. 
6. Actors and issues in chains are generally unknown to each other. Stimulation of 
platforms (such as chain platforms and interprofessions) to share information, de-
velop market arrangements and resolve conflicting interests could contribute to in-
crease contacts among actors and the sustainability of chains in the interest of all. 
7. Land tenure and resource rights for local communities should be rationalised. All 
trees growing on lands used and managed by individuals and communities should 
be their property. 
8. A move should be made towards a regulatory system that fuses two coequal sets of 
legal rules – statutory law and customary law. This would allow communal and col-
lective rights over land and resources to be recognised and protected. Customary 
law regulating NTFPs currently should be critically analysed, including by chain 
actors, to see where it can be an important complement to statutory law. 
9. The regulatory framework for NTFPs should be streamlined and clarified with im-
plementing texts elaborated, to improve its effectiveness, minimise opportunities 
for corruption, reduce bureaucracy and costs associated with operating legally, and 
encourage actors to participate in a legitimate and helpful legal framework. 
10. The results of the revision of the 1994 Forestry Law needs to be relayed back to all 
affected stakeholders in an accessible form. 
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11. Forestry and environment laws should strengthen the clarity and consistency of 
their NTFP elements. The nature and scope of the products regulated need better 
elaboration and definition, particularly the implementing texts. The objectives of 
regulating NTFPs (to promote sustainability, improve local livelihoods, strengthen 
the sector and raise state revenues) should be explicit, and trade-offs between ob-
jectives made clear. NTFPs should be integrated into management plans for timber 
and other land uses, where these uses and management objectives conflict (Ndam et 
al. 2004; Ingram et al. 2009). 
12. Taxation and trade levies should be rational, legitimate and just, and the law com-
municated to the many levels and agencies of government involved in these activi-
ties, and to potentially taxpaying traders and their associations. 
13. Government institutional capacity to regulate these products should be improved. 
Staff should be trained and their capacity built, and resources provided to relevant 
institutions. The government’s understanding of the vast range of NTFP uses, val-
ues and roles in local livelihoods, and their relationships with each other, should be 
strengthened. A sustainable livelihood and chain-based approach needs to be more 
seriously considered in external projects, state-project partnerships, where authority 
is devolved, and when new governance arrangements are imposed. The collection 
of data on NTFP trade should be expanded and systematic, and resources allocated 
for this purpose. Cooperation and coordination within and among ministries con-
cerning wild and cultivated NTFPs should be improved. 
14. Government and other groups should undertake outreach with traders, harvesters 
and other chain actors, informing them about the laws and policies regulating 
NTFPs, and learning from their experiences.  
15. Support could focus on the most vulnerable and key chain actors and activities: 
supporting women’s role in domesticating and cultivating priority NTFPs under 
pressure from over-harvesting; addressing unfavourable customary norms restrict-
ing the possession of valuable species by women; improving value adding opportu-
nities and supporting collective action to access credit and increase bargaining 
power. 
16. Corruption adds costs and uncertainty for many actors in NTFP chains. Although it 
provides income to state officials, dash is counterproductive to developing or main-
taining economically and environmentally sustainable NTFP chains and incompati-
ble with the stated aims of public policies. As an insidious problem in Cameroon 
and not limited to the forest sector, multiple ‘sticks and carrots’ combined with po-
litical willingness are required to overcome its negative impacts. 
 
Some of the emerging, bricolaged governance systems based on institutions that inte-
grate livelihoods and species and product sustainability, provide glimmers of hope and 
opportunity that may reconcile both poverty alleviation/development and conservation 
agendas. Governance arrangements which combine control of access to resources and to 
markets appear better at creating sustainable chains and livelihoods, for example the 
organic certified honey and geographic indication systems. However, as these are still 
young and embrace a small number of people, their efficacy remains to be tested. Com-
binations of project-based, statutory and market-led arrangements that promote, support 
and encourage cultivation, and build on customary knowledge and rules, have also been 
effective in creating ‘win-wins’. However, these tend to be exclusive – such as the cola, 
raffia and gum arabic chains – often restricting access for example, to certain ethnic 
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groups or sexes. Information sharing, role models, capacity building and training have 
helped overcome this on some chains, bringing and resulting from social-cultural 
changes, the long-term implications of which also remain to be seen. Recent experi-
ments in developing new statutory systems, such as for pygeum, drawing on the suc-
cessful project-based institutions, building on new hybrid forms of collective action and 
customary rules, taking a pragmatic approach to using statutory instruments and bor-
rowing from agricultural and forestry models of governance, also show promise. What 
is clear in this ‘mess’ is that the outcomes and impacts of institutional design are ex-
tremely difficult to predict in the short term, an understanding of the natural cycles of 
the species upon which products are based is critical if the livelihoods based upon these 
are to be sustained. Also, ‘getting into the mess’ is essential to understanding.  
Recommendations for further research 
Subjects identified for further research to benefit policymakers, chain actors and support 
organisation’s understanding of NTFPs, their chains and impact of governance ar-
rangements include: 
1. Analysis of the full value chain from other regions for the NTFPs studied and for 
other priority NTFPs. This allows a ‘difference in difference’ approach to test the 
findings of this study and improve chain governance to ascertain changes and the full 
value of these chains nationally, allowing the representativeness of the selected 
NTFP chains for NTFPs across Cameroon to be determined. This is critical for fur-
ther developing and implementing policy and regulation;  
2. The ecology and impact of harvesting for priority NTFPs. Research on sustainable 
harvesting techniques and cultivation methods is needed to increase chain sustaina-
bility;   
3. Sustainable harvesting techniques and cultivation methods, to increase chain sustain-
ability;  
4. Measuring governance intensity using direct methods of questioning measure, to 
confirm its utility;  
5. Longitudinal PAR to further the impact of changing governance arrangements, and 
particularly of cultivation, voluntary and market-based arrangements and develop-
ment interventions – to allow policy and practices to be more effectively designed 
and implemented; 
6. The impact of land tenure reforms and the revision of the forestry law to monitor the 
impact of statutory changes.  
Conclusions 
A pidgin phrase from the Northwest ‘Chop, no broke pot’ (eat, but don’t overdo it) ad-
vocates sustainable consumption. It has been used to refer to unsustainable Prunus afri-
cana harvesting (Ndam et al. 2004) and the politics promoted (but not practised) by 
president Paul Biya, ridiculing both for their short-sighted, arrogant pillaging of re-
sources (Doh 2008; Kah 2010). The expression is highly symbolic of how sustainability 
and governance are entwined. Using this analogy, conclusions can be drawn from the 
chains studied: broken pots illustrating a sad tragedy of the commons; dramas of fine 
messes; silent comedies of errors with half empty or half full pots depending on the 
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reader’s optimism; brimming pots and full bellies; and glimmers of hope with brico-
laged and emerging, more sustainable governance arrangements.  
Commodification has enhanced livelihoods by translating natural capital into a fi-
nancial, monetary value. It also makes available the social values of forest products to 
meet comfort, cultural and symbolic needs and basic requirements for health care, food 
and energy. Governance arrangements in NTFP chains originating in Cameroon have a 
significant influence, both positive and negative, on sustainable livelihoods. How the 
chains are governed affects how products are perceived and value is created along a 
chain. When arrangements effectively restrict access to NTFP production areas, species 
and markets, greater value can be accrued over longer periods of time as production sys-
tems are maintained. Less intense arrangements paradoxically permit more people to 
benefit, and generally have lower costs to implement, ensure compliance and enforce 
arrangements. Trade-offs between livelihoods and sustainability are most acute when 
there are no governance arrangements; when arrangements do not take account of the 
species susceptibility to harvesting; when they do not control the whole chain or do not 
ensure resources are managed such that supply matches demand. All hinge on the dif-
ference between immediate and short-term livelihood benefits from a chain and longer-
term sustainability of the product – indicating that a time-bound sustainability trade-offs 
need to be recognised. Where people live in poverty – as most chain actors were found 
to – households generally have a limited number of options to create capital and accu-
mulate wealth. In urban areas actors tend to have higher dependence on NTFP trade, 
with fewer income or subsistence sources, compared to those in forest-adjacent, rural 
areas. Timescales of sustainability are highly dependent upon the species, the part(s) 
harvested and technique used. This makes generalising the impact of governance ar-
rangements difficult. The tragedy of scarcity is that it enhances values, such as in the 
Gnetum and Prunus chains, exacerbating unsustainability and further shortening the 
time period in which trade-offs occur. Governance arrangements adapted to the species, 
product(s), context and chain, that linking supply and demand, access to resources and 
to markets are more likely to create enduringly sustainable livelihoods. Another time 
bound trade-off occurs when arrangements promoting cultivation lessen pressure on 
wild resources, but usually restrict access, as resources become private property, formal-
ly or customarily recognised. Further trade-offs occur as a result of power differences, 
allowing individuals or groups to benefit at the expense of others rather than through 
value addition, and strikingly exacerbates unsustainable practices by increasing costs 
and uncertainty.   
Multiple governance arrangements are a reality. A mono system is neither realistic or 
desirable, given the current socio-political economic context. Complementary, plural 
arrangements can be effective in creating sustainable livelihoods when they jointly pro-
vide bundles of rights and responsibilities governing a species, its ecological niche, the 
activities and processes in a chain. The ability to craft sustainable livelihoods, fill gaps 
or replace ineffective institutions with more effective and sustainable ones, depends on 
the current patchwork of contexts in which a product in a specific location is embedded, 
as well as the ability, resourcefulness and power of actors in chains to harness capitals 
to construct or ‘bricole’ new governance arrangements.   
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Resembling the silent stars of the 1930s silver screen, ‘actors’ in the NTFP value 
chains also often have little voice or power in formal governance arrangements, and 
so act to create their own fine but messy arrangements. 
